In this paper I shall closely examine some of Gilbert Harman's cases that purport to show that one can have a justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge because of the social environment. I shall provide an account of these cases that helps us not only understand why the people in these situations lack knowledge, but also why philosophers have a difficult time evaluating these cases. More specifically, I shall argue that in these cases we should conclude that the (...) cognizers lack justification. I shall also show how this account sheds some light on certain aspects of the internalism/externalism debate. (shrink)

This unique volume collects some of the best recent work on the philosophical challenge that religious diversity poses for religious belief. Featuring contributors from philosophy, religious studies, and theology, it is unified by the way in which many of the authors engage in sustained critical examination of one another's positions. John Hick's pluralism provides one focal point of the collection. Hick argues that all the major religious traditions make contact with the same ultimate reality, each encountering it through a variety (...) of culturally shaped forms of thought and experience but all offering equally effective paths to salvation or liberation. Another central position is William P. Alston's defense of the Christian practice of forming beliefs about manifestations of God in response to experiences of divine presence or activity. Articles by Hick and Alston develop their arguments and other selections respond, criticizing or defending various aspects of one or both positions. Religious skepticism, religious exclusivism, religious inclusivism, and other perspectives are also represented. In the introduction, the editors suggest connections among the articles and report on additional exchanges between the contributors. The only anthology that provides comprehensive coverage of the current philosophical debate about religious diversity, The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity is ideal for courses and seminars on the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and world religions. (shrink)

Do we have a strong reason to offset even if offsetting is morally inefficient? Some philosophers – such as John Broome – argue that justice-based climate duties require us to contribute money to o...

This paper contends that the first argument of Hume's "Of scepticism with regard to reason" entails that humans have no knowledge as Hume understands knowledge. In defending this claim, we also see how Hume's argument anticipates an important aspect of an extremely influential 20th century development: the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.2 (2000) 221-238 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio Kevin Meeker University of South Alabama In this essay I want to look afresh at David Hume's iterative probability argument, found in the section entitled "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" in his A Treatise of Human Nature.1 Interestingly enough, after years of comparative neglect,2 this argument has been (...) basking in the glow of scholarly sunshine lately.3 But to what can we attribute its extended hiatus? The convergence of three major factors seems responsible. First, philosophers have oftentimes flung this argument into the ocean of obscurity because of its perceived inadequacies.4 Second, and on a related note, many assume that Hume himself permitted this argument to drown because it never resurfaces again in his writings. Most suspiciously, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which is his popular (and preferred) presentation of the epistemological sections [End Page 221] of the Treatise, does not contain this argument.5 Last, but certainly not least, for a long time this argument sat uncomfortably with the naturalist interpretation of Hume6 that has gained ascendancy in the twentieth century. For prior to this century, Hume was almost unanimously regarded as a sceptic. Despite a few waves from those who interpreted Hume as a logical positivist earlier in this century, Norman Kemp Smith charted a new course for Humean interpretations with his emphasis on Hume's naturalism.7 And this is the current according to which most Hume interpreters set their sails today.Because the naturalist reading of Hume relies so heavily on the system he attempts to set forth in the Treatise, though, naturalists have come to see the importance of reading this argument in a naturalistically acceptable way. William E. Morris best expresses the significance of this argument from a naturalistic perspective in the following manner: If we ever are to understand Hume's view of the role of reason, it stands to reason that we should first figure out how to integrate "Of scepticism with regard to reason" into the picture. Only then will we be ready to move to a consideration of Hume's positive views about reason. These views are the least understood of any of Hume's doctrines. Gaining an adequate understanding of them is both the most pressing and the most difficult problem facing Hume studies today.8While I agree with Morris about the importance of getting a clear understanding of the reasoning of I, iv, 1, I will argue that a correct reading of this section reveals the implausibility of major naturalistic interpretations of Hume.This paper has four major sections. In the first important section, I will highlight the crucial aspects of the iterative argument that will be the focus of this paper and deal with a preliminary but important interpretive issue. In the second section, I will briefly look at Annette Baier's naturalistic reading of Hume's philosophy to show how this particular passage bears on broader [End Page 222] interpretive issues. The third main section will focus on explicating Morris' similar but more detailed interpretation. Finally in the last part I will show that while it is legitimate to characterize the argument here as a reductio (as Baier and Morris both do), the argument still yields, contrary to what naturalists have recently suggested, a very sceptical conclusion. 1. The Arguments of Section I, IV, 1 of the TreatiseHume's "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" contains at least two important arguments. While Hume agrees that knowledge involves certainty (whereas beliefs based on probability are by their very nature uncertain9 ), the conclusion of his first argument is that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability" (Treatise, 181). His point here is simply that all of our beliefs are fallible. That is, nothing is absolutely certain; thus none of our beliefs attain the exalted status of certain knowledge. But once this consequence of our fallibility is recognized, he then argues roughly that the probability that any particular belief... (shrink)

W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.2 (2000) 221-238 [Access article in PDF] Hume's Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio Kevin Meeker University of South Alabama In this essay I want to look afresh at David Hume's iterative probability argument, found in the section entitled "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" in his A Treatise of Human Nature.1 Interestingly enough, after years of comparative neglect,2 this argument has been (...) basking in the glow of scholarly sunshine lately.3 But to what can we attribute its extended hiatus? The convergence of three major factors seems responsible. First, philosophers have oftentimes flung this argument into the ocean of obscurity because of its perceived inadequacies.4 Second, and on a related note, many assume that Hume himself permitted this argument to drown because it never resurfaces again in his writings. Most suspiciously, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, which is his popular (and preferred) presentation of the epistemological sections [End Page 221] of the Treatise, does not contain this argument.5 Last, but certainly not least, for a long time this argument sat uncomfortably with the naturalist interpretation of Hume6 that has gained ascendancy in the twentieth century. For prior to this century, Hume was almost unanimously regarded as a sceptic. Despite a few waves from those who interpreted Hume as a logical positivist earlier in this century, Norman Kemp Smith charted a new course for Humean interpretations with his emphasis on Hume's naturalism.7 And this is the current according to which most Hume interpreters set their sails today.Because the naturalist reading of Hume relies so heavily on the system he attempts to set forth in the Treatise, though, naturalists have come to see the importance of reading this argument in a naturalistically acceptable way. William E. Morris best expresses the significance of this argument from a naturalistic perspective in the following manner: If we ever are to understand Hume's view of the role of reason, it stands to reason that we should first figure out how to integrate "Of scepticism with regard to reason" into the picture. Only then will we be ready to move to a consideration of Hume's positive views about reason. These views are the least understood of any of Hume's doctrines. Gaining an adequate understanding of them is both the most pressing and the most difficult problem facing Hume studies today.8While I agree with Morris about the importance of getting a clear understanding of the reasoning of I, iv, 1, I will argue that a correct reading of this section reveals the implausibility of major naturalistic interpretations of Hume.This paper has four major sections. In the first important section, I will highlight the crucial aspects of the iterative argument that will be the focus of this paper and deal with a preliminary but important interpretive issue. In the second section, I will briefly look at Annette Baier's naturalistic reading of Hume's philosophy to show how this particular passage bears on broader [End Page 222] interpretive issues. The third main section will focus on explicating Morris' similar but more detailed interpretation. Finally in the last part I will show that while it is legitimate to characterize the argument here as a reductio (as Baier and Morris both do), the argument still yields, contrary to what naturalists have recently suggested, a very sceptical conclusion. 1. The Arguments of Section I, IV, 1 of the TreatiseHume's "Of Scepticism with regard to Reason" contains at least two important arguments. While Hume agrees that knowledge involves certainty (whereas beliefs based on probability are by their very nature uncertain9 ), the conclusion of his first argument is that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability" (Treatise, 181). His point here is simply that all of our beliefs are fallible. That is, nothing is absolutely certain; thus none of our beliefs attain the exalted status of certain knowledge. But once this consequence of our fallibility is recognized, he then argues roughly that the probability that any particular belief... (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...) we shall call “the quarantine problem”. The quarantine problem expresses a deep skepticism about achieving any exalted epistemic state. Further, the perspective gained by the quarantine problem allows us to easily categorize existing responses to Williamson’s anti luminosity argument and to observe the deficiencies of those responses. In sum, the quarantine problem reveals the deeply fallibilistic nature of whatever knowledge we may possess. (shrink)

Was David Hume radically sceptical about our attempts to understand the world or was he merely approaching philosophical problems from a scientific perspective? Most philosophers today believe that Hume's outlook was more scientific than radically sceptical and that his scepticism was more limited than previously supposed. If these philosophers are correct, then Hume's approach to philosophy mirrors the approach of many contemporary philosophers. This similarity between Hume and many aspects of contemporary philosophy suggests that we should try to understand Hume (...) not as an historical relic but as a partner in a continuing philosophical dialogue. When we look closely at Hume's thoughts about human understanding, we find that Hume's scepticism emerges very insistently in the context of Hume's scientific approach. This book tries to come to terms with Hume's scepticism in a way that sheds light on contemporary philosophy and its relationship to science. (shrink)

This is a terrific tome. Packed with interesting insights and supported with extensive research, this book has tremendous potential to shape certain aspects of Hume studies. In light of such potential, it is not surprising that the earlier hardback edition earned the 2008 Journal of the History of Philosophy History of Philosophy Book Prize. Why is this book so important? Quite simply, this is one of the best contextualist studies of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature ever written. To elaborate (...) a bit, this book provides a unique and fascinating interpretation of the Treatise by relating its structure and content to many of the most influential debates about re- ligion raging at Hume’s time. Even the best of books is not without its flaws, though. After summarizing a representative sample of Russell’s main claims, I will isolate a key weakness of his overall interpretive argument..... Although I am not convinced by the strong version of Russell’s thesis, I want to reiterate that this is one of the best books on Hume I have ever read. Russell’s points about Hume’s religious context are surely important for a complete understanding of the Treatise, even if they do not help to solve the sceptic/naturalist riddle. It is a book that all Hume scholars should read. (shrink)

Stephen Gardiner and Augustin Fragnière offer a thorough critique of the Oxford Principles meant to govern geoenegineering in their paper ‘The tollgate principles for the governance...

Nicholas Wolterstorff has claimed that David Hume hinted at a proper functionalist account that anticipates the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In this paper, I shall argue that we should refrain from attributing a proper functionalist epistemology to Hume. I shall first raise doubts as to how one could fit a notion of proper functioning into Hume's descriptive project. Next, I shall argue that adopting a proper functionalist epistemology would undermine some of Hume's most famous claims about causal inferences.

Nicholas Wolterstorff has claimed that David Hume hinted at a proper functionalist account that anticipates the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In this paper, I shall argue that we should refrain from attributing a proper functionalist epistemology to Hume. I shall first raise doubts as to how one could fit a notion of proper functioning into Hume's descriptive project. Next, I shall argue that adopting a proper functionalist epistemology would undermine some of Hume's most famous claims about causal inferences.

John Turri has recently called for a major shift in how the vast majority of philosophers think of knowledge. Instead of maintaining that knowledge must proceed from reliable processes, he urges epistemologists to move toward an “abilist” view that allows knowledge to proceed from abilities that are not truth-conducive. More strongly, he claims to have provided conclusive reasons for abandoning the idea that knowledge requires reliability. In this paper I explain why Turri has failed to make the case for preferring (...) abilism. (shrink)

After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions, by PasnauRobert. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 384.

This essay addresses the relationship between Hume’s moral theory and his epistemological project. More specifically, it focuses on one particular aspect of the relationship between Hume’s moral theory and his general scepticism with regard to reason. Several philosophers, such as David Owen and Annette Baier, have suggested that Hume’s moral theory provides significant support for his appeal to reason/reasoning. To uncover some of the main obstacles that any future attempts to rest Humean reason on ethics will probably face, this essay (...) critically examines a few of the most prominent examples of such accounts, particularly Michael Ridge’s “Epistemology Moralized: David Hume’s Practical Epistemology,” the most developed account of the possible moral support of reason in Hume‘s philosophy. (shrink)

In this essay, I call into question Yasha Rohwer and Emma Marris’s attack on what they see as a dominant view in conservation biology: namely, that there is a prima facie moral duty to preserve gen...

Although David Hume is no match for Immanuel Kant in terms of opaque writing, his overall philosophy is not without interpretive difficulties. Earlier this century, many philosophers read Hume as the precursor to logical positivism. Of course, the concluding words of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding added fuel to these flames; but with the downfall of positivism, this reading of Hume has virtually disappeared. Today, interpretations of Hume fall into two main camps: the naturalistic camp and the sceptical camp. Roughly (...) speaking, naturalistic interpreters of Hume see him as attempting to employ the methods of the natural sciences in studying human subjects while sceptical interpreters read Hume as denying that we have any knowledge. In this article I want to shed some light on this controversy in an indirect way: namely, by trying to classify Hume’s epistemology as internalist or externalist. Although this internalism/externalism debate has erupted only recently in epistemology, it should be constructive in carving up the logical space of certain epistemological positions. With this background in place, we can not only see how to categorize Hume, but also discern some of the ramifications for Hume’s epistemology when he affirms theses that place him in these categories. To anticipate a bit, I will argue that the internalist aspects of Hume’s epistemology lend great credence to the sceptical interpretation. (shrink)

This paper argues that John Hick's commitment to the moral principle of altruism undermines his pluralistic claim that all of the major world religions are equally efficacious from a soteriological perspective. This argument is placed in a context of a discussion evaluating the theoretical virtues of various hypotheses about religious diversity. (Published Online April 7 2006).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid by Louis E. LoebKevin MeekerLouis E. Loeb. Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 369. ISBN: 978-0-19-536876-5, Cloth, $99.00. ISBN 978-0-19-536875-8, Paper, $45.00.This book is (almost entirely) a collection of previously published essays by Louis Loeb. The first three essays focus primarily (...) on advancing the general interpretive claim that Descartes’s main epistemological goal is achieving unshakable beliefs. While essays 5–10 address many topics in Humean interpretation, they all contribute in various ways to supporting Loeb’s claim that Hume’s primary epistemological goal is achieving stable beliefs. Essay 12 compares the naturalisms of Hume and Reid. All of the collected essays are excellent.Such excellence is not surprising, for Loeb is an influential interpreter of early modern philosophy, justly renowned for the ingenuity of his readings. Spanning the last three decades, these essays display many fine qualities that have helped make Loeb such a prominent historian. Here I will briefly mention three of these qualities. First, Loeb has remarkable command of the primary historical texts and the secondary literature. This mastery is perhaps best seen in his “What is Worth Preserving in the Kemp Smith Interpretation of Hume?” (essay 9). In addition to providing a detailed exposition of a wide range of texts from Hume and Norman Kemp Smith, Loeb also makes adroit comments about the literature discussing the secondary literature when he addresses the “Canonical Understanding” of Kemp Smith (246–47). Second, Loeb effortlessly integrates historical and contemporary concerns. His “Hume’s Agent-Centered Sentimentalism” (essay 8), for instance, has [End Page 257] an interesting discussion of how Hume’s moral theory might aid contemporary utilitarians (238–44). Moreover, essays 5 (“Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification”) and 10 (“Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument about Induction”) fruitfully discuss Hume’s epistemology in light of issues important to the contemporary distinction between internalism and externalism. Third, Loeb’s intuitive knack for isolating important connections amongst various texts and figures allows him to tell a concise story about the evolution of certain philosophical ideas that panoramically covers large portions of the history of philosophy. His “Locke and British Empiricism” (essay 11), which connects epistemological themes in Locke with Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, Malebranche, and Reid, among others, is one example. (Because this essay is, as of this writing, still forthcoming, it is the only essay that is not previously published.) Finally, all three of these qualities are prominently on display in “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce” (essay 4), which interestingly uses contemporary views about belief (especially as developed by David Velleman) to understand Descartes and Hume “against the backdrop of Sextus and Peirce” (107). To my mind this essay is the best in the book.There are at least two main advantages of collecting these excellent essays into a book. First, the collection allows Loeb to systematically emphasize the similarities between different early modern thinkers in a way that typically strengthens the cumulative case he makes for his readings of these philosophers. Second, the volume permits us to catch a rare glimpse of how an interpreter’s views can change over time. Considering the cumulative effect of the arguments as well as the changes in Loeb’s views also provides us with a great opportunity to reflect critically on many important issues in a fruitful way. The rest of this review will focus on such critical reflections.Let us start with Descartes, as Loeb does. In his introduction to the essays, Loeb helpfully contextualizes his discussions of Descartes. He points out that his paper “Was Descartes Sincere in His Appeal to the Light of Nature?” (not included here) maintains that the arguments Descartes presents are so poor that they “suggest” that “Descartes was insincere in offering his proofs of the existence of God and in appealing to Divine veracity to validate clear and distinct perception” (9; cf. 35). Of course others have likewise contended that Descartes was a dissimulator. But in the first four chapters... (shrink)

The Preface's first sentence sketches an ambitious agenda: "The purpose of this book is to present and assess David Hume's most influential contributions to epistemology and metaphysics in a manner that does not presuppose familiarity with Hume on the reader's part and yet is sufficiently deep and rigorous to interest more advanced students". Although it is difficult to achieve such lofty aims, Dicker accomplishes the task he sets for himself in this exceptional book. In what follows, I will first selectively (...) summarize the book before evaluating its appropriateness for beginners and advanced students, its interpretation of Hume, and its assessments of Hume's claims. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid by Louis E. LoebKevin MeekerLouis E. Loeb. Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 369. ISBN: 978-0-19-536876-5, Cloth, $99.00. ISBN 978-0-19-536875-8, Paper, $45.00.This book is (almost entirely) a collection of previously published essays by Louis Loeb. The first three essays focus primarily (...) on advancing the general interpretive claim that Descartes’s main epistemological goal is achieving unshakable beliefs. While essays 5–10 address many topics in Humean interpretation, they all contribute in various ways to supporting Loeb’s claim that Hume’s primary epistemological goal is achieving stable beliefs. Essay 12 compares the naturalisms of Hume and Reid. All of the collected essays are excellent.Such excellence is not surprising, for Loeb is an influential interpreter of early modern philosophy, justly renowned for the ingenuity of his readings. Spanning the last three decades, these essays display many fine qualities that have helped make Loeb such a prominent historian. Here I will briefly mention three of these qualities. First, Loeb has remarkable command of the primary historical texts and the secondary literature. This mastery is perhaps best seen in his “What is Worth Preserving in the Kemp Smith Interpretation of Hume?” (essay 9). In addition to providing a detailed exposition of a wide range of texts from Hume and Norman Kemp Smith, Loeb also makes adroit comments about the literature discussing the secondary literature when he addresses the “Canonical Understanding” of Kemp Smith (246–47). Second, Loeb effortlessly integrates historical and contemporary concerns. His “Hume’s Agent-Centered Sentimentalism” (essay 8), for instance, has [End Page 257] an interesting discussion of how Hume’s moral theory might aid contemporary utilitarians (238–44). Moreover, essays 5 (“Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification”) and 10 (“Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument about Induction”) fruitfully discuss Hume’s epistemology in light of issues important to the contemporary distinction between internalism and externalism. Third, Loeb’s intuitive knack for isolating important connections amongst various texts and figures allows him to tell a concise story about the evolution of certain philosophical ideas that panoramically covers large portions of the history of philosophy. His “Locke and British Empiricism” (essay 11), which connects epistemological themes in Locke with Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, Malebranche, and Reid, among others, is one example. (Because this essay is, as of this writing, still forthcoming, it is the only essay that is not previously published.) Finally, all three of these qualities are prominently on display in “Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce” (essay 4), which interestingly uses contemporary views about belief (especially as developed by David Velleman) to understand Descartes and Hume “against the backdrop of Sextus and Peirce” (107). To my mind this essay is the best in the book.There are at least two main advantages of collecting these excellent essays into a book. First, the collection allows Loeb to systematically emphasize the similarities between different early modern thinkers in a way that typically strengthens the cumulative case he makes for his readings of these philosophers. Second, the volume permits us to catch a rare glimpse of how an interpreter’s views can change over time. Considering the cumulative effect of the arguments as well as the changes in Loeb’s views also provides us with a great opportunity to reflect critically on many important issues in a fruitful way. The rest of this review will focus on such critical reflections.Let us start with Descartes, as Loeb does. In his introduction to the essays, Loeb helpfully contextualizes his discussions of Descartes. He points out that his paper “Was Descartes Sincere in His Appeal to the Light of Nature?” (not included here) maintains that the arguments Descartes presents are so poor that they “suggest” that “Descartes was insincere in offering his proofs of the existence of God and in appealing to Divine veracity to validate clear and distinct perception” (9; cf. 35). Of course others have likewise contended that Descartes was a dissimulator. But in the first four chapters... (shrink)