Logos and Episteme 10 (2):183-194 (2019)

Authors
Daniella Meehan
University of Glasgow (PhD)
Abstract
In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as ‘epistemic blame skepticism,’ seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against a reductionist objection to epistemic blame, offered by Trent Dougherty in “Reducing Responsibility.” This paper will object to Dougherty’s position by examining an account in favour of epistemic blame and demonstrate concerns over the reductionist methodology employed by Dougherty to argue for his sceptical position.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme201910216
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References found in this work BETA

Strong and Weak Justification.Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.
Strong and Weak Justification.Alvin Goldman - 1988 - In James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co.. pp. 51-71.
Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.
Blame and Wrongdoing.Jessica Brown - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):275-296.

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