Background:Moving into the last phase of life comprises a developmental transition with specific needs and risks. Facilitating transitions is an important component of the work of nurses. When curative interventions are no longer helpful, nurses enact key roles in caring for patients and families.Aim:The aim of this study was to examine the experiences of registered nurses in acute care settings as they worked with patients and families to facilitate transition to comfort-focused care.Research design:Sampling, data collection, and data analysis were guided (...) by constructivist grounded theory, chosen because of its strength in identifying and explicating social processes.Participants and context:A purposeful sample of 26 registered nurses working in acute care hospitals in one community in the northeastern United States participated in this study through semi-structured interviews.Ethical considerations:The study received approval from the university’s Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects. Participants provided informed consent.Findings:Nurses facilitated transition to comfort-focused care by enacting their moral commitments to patients and families. They focused on building relationships, honoring patient self-determination, and maintaining respect for personhood. In this context, they discerned a need for transition, opened a discussion, and used diverse strategies to facilitate achieving consensus on the part of patients, family members, and care providers. Regardless of how the process unfolded, nurses offered support throughout.Discussion:Achievement of consensus by all stakeholders is critical in the transition to comfort-focused care. This study deepens our understanding of how nurses as moral agents utilize specific strategies to assist progress toward consensus. It also offers an example of recognizing the moral agency of nurses through listening to their voices.Conclusion:Increased understanding of effective nursing strategies for facilitating transition to comfort-focused care is essential for developing needed evidence for excellent care and strengthening end-of-life nursing education. (shrink)

The male muse in the psychic territory Adrienne Rich called in 1971 ‘The Man’ represents sexualized death and phallic mourning, a concept of masculinity marked by the legacy of the 20th century’s two world wars. In the context of representations of ‘The Man’ in North American white women writers coming of age in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Sylvia Plath’s journal account of the Saint Botolph’s Review party, where she met her husband, and its fictional transformation in her (...) 1957 short story, ‘Stone Boy with Dolphin’, demonstrate Plath’s examination of the Bostonian Puritan heritage and the psychic aftermath of the Second World War. Plath’s constructions of heterosexual romance as participating in the history of Fascism and her concept of writing as sexy violence coincide culturally with Lacan’s theory of phallic signification. (shrink)

We agree with White, Jankowski, and Shelton (2014) that professionalization of health care ethics practice requires serious consideration of a written examination to assess core knowledge competenc...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Women, Ethics, and Inequality in US Healthcare: “To Count among the Living” by Aana Marie Vigen, and: New Feminist Christianity: Many Voices, Many Views ed. by Mary E. Hunt and Diann L. NeuKelly Denton-BorhaugWomen, Ethics, and Inequality in US Healthcare: “To Count among the Living” By Aana Marie Vigen NEW YORK: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2011. 304 PP. $31.11New Feminist Christianity: Many Voices, Many Views Edited by Mary E. Hunt (...) and Diann L. Neu WOODSTOCK, VT: SKYLIGHT PATHS, 2010. 384 PP. $24.99In this age of the Supreme Court Hobby Lobby decision, which declared that corporation owners’ religious commitments could provide a basis for denial of their employees’ critical reproductive health insurance benefits (with particular impact on the lives of women), ethical investigation of medical sociology, theology, and the realities of women’s lives is more important than ever. Originally released in 2006, Aana Marie Vigen’s Women, Ethics, and Inequality in US Healthcare makes important headway through these complex waters. And for this volume in the Palgrave Macmillan Series on Black Religion / Womanist Thought / Social Justice, editors Dwight N. Hopkins [End Page 202] and Linda E. Thomas set forth the goal to “pioneer conceptual work and boundary-pushing effort engaging Black Religion or Womanist thought, and social justice” (xiv).Rereleased in paperback in 2011 with a new preface, Vigen’s updated health statistics reveal how racial-ethnic minorities “continue to be overrepresented among the ranks of the uninsured and/or of those living in poverty” (xliii). Her project is to better understand what enables and perpetuates this inequitable distribution and oppression, and to suggest methods of redress and reform. But in order to accomplish any of this, society in general and especially those with socioeconomic power—including administrative leaders in health care, medical providers, and ethicists—need to listen much more deeply to the stories of those who are most vulnerable and are being most negatively affected by current health care systems and practices. For Vigen, this meant a decision to focus on in-depth interviews with eight black and Latina women with breast cancer, in addition to six health care providers.With this method, Vigen pursues a very ambitious goal to, as she puts it, “begin a conversation among several distinct dialogue partners: medical sociology, biomedical ethics, ethnography, theology, and feminist social ethics” (5). She uses a “reflexive” practice, striving for openness to the new insights and ideas that emerged from this creative, multidisciplinary encounter. However, even before launching her interviews, her analysis of the process to seek approval from the Institutional Research Board illustrates the “clash of cultures” she would encounter, as she writes, “one cannot take for granted that others will share the view that women of color are able to speak truth in their own right and out of their own experiences—without comparison to others—about human personhood, dignity, and adequate healthcare quality” (107). It is to Vigen’s credit that she remained undeterred; if anything, the struggle she encountered with powerful leaders helped to confirm and focus the value of this work: not to tell every story, “but to tell a few with care and attention to detail” (108).Vigen’s ethnographical method makes it possible for her to illuminate and address not only stark inequities but also much subtler dynamics of racism combined with socioeconomic discrimination. Along the way, she illustrates a wide variety of experiences of oppression. In contrast to the experience of white patients, these female patients of color tended to be sent to the accounting/financing office before being allowed to see the doctor (144). Though white patients may express strong emotions in medical settings, some women of color felt pressured to reassure white doctors that they could be rational and not overly emotional (141). Socioeconomic and racial discrimination often reinforced one another in these settings. Perhaps most alarming, Vigen notes, the white care providers she interviewed seemed to be very unconscious of [End Page 203] their own racial identity and its role in medical care encounters (165). Her final chapter concludes with a series of immensely practical ethical mandates that would help alter these oppressive patterns. Clergy, students of ethics, and anyone... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Truth Shall Make You FreireRobert CanterTeaching Contemporary Theory to Undergraduates, edited by Dianne F. Sadoff and William E. Cain; 271 pp. New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1994; $19.75, paper.IThe newest title in the MLA’s Options for Teaching series, this publication is well-timed. Concerns about “classroom advocacy” and “politicized teaching” have recycled into near-critical mass, even in the mass media. The book is well-arranged, too, with (...) a solid sample of deconstructionist, New Historicist, Marxist, feminist, and cultural studies, and more mix-and-match theorists describing their classroom aims and means in twenty-one essays grouped into four sections. Sadoff and Cain offer elegantly evasive introductions—not only to these essays per se, but to the issues these essays purport to address. In “Surveying Theory,” David B. Downing, John Kucich, Susan S. Lanser, Lynette Felber, Donald G. Marshall, and Gary Waller lay broadly “anti-foundational” groundwork. In “Focusing,” Diana Fuss, Sandra A. Grayson, Beverly Lyon Clark, Evan Carton, Laurie A. Finke, Jonathan Arac, and Cary Nelson deconstruct things in more detail. In “Theory and Culture,” Huston Diehl, Cannon Schmitt and Donald Ulin, Lindon Barrett, Simon Gikandi, D. N. Rodowick, and Jan Gorak again widen the scope of “theorized teaching,” aiming regulation anticanonical shrapnel at every bastion of coded convention. And while readers may pause over [End Page 336] its backcover promise of “lively and accessible prose,” on the whole, the book is unusually readable for an MLA publication about theory.Since Teaching Contemporary Theory to Undergraduates is a how-to directed at true-believers, it might seem like critical blindsiding to address its fundamental assumptions rather than its tactical suggestions, to focus on its “theory” rather than on its pedagogy. Yet such a focus is not only fair but necessary. The pedagogy is in this book a pawn of the theory. And the theory is, at best, a lesson in how not to teach students how to learn. For despite all its noisy celebrations of methodological, cultural, ontological, and occasionally even human “difference,” the anthology is really a chorus of self-defeating dogma. 1 Like the virtue of variety, even the relative absence of jargon here works as much against as for the book, revealing self-contradictions so perfectly unwitting that they are twice as funny. It is a good thing, then, that the authors eventually contradict these claims, too—even if they know not that they do.The canon? In accordance with postmodern tradition, “the canon” can be calibrated to be whatever best attacks whatever other tradition a particular theorist is aiming at. It is a very modular “monolith.” And theorists never try to “overdetermine” definitions, anyway. The classroom? As an “overdetermined” site of class-struggle, “the classroom (and the academy at large) is... a social institution designed to reproduce the interests, values, and politics of the dominant social classes” (p. 104). Convention? Anything “mainstream” is so polluted with “the notion of mastery, of total and complete knowledge” that even assigning “mainstream” theorists in a theory class “reproduces that hegemony, no matter how critically we read them” (pp. 105, 61). The runoff of mainstream theorists quoted here—conventional MLA Style—makes the same point. Culture? As always already—and only—“a struggle between power and its disenfranchised shadow,” culture “systematically excludes and marginalizes disenfranchised social members” (pp. 263–64, 20–21).Education? As Paulo Freire has revealed, 2 on the one, bad, goatish, wrong Right-wing hand of God, there is the repressive “banking” model of education; on the other, good-shepherdish, right Left-wing side, there is the liberating “problem-posing” model. You are either a droning clerk bent on subduing students into serfdom, or you are a resistance fighter lighting fuses of freedom. “Instrumental activity” does “pedagogical violence,” making the teacher a tyrant and the student a victim, a “submissive imitator” in a “system” that’s “abidingly committed [End Page 337] to the vision of a white-supremacist oligarchy.” Even asking students what level of “guidance” they feel they need is imposing “rhetorical control” (pp. 32, 23, 222, 135).Facts? The fact is, they are “the discursive gestures of the dominant groups” (p. 222). Unless they are... (shrink)

Managerial effort has been moving from maintaining a “steady state” to wrestling with the challenge of continuing change and the ethical dilemmas which this can present. Is it possible to formulate an “ethics of change” to guide individuals in such circumstances? The author is a senior lecturer at Cranfield University, Bedford MK43 OAL, UK, and a visiting research associate at the London School of Economics. His principal interests concern the management of organisational change in settings where technology is either the (...) key driver of change, or is the key enabler of some aspect of organisational or process redesign. (shrink)

Hayden White probes the notion of authority in art and literature and examines the problems of meaning - its production, distribution, and consumption - in different historical epochs. In the end, he suggests, the only meaning that history can have is the kind that a narrative imagination gives to it. The secret of the process by which consciousness invests history with meaning resides in the content of the form, in the way our narrative capacities transforms the present into a (...) fulfillment of a past from which we would wish to have desceneded. (shrink)

In a recent article, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.

In these essays Stephen White examines the forms of psychological integration that give rise to self-knowable and self-conscious individuals who are responsible, concerned for the future, and capable of moral commitment. The essays cover a wide range of basic issues in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, moral psychology, and political philosophy, providing a coherent, sophisticated, and forcefully argued view of the nature of the self. Beginning with mental content and ending with Rawls and utilitarianism, each essay argues a distinctive line. (...) Together they are a unified and powerful philosophical position of considerable scope, one that provides a unique vision of the mind, consciousness, personhood, and morality. White argues that the unity of the self revealed in personal identity and moral responsibility is best understood in normative terms. Basic to such features of the self are the patterns of self-concern in which they are characteristically displayed and the internal justification that supports such concern. The treatment of intentionality and consciousness that grounds this account emphasizes privileged selfknowledge and practical rationality and their corresponding contributions to the unity of the self. A final source of unity emerges from the analysis of our fundamental commitments, an analysis that ensures a central place in moral theory for the notion of the self. (shrink)

White's dense article on narrative discusses the ways that different groups of 20th century historians, particularly historical theorists (see pp.8-9), have constructed and deconstructed narrative as a means of communicating history. White himself acknowledges that narrativity challenges the scientific of history, but suggests that narrativity is not only unavoidable, but also offers a form of literary or allegorical truth.\n\nWhite first discusses the critiques of narrative as a means of communication--it focuses too heavily on political players, it is "unscientific," (...) it is inherently limited because narrative itself cannot be objective (although it's authors sometimes claim it to be).\n\nHe then moves on to discuss other, heavily theoretical, takes on why narrative is still useful as a means of historical communication: that narrative works because it performs as a trope which readers can easily recognize from myth and fiction, or, that narrative works because it allows us to transform events from the present to a synthesized past.\n\nWhite's article is difficult to read, but important background for anyone who wants to see what people have said about narrative in the past 100 years--and why it is still important. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist holds (1) and (3) (...) but denies (2). The transcendentalist holds (1) and (2) and denies (3). I argue that both versions of physicalist-functionalism inherit the problem of property dualism which originally helped to motivate functionalist theories of mind. I also argue that neither version of physicalist-functionalism can distinguish in a principled way between those neurophysiological properties of a subject which are relevant to the qualitative character of that subject's mental states and those which are not. I conclude that the only alternative to a functionalist account of qualitative states is a transcendentalist account and that this alternative is not likely to appeal to the critics of functionalism. (shrink)

White opposes the long-standing view that ancient Greek ethics is fundamentally different from modern ethical views. He examines the ways in which Greek ethics has been interpreted since the 18th century, and traces the history in Greek ethical thought of the idea of conflict among human aims, in particular the conflict between conformity to ethical standards and one's own happiness.

Patricia White; Friendship and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 81–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

Roger White; X*—Wittgenstein on Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 157–174, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross‐culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God—an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma—another culturally widespread but ostensibly non‐agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high‐powered samples, including mostly (...) Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma—including morally laden, non‐agentic, and agentic conceptualizations—above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts. (shrink)

We consider the symbol grounding problem, and apply to it philosophical arguments against Cartesianism developed by Sellars and McDowell: the problematic issue is the dichotomy between inside and outside which the definition of a physical symbol system presupposes. Surprisingly, one can question this dichotomy and still do symbolic computation: a detailed examination of the hardware and software of serial ports shows this.

Roger White; X*—Wittgenstein on Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 157–174, https://doi.org/10.1093/arist.

This conversation between two scholars of international law focuses on the contemporary realities of feminist analysis of international law and on current and future spaces of resistance. It notes that feminism has moved from the margin towards the centre, but that this has also come at a cost. As the language of women’s rights and gender equality has travelled into the international policy worlds of crisis management and peace and security, feminist scholars need to become more careful in their analysis (...) and find new ways of resistance. While noting that we live in dangerous times, this is also a hopeful discussion. (shrink)

Health care is provided in many contexts—not just hospitals, clinics, and community health settings. Different institutional settings may significantly influence the design and delivery of health care and the ethical obligations and practices of health care practitioners working within them. This is particularly true in institutions that are established to constrain freedom, ensure security and authority, and restrict movement and choice. We describe the results of a qualitative study of the experiences of doctors and nurses working within two women’s prisons (...) in the state of New South Wales (NSW), Australia. Their accounts make clear how the provision and ethics of health care may be compromised by the physical design of the prison, the institutional policies and practices restricting movement of prisoners and practitioners, the focus on maintaining control and security, and the very purpose of the prison and prison system itself. The results of this study make clear the impact that context has on professional practice and illustrate the importance of sociology and anthropology to bioethics and to the development of a more nuanced account of professional ethics. (shrink)

Patricia White; Self-respect, Self-esteem and the ‘Management’ of Schools and Colleges, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pag.

Pat White; Work-place Democracy and Political Education [1], Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 5–20, https://doi.org/10.

J P White; Intelligence and the Logic of the Nature-Nurture Issue, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 30–51, https://doi.

This article examines happiness as an activity, modeled on pleasure in NE 10, 1-5. Aristotle is not proposing a choice, but defining the formal nature of happiness. Contemplation, as the activity of wisdom, constitutes happiness in the strict and formal sense. It has all the attributes of happiness, highest, most continuous, most pleasant, most self-sufficient, leisured, and an end in itself. Practical virtues are formally secondary, as including elements outside the activity of the best part and having leisure as their (...) end. Thus, amusements, practical activities and contemplation are integrated in the life of the sage, the contribution of each formally defined. (shrink)

Richard White explores how moral virtues affect and support social movements such as pacifism, environmentalism, multiculturalism, and animal rights. White's philosophical treatment of virtue ethics is extended through historical and cross-cultural analysis to help the reader understand and acquire moral wisdom.

John White; A Reply to Raymond Godfrey, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–121, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

Pat White; Education, Democracy and the Public Interest, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 7–28, https://doi.org/10.1111.

Patricia White; Reply to Grenville Wall, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 247–250, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

Patricia White; Educating Courageous Citizens, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 67–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

Teachers White and Thompson allowed students to explore the primary-source readings from several philosophers in a 5th grade course called Apogee. The essay is written with a focus on Patience and other virtues.

White, Don The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in 'Preaching the Mystery of Faith: The Sunday Homily' identified a problem with liturgical preaching in the Catholic Church: 'in survey after survey over the past years, the People of God have called for more powerful and inspiring preaching. A steady diet of tepid or poorly prepared homilies is often cited as a cause for discouragement on the part of the laity and even leading some to turn away from the (...) Church'. Pope Francis in Evangelii Gaudium has referred to the same problem, saying that 'so many concerns have been expressed about this important ministry and we cannot simply ignore them'. (shrink)

White, Robert; Moo, Jonathan In an age when many have begun to consider widespread environmental collapse inevitable, the certain hope held out in the Christian gospel rules out both complacency and despair. Scripture's vision of a future for all of creation that is secure in Christ and given by God's grace challenges Christians to a radical environmental ethos that is marked by wisdom, self-sacrifice, perseverance, love and joy.

Ian White; VIII*—Kant on Forms of Intuition, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 June 1979, Pages 123–136, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

This essay uses the phenomenal advent of women's climbing as a paradigm case for integrating feminism and phenomenology, and for analyzing how women experience and evolve free movement and existence. In contrast to the paradigm set by Iris Marion Young's “Throwing like a Girl,” it stresses the category of the lived body over the category of gender, and it reveals how women, by employing and cultivating the body's motility and spatiality, engage and transcend the limits of crux situations.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains a wide range of profound insights into the nature of logic and language – insights which will survive the particular theories of the Tractatus and seem to me to mark definitive and unassailable landmarks in our understanding of some of the deepest questions of philosophy. And yet alongside these insights there is a theory of the nature of the relation between language and reality which appears both to be impossible to work out in detail in a way (...) which is completely satisfactory, and to be bizarre and incredible. I am referring to the so-called logical atomism of the Tractatus . The main outlines of this theory at least are clear and familiar: there are elementary propositions which gain their sense from being models of possible states of affairs; such propositions are configurations of names of simple objects, signifying that those simples are analogously configured; every proposition has its sense through being analysable as a truth-functional compound of elementary propositions, thus deriving its sense from the sense of the elementary propositions when this view is taken in conjunction with the idea that the sense of a proposition is completely specified by specifying its truth-conditions. In this way the Tractatus incorporates in its working out a philosophical system analogous to the classical philosophical systems of Leibniz or Spinoza which are regarded by many people, in a sense rightly, as the prehistoric monsters of philosophy which are not to be studied as living organisms, but studied as the curiosities of human thought. And we may here agree that in the end we must simply reject a philosophy which incorporates such features as its postulation of simple eternal objects, or of a possibility of an analysis of a proposition which was presented as a pre-condition for the propositions that we ordinarily utter to make sense, and yet the specific form of which we are unaware of, and so on. (shrink)