The expansion of human evolutionary theory into the domain of personal and environmental determinants of mating strategies is applauded. Questions are raised about the relation between fluctuating asymmetry (FA), testosterone, and body size and their effects on male behavior and outcomes. Low FA males' short-term mating pattern is considered in the context of an evolved tendency for closer and longer human relationships.

The current work builds a definition of irritability from both academic definitions and lay perspectives. In Study 1, a quantitative content analysis of academic definitions resulted in eight main content categories. In Study 2, a community sample of 39 adults participated in qualitative interviews. A deductive thematic analysis resulted in two main themes. The first main theme dealt with how participants positioned irritability in relation to other negative states. The second dealt with how participants constructed irritability as both a loss (...) of control and as an experience that should be controlled. The discussion integrates the findings of both studies and provides a concise, but comprehensive definition. (shrink)

تناول هذا الكتاب بالبحث فلسفة ابن رشد (الرشدية) في فكر محمد عابد الجابري، واعتمدت على فرضية مفادها: إن فلسفة ابن رشد(الرشدية) تشكل حجر الزاوية في فكر الجابري، وسعىي إلى استخلاص الرشدية من بين أعماله، وتحليلها وتصنيفها، من خلال الإجابة عن سؤالين أساسيين، وهما: كيف فهم الجابري فلسفة ابن رشد، وقدمها للقارئ العربي؟ وكيف وظف (الرشدية) في أعماله الفكرية والنهضوية؟ من خلال منهجية تحليلية لا تكتفي بالوصف، وإنما تتعدى ذلك لتحليل الرشدية عند الجابري، وتصنيفها، واستخراج ما تتميز به، بتتبعها، وجمعها، وتصنيفها (...) في مختلف أعماله. وخلصت إلى عدد من الاستنتاجات، وأهمها: إن رشدية الجابري تميزت بجمعها بين مستويي الفهم، والتوظيف، ضمن مشروع واحدٍ يصح أن يطلق عليه مشروعٌ تصحيحي يرمي إلى تصحيح الصورة السائدة في الفكر العربي عن ابن رشد وفلسفته، وإن هذا المشروع مسكون من أوله إلى آخره بهمٍّ نهضوي يبحث صاحبه، من خلال التنقيب في التراث الرشدي، عن إجابات لسؤال النهضة والتقدم، وبينت أن فكر ابن رشد، هو الذي يصلح بين كل هذا التراث، ليعيش معنا واقعنا اليوم، والجابري بذلك لا يدعو إلى إرجاع عقارب الساعة إلى الوراء أبدا، وتبني المحتوى العرفي للرشدية، في الفلسفة، أو الطبيعة، أو الفلك، أو الطب؛ لعدم إمكانية استعادته؛ لإنه أصبح جزءا من الماضي، وما يدعو له الجابري هو استعادة المضمون الايديولوجي لفلسفة ابن رشد، أو أسماها "الروح الرشدية" التجديدية، والعقلانية في التعامل مع واقعنا الراهن، وقضايانا المعاصرة. (shrink)

An important function of the self is to identify external objects that are potentially personally relevant. We suggest that such objects may be identified through mere ownership. Extant research suggests that encoding information in a self-relevant context enhances memory , thus an experiment was designed to test the impact of ownership on memory performance. Participants either moved or observed the movement of picture cards into two baskets; one of which belonged to self and one which belonged to another participant. A (...) subsequent recognition test revealed that there was a significant memory advantage for objects that were owned by self. Acting on items had no impact on memory. Results are discussed with reference to the importance of self-object associations in cognition. (shrink)

It is uncontroversial that something goes wrong with the blaming practices of hypocrites. However, it is more difficult to pinpoint exactly what is objectionable about their blaming practices. I contend that, just as epistemologists have recently done with blame, we can constructively treat hypocrisy as admitting of an epistemic species. This paper has two objectives: first, to identify the epistemic fault in epistemically hypocritical blame, and second, to explain why epistemically hypocritical blamers lose their standing to epistemically blame. I tackle (...) the first problem by appealing to an epistemic norm of consistency. I address the second by arguing that the epistemically hypocritical blamer commits to an opting-out of the set of shared epistemic standards that importantly underlies our standing to epistemically blame. I argue further that being epistemically hypocritical undermines a blamer’s standing even to judge epistemically blameworthy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.3 (2001) 207-224 [Access article in PDF] Virtual Witnessing and the Role of the Reader in a New Natural Philosophy Richard Cunningham [Figures]How did the self-described new natural philosophies of the early modern period displace other philosophic (moral, ethical, legal), and specifically religious, discourses as the locus of truth in our culture? Natural philosophy's rejection of disputation and of revelation as means of producing truth (...) in favor of the "discovery" of truth was more accurately an introduction of the invention of truth than of its discovery, and this invention demanded the creation of and participation of a certain kind of reader. Rhetorical examination of the early modern magnetic philosopher William Gilbert's most influential work, De Magnete, 1 will help us understand the "paradigm change," to use Thomas Kuhn's oft-misquoted term, 2 from a culture that accepted probabilistic truth in the natural realm to one that expected moral certainty, from a culture that accepted revelation as a legitimate means of access to truth to one that increasingly recognized only the "discovery" of truth through sensual experience disciplined through experiment.One way this paradigm change was effected was through the inclusion of the reader as an active participant in the new natural philosophies. The reader was included in the new natural philosophies by engendering in him desires for particular forms of knowledge and particular ways of attaining that knowledge. Peter Dear notes that "in the seventeenth century old practices changed and new ones appeared. Those changing practices represent shifts in the meaning of experience itself" (12-13), and he then asks the question that might well have been on the tongues of many as the old practices gave way to the new: "how can a universal knowledge-claim about the natural world be justified on the basis of singular items of individual experience?" (13). A crucially important way to justify the universal knowledge-claim on singular items of individual experience [End Page 207] was through the employment of a technique Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have labeled "virtual witnessing" (60-65). Briefly, "virtual witnessing" describes the use of linguistic resources to produce a vicarious experience enabling a reader to confer agreement as though she had actually been present when an experiment was conducted. Virtual witnessing alone, however, cannot explain how the scientific became the dominant truth-producing paradigm in our culture. Virtual witnessing intermingled with a variety of other elements in early modern natural philosophy to encourage readers to participate in the invention of "true" accounts of the world in which we live. In this article I will apply the tools of rhetorical analysis as I use the example of De Magnete to elaborate on how a Foucauldian form of disciplinary impulse combined in the early modern period with the technology of virtual witnessing to create an audience inculcated with desire, interest, and belief in the new natural philosophy, which had to precede and accompany expansion of the scientific into the dominant truth-producing paradigm it has long since become.For the sake of clarity I should expound upon the two key elements of my argument, "discipline," in the Foucauldian sense in which I use the term, and "virtual witnessing." According to Michel Foucault, "discipline" is "a political anatomy of detail... situated on the axis that links the singular and the multiple" (139-49), and I argue that this point, on the "axis that links the singular and the multiple," is exactly the point that enables modern science. William Gilbert's De Magnete can help us understand how knowledge and power--or epistemê and technê, to use another, perhaps more rhetorically inflected, vocabulary--combined in the early modern period to produce the effects that would become those of modern science. Gilbert provides an excellent example of the movement from the production of truth through revelation to the production of truth through discovery and the experimental method. De Magnete persuades its reader by rendering visible a formerly invisible "universal nature," 3 so that truth is no longer warranted by the invisible workings... (shrink)

The Heart of What Matters shows that literature has a powerful and unique role to play in understanding life's deepest ethical problems. Anthony Cunningham provides a rigorous critique of Kantian ethics, which has enjoyed a preeminent place in moral philosophy in the United States, arguing that it does not do justice to the reality of our lives. He demonstrates how fine literature can play an important role in honing our capacity to see clearly and choose wisely as he develops (...) a moral philosophy that engages with our intimate emotional concerns. Written in an accessible style and drawing from a provocative body of contemporary literature, this book shows how moral philosophy can reach a far wider audience than it has. In part one of this book, Cunningham sketches out the theoretical basis for a redefined conception of moral philosophy. In part two, he engages in extended analyses of novels that address significant life and character issues, specifically Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day, Toni Morrison's Beloved, and Zora Neale Hurston's Their Eyes Were Watching God and Seraph on the Suwanee. Cunningham shows exactly how works like these can inform moral philosophy. Drawing from film, history, psychology, and other social sciences in addition to literature, this book adds to the growing number of works that use literature for ethical analysis and to the growing controversy over Kantian ethic. (shrink)

This symposium provides five case studies of the ways that John Dewey's philosophy and practice were influenced by women or "weirdoes" (our choices include F. M. Alexander, Albert Barnes, Helen Bradford Thompson, Elsie Ripley Clapp, and Jane Addams) and presents some conclusions about the value of dialoging across difference for philosophers and other scholars.

v. 1. al-Nuṣūṣ al-manṭiqīyah -- v. 2. al-Shurūḥ al-manṭiqīyah -- al-mujallad 3. al-Shurūḥ ʻalá al-nuṣūṣ al-manṭiqīyah.

This thesis concerns our standing to epistemically blame. We have reason to think three claims hold true: we only have the standing to epistemically blame when it’s our epistemic business, other people’s epistemic errors are rarely our epistemic business, and we often have the standing to epistemically blame. These jointly inconsistent claims generate the puzzle which motivates this thesis. I begin in Chapter II by offering a novel account of epistemic blame. Chapters III and IV represent my argument against the (...) second of the above claims. I argue for two standing conditions on epistemic blame in order to demonstrate that others’ epistemic errors are often our epistemic business. Finally, in Chapter V, I examine a distinctly epistemic conception of hypocrisy to clarify one way in which we can lose the standing to epistemically blame. In sum, this thesis is meant to explain and defend our entitlement to epistemically blame. (shrink)

Abstract:Jane Addams’ short book The Long Road of Woman’s Memory, which has largely been ignored by philosophers, identifies two important powers of memory. In addition to consoling the elderly and enabling them to make meanings of their pasts, memories also have the power to calcify into stories that reinforce shared moral values and incite moral progress. These observations serve as the starting point for a conversation on narrative medicine and its potential for improving medical treatment for patients receiving end-of-life care. (...) In addition to filling in one of the many gaps that exists in the literature surrounding Addams’ work, I also aim to contribute to the growing scholarship on person-centered end-of-life care in the field of bioethics. (shrink)

A central mistake in Rolf Gruner's recent article on understanding in the socia sciences in ferreted out, and consideration of it is used both to analyse Gruner's interpretation of understanding and to sketch a more adequate interpretation. The mistake is in distinguishing meanings and facts. The analysis suggests that Gruner was forced to see understanding both as a special kind of explanation and at the same time as no explanation. The sketch offers a distinction of three senses of ?understanding? ? (...) as identification of a certain kind of subject matter, as explanation of it, and as a subjective feeling consequent upon such explanation. (shrink)