The ultimate source of explanation in biology is the principle of natural selection. Natural selection means differential reproduction of genes and gene combinations. It is a mechanistic process which accounts for the existence in living organisms of end-directed structures and processes. It is argued that teleological explanations in biology are not only acceptable but indeed indispensable. There are at least three categories of biological phenomena where teleological explanations are appropriate.

. Introductory Remarks THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY The problems of reduction in biology are currently of considerable theoretical interest and practical ...

The paper examines the ethically relevant category of choice in Edmund Husserl’s ethics and asks whether a choice is a purely individual moment or whether it is not characterized by an intersubjective dimension. To this end, the centrality of the category of choice in Husserlian ethical reflection is considered, and its structural elements are highlighted: the subject of choice, the situation of choice, and the values in relation to which the choice is made. By analyzing these elements, especially in the (...) context of the development of Husserlian thought in the Freiburg period, it appears that choice, the most individual moment in which the subject becomes him or herself, has no less an intersubjective dimension. If this is so, then it is possible to conceive of a deep connection between ethics and intersubjectivity in the thought of Edmund Husserl. (shrink)

The article elucidates the concept of subjectivity in Karl Marx, while providing an analysis from a Heideggerian and a Foucaultian perspective. Furthermore, the aim of the article is to determine the relevance of the categories elaborated by Heidegger and Foucault in the analysis of the Marxist concept of subjectivity. In order to achieve this goal, the article is divided into three sections. First, the concept of subjectivity is studied as it appears in Marx’s works. Second, a Heideggerian reading of that (...) concept is reconstructed from elements of the “early” and “later” Heidegger. Third, a Foucaultian reading of subjectivity is proposed from the coordinates of the notions of governmentality, veridiction and subjectivation. It is concluded that the readings of Heidegger and Foucault are, respectively, insufficient and partially sufficient, which does not exclude, however, the possibility of adding nuances to them in order to develop, with contributions from all three philosophers, a kind of “post-Heideggerian and post-Foucaultian Marxism”. (shrink)

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to thecapacity for ethics (e.i., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moralnorms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.Humans exhibits ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup determines the presence (...) of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgements; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequece of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

El presente artículo elucida la posición de Félix Guattari sobre la organización política. Por este término entendemos la manera cómo, teórica y prácticamente, se construye y se desarrolla una militancia en lo real social, lo cual implica sostener una postura respecto al rol de los partidos, las instituciones y el Estado. A fin de precisar la especificidad del abordaje guattariano, desarrollado entre Psychanalyse et transversalité y Mille Plateaux, comparamos su planteamiento con los desarrollos tradicionales del anarquismo y el socialismo. Con (...) ello se asegura una aprehensión de la posible singularidad de los conceptos guattarianos de transversalidad, polivocidad, diagramatismo, entre otros. Finalmente, se reflexiona sobre el lugar que ocupa la macropolítica en estos conceptos. (shrink)

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup (...) determines the presence of three necessary conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequence of man’s eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. That is, morally evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation. Since Darwin’s time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate. (shrink)

This collection of specially commissioned essays puts top scholars head to head to debate the central issues in the lively and fast growing field of philosophy ...

Individuals can do a broad variety of things with their words and enjoy different degrees of this capacity. What moderates this capacity? And in cases in which this capacity is unjustly disrupted, what is a good explanation for it? These are the questions I address here. I propose that speech capacity, understood as the capacity to do things with your words, is a structural property importantly dependent on individuals' position in a social structure. My account facilitates a non-individualistic explanation of (...) cases in which speech capacity is undermined due to speaker's perceived social identity, e.g. episodes of silencing. Instead of appealing to interlocutors' implicit bias against speaker's identity, a structural approach refers to the positions interlocutors occupy in the social structure and the discursive conventions operating upon those positions. I articulate my proposal drawing on the notion of affordances. Each position within a social structure is associated with its own range of speech affordances. Thus, speech capacity is a function of the probability distribution of speech affordances across positions in the structure. (shrink)

Este artículo propone una revisión crítica sobre los alcances del transhumanismo en la esfera de la Psicología. Para ello, se expondrán antecedentes y se definirá lo que se entiende por transhumanismo y el resultado de éste, denominado poshumanismo. A través de características humanas tan básicas y diversas como la cognición, el sufrimiento y la identidad, se discute sobre los inéditos cambios que la ejecución y logro de las propuestas transhumanistas significarían para la sociedad, el cómo la psicología podría prever y (...) anticipar un escenario así de radical, y la necesidad y urgencia de nuevas teorías éticas que ayuden a comprender los fenómenos en cuestión. (shrink)

Il volume considera la figura teoretica del valore dell’altro nel pensiero di Edmund Husserl, ponendo in connessione le analisi del filosofo sull’intersoggettività e sull’etica. Da qui le questioni fondamentali che guidano il percorso: è possibile impiegare le analisi fenomenologiche husserliane della relazione nel campo dell’assiologia e dell’etica? Può così essere fondato il valore dell’altro soggetto e della dimensione intersoggettiva e, dunque, un dovere nei loro confronti? Le analisi etiche presentano una particolare concezione dell’altro soggetto e della relazione come dotate di (...) valore? È la categoria etica dell’amore a permettere di guadagnare una prospettiva significativa rispetto a tali interrogativi, rivelando come valore e dovere siano implicati dalla dimensione intersoggettiva dell’esperienza. Si apre così un’interessante prospettiva interpretativa, secondo la quale la fenomenologia husserliana contribuisce ad analizzare la dimensione dell’alterità e della relazione intersoggettiva anche da un punto di vista assiologico ed etico. (shrink)

Este trabajo plantea un ejercicio de interpretación del relato bíblico de los macabeos, su rebelión y resistencia religiosa, política y militar frente a la imposición imperial desde algunas perspectivas recogidas de los escritos de Walter Benjamin sobre la juventud. Se ponen de relieve temas como la situación religiosa ante el horizonte de la Ilustración; la relevancia que tiene la religión en los movimientos sociales juveniles; el mesianismo reinterpretado por el movimiento romántico de los intelectuales judíos de la Mitteleuropa, según lo (...) ha estudiado el académico Michael Löwy para, finalmente, ensayar una reflexión sobre la ideología de la soberanía militar en contraste con el mesianismo utópico. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: The Design Argument The Design Argument in Antiquity Christian Authors Hume's Onslaught William Paley's Natural Theology The Bridgewater Treatises Intelligent Design: A Political Movement Eyes to See No “There” There Blood and Tears Gambling to Non‐existence Natural Selection Natural Selection and Design Postscript: Counterpoint Notes References.

St. Thomas Aquinas has always considered intelligence a potency higher than the will, absolutely speaking. That being said, and in my view, the existential primacy of the will in the act of freedom (particularly in choosing the existential end) is also indisputably Thomistic, as Cornelio Fabro has shown. This paper endeavors to explain Aquinas' doctrine on the absolute primacy of the intellect and thus show that these two primacies can be affirmed coherently, that is, the intellect’s absolute primacy and the (...) will’s existential primacy. Firstly, I will explain the reasoning St. Thomas Aquinas uses in the Summa to justify the absolute primacy of the intellect over the will. Secondly, I will explore some parallel texts, in order to shed light on my interpretation of the Summa and expand our view regarding this and related doctrinal points. Thirdly, I will offer a brief study of Fabro’s position, one in which his concerns regarding the intellect’s absolute primacy are taken into account and carefully considered. (shrink)

El presente artículo elucida la posición de Félix Guattari, y secundariamente la de Gilles Deleuze, respecto al concepto de ideología. Para ello se efectúa un análisis del recorrido intelectual de Guattari desde sus primeros artículos reunidos en Psychanalyse et transversalité (1974) hasta Mille Plateaux (1980). Se procede en dos instancias. Primero, se precisa cuál es el concepto específico de ideología con el cual Guattari discute. Este no es otro que la noción desarrollada por Louis Althusser como se puede detectar en (...) referencias explícitas tanto cuanto en alusiones implícitas. Segundo, a partir de la discusión de los elementos centrales de la posición guattariana, se argumenta la afinidad que existe entre el célebre concepto de agenciamiento de Guattari y Deleuze y la recusación crítica de los aparatos ideológicos de Althusser. (shrink)

These thirteen paragraphs portray epistemology as the study, not directly of knowing as a human action (which could be considered the object also of anthropology) but as the study of the mode of being of the object in the subject and, in this sense, of intentional being. Moreover, intentional being is not understood as the being of the cognitional species or representation, which is real and subjective, but as the being of the known, as the presence of the known to (...) the knower (obviously, through the species but a being not reduced to the subjective being of the species): this kind of being is the proper object of epistemology. Other considerations regarding the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology take place as well. As regards the method, this essay attempts to apply Aquinas’ four steps of scientific reasoning to epistemology, in the following fashion and order: 1- Solution of the problem of the universals by recourse to the theory of the agent intellect (resolutio secundum rem); 2- Definition of knowledge as intentional possession of being (res. sec. rationem); 3- Judgment of value regarding the different instances of human knowledge or critique of knowledge (compositio secundum rem) and 4- Reinterpretation (in the light of the previous path) of common notions of epistemology, such as truth, certainty, evidence, and error (comp. sec. rationem). (shrink)

This article discusses the category of foreigner in the context of academia. In the first part I explore this category and its philosophical significance. A quick look at the literature reveals that this category needs more attention in analyses of dimensions of privilege and disadvantage. Foreignness has peculiarities that demarcate it from other categories of identity, and it intersects with them in complicated ways. Devoting more attention to it would enable addressing issues affecting foreigners in academia that go commonly unnoticed. (...) In the second part of the article I argue that current efforts to make academia a more inclusive environment should address the disadvantages that many foreign academics face. I focus on two senses of foreigner: working and living in a country that is not your country of origin, and being a nonnative speaker of the language in which you work. (shrink)

This paper builds upon Mary Kate McGowan’s analysis of the mechanisms of harm in conversations (McGowan 2004; 2009). McGowan describes how a speaker’s intervention might constitute harm by enacting what is permissible to do in the conversation thereafter. We expand McGowan’s analysis in two ways: first, we use her account to argue for the potential of interlocutor’s silence, not only speaker’s intervention, to enact harm; second, we introduce a new party into the picture: observers of the conversation. We propose that (...) not only interlocutors who contribute to harm through action, but also those who do so by omission are morally responsible for that harm. We focus on one aspect of conversations: introduction of presuppositions. We argue that when the presupposition is morally problematic (e.g., sexist, ableist, racist, homo-, trans- or xeno-phobic), interlocutors have a moral responsibility to block it. This responsibility comes in degrees, and, importantly, depends on whether the interlocutor’s speech capacity is diminished by the harmful presupposition (i.e. whether the interlocutor is being silenced). Unlike common approaches to harm in speech, which take the unit of analysis to be the speaker-interlocutor relationship, we take as unit of analysis the relationship between the pair speaker-interlocutor and an observer. Problematic presuppositions introduced in conversations can harm observers overhearing these conversations (as well society as a whole), and prevention of such harm motivates our proposal for attribution of responsibility to interlocutors. We proceed as follows. First we review the dynamics of presupposition introduction. Second, we briefly introduce McGowan’s analysis of conversational pragmatics, subscribing to her account that some conversational moves constitute a special type of harm related to oppression, and outline a taxonomy of the pathways through which harm can be inflicted upon observers and the society as a whole. In the third part we articulate our argument that in the cases of presupposition introduction considered here, interlocutors are not merely allowing harm, but actively doing it, and put forward our proposal for responsibility attribution. Finally, we address potential objections, and situate our proposal within a broader project to fight oppressive speech. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo presenta una reconstrucción argumentativa del primer capítulo de la tercera sección de la Doctrina de la Esencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica de Hegel, el cual lleva como título "Lo Absoluto". Su hipótesis es que la critica de la metafísica contenida en este capítulo no solo aboga por una ontología relacional del proceso, sino que también establece implícitamente una distinción entre una teoría de lo absoluto de primer orden y una de segundo orden. La teoría de (...) lo absoluto de primer orden tiene como objetivo una exposición de lo absoluto libre de contradicciones analíticas. Por su parte, la teoría de lo absoluto de segundo orden no solo expone en qué consiste lo absoluto, sino que pretende también incluir el pensamiento y la teoría de lo absoluto en lo absoluto mismo. ABSTRACT This paper aims to reconstruct the arguments of the first chapter within the third section of the Doctrine of Essence, namely "The Absolute". Its hypothesis is that the critic of metaphysics within this chapter not only champions a relational process-ontology, but also states an implicit distinction between first and second order theories of the Absolute. The first-order theory of the Absolute purports to present a definition of the Absolute without analytic contradictions. The second-order theory of the Absolute not only sets out the nature of the Absolute, but also seeks to include the thought and the theory of the Absolute within the Absolute itself. (shrink)

Given the importance of the principle of causality for the demonstration of God’s existence, this paper attempts to justify the evidence and necessity of the principle of causality, by following Fr. Fabro’s thomistic defense—based on the notion of participation—but adding a particular emphasis on the notion of “being which is not per se,” this latter as an explanatory notion of the notion of “being which is by participation.” The introductory remarks touch upon two misunderstandings regarding the notion of participation employed (...) as a subject of the principle of causality: the first, considering “participated being” as a synonim of “received being,” and the second, the confusion, regarding the notion of being by participation, between its notional dependence on the notion of being as a whole and its real dependence on the real intensive Being. Then, in the first point, the defense of the principle of causality is distinguished from other related problems, like the particular applications of this principle. In the second and main point, we try to justify the necessity of being caused in the being which is experienced as being by participation, as follows: 1) that which is something by participation is not this something per se; 2) now, that which is not per se, either is not or is per aliud, 3) Therefore, that which is something by participation is per aliud. In the third and last point, we endeavor to justify the Thomism of our defense and of our emphasis on this notion of “being which is not per se” by considering two texts of St. Thomas. (shrink)

This paper is my best attempt to confute (Kantian) Modern Philosophy at its very core. This implies, of course, that in my view the principles of Critical Realism are Kantian. The basic arguments supporting Critical Realism are powerful: I have tried to show clearly their power, but also to expose clearly their putrid root. Section 3 on the principle of immanence offers the most important contribution in this undertaking. The arguments of critical realism studied in this paper are the following: (...) 1. The Notion of Experience 2. The Nature of Knowledge: Question and Inquiry 3. The Principle of Immanence 4. The Notion of Relation 5. Judgment as the Position of the Real. (shrink)

Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. : “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa : “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument (...) for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow that there is a choice involved. (shrink)

In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts for social justice. I am referring to the way in which being a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes (...) wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for it might make us miss important things that could improve philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy. (shrink)

We propose an externalist understanding of sex that builds upon extended and distributed approaches to cognition, and contributes to building a more just, diversity-sensitive society. Current sex categorization practices according to the female/male dichotomy are not only inaccurate and incoherent, but they also ground moral and political pressures that harm and oppress people. We argue that a new understanding of sex is due, an understanding that would acknowledge the variability and, most important, the flexibility of sex properties, as well as (...) the moral and political meaning of sex categorization. We propose an externalist account of sex, elaborating on extended and distributed approaches to cognition that capitalize on the natural capacity of organisms to couple with environmental resources. We introduce the notion of extended sex, and argue that properties relevant for sex categorization are neither exclusively internal to the individual skin, nor fixed. Finally, we spell out the potential of extended sex to support an active defense of diversity and an intervention against sex-based discrimination. (shrink)

Reseña de 'Piensa y Repite', realizada por Felipe Berríos Ayala, Dr. en Filosofía Política y Moral, por la Universidad de Chile. Camilo Brodsky Piensa y Repite 2023 Editorial Aparte Arica 118 páginas ISBN: 9789566054689.

This article aims to analyze the concept of animality from the perspective of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. More precisely, the question arises as to whether the animal possesses the status of otherness or lacks it. Indeed, the animal, with respect to the human, turns out to be another entity, but, from the assumptions of phenomenology, is that enough for it to be apprehended as an intersubjectivity or a coexistence that is donated to the world of human beings? To answer (...) this question, we will review Husserl's argumentation, especially in Hua IV and Hua XXXIX, and Heidegger's in GA 2 and GA 29/30. Finally, we will add a critical consideration of the ideas of the authors studied in the face of developments in contemporary biology to ask ourselves to what extent their philosophical inquiry would be consistent with current zoological evidence. (shrink)

This study aims to test the theoretical model of career adaptability of refugees to investigate the dynamics of successful resettlement. The theoretical model is grounded on career construction and social network theory. We employ quantitative and qualitative methodologies to test the model in a sample of Venezuelans living and working in Colombia. The quantitative results provide partial support for Campion’s model. However, we test an alternative model and find that career adaptability has a direct relationship with subjective resettlement. In addition, (...) cultural identification plays a buffering role on the harmful effects of discrimination on subjective resettlement. Qualitative results from eight in-depth interviews shed light on the process of refugee resettlement, thus revealing the role of social networks. Our study contributes to previous research on refugees by testing, adapting, and expanding a novel model of work resettlement and focusing on a group of refugees transitioning from one emerging country to another emerging country. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clarify, from a Thomistic point of view, the nature and method of metaphysics. I argue that metaphysics' object is created being, not God, even if God enters metaphysics as efficient cause of metaphysic's object. Also, that metaphysics is a science, insofar as a particular kind of coherent reasoning process, going from the many to understand a certain oneness, and then from that oneness to reinterpret the many. Moreover, that, in this particular process of reasoning, (...) doctrinal topics must follow a certain order. Thus, in particular, I argue that the distinction between essence and act of being in every creature cannot be argued before arguing the existence of God. I touch upon the notion of separation in metaphysics and I compare Aquinas' notion of resolution with Fabro's notion. (shrink)

We explore the distinctive characteristics of Mexico's society, politics and history that impacted the establishment of genetics in Mexico, as a new disciplinary field that began in the early 20th century and was consolidated and institutionalized in the second half. We identify about three stages in the institutionalization of genetics in Mexico. The first stage can be characterized by Edmundo Taboada, who was the leader of a research program initiated during the Cárdenas government (1934-1940), which was primarily directed towards improving (...) the condition of small Mexican farmers. Taboada is the first Mexican post-graduate investigator in phytotechnology and phytopathology, trained at Cornell University and the University of Minnesota, in 1932 and 1933, respectively. He was the first investigator to teach plant genetics at the National School of Agriculture and wrote the first textbook of general genetics, Genetics Notes, in 1938. Taboada's most important single genetics contribution was the production of "stabilized" corn varieties. The extensive exile of Spanish intellectuals to Mexico, after the end of Spain's Civil War (1936-1939), had a major influence in Mexican science and characterizes the second stage. The three main personalities contributing to Mexican genetics are Federico Bonet de Marco and Bibiano Fernández Osorio Tafall, at the National School of Biological Sciences, and José Luis de la Loma y Oteyza, at the Chapingo Agriculture School. The main contribution of the Spanish exiles to the introduction of genetics in Mexico concerned teaching. They introduced in several universities genetics as a distinctive discipline within the biology curriculum and wrote genetics text books and manuals. The third stage is identified with Alfonso León de Garay, who founded the Genetics and Radiobiology Program in 1960 within the National Commission of Nuclear Energy, which had been founded in 1956. The Genetics and Radiobiology Program rapidly became a disciplinary program, for it embraced research, teaching, and training of academics and technicians. The Mexican Genetics Society, created by de Garay in 1966, and the development of strains and cultures for genetics research were important activities. One of de Garay's key requirements was the compulsory training of the Program's scientists for at least one or two years in the best universities of the United States and Europe. De Garay's role in the development of Mexican genetics was fundamental. His broad vision encompassed the practice of genetics in all its manifestations. (shrink)

Kant and Aquinas: who can doubt they are different? And however, there are some who equate Aquinas and Kant in doctrines in which they are actually opposed; some attribute to St. Thomas Aquinas approaches that are Kantian and by no means Thomistic. They make those mistakes by misinterpreting or misusing Aquinas’ texts. This paper intends to clarify a little bit the radical difference between the approaches of Aquinas and Kant to human knowledge. In my view, we need first of all (...) to understand the problem of the universals, which is the basic problem of human understanding and, in a sense, the only problem of philosophy. Second, we need to understand the stance of both philosophers in front of this same problem. Only then will we be able to see what and how radical is the difference between Aquinas and Kant. (shrink)

La formalización puede ser considerada como un proceso natural del pensamientoo de todo proceso cognitivo en la medida en que el lenguaje comúnes en sí mismo un proceso de formalización. Pero, ¿qué se puede entenderpor formalización en el marco de la física?, ¿hay una distinción de base conesos procesos comunes de formalización?, ¿es la formalización sinónimo dematematización? y ¿en qué se diferencian? En el artículo se caracterizancuatro maneras diferentes de formalizar, pretendiendo con ello estableceruna base más adecuada para responder este (...) tipo de preguntas: 1)formalización de carácter pragmático, 2) aplicación de las matemáticas 3)axiomatización de las teorías físicas y unificación de campos fenoménicos y4) matematización de un campo fenoménico. (shrink)

The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) is a multilateral, multisectoral partnership comprised of more than 70 countries, international organizations, foundations, and businesses to strengthen global health security.

Magnífico libro ha tenido a bien reeditar la editorial madrileña Encuentro, situándolo como el primer volumen de la colección Mínima Política. En él, además de realizar algunas correcciones y estructurar la obra de forma más manejable para el lector, se ha encargado del estudio preliminar el profesor Jerónimo Molina, como ya hiciera con otras obras del mismo autor, Teoría y sistema de las formas políticas e Introducción al Derecho político actual, hace unos pocos años. En esta introducción, se nos ofrece (...) un recorrido biográfico, intelectual y político por Francisco Javier Conde, sencillo, directo y profundo. Propio de quien tiene un riguroso conocimiento del autor y de su obra. Con su lectura conseguiremos enmarcar correctamente este libro en la trayectoria vital e intelectual de Conde, entre la actitud intelectual del realismo político, el fracaso en la vida de actividad política y el olvido arrastrado hasta casi nuestros días. Y digo casi, porque, según lo que hemos dicho, no son pocos los que honran a Conde y su trabajo intelectual, de gran mérito. No en vano señala el profesor Molina que este libro es un pequeño clásico contemporáneo. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the main contribution of Hegel's philosophy of right to the contemporary political debate is that it opens a window on the idea that liberalism and individual freedom are incompatible. My main thesis is that the liberal conception of the State and law, structured from a nonrelational account of singularity, ends up denying the individual freedom that it claims to defend. I begin by reconstructing the Hegelian concept of freedom from its most general lines, showing (...) that being free consists in wanting to become someone and not so much in wanting to do something. After showing that the purpose of becoming someone can only be fulfilled in a social medium, I focus on Hegel's critique of the liberal state (as expounded in the section on “civil society”). I argue that civil society structurally impedes individuals from realizing their purpose of becoming someone: the economical interactions of civil society give rise to impersonal and inscrutable mechanisms, which take the social conditions of people's individuation beyond their control. Finally, I claim that (rational) individual freedom consists in being able to thematize and democratically control the very social conditions of individuation through the State and law. (shrink)

I’m at the playground with my baby, and a smiling adult inquires, “Is it a boy or a girl?” Scientific studies show that if I say X, they will see my baby as doing A, being A, feeling A—versus if I say Y.1 They’ll likely make different assumptions about whether my baby is able to climb up the playground structures and sit without support, and they’ll encourage my baby to engage in different activities.2 And of course, they’ll respond to them (...) differently depending on whether they think the baby is a boy or a girl. What do I do if I don’t want that to happen? One way to respond to the question is not to reveal the gender, or rather, to reject the assumption that my baby already has a gender, which is arguably a weird move, breaking out of a smoothly functioning, well-oiled social exchange. Here I want to talk about this weird move: How weird it is? What are some of the reasons to make the move anyway, and what are some of the concerns? (shrink)

What is the distinction between understanding and forming a concept? In my view, for Aquinas, intelligere (the act of understanding) and dicere (the forming of a verbum or mental word) are not two different acts, but simply two different aspects of the same act of understanding. In the following, I will explore more in depth what this distinction means for Aquinas. Firstly, I will give a mostly doctrinal or systematic overview of the issue and, secondly, I will support my claims (...) with relevant textual evidence, taken exclusively from Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. This study, as an appendix, is part of “The Influence of Kant in Transcendental Thomism: Rahner, Lonergan and Von Balthasar” (forthcoming). In my view, Lonergan’s way of distinguishing intelligere and dicere is different from St. Thomas’ way. In the body of my book, I focus on Lonergan’s reasons to distinguish these notions in his own particular way, whereas this study focuses on St. Thomas’ doctrine. It is my hope that the following lines will foster an understanding of St. Thomas’ epistemology and of its application to Trinitarian theology. (shrink)

El presente trabajo aborda el problema del movimiento representacional de la subjetividad, entendido este como un despliegue de sí misma que tiene como resultado una operación de aparente «externalización» de sí. Para desarrollar esta idea se recurre a elementos teóricos tratados por Hegel en la Fenomenología del espíritu, así como también a algunas nociones formuladas desde el psicoanálisis lacaniano. Ambos recursos teóricos se conjugan con interpretaciones que se proponen de cuatro escenas de la película El séptimo sello, de Ingmar Bergman, (...) con el propósito de conjugar relaciones y posibilidades analíticas. (shrink)