What does it take to be subjectively free in an objectively rational social order? In this book Andreja Novakovic offers a fresh interpretation of Hegel's account of ethical life by focusing on his concept of habit or 'second nature'. Novakovic addresses two central and difficult issues facing any interpretation of his Philosophy of Right: why Hegel thinks that it is is better to relate unreflectively to the laws of ethical life, and which forms of reflection, especially critical reflection, remain (...) available within ethical life. Her interpretation draws on numerous parts of Hegel's system, particularly on his 'Anthropology' and his Phenomenology of Spirit, and also explores connections between his account and those of other philosophers. Her aim is to argue that Hegel has a compelling conception of the ordinary ethical standpoint which takes seriously both the virtues and the perils of reflection. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce connectification operators for intuitionistic and classical linear algebras corresponding to linear logic and to some of its extensions withn-contraction. In particular,n-contraction (n2) is a version of the contraction rule, wheren+1 occurrences of a formula may be contracted ton occurrences. Since cut cannot be eliminated from the systems withn-contraction considered most of the standard proof-theoretic techniques to investigate meta-properties of those systems are useless. However, by means of connectification we establish the disjunction property for both intuitionistic (...) and classical affine linear logics withn-contraction. (shrink)

Hegel frequently identifies ethical life with a “second nature.” This strategy has puzzled those who assume that second nature represents a deficient appearance of ethical life, one that needs to be overcome, supplemented, or constantly challenged. I argue that Hegel identifies ethical life with a second nature because he thinks that a social order only becomes a candidate for ethical life, if it provides a context conducive to the development of what I call “real habits.” First, I show that a (...) criterion for a real habit can be found in Hegel's Anthropology, namely, that of liberation. Next, I explain how the state, as Hegel analyzes it in the Philosophy of Right, provides such an environment by enabling trust toward and within it. I then consider two literary examples of contexts that fail to be similarly supportive—Coates' Between the World and Me and Atwood's Handmaid's Tale—concluding with reasons for thinking that real habits are an integral part of ethical life. (shrink)

In this paper, constructions of free ordered algebras on one generator are given that correspond to some one-variable fragments of affine propositional classical logic and their extensions with n-contraction. Moreover, embeddings of the already known infinite free structures into the algebras introduced below are furnished with; thus, solving along the respective cardinality problems.

In this paper, we consider multiplicative-additive fragments of affine propositional classical linear logic extended with n-contraction. To be specific, n-contraction (n 2) is a version of the contraction rule where (n+ 1) occurrences of a formula may be contracted to n occurrences. We show that expansions of the linear models for (n + 1)- valued ukasiewicz logic are models for the multiplicative-additive classical linear logic, its affine version and their extensions with n-contraction. We prove the finite axiomatizability for the classes (...) of finite models, as well as for the class of infinite linear models based on the set of rational numbers in the interval [0, 1]. The axiomatizations obtained in a Gentzen-style formulation are equivalent to finite and infinite-valued ukasiewicz logics. (shrink)

This book aims to re-think the way in which the subject is inscribed in the modern political, and does so by exploring the potentiality of Lacano-Deleuzian theoretical framework. It concerns a different ontology and a non-dualist understanding of political and legal existence, by focusing on questions such as _how to think alternative notions of political existence_ and _what kind of political, social and legal order do these come to create. _ This investigation into political appearance of subjects through concepts of (...) law, body and life is led and influenced by the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Lacan, as well as Alain Badiou, Antonio Negri and Slavoj Žižek. The book takes on various conceptualisations of life, explores the relationship between law and life and develops an alternative notion of legal and political existence in particular in the context of rights. On the back of Guantánamo’s legal and political discourses this work aims to show why and how the problems of world politics or the limitations of rights discourse require an engagement with questions such as what it means to exist as a human being, what forms of life are politically recognised, which are not, and why this distinction. By pointing to a different ontology for thinking and understanding global politics and demonstrating how a trans-disciplinary and philosophical approaches can foster the debates in world politics, this book will be of interest to postgraduates and scholars working on critical normative ideas in international politics, critical security studies and critical legal studies. (shrink)

The main purpose of this note is to present "difficult" embeddings of minimal and full intuitionistic logic into classical linear logic, and to prove their soundness and faithfulness. Moreover, it is also pointed out that Girard's translation of intuitionistic logic into classical linear logic is provably equivalent to one of the translations considered in this paper.

This article explores how the Slovenian women's lifestyle magazine Naša žena (Our Woman) helped the Yugoslavian socialist project construct and shape the ideal socialist woman, and argues that she became the crucial ally in implementing socialist ideas in the everyday lives of Slovenians. The article shows how texts on food preparation and consumption, as well as those touching on household management and family care, published in Naša žena from 1960 to 1991 played an important part in the ‘civilising’ process that (...) shaped behaviour, directed cultural and social practices, influenced social relations and constructed women's identities during socialism. We show how food-related texts (articles, recipes, columns, advertisements and advertorials) were never far removed from the larger political and economic socialist realities. In fact, they bore witness to changes in living standards and told stories about gender regimes, socialist ideologies and fantasies. These texts belong to a corpus of social transcripts that guide collective understandings of what it means to select, prepare, cook and eat food; what constitutes good cooking and eating; and who is responsible for preparing meals. Despite official socialist feminist rhetoric about freeing women from backward patriarchal arrangements, this article shows that texts offering food-related advice in socialist Yugoslavia contained explicit instructions for the ‘correct’ performance of the social roles of women, legitimising women's roles as worker, mother, wife and housekeeper. Above all, a woman was to be an ‘engineer’ of the private domain whose goals were to feed her family and keep the nation healthy and hence productive, and to modernise her kitchen in support of the technological and economic development of Yugoslavia. (shrink)

Kaj učimo, ko v sodobni slovenski gimnaziji učimo latinsko? S kakšnimi cilji vstopamo v razrede, kaj pričakujemo, da bodo naši dijaki znali? Navedena vprašanja so le na videz preprosta. V najbolj pragmatičnem smislu nanje odgovarja veljavni učni načrt za latinščino, ki niza cilje pouka in s tem pričakovane zmožnosti dijakov. V tem prispevku skušam slednje osvetliti z zornega kota prakse in sicer z vpogledom v slovensko državno tekmovanje v znanju latinščine, namenjeno di­jakom tretjega letnika gimnazije. Ob tem izhajam iz predpostavke, (...) da je tekmovalne naloge moč vsaj do določene mere imeti za »praktično« dopolnilo učnemu načrtu, za dovolj reprezentativne odgovore na vpra­šanje, kaj si pod začrtanimi cilji predstavljamo povsem pragmatično, in tako tudi za ilustrativen prikaz naših skupnih pričakovanj o tem, katere kompetence naj bi dijaki po skoraj treh letih gimnazijskega učenja imeli. Tekmovalne naloge, deloma pa tudi dileme, ki jih pred ocenjevalce postavlja točkovanje odgovorov, mi obenem služijo kot osnova za razmislek o tem, kje ležijo prednosti in didaktični izzivi sodobnega pouka latinščine. (shrink)

In this paper, constructions of free algebras corresponding to multiplicative classical linear logic, its affine variant, and their extensions with -contraction () are given. As an application, the cardinality problem of some one-variable linear fragments with -contraction is solved.

The paper analyses a short scene that forms part of the opening of Sophocles’ Aias : Aias, suffering from the madness that was inflicted upon him by Athena, is displayed by the goddess to Odysseus. In the corpus of extant ancient drama, this inset appears to be unique. Its expressive power is derived from the scene’s specific structure that doubles the integral elements of theatre. The paper suggests the reasons why the scene has often been labeled “a play-within-a-play,” describing and (...) illustrating the elements that can be paralleled with the structural components of theatre. Taking as basis concepts and ideas proposed by modern theatre theoreticians, the paper argues that the essence of the performative dimension of the scene is to be found in the phenomenon of the “ostentation act” first described by Umberto Eco. Tracing the meaning of the inset within the tragedy as a whole, the paper emphasizes the fact that the “ostentation” in Aias is a divine creation, and examines how Odysseus, a privileged recipient of the spectacle, reacts to the display of Aias’ shameful condition. (shrink)

Hegel's Science of Logic tracks the self-contained and self-generated development of what Hegel calls the concept. My question is: can the concept in the Logic surprise itself? I argue that the answer to that question is yes—the concept can surprise itself when it rediscovers itself in a place it did not expect to be. I first clarify the kind of perspective that the Logic asks us as readers to occupy and its difference from the perspective inside the ‘opposition’ of consciousness. (...) I then provide an example of the concept's self-surprise, namely, the transition from subjective to realized purpose in the Subjective Logic. I conclude by drawing out some implications of self-surprise for Hegel's method in the Logic and in the subsequent Realphilosophie. (shrink)

In this paper, constructions of free ordered algebras on one generator are given that correspond to some one-variable fragments of affine propositional classical logic and their extensions with n-contraction (n ≥ 2). Moreover, embeddings of the already known infinite free structures into the algebras introduced below are furnished with; thus, solving along the respective cardinality problems.

This paper deals with some strengthenings of the non-directional product-free Lambek calculus by means of additional structural rules. In fact, the rules contraction and expansion are restricted to basic types. For each of the presented systems the usual proof-theoretic notions are discussed, some new concepts especially designed for these calculi are introduced reflecting their intermediate position between the weaker and the stronger sequent-systems.

This paper takes the removal of the Colston statue in Bristol in the summer of 2020 and the accompanying Black Lives Matter protest as a political setting which can help us explore the radical political potential of Ari Hirvonen’s work. In this intervention I return to some of the themes that his work continuously engages with (such as the question of the limits, transgressions of law, and ethical acts), and re-think them in the context of racial justice. This think-piece opens (...) with reconsideration of ethics and politics drawing on Hirvonen’s brilliant readings of the Antigone and his last book Ethics of Tragedy. By reading transgressions of law as forms of (productive) perversions, this intervention, explores ways in which a different kind of politics might emerge. If in most of his works, Hirvonen saw radical democracy as a vehicle for socio-political transformation, his last work, I argue, moves towards radical even revolutionary transformations. Here I propose to read actions taken by the contemporary racial justice groups as an attempt to embody ‘perversion as rebellion’ or perversion as resistance (both ideas found in Hirvonen’s work). (shrink)

When anti-racist protestors toppled the statue of Edward Colston in Bristol in June 2020, British political elites across the left-rights spectrum, despite acknowledging that a statue of a slave trader has no place in the contemporary politics, called to firm the application of law and order. Through the example of Edward Colston, the essay examines what Lacan’s idea of perversion can reveal about the power relations between political elites and anti-racist protestors. It opens by discussing the impossibility of ethics in (...) political contexts, before turning to the question of jouissance and its role in the creation of a racialised other and political institutions (and myths of white supremacy). If jouissance of the other racialises the other as deviant, pervert’s jouissance is de-personalised and made to follow “a greater good”. In doing so, the essay argues that perversion reveals the logics of racial hierarchies, which underpin and maintain modern society. (shrink)

Hegel never wrote a treatise on the philosophy of history, though he lectured regularly on the subject between 1818 and 1831 in Berlin. The posthumously publish.

There has been contemporary disagreement about Aristotle`s substance theory. This disagreement has mainly focused on the problem of whether Aristotelian forms are particular or universal. According to the majority of the criteria which are stipulated by Aristotle in Metaphysics Zeta, forms are substances. However, Aristotle also explicitly outlines in the Zeta, and especially in chapters 13 and 16, that no universal can be a substance. At these points in his work, Aristotle should have been clearer regarding whether forms are universals (...) or particulars. In terms of the conclusion of Chapter 13 of Zeta, as well as some other criteria, one may conclude that, if the substance is form, then it should be particular. There are many instances, however, where Aristotle says that since universals are knowable, particulars cannot be known. It seems that if substances are particulars, it is hard to see how they can be knowable. Furthermore, if they are universal, it is hard to say whether particular forms are substances. Since Aristotle never mentioned whether forms could be both universal and particular, this causes difficulties. To examine this problem in more depth, I will not only analyse some textual evidence which is often used to justify the view that forms are universal, but also some textual evidence which is used to justify the view that forms are particular. In so doing, I will also identify some possible solutions regarding the problem of the status of forms in Aristotle`s substance theory. Lastly, I will suggest that individual forms are substances because they are instances of universals and, hence, may be knowable. I will support my view by employing the neo-Aristotelian substance theory posited by Jonathan Lowe; namely, the “Four-Category Ontology.”. (shrink)

In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel draws a favourable comparison between his project and Plato’s Republic, while making a critical comment about an example taken from Plato’s Laws. In...

Both for Kant and for Nietzsche, aesthetics must not be considered as a systematic science based merely on logical premises but rather as a set of intuitively attained artistic ideas that constitute or reconstitute the sensible perceptions and supersensible representations into a new whole. Kantian and Nietzschean aesthetics are both aiming to see beyond the forms of objects to provide explanations for the nobility and sublimity of human art and life. We can safely say that Kant and Nietzsche used the (...) dualities of the beautiful/sublime and Apollonian/Dionysian to advocate their general philosophical worldview, and that the initial formation (in Observations and The Birth of Tragedy) and final dissolution (in the Critique of Judgment and Zarathustra and other later works) of these dualities are determined by the gradually established telos of their philosophical endeavor. Therefore, by observing the evolution of these so-called dualities, Kaplama gathers important clues as to how Kant’s and Nietzsche’s aesthetics transformed into different ways to affirm human art and life. On the one hand, Kaplama argues, the Dionysian came to be the heart and soul of Nietzschean aesthetics and ethics, and the Apollonian (or the formal drive of individuation) was reduced into a mere aesthetic criterion. On the other, Kant treats the sublime (which is originally an idea-producing feeling and/or judgment) as a mere appendix to his Critique of Judgment and aesthetic theory teleologically reducing it into its possible moral consequences. This is why Schopenhauer calls the sublime “by far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Judgment” which touches on the real problem of aesthetics very closely but does not provide a real solution for it. Kant’s forced teleological move is to make his theory of aesthetic judgment stand as a ‘reaffirmation’ of the earlier ethical justification he believed to have accomplished in the first two Critiques and the Groundwork where he defends an affirmation of human life through a teleological morality centered on the principle of free-will. In contrast, Nietzsche’s aesthetics (particularly the Dionysian) guides his ethics and metaphysics again through defining an ideal human nature without which ethos would be static and meaningless, lacking the ability to move and change and represent the tragic pathos of human life. (shrink)

Both Heraclitus and Democritus, as the philosophers of historia peri phuseôs, consider nature and human character, habit, law and soul as interrelated emphasizing the links between phusis, kinesis, ethos, logos, kresis, nomos and daimon. On the one hand, Heraclitus’s principle of change (panta rhei) and his emphasis on the element of fire and cosmic motion ultimately dominate his ethics reinforcing his ideas of change, moderation, balance and justice, on the other, Democritus’s atomist description of phusis and motion underlies his principle (...) of moderation and his ideas of health and measured life. In this series, particularly referring to the main principles of motion, moderation and justice, I attempt to describe a coherent pre-Socratic ethical perspective based on the Heraclitean and Democritean fragments. I explore the connections between their physics and ethics also borrowing from Nietzsche’s lectures and writings on the Pre-Socratics. I redefine such Heraclitean and Democritean concepts as harmony, order, perfection, health, self-control, contentment, cheerfulness, concord, sound judgment, wisdom, measure and balance and discuss them under the principles of motion (phusis), moderation (sophrosyne) and justice. In doing so, I also expose the relevance of the Heraclitean notion of logos (interpreting it as the underlying categorical principle of transition between phusis and ethos) in bringing together these ideas and principles. Finally, based on this pre-Socratic Weltanschauung, I assess the possibility of a coherent picture of humanity, its nature and conduct as extending from or fitting into or extending-from-when-fitting-into the cosmos of moving forces and atoms. (shrink)

Some artworks are called sublime because of their capacity to move human imagination in a different way than the experience of beauty. The following discussion explores how Van Gogh’s The Starry Night along with some of his other late landscape paintings accomplish this peculiar movement of imagination thus qualifying as sublime artworks. These artworks constitute examples of the higher aesthetic principles and must be judged according to the cosmological-aesthetic criteria for they manage to generate a transition between ethos and phusis (...) and present them in unity. Here, referring to Heraclitean, Kantian, Nietzschean and Heideggerian metaphysics and aesthetics, I propose that the principles of motion and transition be the new cosmologic-aesthetic categories for the judgment of sublime artworks as well as for the understanding of the world (Weltanschauung) they represent. (shrink)

This paper is founded on a close reading of Kant’s Opus Postumum in order both to explore the essential motivation that drove Kant to write a last comprehensive magnum opus and, by doing so, to show the essential link between his aesthetics and the idea of Übergang, the title of this last work. For this work contains not only his dynamical theory of matter defining motion as preliminary to the notions of space and time, and the advanced version of his (...) philosophy of natural science, but also his arguments for the phenomenal validity of the metaphysical foundations, his teachings on the aesthetic human faculties of judgment and Anschauung, and the discernment of the transcendental philosophy from Platonic idealism carrying it to a cosmological level, i.e. Kant’s insertion of the concept of cosmotheoros. Since the process of transition is an aesthetic process based on human senses, intuitions and judgments, the argument will follow that in order to explicate Übergang, we need to reconcile cosmology, as the oldest branch of philosophy dealing with the interactions between the cosmic forces and the ways they affect human life, with aesthetics, as the youngest branch of philosophy dealing with how we sense, intuit and judge the form and motion of matter. Therefore, in the last analysis, Übergang becomes rather a cosmologic-aesthetic principle similar to the Heraclitean logos. Another building block of the paper is the fruitful comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian, which are going to be construed as the aesthetic theories on human understanding representing the transition from nature to art. For they are not only conceptual – aesthetic but also dynamic – cosmological theories due to their reference both to nature and to human nature. (shrink)

Los poetas en la época prehispánica nahua eran llamados cuicapicque que significa “creadores de cantos” o “forjadores de cantos”, se sabe que por poseer el don poético, eran admirados, respetados y su producción fue vasta. Miguel León Portilla rescató el nombre de veinte de ellos, incluida una mujer, Macuilxochitzin a quien trataremos de conocer a través del análisis y reflexión que se desprende del único canto que de ella se tiene. ¿Quién era? ¿Por qué solamente se tiene este poema de (...) la época prehispánica atribuido a una mujer? ¿Qué hay más allá del hecho histórico al que alude? Es lo que trataremos de responder a lo largo de este trabajo, insuficiente creemos para conocer el legado femenino de las forjadoras de cantos de aquella época pero que intentaremos al menos, rescatar su voz en una sociedad donde el valor de “lo femenino” y por ende, la importancia de la mujer, aún está por comprenderse. (shrink)

IntroductionIn recent years, there has been something of an explosion of news stories about various college and university campuses across North America experiencing heightened levels of political advocacy and political unrest. Visible examples include the “canceling” of invited speakers who have been deemed offensive by select student groups1 or petitions calling for the removal of instructors who have been accused of using harmful language.2 While these examples shed light on some of the more intense political debates circulating in higher educational (...) institutions, they are also newsworthy stories precisely because they suggest strong divisiveness in worldviews in action—the contradiction between different…. (shrink)

Kant makes a much-unexpected confession in a much-unexpected place. In the Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology of the first Critique Kant accepts the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject. The major Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei makes it impossible to conduct philosophical inquiry by assuming a self-conscious subject or “I,” which would potentially be in constant motion like (...) other thoughts. For it rules out the possibility of completely detached reasoning which necessitates an unchanging state of mind. In this paper, Kaplama uses panta rhei to critically examine the philosophical shortcomings and contradictions of Kantian and Enlightenment ethics. In his examination, he specifically focuses on the teleological nature of Kant’s principle of freedom and ideal of moral autonomy which have dominated the Enlightenment thought. By doing so, he argues that it is essentially inaccurate to posit Überlegenheit (the state of being superior to nature) as the foundation of philosophical inquiry mainly because this would contradict the Enlightenment’s claim to constitute a rupture from classic and medieval metaphysics and would render Enlightenment a mere extension of Christian metaphysics. As in Christianity, Überlegenheit presupposes two separate realms, the actual (contingent) and ideal (pure) realms of thought and assumes that the transcendence commences from the level of the late metaphysical/teleological construction of the ‘subject’ who is completely persistent, self-conscious and immune to change. He then substantiates these points with reference to the philosophical roots of ethnic prejudice displayed by the post-Enlightenment colonialists and the missionaries in Fiji and the Pacific. This brief critical examination of the post-Enlightenment ethnocentrism will be conducted under the following three points: a) On the Enlightenment’s teleological and universalistic understanding of humanity and the concept of progress versus the Fijian concepts of the continuity of life, regeneration, and reproduction b) On the Enlightenment’s ideal of the free-willing and independent individual subject versus the Fijian ideas of 'the cord', reciprocity, and vanua, and c) On the Enlightenment’s (and Christianity’s) strict dualism between physics and metaphysics, nature and human mind, body and soul versus the Fijian bio-centrism, the sanctity of vanua and the cosmological concept of mana. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 6, June 2022.

Lacan wrote and generated ideas at the intersection of structuralism and poststructuralism, and the question of where he stands in this intersection is crucial to understand his conception of the subject. This essay takes the multiplicity of views on Lacan as a structuralist and a poststructuralist as its starting point and aims to weigh these labels against the background of his specific theories and views. We suggest that in his early phase when he was categorised as a structuralist, he had (...) the seeds of his later poststructuralist phase, and when he was generating his poststructuralist ideas, he was building them on his structuralist legacy. This evolution is similar to that of Roland Barthes in that he establishes an ongoing dialog between structuralism and poststructuralism: he is both a threshold figure suggesting an amalgam of these movements, but he is also a dividing figure as his evolution points at the unbridgeable rupture between structuralism and poststructuralism. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 6, June 2022.

This book is founded on a close reading of Kant’s Opus Postumum in order both to explore the essential motivation that drove Kant to write a last comprehensive magnum opus and, by doing so, to show the essential link between his aesthetics and the idea of Übergang, the title of this last work. For this work contains not only his dynamical theory of matter defining motion as preliminary to the notions of space and time, and the advanced version of his (...) philosophy of natural science, but also his arguments for the phenomenal validity of the metaphysical foundations, his teachings on the aesthetic human faculties of judgment and Anschauung, and the discernment of the transcendental philosophy from Platonic idealism carrying it to a cosmological level, i.e. Kant’s insertion of the concept of cosmotheoros. Since the process of transition is an aesthetic process based on human senses, intuitions and judgments, the argument will follow that in order to explicate Übergang, we need to reconcile cosmology, as the oldest branch of philosophy dealing with the interactions between the cosmic forces and the ways they affect human life, with aesthetics, as the youngest branch of philosophy dealing with how we sense, intuit and judge the form and motion of matter. Therefore, in the last analysis, Übergang becomes rather a cosmologic-aesthetic principle similar to the Heraclitean logos. Another building block of the book is the fruitful comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian, which are going to be construed as the aesthetic theories on human understanding representing the transition from nature to art. For they are not only conceptual – aesthetic but also dynamic – cosmological theories due to their reference both to nature and to human nature. Finally, Cosmological Aesthetics employs the principles of transition and motion to analyze Van Gogh’s Starry Night in an excursus. (shrink)

Political realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists, has raised concerns about their own source of normativity. Some realists have responded to such concerns by theorizing a distinctively political normativity. According to this view, politics is seen as an autonomous, independent domain with its own evaluative standards. Therefore, it is in this source, rather than in some moral values ‘outside’ of this domain, that normative justification should be sought when theorizing justice, democracy, political legitimacy, and the (...) like. For realists the question about a distinctively political normativity is important, because they take the fact that politics is a distinct affair to have severe consequences for both how to approach the subject matter as such and for which principles and values can be justified. Still, realists have had a hard time clarifying what this distinctively political normativity consists of and why, more precisely, it matters. The aim of this paper is to take some further steps in answering these questions. We argue that realists have the choice of committing themselves to one of two coherent notions of distinctively political normativity: one that is independent of moral values, where political normativity is taken to be a kind of instrumental normativity; another where the distinctness still retains a justificatory dependence on moral values. We argue that the former notion is unattractive since the costs of commitment will be too high, and that the latter notion is sound but redundant since no moralist would ever reject it. Furthermore, we end the paper by discussing what we see as the most fruitful way of approaching political and moral normativity in political theory. (shrink)

In response to the democratic boundary problem, two principles have been seen as competitors: the all-affected interests principle and the all-subjected principle. This article claims that these principles are in fact compatible, being justified vis-à-vis different functions, accommodating different values and drawing on different sources of normativity. I call this a ‘function-sensitive’ view. More specifically, I argue that the boundary problem draws attention to the decision functions of democracy and that two values are indispensable when theorizing how to regulate these (...) functions: procedural fairness and political autonomy. While the value of procedural fairness is best promoted through a version of the all-affected interests principle, applied to decision making generally, it is argued that political autonomy is best promoted through a version of the all-subjected principle, applied to coercive decision making specifically. The article concludes by drawing out some practical implications of the function-sensitive view for the case of immigration and border controls. (shrink)

The creation of increasingly complex artificial intelligence (AI) systems raises urgent questions about their ethical and social impact on society. Since this impact ultimately depends on political decisions about normative issues, political philosophers can make valuable contributions by addressing such questions. Currently, AI development and application are to a large extent regulated through non-binding ethics guidelines penned by transnational entities. Assuming that the global governance of AI should be at least minimally democratic and fair, this paper sets out three desiderata (...) that an account should satisfy when theorizing about what this means. We argue, first, that an analysis of democratic values, political entities and decision-making should be done in a holistic way; second, that fairness is not only about how AI systems treat individuals, but also about how the benefits and burdens of transformative AI are distributed; and finally, that justice requires that governance mechanisms are not limited to AI technology, but are incorporated into a range of basic institutions. Thus, rather than offering a substantive theory of democratic and fair AI governance, our contribution is metatheoretical: we propose a theoretical framework that sets up certain normative boundary conditions for a satisfactory account. (shrink)

An intensified discussion on the role of normative ideals has re-emerged in several debates in political philosophy. What is often referred to as “ideal theory,” represented by liberal egalitarians such as John Rawls, is under attack from those that stress that political philosophy at large should take much more seriously the nonideal circumstances consisting of relations of domination and power under which normative ideals, principles, and ideas are supposed to be applied. While the debate so far has mainly been preoccupied (...) with defending or rejecting ideal theory through a defense or rejection of a specific ideal theory, this paper instead focuses on a number of general philosophical concerns on which the critique relies. More specifically, it brings up for scrutiny, and ultimately rejects, three charges against ideal theory: the charge that ideal theory is not action-guiding, that ideal theory is impossible, and that ideal theory is distorting. By investigatingthese charges in tandem, the paper shows that the criticism against ideal theory is premised on assumptions about the relationships between thought and action and between concepts and the world for which there is little or no support. (shrink)