Hartmut Rosa advances an account of the temporal structure of society from the perspective of critical theory. He identifies three categories of change in the tempo of modern social life: technological acceleration, evident in transportation, communication, and production; the acceleration of social change, reflected in cultural knowledge, social institutions, and personal relationships; and acceleration in the pace of life, which happens despite the expectation that technological change should increase an individual's free time. According to Rosa, both the structural (...) and cultural aspects of our institutions and practices are marked by the "shrinking of the present," a decreasing time period during which expectations based on past experience reliably match the future. When this phenomenon combines with technological acceleration and the increasing pace of life, time seems to flow ever faster, making our relationships to each other and the world fluid and problematic. It is as if we are standing on "slipping slopes," a steep social terrain that is itself in motion and in turn demands faster lives and technology. As Rosa deftly shows, this self-reinforcing feedback loop fundamentally determines the character of modern life. (shrink)

There are many ways in which a speaker can confuse their audience. In this paper, I will focus on one such way, namely, a way of talking that seems to manifest a cross-level kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the speaker. The goal of the paper is to explain why such ways of talking sound so twisted. The explanation is two-pronged, since their twisted nature may come either from the very mental states that the speaker thereby makes manifest, (...) or from how the speaker chooses to express themselves (even if there is nothing wrong with their mental states). So-called ‘Moore-paradoxical’ utterances are but one example of the phenomenon, and the explanation of what is wrong about them is subsumed under a more general explanation here—one that captures also the twisted-ness of utterances whereby questions are raised or intentions expressed. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo busca presentar una visión fenomenológica de la identidad personal en tanto fenómeno complejo y multidimensional, tomando como punto de partida el pensamiento del filósofo danés Dan Zahavi. Mientras que Zahavi presenta la dimensión experiencial del yo como fundamento y núcleo del yo, y por ende de la identidad, cabe preguntarse si este yo experiencial no puede ser complementado con una noción de yo más fuerte, que yo llamo núcleo personal. En primer lugar, se presentará la visión de (...) identidad personal de acuerdo con el pensamiento de Zahavi. En segundo lugar, se propondrá que tal núcleo personal se da como un hecho fenomenológico, es decir, revelado por la experiencia misma del yo. Finalmente, se sostendrá que dicho núcleo personal, que es el fundamento de las otras dimensiones del yo y de la identidad personal, se puede complementar con las otras dos dimensiones del yo desarrolladas por Zahavi. (shrink)

In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...) assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment. (shrink)

En este trabajo se explora la segunda parte de la fórmula foucaulteana para describir a la biopolítica, esto es, el “dejar morir” biopolítico. A través del análisis de los diferentes abordajes de Michel Foucault, realizados en el período comprendido entre 1976 y 1979, se buscará entender cómo esta forma de ejercicio del poder, a pesar de estar centrada en la maximización de la vida, posee un accionar tanático, una vinculación con la muerte en términos poblacionales. Por esto mismo, el objetivo (...) de este escrito será mostrar que la biopolítica para maximizar la vida precisa intervenir y gestionar e incidir sobre la muerte. (shrink)

In his 1994 paper, neuroscientist Benjamin Libet affirmed that he found a way to test the interaction between the mind and the brain. He believed that this procedure would also test the reality of a non-physical mind, emerging from neural activity. In 2000 John Searle objected to Libet’s evident dualism, affirming that the mind is not a hypothesis to test but a datum to be explained. According to Searle, Libet’s problem arose from accepting the Cartesian distinction of ‘mind’ and ‘body’, (...) obsolete categories from an old philosophy. Searle’s solution implied the rejection both of dualism and reductive materialism, suggesting a non-reductive materialism. This first-person ontology, as Searle calls it, aims at preserving, against reductive materialism, the essential features of consciousness, i.e. subjective, qualitative and unified. Searle argued, however, that the nature of consciousness remained biological. Dan Zahavi’s thesis is that a phenomenological approach to the self and consciousness can offer a complementing alternative to the contemporary comprehension of the nature of consciousness. Engaged in an open dialogue with neuroscience and cognitive science in his dealings with consciousness, Zahavi holds, nonetheless, that this notion cannot be completely understood without reference to the notion of the self. Thus, this paper will analyse Zahavi’s ideas about the self and consciousness in Subjectivity and Selfhood as to evaluate whether his phenomenological approach is able to overcome the materialist tones of Searle’s philosophy of mind, opening the possibility of a non-reductive comprehension of human beings. (shrink)

El discernimiento de espíritus ha sido a lo largo de la historia del cristianismo un mecanismo fundamental para el control del acceso al carisma. Su desarrollo ha estado profundamente ligado a los cambios en la estructura social de las iglesias. Por ello buscamos aportar nuevas miradas sobre este dispositivo, analizándolo en el contexto de las periferias cristianas. Específicamente centraremos nuestro análisis en las iglesias evangélicas aborígenes mocoví del suroeste de la provincia del Chaco en Argentina. Nos aproximaremos a estas cuestiones (...) a partir del análisis a la estructura social de estas iglesias, sus concepciones sobre los vínculos con las potencias no-humanas, la gestión de salud y enfermedad y la experiencia del culto. (shrink)

En este trabajo se explora la primera parte de la formula foucaulteana para describir a la biopolítica, esto es, el “hacer vivir” biopolítico. Mediante estos análisis se busca entender el modo en que el poder se vincula con la vida de la población, cuáles son sus estrategias, sus mecanismos y sus efectos. Para ello se detiene, en primer lugar, en comprender el concepto de vida que atañe al biopoder, sirviéndose de los análisis de Foucault respecto a la biología. Luego, en (...) segundo lugar, se busca dar cuenta de las prácticas utilizadas por dicha tecnología para modificar los fenómenos vitales en pos de sus intereses de gobierno. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone analizar la actualidad de los abordajes foucaulteanos sobre el saber médico para explicar los sucesos acontecidos a raíz de la pandemia del covid-19. Para ello nos centraremos en su definición de la medicina como práctica biopolítica, analizando en qué medida esta continúa siendo una técnica política de intervención con efectos de poder sobre la vida y sobre la muerte de la población. Al mismo tiempo, intentaremos pensar el marco de racionalidad política en el que se inscribe (...) la actual crisis sanitaria, esto es: el neoliberalismo y sus consecuentes formas de “hacer vivir y dejar morir”. (shrink)

En 1954, la Cour d’appel de Buenos Aires acquitte Elena Teotina Haedo de Gaitán et la sage-femme Catalina Fuccia du délit d’avortement en invoquant la figure juridique de la « tentative d’avortement impossible », la grossesse étant scientifiquement et médicalement impossible à vérifier. Cet article examine l’application de la législation anti-avortement dans l’Argentine du milieu du xxe siècle, une Argentine considérée par l’historiographie comme pronataliste. L’analyse des processus judiciaires à l’œuvre permet également d’examiner les formes de tutelle sur le corps (...) et la reproduction des femmes. (shrink)

This paper tries to penetrate Jon Elster’s contribution to ratioanlity in the frame of the problem ofmeans and ends rationality. To treat rationality in Elster, we will study the imperfect rationality and its relation to weakness of will,and the development of precommitment strategies. We will also point out the role of Emotions, false beliefs and cognitive fallacies in the consideration of rationality. We Will show the difference that the author makes between the thin theory and the broad theory of rationality. (...) Taking into account Hamlin’s distinction between means, beliefs, ends and extended rationality, we will explain the relation between his belief rationality and Elster’s broad theory. (shrink)

Contingentism depicts normativity as one of our human effective possibilities rather than as a metaphysical bottleneck which we should necessary fulfill. The book is a critical survey of Richard McKay Rorty’s “neo-pragmatism”, in the light of various theoretical arguments as well as of his own resourceful attempts to renew philosophy from within its practice.

Resumen: El presente artículo propone que la 31ª Bienal de Sao Paulo entraña un afán emancipador para los "sin tierra" - errantes, migrantes y viajeros. Para ello se conforma como un cuerpo sin órganos, que despliega estrategias liberadoras promoviendo: desarticulación, experimentación, vagabundeo y tránsito de sujetos y pueblos. Esta Bienal, en tanto CsO, mueve intensidades como flujos sensibles por los intersticios de los proyectos artísticos dispuestos en organismo. Acá el CsO es un conjunto de prácticas reservadas a desterritorializar los estratos (...) del "organismo social" y hacer estallar los órganos estructurados en dichos sistemas.: This article shows that the 31st Sao Paulo Biennial has an emancipatory affinity for the landless - wanderers, migrants, and travelers. As such it becomes a Body without Organs that displays liberating strategies, promoting disarticulation, experimentation, wandering, and the transit of subjects and peoples. This Biennial, as a BwO, moves intensities as sensible flows through the interstices of the artistic projects inside the organism. Here, the BwO becomes a set of practices that deterritorialize the strata of the "social organism", making the structured organs in these systems explode. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to make evident the political impact of popular sovereignty in the search for a new social structure, in virtue of the crisis that the representative system of party hegemony manifested, in order to point out in the first place the need of the Venezuelan people to ..

The proposed text reflects on the Muslim community and families in Padua including interviews in order to individuate the practices of the transmission of beliefs within the family and the continuity of the group. Mainly from the development of three main points: religious socialization, community representation as umma, according to the mandate of Give to Islam as well of the dichotomy we Muslims / they Christians discourses. Finally, the meanings of identities governed by ethnicity and / or religion and new (...) generations with current debates and struggles identified as new collective identities. That is, the reinterpretation allows the emergence of a new collective identity that makes use of practices that are in tension with the host society emerging like a political force. (shrink)

How do engineers respond to ethical dilemmas that occur in practice? How do they view their individual and collective responsibilities? How do they make decisions before all the facts are in? Using the space shuttle programme as the framework, this book examines the role of ethical decision making in the practice of engineering. In particular, the book considers the design and development of the main engines of the space shuttle as a paradigm for how individual engineers perceive, articulate, and resolve (...) ethical dilemmas in a large, complex organisation. A series of in-depth case studies show engineers at work on various stages of the project as they balance budgets, deadlines and risks. By documenting the historical development of a single system, the book provides a unique opportunity to explore the complex interactions between political, organisational and technical pressures and engineering and management decisions. (shrink)

El Realismo Crítico Auténtico (RCA) sostenido por Uskali Mäki se distingue del Realismo Crítico de Lawson. En el marco del Realismo Mínimo se explicitará qué es el RCA y se presentará el Realismo Posible de los modelos económicos en su versión MISS. Se diferenciará el Realismo Mínimo del Realismo Científico Standard. Se desarrollarán las dificultades en torno al RCA.

La Escuela Austríaca de Economía no se compone de una serie de conceptos estáticos desarrollados en un eterno presente fuera de lo humano. Al contrario, es y ha sido un conjunto de teorías evolutivamente articuladas a lo largo de la vida y obra de sus muchos y diversos autores. Esa es la perspectiva que desarrolla en profundidad este libro.

El presente artículo se centra en el esclarecimiento de las nociones de percepciones inconscientes («petites perceptions»), percepciones y apercepciones en la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz con el fin de responder dos preguntas: 1) Ad intra, es decir, intra-sustancialmente: ¿Cómo un evento inconsciente se vuelve consciente dentro de una misma sustancia simple?; 2) Ad extra, es decir, inter-sustancialmente: ¿dónde puede decirse que surge la conciencia en la jerarquía de mónadas? Para responder estas preguntas, seguiré la siguiente metodología. En primer (...) lugar, presentaré la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz enmarcada en su visión metafísica. Presentaré a su vez los pasajes más conflictivos y el problema que surge al momento de definir la conciencia. En segundo lugar, presentaré las interpretaciones más comentadas que existen actualmente acerca de este problema. Me centraré en las posturas de Rocco J. Gennaro, Larry M. Jorgensen, Christian Barth y Alison Simmons. Finalmente, propondré una interpretación propia de la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz. (shrink)

Rousseau et l'exegese biblique du XVIIIe siecle -- Des pratiques bibliques du XVIIIe siecle a la lecture-consolation de Rousseau -- Intertextualite biblique dans l'ouvre de Rousseau -- Intertexte biblique et representation de soi -- Le Levite d'Ephraim : reecriture biblique -- Schemes de la pensee du religieux -- Ouvre de doctrine : la lettre a Christophe de Beaumont -- Etre Chretien de Jacques : les lettres ecrites de La Montagne.

Resumen Según el diagnóstico sobre la academia contemporánea del pensador italiano Piero Coda, la teología, disciplina escindida de la filósofa desde la modernidad, se ha reducido a una mera apologética de la fe. En este marco, la Trinidad se vacía de contenido ontológico, dejando de ser principio de interpretación de la realidad. En el presente artículo analizaré las consecuencias antropológicas que posee el hecho de que la creación, específicamente del hombre, sea imago Trinitatis en el pensamiento de Edith Stein. En (...) la primera sección, presentaré brevemente cómo Stein aborda el misterio y las relaciones intra-trinitarias utilizando las imágenes del amor y de la vida. Luego, presentaré brevemente el desarrollo de la noción de persona y como ésta es resignificada a la luz del dogma trinitario para explicar en qué sentido Dios es persona. En la segunda sección, presentaré cómo se da la imagen del Dios Trino en la creación. Este será el primer paso, dado que para Stein el discurso cosmológico es solo la antesala del discurso antropológico. Finalmente, analizaré cómo se da la imagen del Dios trinitario en la persona humana y por ende cómo esta noción es resignificada y enriquecida.According to the diagnosis on the contemporary academy of the Italian thinker Piero Coda, theology, having been cut off from philosophy since modernity, has been reduced to mere apologetics. Within this framework, the doctrine of the Trinity is emptied of any ontological content, ceasing to be a principle of interpretation of reality. In this article I will analyse the anthropological consequences of the fact that creation, specifically of man, is imago Trinitatis in the thought of Edith Stein. In the first section, I will briefly present how Stein approaches mystery and intra-Trinitarian relationships using the images of love and life. Then, I will offer a quick description of the development of the notion of person and how it is re-signified in light of the Trinitarian dogma as to explain in what sense God is a person. In the second section, I will present how the image of the Triune God appears in Creation, a first step in cosmological discourse that will lead, for Stein, to the anthropological discourse. Finally, I will analyse how the image of the Trinitarian God is present to the human person and therefore how this notion is re-signified and enriched. (shrink)

El presente artículo parte de la idea de que para superar la crisis ecológica que estamos viviendo no basta con desarrollar más tecnología y más ciencia, sino que también es necesario repensar y modificar nuestra relación con la naturaleza. Como sostiene la eco-filosofía, es necesario superar una ontología mecanicista centrada en un antropocentrismo fuerte que contrapone dualísticamente al hombre con la naturaleza, viéndola como mera propiedad al servicio del ser humano. Ahora bien, mientras que las eco-filosofías suelen apoyarse en una (...) ontología relacional, la hipótesis que se sostendrá a lo largo de este artículo es que no solo esta ontología puede funcionar de base para repensar y modificar nuestra relación con la naturaleza, sino que también la clásica doctrina metafísica de los grados del ser puede servir como base para un nuevo paradigma ecológico. (shrink)

This work develops the ethical attitude of courageous vulnerability through the integration of the phenomenon of involuntary memory in Marcel Proust's work and ...

The significance of critical phenomenology for psychiatric praxis has yet to be expounded. In this paper, I argue that the adoption of a critical phenomenological stance can remedy localised instances of hermeneutical injustice, which may arise in the encounter between clinicians and patients with psychosis. In this context, what is communicated is often deemed to lack meaning or to be difficult to understand. While a degree of un-shareability is inherent to subjective life, I argue that issues of unintelligibility can be (...) addressed by shifting from individualistic conceptions of understanding to an interactionist view. This takes into account the contextual, historical and relational background within which meaning is co-constituted. I conclude by providing a corrective for hermeneutical injustice, which entails a specific attentiveness towards the person’s subjectivity, a careful sensitivity to contingent meaning-generating structures, and a degree of hermeneutical flexibility as an attitude of openness towards alternative horizons of possibility. (shrink)

Are there representations in the brain? It depends on what you mean by representations, and it depends on what you want them to do for you—both in terms of the causal role they play in the system, and in terms of their explanatory value. But ideally, we would like an account of representation that allows us to assign a representational role and content to the appropriate mechanistic precursors of behavior that in fact play that role and conversely, search for the (...) mechanistic realizers of representational roles that are posited by our models of behavior and cognition. Such an account would be methodologically valuable in neuroscience. Lately, people have started asking similar questions about deep neural networks. What representations do they learn and use, and what is the relation between those representations and the sometimes impressive capacities these networks exhibit? More philosophically puzzling, perhaps, is the question of why the internal activities or dispositions labeled as such in neuroscience and AI research should count as representations at all. I think we can give a unified answer to both sets of questions, in the form of a kind of representational pragmatism. What makes something a representation just is that we can identify and re-identify it as such, and moreover, that we can manipulate it effectively to do whatever it is that we think representations ought to do for us in that particular context. For the first condition, the idea is that so long as we have some probe that allows us to pick out the relevant causally effective candidate, we should consider that to be a candidate representation-relative-to-that-probe. The second condition can be understood as a kind of anti-gerrymandering constraint: one ought to be able to intervene on the candidate, and see effects of that intervention consistent with the functional role the representation is supposed to play. Naturally the details need to be spelled out for different contexts—and I will articulate them for a few illustrative cases—which effectively allows for a kind of pluralism about representation depending on the setting and the kinds of questions being asked. With the extra components filled in, representational pragmatism can make sense of existing practices in neuroscience and AI, as well as their relationship to naturalistic theories of representation in philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophical proponents of predictive processing cast the novelty of predictive models of perception in terms of differences in the functional role and information content of neural signals. However, they fail to provide constraints on how the crucial semantic mapping from signals to their informational contents is determined. Beyond a novel interpretative gloss on neural signals, they have little new to say about the causal structure of the system, or even what statistical information is carried by the signals. That means that (...) the predictive framework for perception can be relabeled in traditional, non-predictive terms, with no empirical consequences relevant to existing or future data. To the extent that neuroscientific research based on predictive processing is both innovative and productive, it will be due to the framework’s suggestive heuristic effects, or perhaps auxiliary empirical claims about implementation, rather than a difference in the information-processing structure that it describes. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has often been regarded as complementary or laissez-faire ethics in solving business problems. This paper seeks conceptual and methodological improvements by developing a virtue character scale that will enable assessment of the link between organizational level virtue and organizational performance, financial or non-financial. Based upon three theoretical assumptions, multiple studies were conducted; the content analysis of 158 Fortune Global 500 firms ethical values and a survey of 2548 customers and employees. Six dimensions of organizational virtue (Integrity, Empathy, Warmth, (...) Courage, Conscientiousness and Zeal) are identified through confirmatory factor analysis, and validated against satisfaction measure. Strategic implications of virtue characters are discussed. (shrink)

The strong influence of pragmatism in the early 20th-century international debate, its subsequent and apparently inexorable decline, and its recent revival are intertwined with the fate of other currents of thought that have marked the development of contemporary philosophy. This volume clarifies the most recent events of this development focusing on key theoretical issues common both to American classic philosophical tradition and analytical thought. Many essays in this volume belong to what we can call “new” pragmatism, namely a pragmatist perspective (...) that is different from the postmodernist “neo” pragmatism à la Rorty. The volume shows that both pragmatists and analytic thinkers stress the importance of logic and scientific method in order to deal with philosophical problems and seek for a clarification of the relation between our ethical values and our understanding of natural facts. Moreover, the anti-skeptic attitude that characterizes pragmatism as well as most part of analytic philosophy, and their common attention to the problems of language and communication are emphasized. The more sophisticated tools for addressing both theoretical and methodological problems developed by analytic philosophy are pointed out, and the essays show the possible integration of these two forms of speculation that, for too a long time, mutually disregarded one another. (shrink)

The brain is often taken to be a paradigmatic example of a signaling system with semantic and representational properties, in which neurons are senders and receivers of information carried in action potentials. A closer look at this picture shows that it is not as appealing as it might initially seem in explaining the function of the brain. Working from several sender-receiver models within the teleosemantic framework, I will first argue that two requirements must be met for a system to support (...) genuine semantic information: 1. The receiver must be competent —that is, it must be able to extract rewards from its environment on the basis of the signals that it receives. 2. The receiver must have some flexibility of response relative to the signal received. In the second part of the paper, this initial framework will be applied to neural processes, pointing to the surprising conclusion that signaling at the single-neuron level is only weakly semantic at best. Contrary to received views, neurons will have little or no access to semantic information (though their patterns of activity may carry plenty of quantitative, correlational information) about the world outside the organism. Genuine representation of the world requires an organism - level receiver of semantic information, to which any particular set of neurons makes only a small contribution. (shrink)

Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; some delusions can also enhance the sense that one’s life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. (...) Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one’s unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one’s endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people’s lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti‐nativist arguments of Book I of Locke's Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn't currently aware or hasn't been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments' (...) dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke's arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the Awareness Principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question‐begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism. (shrink)

Gabriel J. Zanotti. La hermenéutica como el humano conocimiento. Cheyenne, Wyoming: Ed. Arje, 2019, 165 pp., ISBN-10:1-7335483-0-0, ISBN-13:978-1-7335483-0-4 (Agustina Borella) Daniele Aucone. Oltre l’utopia e il disincanto. La speranza cristiana oggi. Roma: Angelicum University Press, 2019, 313 pp. ISBN 978-88-99616-20-5. (Julio Raúl Méndez).