Philosophy of Mind > Intentionality > Naturalizing Mental Content > Teleological Accounts of Mental Content
Teleological Accounts of Mental Content
Edited by Ming Tan
About this topic
Summary | Teleological accounts of mental content seek to account for the contents of our mental states in terms of the biological functions of the mechanisms that produce and use those states, and/or the functions of those states themselves. Such accounts are naturalistic because they posit the scientifically respectable, non-semantic property of biological function to explain why our mental states have the contents that they have. The main objection to teleological accounts is that they are unable to attribute determinate functions to the mechanisms that produce and use mental states, and so are unable to attribute determinate contents to those states. The major proponents of teleological accounts offer contrasting responses to this objection, which turn on differences in their respective theoretical frameworks. |
Key works | Millikan 1984 is the initial statement of the most influential version of the teleological account, while Millikan 1989 provides a more accessible overview. Other key papers on this version of the account are collected in Millikan 1993. Papineau 1984 and Papineau 1987 introduce a rival teleological account. The indeterminacy problem for such accounts, first raised in Fodor 1990, is addressed in Neander 1995 and Papineau 1998, which also offer contrasting responses to the problem. The main papers on the notion of biological function are collected in Ariew et al 2002, while views on the current state of play in the literature on teleological accounts can be found in Macdonald & Papineau 2006. |
Introductions | A useful overview article on teleological accounts is Schulte & Neander 2022, while a recent summary of the most influential version of the account is Millikan 1989. An accessible introduction to the rival version of the account can be found in Papineau 1987. |
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Related categories
Siblings:
- Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content (167)
- Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content (84)
- Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc (74)
- Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content (380)
- Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content (187)
- Phenomenal Intentionality (181)
- Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc (166)
- Explanation in Neuroscience (344)
- Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content (167)
- Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content (84)
- Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc (74)
- Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content (380)
- Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content (187)
- Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc (166)
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General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Esa Diaz-Leon Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Aness Kim Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers |