Roger Penrose formuló en 1989 un argumento contra la IA. Dicho argumento concluye que la explicación científico-matemática de la realidad es más amplia que la meramente computacional, porque existen ciertos aspectos de la realidad no-computables. Este artículo analiza dicho argumento y la discusión al respecto, para concluir que el tipo de argumento que quiere desarrollar Penrose está viciado de raíz, lo que impide llegar a las conclusiones deseadas. A la vez se sostiene la validez filosófica de sus conclusiones y se (...) apunta a la idea de no-localidad como consistente al hablar sobre la conciencia. (shrink)

The paper has been written from a philosophical perspective and triggered by the recurrent discussions in psychology about the most suitable methods to study our multifaceted subjectivity. Its main point is that a phenomenological understanding of the human person provides a robust and also flexible philosophical framework for psychology. The first part discusses three classical distinctions –individual/general; explaining/understanding; induction/interpretation– which, in spite of possible deficiencies, are useful to illustrate the specificity of the human sciences relative to the natural sciences. If (...) not understood as an either-or dichotomy these distinctions represent the search of the right balance to reflect the complexity and richness of psychological science. The second part presents the phenomenological notions of ‘vital reduction’ and ‘personalist reduction’, where reductions does not take on an eliminativistic meaning, but of directing the mind’s gaze to attend to what is originally the case. The ‘vital reduction’ reveals a subject of experience at the center of the lifeworld, and the ‘personalist reduction’ sees in rationality –i.e., the power to grasp the meaning of things and to recognize other subjects of experience­– a deeper dimension of the subject, who we can thus call a person. Psychology and phenomenology converge in disclosing the person-centeredness of our lifeworld. (shrink)