This article uses Whitehead's process ontology and epistemology to propose Aesthetic Experience as a theory that can be used in organizational studies. The article starts from the intersections of ludic theory and aesthetics, to formulate a theory of Aesthetic Experience that improves and promotes enjoyment, creativity, satisfaction, and productivity in the workspace. Located in a process ontology and epistemology, we propose a simple approach for theory evaluation, using thought experiments to identify issues in the formulations (...) of extant theories, and formulate the theory of Aesthetic Experience using grounded methods, visual mapping, and process modeling. The broader purpose of the paper is to revive the study of Whiteheadian process philosophy within organizational studies. (shrink)

The role of judgments of beauty in scientific theory evaluation is the subject of significant debate in contemporary philosophy of science. This book advances that debate by broadening its scope. In Judgments of Beauty in Theory Evaluation, the author argues that judgments of beauty are a justified part of theory evaluation of all sorts: not only scientific theory evaluation, but also philosophical theory evaluation. The author argues for this thesis by (...) providing an account of beauty—inherited from Kant and Mothersill—on which the distinctive nature of judgments of beauty is that they are unprincipled, yet possible. The author then analyzes two important methods of theory evaluation—reflective equilibrium and simplicity—and argues that these methods require making judgments of beauty so understood. Finally, the author argues that these methods of theory evaluation are not anomalies, but that they point to a deeper lesson about the nature of theorizing and the necessity of using judgments of beauty to evaluate systems, like theories. This conclusion has implications for the debate in philosophy of science over judgments of beauty, but also prompts a reckoning in philosophy itself over the use of judgments of beauty in philosophical theory evaluation. (shrink)

Are theories judged on the basis of empirical tests of their predictions, as proposed by Karl Popper and others, or are new theories adopted by younger scientists while old theories fade away when their advocates die, as Max Planck suggested? A famous historical episode, the rejection of steady state cosmology and the revival of the big bang cosmology following the 1965 discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation, is examined to determine whether the scientific community followed Popper’s or Planck’s principle. (...) It is found that by 1975 almost all supporters of the steady state had either switched to the big bang or stopped publishing on cosmology. This case therefore seems to exemplify Popper’s principle, although it should be noted that two of the founders of steady state cosmology had strongly proclaimed their adherence to that principle. The case does not support the Popperian claim that successful novel predictions provide better evidence for a theory than deductions of known facts. (shrink)

It is claimed that Kuipers' approach to explanation opens the possibility for a further refinement of his own refined HD method for the evaluation of theories. One severe problem for the HD method, refined or not, is theory-ladeness. Given that experimental results are theory-laden, the comparative evaluation of alternative hypotheses is always relative to background knowledge. This difficulty can be avoided by supplementing HD considerations with the principle of inference to the best explanation. The authors sketch (...) a program for doing this. The general idea plays on some similarities between Kuipers' account of explanation and Lipton's. The former, however, is considered more flexible than the latter, which makes it even more attractive for the purpose under consideration. (shrink)

This article investigates whether or not theories of justice from political philosophy, first, support the position that health research should contribute to justice in global health, and second, provide guidance about what is owed by international clinical research (ICR) actors to parties in low- and middle-income countries. Four theories—John Rawls's theory of justice, the rights-based cosmopolitan theories of Thomas Pogge and Henry Shue, and Jennifer Ruger's health capability paradigm—are evaluated. The article shows that three of the four theories require (...) the conduct of health research for justice in global health. The theories help identify the ends of justice to which ICR is to contribute, but they cannot tell us how to organize ICR to promote these ends. Aside from Ruger's health capability paradigm, the theories also lack an allocative principle for assigning specific duties to specific actors. This creates difficulties for establishing obligations for certain types of ICR actors. (shrink)

The dissertation is a critical examination of theory evaluation in population genetics. There are three main philosophical approaches to theory evaluation in philosophy of science: confirmation and hypothesis testing, scientific change, and experimentation. Accounts that champion each of the main philosophical approaches to scientific theory evaluation are represented in philosophy of biology: confirmation and hypothesis testing by Elisabeth A. Lloyd, scientific change by Lindley Darden, and experimentation by David W. Rudge. I argue that each (...) of the main approaches is insufficient for evaluating population genetics theories. However, the accounts I critique are not fundamentally incompatible. I modify, unify, and extend them into a comprehensive account of theory evaluation for population genetics. ;My philosophical analysis is driven by a complex, important, and ongoing controversy in population genetics, viz., the R. A. Fisher-Sewall Wright controversy in population genetics. I use my historical case study to assess the adequacy of both the extant philosophical analyses of theory evaluation and my own account. Between 1929 and 1962 Fisher and Wright debated the main differences emanating from their alternative approaches to evolutionary theorizing. The debates between Fisher and Wright functionally ended with Fisher's death. However, Wright continued to clarify his position in the controversy until his death in 1988, and other biologists have continued work on the core debates. ;Recently, four scientific papers led by biologists Jerry A. Coyne and Michael J. Wade have been key in revisiting and rekindling the Fisher-Wright controversy with analyses of old theoretical and empirical issues as well as new developments that have spun off the older work. Four decades after the debates between Fisher and Wright, these papers have staked out, with substantial disagreement, claims about the evaluative status of the two predominant population genetics approaches to evolution in the field. A further task of this dissertation is to provide a non-partisan evaluation of the last 40 years of work on the controversy, i.e., the controversy since Fisher's death in 1962. It is hoped that such a critical analysis of the controversy will advance it to some extent. (shrink)

Depression is the principal cause of illness and disability in the world. Studies charting the prevalence of depression among children and adolescents report high percentages of youngsters in both groups with depressive symptoms. This review analyzes the construct and explanatory theories of depression and offers a succinct overview of the main evaluation instruments used to measure this disorder in children and adolescents, as well as the prevention programs developed for the school environment and the different types of clinical treatment (...) provided. The analysis reveals that in mental classifications, the child depression construct is no different from the adult one, and that multiple explanatory theories must be taken into account in order to arrive at a full understanding of depression. Consequently, both treatment and prevention should also be multifactorial in nature. Although universal programs may be more appropriate due to their broad scope of application, the results are inconclusive and fail to demonstrate any solid long-term efficacy. In conclusion, we can state that: (1) There are biological factors (such as tryptophan—a building block for serotonin-depletion, for example) which strongly influence the appearance of depressive disorders; (2) Currently, negative interpersonal relations and relations with one's environment, coupled with social-cultural changes, may explain the increase observed in the prevalence of depression; (3) Many instruments can be used to evaluate depression, but it is necessary to continue to adapt tests for diagnosing the condition at an early age; (4) Prevention programs should be developed for and implemented at an early age; and (5) The majority of treatments are becoming increasingly rigorous and effective. Given that initial manifestations of depression may occur from a very early age, further and more in-depth research is required into the biological, psychological and social factors that, in an interrelated manner, may explain the appearance, development and treatment of depression. (shrink)

Chow's endorsement of a limited role for null hypothesis significance testing is a needed corrective of research malpractice, but his decision to place this procedure in a hypothetico-deductive framework of Popperian cast is unwise. Various failures of this version of the hypothetico-deductive method have negative implications for Chow's treatment of significance testing, meta-analysis, and theory evaluation.

1. Introduction. The papers by Hellman and Mayo offer up a rich menu of problems and proposed solutions, so there is much here for a friendly critic to fasten on. In order to bring a modicum of focus to my commentary, I shall limit my remarks to the Duhem problem and its radiations in epistemology and methodology. Both Mayo and Hellman claim to have solutions to that hoary old problem and they tout these solutions as key indicators of the explanatory (...) power of their respective technical epistemologies, whether Bayesian or Neyman/Pearsonian. Like Mayo, I shall be arguing that the Bayesian treatment of Duhem's problem is no solution at all; that, indeed, it fails to grapple with the core challenges posed by the purported ambiguities of falsification. My response to Mayo's more detailed, and I think more right-headed, treatment of the Duhem problem will be more complex. While I believe that she is moving in the right direction in many respects, I think that she fails to see one key dimension of the Duhemian conundrum. Indeed, she risks solving not Duhem's problem but quite a different one. I shall gently try to encourage her to steer her way back towards the central task. (shrink)

An argument evaluation inventory distinguishing between different levels of theory-evidence differentiation was designed corresponding to the levels of argument observed in argument generation tasks. Five scenarios containing everyday theories about a social problem, and arguments to support those theories were presented to 170 participants from two age groups (15 and 22 years) and different educational tracks. Participants had to rate the validity of arguments proposed by a story figure, to support the theory, to choose the best argument, (...) and to justify their choice. The rating task proved to be very difficult for all age groups, with only 49% of the university students consistently rating valid evidence-based arguments higher than flawed arguments. Competence improved with age and educational level. In the choice task more than 80% of the adults preferred an argument that reflected theory-evidence differentiation over mere theory elaboration or flawed reasoning. However, only adults with a university education were able to also explicitly justify their choice. Overall, these findings imply that laypersons have similar conceptual problems in differentiating theory from evidence as it has been reported for evidence generation tasks (Kuhn, 1991). Performance on the choice task suggests that some implicit awareness of differences between theory and evidence may precede a full, explicit understanding. Implications for education are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that singularist approaches to solving the Pessimistic Induction, such as Structural Realism, are unacceptable, but that when a pluralist account of methodological principles is adopted this anti-realist argument can be dissolved. The proposed view is a contextual methodological pluralism in the tradition of Normative Naturalism, and is justified by appeal to meta-methodological principles that are themselves justified via an externalist epistemology. Not only does this view provide an answer to the Pessimistic Induction, it can also (...) accommodate our strongest intuitions regarding the progress of science. (shrink)

-/- This essay discusses the relation between ideal theory and two forms of political moralism identified by Bernard Williams, structural and enactment views. It argues that ideal theory, at least in the sense Rawls used that term, only makes sense for structural forms of moralism. These theories see their task as describing the constraints that properly apply to political agents and institutions. As a result, they are primarily concerned with norms that govern action. In contrast, many critiques of (...) ideal theory are structured and motivated by their commitment to an enactment model of political theorizing. This instead sees political agents and institutions as instruments for producing or promoting better states of affairs. Enactment models treat the evaluations that rank different states of affairs as justificatorily basic, rather than norms governing action on which structural models focus. This reveals an important feature of debates about ideal theory. Whether ideal theory is capable of appropriately guiding action will depend on what the criteria for appropriately guiding action are, about which different theorists have importantly different views. For example, some popular strategies for defending ideal theory fail, while it may be much less clear that some alternatives to ideal theory can provide action guidance than their advocates claim. (shrink)

Naturalistic theories of disease appeal to concepts of biological function, and use the notion of dysfunction as the basis of their definitions. Debates in the philosophy of biology demonstrate how attributing functions in organisms and establishing the function-dysfunction distinction is by no means straightforward. This problematization of functional ascription has undermined naturalistic theories and led some authors to abandon the concept of dysfunction, favoring instead definitions based in normative criteria or phenomenological approaches. Although this work has enhanced our understanding of (...) disease and illness, we need not necessarily abandon naturalistic concepts of function and dysfunction in the disease debate. This article attempts to move towards a new naturalistic theory of disease that overcomes the limitations of previous definitions and offers advantages in the clinical setting. Our approach involves a reevaluation of concepts of biological function employed by naturalistic theories. Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of biology, we develop a contextual and evaluative account of function that is better suited to clinical medicine and remains consistent with contemporary naturalism. We also show how an updated naturalistic view shares important affinities with normativist and phenomenological positions, suggesting a possibility for consilience in the disease debate. (shrink)

Naturalistic theories of disease appeal to concepts of biological function, and use the notion of dysfunction as the basis of their definitions. Debates in the philosophy of biology demonstrate how attributing functions in organisms and establishing the function-dysfunction distinction is by no means straightforward. This problematization of functional ascription has undermined naturalistic theories and led some authors to abandon the concept of dysfunction, favoring instead definitions based in normative criteria or phenomenological approaches. Although this work has enhanced our understanding of (...) disease and illness, we need not necessarily abandon naturalistic concepts of function and dysfunction in the disease debate. This article attempts to move towards a new naturalistic theory of disease that overcomes the limitations of previous definitions and offers advantages in the clinical setting. Our approach involves a re-evaluation of concepts of biological function employed by naturalistic theories. Drawing on recent insights from the philosophy of biology, we develop a contextual and evaluative account of function that is better suited to clinical medicine and remains consistent with contemporary naturalism. We also show how an updated naturalistic view shares important affinities with normativist and phenomenological positions, suggesting a possibility for consilience in the disease debate. (shrink)

In contemporary psychology and philosophy, influential theories approach the emotions via their relations to values and evaluations. My aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy relate to one another. I first explain why this presupposes that we make up our minds about the relations between “molecular” and “molar” properties. The rest of my discussion explores some ways of understanding the relation between the molar and the molecular: as a relation of epistemological (...) support, of identity or of the determinable-determinates type. (shrink)

This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously (...) con- stitutive of that import by virtue of the broader rational patterns of which they are a part and that they serve to de?ne. This account of felt eval- uations makes sense of the way in which pleasures and pains grab our attention and motivate us to act and of the peculiar dual objectivity and subjectivity of their implicit evaluations, while o?ering a phenomenology adequate to both emotional and bodily pleasures and pains. (shrink)

This article points out the criteria necessary in order for a qualitative scientific method to qualify itself as phenomenological in a descriptive Husserlian sense. One would have to employ description within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, and seek the most invariant meanings for a context. The results of this analysis are used to critique an article by Klein and Westcott , that presents a typology of the development of the phenomenological psychological method.

In activist circles feminist political thought is often viewed as abstract because it does not help activists make the kinds of arguments that are generally effective with donors and policy makers. The feminist political philosopher's focus on how we know and what counts as knowledge is a large step away from the terrain in which activists make their arguments to donors. Yet, philosophical reflection on the relations between power and knowledge can make a significant contribution to women's human rights work (...) in the area of evaluation. Feminist political philosophy can offer guidelines for how to evaluate the work of women's human rights organizations and their funders in light of the social, political, and economic conditions that render their work necessary and difficult. This article offers 1) an account of the difficulty in showing the impact of social change activism using conventional modes of measurement, particularly those that focus on first order effects, 2) feminist theoretical insights into the interrelatedness of global gender injustices that may help us develop better benchmarks of evaluation for women's human rights programming, and 3) a sketch of how to approach the evaluation of organizations and donors who seek to support global gender justice. (shrink)

Kuhn claimed that several algorithms can be defended to select the best theory based on epistemic values such as simplicity, accuracy, and fruitfulness. In a recent paper, Okasha :83–115, 2011) argued that no theory choice algorithm exists which satisfies a set of intuitively compelling conditions that Arrow had proposed for a consistent aggregation of individual preference orderings. In this paper, we put forward a solution to avoid this impossibility result. Based on previous work by Gaertner and Xu, we (...) suggest to view the theory choice problem in a cardinal context and to use a general scoring function defined over a set of qualitative verdicts for every epistemic value. This aggregation method yields a complete and transitive ranking and the rule satisfies all Arrovian conditions appropriately reformulated within a cardinal setting. We also propose methods that capture the aggregation across different scientists. (shrink)

ArgumentAgent-based social simulations have historically been evaluated using two criteria: verification and validation. This article questions the adequacy of this dual evaluation scheme. It claims that the scheme does not conform to everyday practices of evaluation, and has, over time, fostered a theory-practice gap in the assessment of social simulations. This gap originates because the dual evaluation scheme, inherited from computer science and software engineering, on one hand, overemphasizes the technical and formal aspects of the implementation (...) process and, on the other hand, misrepresents the connection between the conceptual and the computational model. The mismatch between evaluation theory and practice, it is suggested, might be overcome if practitioners of agent-based social simulation adopt a single criterion evaluation scheme in which: i) the technical/formal issues of the implementation process are tackled as a matter of debugging or instrument calibration, and ii) the epistemological issues surrounding the connection between conceptual and computational models are addressed as a matter of validation. (shrink)

String theory has been the dominating research field in theoretical physics during the last decades. Despite the considerable time elapse, no new testable predictions have been derived by string theorists and it is understandable that doubts have been voiced. Some people have argued that it is time to give up since testability is wanting. But the majority has not been convinced and they continue to believe that string theory is the right way to go. This situation is interesting (...) for philosophy of science since it highlights several of our central issues. In this paper we will discuss string theory from a number of different perspectives in general methodology. We will also relate the realism/antirealism debate to the current status of string theory. Our goal is two-fold; both to take a look at string theory from philosophical perspectives and to use string theory as a test case for some philosophical issues. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is widely accepted but elementary aspects remain indeterminate as the term ‘stakeholder’ is an essentially contested concept, being variously describable, internally complex and open in character. Such contestability is highly problematic for theory development and empirical testing. The extent of essential contestability, previously unknown, is demonstrated in this paper through a bounded systematic review of 593 different stakeholder theory definitions. As an essentially contested concept, the solution does not lie in a universal stakeholder definition, but (...) in debating the boundaries of stakeholder identification. To this end, this paper presents the first major attempt at sorting, filtering and ordering stakeholder theory and stakeholder definitions to produce a comprehensive, multi-dimensional classification of stakeholder theory. The constructs of the classification model juxtapose existing stakeholder theories and contributions from across the multi-contextual applications of stakeholder theory, thereby providing an invaluable overview of what we know about stakeholder theory in one model. The classification model is then tested with positive results. The paper concludes with a comprehensive discussion of the implications of classification stakeholder theory definitions, which has for future research. (shrink)

This chapter considers the question of ordinary judgment in ethics, followed by certain criticisms and forms of skepticism with regard to attempts at theorization in moral philosophy. It then presents the principal ethical theories. These are used to support more general forms of pluralism in practical reasoning. The chapter outlines an analytical approach to the fullest possible form of ethical pluralism, in relation to ethical evaluation in a context of justification. This pluralism applies to participatory technology assessment (PTA), responsible (...) research and innovation (RRI) and, beyond that, to any ethical evaluation. From these essential bases, forming part of ethical judgments and evaluations, the chapter considers the rapprochement between ethical theories and ethical argument in the conclusion. Meta‐ethics is involved in developing other areas of interest, and may enter into relation with other areas of science, such as psychology, epistemology, metaphysics or linguistics. (shrink)

Third generation prospect theory is a theory of choices and of judgments of highest buying and lowest selling prices of risky prospects, i.e., of willingness to pay and willingness to accept. The gap between WTP and WTA is sometimes called the “endowment effect” and was previously called the “point of view” effect. Third generation prospect theory combines cumulative prospect theory for risky prospects with the theory that judged values are based on the integration of price (...) paid or price received with the consequences of gambles. In TGPT, the discrepancy between WTP and WTA is due to loss aversion-losses have greater absolute utility than gains of the same value. TGPT was developed independently of similar developments by Birnbaum and Zimmermann :145–187, 1998) and Luce. This paper reviews theoretical and empirical findings, to show that TGPT fails as a descriptive model of both choices and judgments. Evidence refutes three implications of TGPT, but they are consistent with configural weight models in which loss aversion is not needed to describe the results. In the configural weight models, buyers place greater weight on lower consequences, attributes or estimates of value compared to sellers, who place greater configural weight on higher aspects of an object or prospect. (shrink)

The recent literature on epistemic virtues advances two general projects. The first is virtue epistemology, an attempt to explicate key epistemic notions in terms of epistemic virtue. The second is epistemic virtue theory, the conceptual and normative investigation of cognitive traits of character. While a great deal of work has been done in virtue epistemology, epistemic virtue theory still languishes in a state of neglect. Furthermore, the existing work is non-naturalistic. The present paper contributes to the development of (...) a naturalistic epistemic virtue theory by presenting a virtue-theoretic evaluation of need for cognition as informed by the relevant psychological studies. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of the epistemic distinction between the grounds that are relevant for justification in normal knowledge-claim contexts and those that are relevant in philosophical knowledge-claim contexts for inductive logics.

This paper is the third in a series of four that is directed at understanding and assessing stakeholder theory for the purposes of business ethics. It addresses the suitability and viability of the theory, rejecting objections of a moral and efficiency sort based (respectively) on claims about property rights and the economic superiority of the alternative stockholder approach, but accepting that implementation problems require limiting both the number of groupings admitted to stakeholder status and the degree of responsibility (...) towards them. The conclusion looks forward to the construction of a suitably limited version of the stakeholder approach in a fourth paper drawing upon this one and the previous two. (shrink)

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by (...) Jeff McMahan, has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations. (shrink)

The field of enquiry into the phenomenon of language has long been dominated by the Computational-Representational (C-R) theories of language. This seems to be the most natural and plausible state of affairs, given the revolutionary impact that the advent of computers and the emergence of information technology have had in our lives lately. Noam Chomsky’s variant has been the most influential among such theories. However, there are certain conceptual issues pertaining to the very method, object and modality of the Chomskyan (...) project. In the present paper, I will try to locate these issues and contend that they arise from the peculiar conception of human embodiment involved in the propositions forming the Chomskyan scheme of language. They come to light only when engaged closely with from a phenomenological viewpoint. And this will be done in the first part. Once this is done, I will propose an alternative approach towards language, contained in the phenomenological insights on human embodiment and perception of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau Ponty. I will also hint at how befitting this alternative scheme is to the connectionist-neural network models of language, which are fast replacing the C–R models lately. (shrink)

L’objectif de ce texte est double: expliquer certaines limitations des approches traditionnelles du succès des théories, et esquisser un critère pour l’évaluation comparative des succès empiriques d’une théorie. On insiste sur les points suivants: a) la supériorité de la prédiction sur l’adaptation, b) la résolution des anomalies non-réfutantes et c) l’utilisation limitée d’hypothèses ad hoc. Après une première partie consacrée à lever les ambiguïtés de l’expression « succès d’une théorie », la deuxième partie traite de quelques-unes des principales lacunes des (...) approches conséquentialistes traditionnelles du succès des théories. Enfin, dans la dernière section, on esquisse le critère de succès empirique d’une théorie et on donne quelques éléments pour renforcer ce critère. (shrink)

L’objectif de ce texte est double: expliquer certaines limitations des approches traditionnelles du succès des théories, et esquisser un critère pour l’évaluation comparative des succès empiriques d’une théorie. On insiste sur les points suivants: a) la supériorité de la prédiction sur l’adaptation, b) la résolution des anomalies non-réfutantes et c) l’utilisation limitée d’hypothèses ad hoc. Après une première partie consacrée à lever les ambiguïtés de l’expression « succès d’une théorie », la deuxième partie traite de quelques-unes des principales lacunes des (...) approches conséquentialistes traditionnelles du succès des théories. Enfin, dans la dernière section, on esquisse le critère de succès empirique d’une théorie et on donne quelques éléments pour renforcer ce critère. (shrink)

We use psychological concepts (e.g., intention and desire) when we ascribe psychological states to others for purposes of describing, explaining, and predicting their actions. Does the evidence reported by Knobe show, as he thinks, that moral evaluation shapes our mastery of psychological concepts? We argue that the evidence so far shows instead that moral evaluation shapes the way we report, not the way we think about, others' psychological states.