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  1. On the Logical Form of Concessive Conditionals.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-19.
    This paper outlines an account of concessive conditionals that rests on two main ideas. One is that the logical form of a sentence as used in a given context is determined by the content expressed by the sentence in that context. The other is that a coherent distinction can be drawn between a reading of ‘if’ according to which a conditional is true when its consequent holds on the supposition that its antecedent holds, and a stronger reading according to which (...)
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  2. ‘A Formula Which I Derived Many Years Ago’ Boole, Reichenbach and Popper on Probability and Conditionals.Hans Rott - forthcoming - History and Philosophy of Logic:1-8.
    This note presents a very brief history of the observation that the probability of the material conditional A⊃B is in general different from, but cannot be less than, the conditional probability of...
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  3. Revealing the Counterfactuals: Molinism, Stubbornness, and Deception.Matyáš Moravec - forthcoming - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-18.
    This paper argues that the possibility of revealing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to agents in possible worlds forming part of God’s natural knowledge poses a new problem for Molinism. This problem best comes to light when considering the phenomenon of stubbornness, i.e., the conscious refusal of fulfilling the providential plan revealed to and intended for us by another agent. The reason why this problem has gone unnoticed is that the usual instances of prophecy dealt with by Molinists (especially the story (...)
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  4. Conditional Logics Accommodating Stalnaker's Thesis.Andrew Bacon - manuscript
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  5. Indicative Conditionals and Epistemic Luminosity.Matt Hewson & James Ravi Kirkpatrick - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):231–258.
    Kevin Dorst has recently pointed out an apparently puzzling consequence of denying epistemic luminosity: given some natural-sounding bridging principles between knowledge, credence, and indicative conditionals, the denial of epistemic luminosity licenses the knowledge and assertability of abominable-sounding conditionals of the form ⌜If I don’t know that ϕ, then ϕ⌝. We provide a general and systematic examination of this datum by testing Dorst’s claim against various semantics for the indicative conditional in the setting of epistemic logic. Our conclusion is that, regardless (...)
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  6. Morgenbesser’s Coin.Yael Loewenstein - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):317-328.
    Before a fair, indeterministic coin is tossed, Lucky, who is causally isolated from the coin-tossing mechanism, declines to bet on heads. The coin lands heads. The consensus is that the following counterfactual is true: (M:) If Lucky had bet heads, he would have won the bet. It is also widely believed that to rule (M) true, any plausible semantics for counterfactuals must invoke causal independence. But if that’s so, the hope of giving a reductive analysis of causation in terms of (...)
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  7. Counterfactuals in Historiography.Zenonas Norkus - 1998 - Problemos 53.
    The article exposes the theories of the counterfactuals in analytical philosophy and discusses the conditions of assertability of counterfactuals in historiography. The conviction of some historians that the counterfactuals are essentially forbidden in the scientific historiography is critised on the ground that counterfactuals are implied by the causal statements and statements of the relative causal importance. The admission is made that the traditional historiography lacks adequate conceptual infrastructure for the detailed analysis of the objectively possible historical alternatives because its only (...)
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  8. Counterfactuals and Modality.Gabriel Greenberg - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (6):1255-1280.
    This essay calls attention to a set of linguistic interactions between counterfactual conditionals, on one hand, and possibility modals like could have and might have, on the other. These data present a challenge to the popular variably strict semantics for counterfactual conditionals. Instead, they support a version of the strict conditional semantics in which counterfactuals and possibility modals share a unified quantificational domain. I’ll argue that pragmatic explanations of this evidence are not available to the variable analysis. And putative counterexamples (...)
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  9. Laws and Other Worlds: A Humean Account of Laws and Counterfactuals.Fred Wilson - 1986 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
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  10. Generalized Probabilistic Modus Ponens.Giuseppe Sanfilippo, Niki Pfeifer & Angelo Gilio - 2017 - In A. Antonucci, L. Cholvy & O. Papini (eds.), Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 10369). Cham, Switzerland: pp. 480-490.
    Modus ponens (from A and “if A then C” infer C) is one of the most basic inference rules. The probabilistic modus ponens allows for managing uncertainty by transmitting assigned uncertainties from the premises to the conclusion (i.e., from P(A) and P(C|A) infer P(C)). In this paper, we generalize the probabilistic modus ponens by replacing A by the conditional event A|H. The resulting inference rule involves iterated conditionals (formalized by conditional random quantities) and propagates previsions from the premises to the (...)
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  11. Counterfactuals, Indicative Conditionals, and Negation Under Uncertainty: Are There Cross-Cultural Differences?Niki Pfeifer & H. Yama - 2017 - In G. Gunzelmann, A. Howes, T. Tenbrink & E. Davelaar (eds.), Proceedings of the 39th Cognitive Science Society Meeting. pp. 2882-2887.
    In this paper we study selected argument forms involving counterfactuals and indicative conditionals under uncertainty. We selected argument forms to explore whether people with an Eastern cultural background reason differently about conditionals compared to Westerners, because of the differences in the location of negations. In a 2x2 between-participants design, 63 Japanese university students were allocated to four groups, crossing indicative conditionals and counterfactuals, and each presented in two random task orders. The data show close agreement between the responses of Easterners (...)
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  12. Probabilistic Entailment and Iterated Conditionals.A. Gilio, Niki Pfeifer & Giuseppe Sanfilippo - 2020 - In S. Elqayam, Igor Douven, J. St B. T. Evans & N. Cruz (eds.), Logic and uncertainty in the human mind: a tribute to David E. Over. London, UK: pp. 71-101.
    In this paper we exploit the notions of conjoined and iterated conditionals, which are defined in the setting of coherence by means of suitable conditional random quantities with values in the interval [0,1]. We examine the iterated conditional (B|K)|(A|H), by showing that A|H p-entails B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Then, we show that a p-consistent family F={E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails a conditional event E3|H3 if and only if E3|H3= 1, or (E3|H3)|QC(S) = 1 for some nonempty subset S (...)
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  13. Living in a Material World: A Critical Notice of Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals by Timothy Williamson.Daniel Rothschild - forthcoming - Mind:fzab049.
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  14. Corrigendum To: A Suppositional Theory of Conditionals.Sam Carter - forthcoming - Mind:fzab074.
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  15. Choice-Driven Counterfactuals.Ilaria Canavotto & Eric Pacuit - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-49.
    In this paper, we investigate the semantics and logic of choice-driven counterfactuals, that is, of counterfactuals whose evaluation relies on auxiliary premises about how agents are expected to act, i.e., about their default choice behavior. To do this, we merge one of the most prominent logics of agency in the philosophical literature, namely stit logic, with the well-known logic of counterfactuals due to Stalnaker and Lewis. A key component of our semantics for counterfactuals is to distinguish between deviant and non-deviant (...)
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  16. Probabilities of Conditionals and Previsions of Iterated Conditionals.Giuseppe Sanfilippo, Angelo Gilio, David E. Over & Niki Pfeifer - 2020 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 121.
    We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis's triviality result, which shows the conditions a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach, however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then Cas information, the probability of A should intuitively increase. We explain (...)
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  17. 'Deduction' Versus 'Inference' and the Denotation of Conditional Sentences.Carsten Breul - manuscript
    The paper defends a variant of the material implication approach to the meaning of conditional sentences against some arguments that are considered to be widely subscribed to and/or important in the philosophical, psychological and linguistic literature. These arguments are shown to be wrong, debatable, or to miss their aim if the truth conditions defining material implication are viewed as determining nothing but the denotation of conditional sentences and if the function of conditional sentences in deduction (logic) is focused on rather (...)
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  18. Probability, Evidential Support, and the Logic of Conditionals.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2021 - Argumenta 6:211-222.
    Once upon a time, some thought that indicative conditionals could be effectively analyzed as material conditionals. Later on, an alternative theoretical construct has prevailed and received wide acceptance, namely, the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. Partly following critical remarks recently ap- peared in the literature, we suggest that evidential support—rather than conditional probability alone—is key to understand indicative conditionals. There have been motivated concerns that a theory of evidential conditionals (unlike their more tra- ditional counterparts) cannot generate (...)
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  19. A Graded Semantics for Counterfactuals.Libor Běhounek & Ondrej Majer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):11963-11994.
    This article presents an extension of Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals to a graded framework. Unlike standard graded approaches, which use the probabilistic framework, we employ that of many-valued logics. Our principal goal is to provide an adequate analysis of the main background notion of Lewis’ approach—the one of the similarity of possible worlds. We discuss the requirements imposed on the analysis of counterfactuals by the imprecise character of similarity and concentrate in particular on robustness, i.e., the requirement that small changes (...)
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  20. Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - forthcoming - History and Philosophy of Logic:1-8.
    Conditional judgements—judgements employing ‘if’—are essential to practical reasoning about what to do, as well as to much reasoning about what is the case. We handle them well enough from an early...
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  21. Interventionist Counterfactuals and the Nearness of Worlds.Reuben Stern - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10721-10737.
    A number of authors have recently used causal models to develop a promising semantics for non-backtracking counterfactuals. Briggs shows that when this semantics is naturally extended to accommodate right-nested counterfactuals, it invalidates modus ponens, and therefore violates weak centering given the standard Lewis/stalnaker interpretation of the counterfactual in terms of nearness or similarity of worlds. In this paper, I explore the possibility of abandoning the Lewis/stalnaker interpretation for some alternative that is better suited to accommodate the causal modeling semantics. I (...)
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  22. A graph model for probabilities of nested conditionals.Anna Wójtowicz & Krzysztof Wójtowicz - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-48.
    We define a model for computing probabilities of right-nested conditionals in terms of graphs representing Markov chains. This is an extension of the model for simple conditionals from Wójtowicz and Wójtowicz. The model makes it possible to give a formal yet simple description of different interpretations of right-nested conditionals and to compute their probabilities in a mathematically rigorous way. In this study we focus on the problem of the probabilities of conditionals; we do not discuss questions concerning logical and metalogical (...)
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  23. Path Semantics for Indicative Conditionals.Paolo Santorio - forthcoming - Mind.
    The literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don't express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported by strong arguments, but they are incompatible on their standard formulations. Hence it appears that we have to choose between mutually exclusive options. (...)
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  24. Properties, Propositions and Conditionals.Hartry Field - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):112-146.
    ABSTRACT Section 1 discusses properties and propositions, and some of the motivation for an account in which property instantiation and propositional truth behave ‘naively’. Section 2 generalizes a standard Kripke construction for naive properties and propositions, in a language with modal operators but no conditionals. Whereas Kripke uses a 3-valued value space, the generalized account allows for a broad array of value spaces, including the unit interval [0,1]. This is put to use in Section 3, where I add to the (...)
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  25. Property Identity and Relevant Conditionals.Zach Weber - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):147-155.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Properties, Propositions, and Conditionals’ Field [2021] advances further on our understanding of the logic and meaning of naive theories – theories that maintain, in the face of paradox, basic assumptions about properties and propositions. His work follows in a tradition going back over 40 years now, of using Kripke fixed-point model constructions to show how naive schemas can be consistent, as long as one embeds in a non-classical logic. A main issue in all this research is the question (...)
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  26. A Bit of Connexivity Around the Field of Ordinary Conditionals.Elisángela Ramírez-Cámara & Luis Estrada-González - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):156-161.
    ABSTRACT In this brief note we explore a couple of features of the semantics for indicative conditionals provided by Field. Those features strikingly resemble some controversial principles in connexive logic. We will show that although Field’s semantics has the technical means to stand to the mentioned features, more work is needed to make some of its outcomes less unintuitive.
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  27. Proofs and Models in Naive Property Theory: A Response to Hartry Field's ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’.Greg Restall, Rohan French & Shawn Standefer - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):162-177.
    ABSTRACT In our response Field's ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’, we explore the methodology of Field's program. We begin by contrasting it with a proof-theoretic approach and then commenting on some of the particular choices made in the development of Field's theory. Then, we look at issues of property identity in connection with different notions of equivalence. We close with some comments relating our discussion to Field's response to Restall’s [2010] ‘What Are We to Accept, and What Are We to Reject, (...)
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  28. Curitorial Introduction: Hartry Field, ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’.Edwin Mares - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):105-111.
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  29. In Defense of a Probability Based Semantics for Counterfactuals.Lars Gundersen & Mads Olesen - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):538-549.
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  30. No Fact of the Middle.Justin Khoo - forthcoming - Noûs.
    A middle fact is a true proposition about what would have happened had A been true (where A is in fact false), whose truth isn't entailed by any non-counterfactual facts. I argue that there are no middle facts; if there were, we wouldn't know them, and our ignorance of them would result in ignorance about whether regret is fitting in cases where we clearly know it is. But there's a problem. Consider an unflipped fair coin which is such that no (...)
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  31. What Killed Your Plant? Profligate Omissions and Weak Centering.Johannes Himmelreich - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    This paper is on the problem of profligate omissions. The problem is that counterfactual definitions of causation identify as a cause anything that could have prevented an effect but that did not actually occur, which is a highly counterintuitive result. Many solutions of this problem appeal to normative, epistemic, pragmatic, or metaphysical considerations. These existing solutions are in some sense substantive. In contrast, this paper concentrates on the semantics of counterfactuals. I propose to replace Strong Centering with Weak Centering. This (...)
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  32. Gender in Conditionals.Sandro Zucchi & Fabio Del Prete - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (4):953-980.
    The 3sg pronouns “he” and “she” impose descriptive gender conditions on their referents. These conditions are standardly analysed as presuppositions. Cooper argues that, when 3sg pronouns occur free, they have indexical presuppositions: the gender condition must be satisfied by the pronoun’s referent in the actual world. In this paper, we consider the behaviour of free 3sg pronouns in conditionals and focus on cases in which the pronouns’ gender presuppositions no longer seem to be indexical and project locally instead. We compare (...)
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  33. Vagueness-Induced Counterexamples to Modus Tollens.Tom Beevers - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):405-416.
    I argue that vagueness produces counterexamples to modus tollens. I begin by outlining cases where indicative and counterfactual conditionals seem intuitively to be determinate even when their antecedents are borderline and their consequents are determinately false. Accepting these intuitions has some revisionary implications; however, rejecting them leads to unacceptable consequences for our knowledge of conditionals. I thus take it that we should accept that our intuitions are reliable. I show it follows that modus tollens fails. I conclude by defending this (...)
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  34. G. Priest's An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (2001). [REVIEW]Hans-Peter Leeb - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24:65-66.
    The review gives a short description of the content of the book and discusses the treatment of conditionals in it.
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  35. A Question of Detail: Matching Counterfactuals to Actual Cause in Pre-Emption Scenarios.Denis Hilton, Christophe Schmeltzer & Valentin Goulette - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning:1-39.
    Causal pre-emption scenarios are problematic for the counterfactual framework of causation because people judge an action to be the actual cause of an outcome although the outcome would have...
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  36. Probabilistic Inferences From Conjoined to Iterated Conditionals.Giuseppe Sanfilippo - 2018 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 93:103-118.
    There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)$, is the conditional probability of $B$ given $A$, $P(B|A)$. We identify a conditional which is such that $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)= P(B|A)$ with de Finetti's conditional event, $B|A$. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of (...)
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  37. Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscript
    I argue that we should solve the Lottery Paradox by denying that rational belief is closed under classical logic. To reach this conclusion, I build on my previous result that (a slight variant of) McGee’s election scenario is a lottery scenario (see Lissia 2019). Indeed, this result implies that the sensible ways to deal with McGee’s scenario are the same as the sensible ways to deal with the lottery scenario: we should either reject the Lockean Thesis or Belief Closure. After (...)
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  38. Conditional Learning Through Causal Models.Jonathan Vandenburgh - 2020 - Synthese (1-2):2415-2437.
    Conditional learning, where agents learn a conditional sentence ‘If A, then B,’ is difficult to incorporate into existing Bayesian models of learning. This is because conditional learning is not uniform: in some cases, learning a conditional requires decreasing the probability of the antecedent, while in other cases, the antecedent probability stays constant or increases. I argue that how one learns a conditional depends on the causal structure relating the antecedent and the consequent, leading to a causal model of conditional learning. (...)
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  39. Everyday Reasoning with Unfamiliar Conditionals.Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda & Markus Knauff - forthcoming - Tandf: Thinking and Reasoning:1-28.
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  40. If a Man Buys a Horse, … You Have No Argument Against Material Implication: On a Flaw in the Foundations of the Restrictor Approach to Conditionals.Carsten Breul - manuscript
    The paper discusses a prominent one of Kratzer's (1986, 1991, 2012) arguments against material implication analyses of the denotation of (indicative) conditional sentences. This is the argument based on the sentence _Most of the time, if a man buys a horse, he pays cash for it_. It is shown that material implication makes a prediction that does conform to speakers' intuitions, contrary to Kratzer's claim. The paper also argues that Lewis's (1975) attack on material implication analyses of conditional sentences based (...)
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  41. Gender in Conditionals.Fabio Del Prete & Alessandro Zucchi - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44:953–980.
    The 3sg pronouns “he” and “she” impose descriptive gender conditions on their referents. These conditions are standardly analysed as presuppositions. Cooper argues that, when 3sg pronouns occur free, they have indexical presuppositions: the gender condition must be satisfied by the pronoun’s referent in the actual world. In this paper, we consider the behaviour of free 3sg pronouns in conditionals and focus on cases in which the pronouns’ gender presuppositions no longer seem to be indexical and project locally instead. We compare (...)
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  42. Counterfactual Probability.Ginger Schultheis - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Stalnaker's Thesis about indicative conditionals is, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional equals the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. The thesis seems right. If you draw a card from a standard 52-card deck, how confident are you that the card is a diamond if it's a red card? To answer this, you calculate the proportion of red cards that are diamonds -- that is, you calculate the (...)
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  43. Quantified Conditionals and Compositionality.Janneke Huitink - 2010 - Language and Linguistics Compass 4:42-53.
    The interpretation of conditionals in the scope of a quantifier (as in ‘No student will succeed if he goofs off’) presents a troubling puzzle. Either we are forced to abandon the thesis that natural language obeys the compositionality principle, or we must commit to a semantics for conditionals that involves an uncomfortably high degree of stipulation. This article surveys the recent literature on quantified conditionals and aims to pinpoint the issues that stand in the way of a compositional analysis.
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  44. "If Oswald Had Not Killed Kennedy" – Spohn on Counterfactuals.Hans Rott - 2016 - In Wolfgang Freitag, Hans Rott, Holger Sturm & Alexandra Zinke (eds.), Von Rang und Namen. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn. Münster, Germany: Mentis. pp. 379–399.
    Wolfgang Spohn's theory of ranking functions is an elegant and powerful theory of the structure and dynamics of doxastic states. In two recent papers, Spohn has applied it to the analysis of conditionals, claiming to have presented a unified account of indicative and subjunctive (counterfactual) conditionals. I argue that his analysis fails to account for counterfactuals that refer to indirect causes. The strategy of taking the transitive closure that Spohn employs in the theory of causation is not available for counterfactuals. (...)
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  45. Concessive Conditionals Without Even If and Nonconcessive Conditionals with Even If.Gilberto Gomes - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (1):1-21.
    This paper investigates whether 'even if A, B' is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive conditional may have 'even if', and whether concessive conditionals, pragmatically defined, can fail to have 'even if' or a non-temporal 'still'. Different paraphrases are used to help elucidate pragmatic meanings. A theory of the pragmatic meanings of concessive and implicative conditionals is presented. The semantic meaning of 'even if' and the question of whether concessive conditionals imply the truth of their consequents are also discussed.
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  46. Anankastic Conditionals Are Still a Mystery.Milo Phillips-Brown - 2019 - Semantics and Pragmatics 12 (13):1-17.
    ‘If you want to go to Harlem, you have to take the A train’ doesn’t look special. Yet a compositional account of its meaning, and the meaning of anankastic conditionals more generally, has proven an enigma. Semanticists have responded by assigning anankastics a unique status, distinguishing them from ordinary indicative conditionals. Condoravdi & Lauer (2016) maintain instead that “anankastic conditionals are just conditionals.” I argue that Condoravdi and Lauer don’t give a general solution to a well-known problem: the problem of (...)
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  47. Pensamento e linguagem nas afirmações condicionais.Gilberto Gomes - 2013 - D.E.L.T.A 1 (29):121-134.
    Conditional assertions are a peculiar language structure that manifests a specific cognitive operation. In order to express it, different languages have found different ways of using verb forms. Primary conditionals are here defined as those that presuppose the possibility of the falsity of both the antecedent and the consequent. In them, the truth of the antecedent appears as a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent. The truth condition of primary conditionals is defined as the impossibility of the conjunction (...)
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  48. Meaning-Preserving Contraposition of Conditionals.Gilberto Gomes - 2019 - Journal of Pragmatics 1 (152):46-60.
    It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed (...)
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  49. The Dialogical Entailment Task.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2019 - Cognition:104010.
    In this paper, a critical discussion is made of the role of entailments in the so-called New Paradigm of psychology of reasoning based on Bayesian models of rationality (Elqayam & Over, 2013). It is argued that assessments of probabilistic coherence cannot stand on their own, but that they need to be integrated with empirical studies of intuitive entailment judgments. This need is motivated not just by the requirements of probability theory itself, but also by a need to enhance the interdisciplinary (...)
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  50. Norm Conflicts and Conditionals.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, David Kellen, Ulrike Hahn & Karl Christoph Klauer - 2019 - Psychological Review (5):611-633.
    Suppose that two competing norms, N1 and N2, can be identified such that a given person’s response can be interpreted as correct according to N1 but incorrect according to N2. Which of these two norms, if any, should one use to interpret such a response? In this paper we seek to address this fundamental problem by studying individual variation in the interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual profiles of the participants based on their case judgments and reflective attitudes. To investigate (...)
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