Definitions of what it is to be a stakeholder are divided into "claimant" definitions requiring some sort of claim on the services of a business, "influencer" definitions requiring only a capacity to influence the workings of the business, and "combinatory" definitions allowing for either or both of these requirements. It is argued that for the purposes of business ethics, stakeholding has to be about improving the moral conduct of businesses by directing them at serving more than just the interests of (...) owners. On that basis, influencer definitions are eliminated on the grounds that they only concern morally neutral strategic considerations and combinatory definitions on the grounds that the combining of ethical and strategic considerations they promise can be less confusingly achieved through an exclusively claimant definition. It is concluded that for the purposes of business ethics, stakeholders are claimants towards whom businesses owe perfect or imperfect moral duties beyond those generally owed to people at large. (shrink)

Following on from work on stakeholder identification, this paper constructs a typology of stakeholder theories based on the extent to which serving the interests of non-shareholders relative to those of shareholders is accepted as a responsibility of companies. A typology based on the division of stakeholder theories into normative, descriptive, and instrumental is rejected on the grounds that the latter two designations refer to second order theories rather than divisions within stakeholder theory and the first is a designation which, for (...) the purposes of business ethics, applies to all stakeholder theories. The crucial distinction between stockholder and stakeholder theory is argued to be their respective rejection and acceptance of role-specific responsibilities toward non-shareholders that are `ultimate objective fulfilling''. From this starting point, a typology is constructed using a division of stakeholder theories into those which do and do not give priority to the interests of shareholders over those of non-shareholders, do and do not posit perfect duties towards non-shareholders as well as shareholders, do and do not accept accountability to non-shareholders as well as shareholders. (shrink)

This paper is the third in a series of four that is directed at understanding and assessing stakeholder theory for the purposes of business ethics. It addresses the suitability and viability of the theory, rejecting objections of a moral and efficiency sort based (respectively) on claims about property rights and the economic superiority of the alternative stockholder approach, but accepting that implementation problems require limiting both the number of groupings admitted to stakeholder status and the degree of responsibility towards them. (...) The conclusion looks forward to the construction of a suitably limited version of the stakeholder approach in a fourth paper drawing upon this one and the previous two. (shrink)

This paper attempts to mediate between the extremes of a managerial conception of business ethics which subordinates it to management and a political conception which subordinates it to political philosophy. The mediated position arrived at sees the central focus of business ethics in the intersection of micro-managerial concerns with macro-political ones provided by the task of determining morally optimum forms of business. Involvement with the macro rules out subordination to management while, conversely, involvement with the micro rules out subordination to (...) political philosophy. Moreover, such is the (increasing) social importance of business, that business ethics can have at least co-equal explanatory status with political philosophy as a discipline. (shrink)

‘Responsibility’, ‘accountability’ and ‘governance’ are key terms within business ethics. This paper aims to construct a framework to help us understand the relationships between these terms. I first of all analyse the concept of responsibility to show the place of accountability within it, then move to analyse accountability as a sub–concept of responsibility, then finally attempt to show how accountability along with responsibility in general figures within governance structures. While obviously not as complex as the concept of responsibility of which (...) it is part, the sub–concept of accountability is somewhat more complex than often seems to be supposed. The view taken of governance is that as a concept it is relatively straightforward. It acquires complexity only with the involvement of responsibility along with accountability and other aspects of responsibility. The vexed questions as to how these are to be applied lie at the heart of disputes about corporate governance. Though not offering a solution to those disputes, the fact that they arise from the involvement of responsibility, accountability and related matters means that the analysis of concepts given here does offer a framework for thinking about these disputes more clearly. (shrink)

This article is the final one in a series of four papers investigating the stakeholder approach to running businesses. It argues that the optimally viable version of that approach is one in which employees have a co-equal status as stakeholders with shareholders (the maximum allowed for under stakeholder theory) while other groupings only have a minimal status as stakeholders and are generally restricted to just customers, suppliers, and lenders. This version is argued for on the grounds that it both overcomes (...) the implementation problems attendant upon having to serve the interests of a range of groupings and is justified in terms of stakeholder membership being confined to those groupings with a claim on the services of a business in virtue of directly contributing to its economic functioning. The ranking of non-shareholder stakeholders in the recommended version and, in particular, the maximal ranking granted to employees is argued to reflect the scale of the various contributions as measured by the degree to which making it exposes those stakeholders to both financial risk and a non-financial “work-related” risk peculiar to employees. It is concluded that although this is the best available version of the stakeholder approach it may not be the best of all possible ways of running a business. (shrink)

It is argued that presently prevailing ethical theories can be largely dispensed with. Such theories are of limited use in solving ethical problems. They fail because they are ‘reductionist’. They take an aspect of morality to be the whole of morality. Moreover, the very process of constructing, testing, and modifying them reveals that we already have that understanding of the nature of the ethical which they purport to provide us with. (This is labelled the ‘paradox of ethical theory’.) That prior (...) understanding is the identification of morality with the common good. This, it is claimed, is all the understanding we need to approach problems within business ethics or any other branch of ‘applied ethics’. UNDERSHAFT....Well, come! Is there anything you know or care for? STEPHEN. I know the difference between right and wrong. UNDERSHAFT....Why man you’re a genius, a master of masters, a god! At twentyfour too! STEPHEN.... I pretend to nothing more than any honourable English gentleman claims as his birthright. SHAW, Major Barbara, Act III. (shrink)

‘Responsibility’, ‘accountability’ and ‘governance’ are key terms within business ethics. This paper aims to construct a framework to help us understand the relationships between these terms. I first of all analyse the concept of responsibility to show the place of accountability within it, then move to analyse accountability as a sub–concept of responsibility, then finally attempt to show how accountability along with responsibility in general figures within governance structures. While obviously not as complex as the concept of responsibility of which (...) it is part, the sub–concept of accountability is somewhat more complex than often seems to be supposed. The view taken of governance is that as a concept it is relatively straightforward. It acquires complexity only with the involvement of responsibility along with accountability and other aspects of responsibility. The vexed questions as to how these are to be applied lie at the heart of disputes about corporate governance. Though not offering a solution to those disputes, the fact that they arise from the involvement of responsibility, accountability and related matters means that the analysis of concepts given here does offer a framework for thinking about these disputes more clearly. (shrink)

The word 'participation' is taken to refer to a situation in which employees have some sort of share in the businesses which employ them. On this basis a classificatory scheme is produced which distinguishes between different forms of participation as well as the sources and motives behind those different forms. Participation as a whole is then distinguished from bargaining between management and labour. In bargaining, separate and opposing interests are accepted. In participation, there is an attempt to produce an over-arching (...) common interest. More importantly, bargaining operates outside those organizational arrangements definitive of a business which grant a strictly subordinate role to labour with respect to management structures and property entitlements. In contrast, participation is a modification of those arrangements up to, but not beyond, a position of equality for labour. It is this which gives participation its essentially reformist character and exposes it to attack from both those seeking a more than participatory share to labour and those for whom even a participating share is excessive. (shrink)

Understanding just what it is to be a business is a vital though neglected topic in business ethics. The account given here makes the possession of customers the defining feature. This excludes obvious nonbusinesses while allowing the widest possible range of options for deciding on the morally preferable form or forms which businesses should take.

This paper examines the self-interested reasons that businesses can have for ethical behaviour. It distinguishes between economic and non-economic reasons and, among the latter, notes those connected with the self-esteem of managers. It offers a detailed typology of prudential reasons for ethical behaviour, laying particular stress on those to do with avoiding punishment by society for wrongdoing and, more particularly still, stresses the role of campaigning pressure groups within that particular category of reasons. It goes on to suggest that because (...) of their occupation of the moral high ground, campaigning groups are well placed to damage the self-esteem of managers and that this is why those groups seem able to exert an influence that goes beyond their somewhat limited capacity to inflict economic damage upon businesses. The paper concludes with the suggestion that we may be witnessing a virtuous spiral whereby rising public expectations of morality in business lead to ever increasing moral commitments by business that then cause those expectations to rise still further. (shrink)