As a response to what I see as the challenge posed by constructivist and narrative pedagogies, this paper seeks to sympathetically reconstruct Bernard Williams’ Absolute Conception from the scattered texts in which he briefly sketched it While ultimately defending the Absolute Conception or something close enough to it, the paper criticizes and distances itself from some aspects of Williams’ version, notably his conception of philosophy as insurmountably perspectival. Williams’ understanding of perspectival knowledge as contrasted to absolute knowledge is illustrated with (...) the concrete, if fictional case of the Dr Manhattan character from Zack Snyder’s Watchmen (2009). Adrian Moore’s reading, and Hilary Putnam’s criticisms of Williams’ Absolute Conception are amongst the positions engaged with. (shrink)

From the author: This dissertation undertakes a critical examination of one central problem in Hegelian philosophy: viz., whether the final realization of “absolute knowledge” is logically consistent with significant epistemic progress in the system’s continuing development. Serious consideration of the concept of systematic completeness, as interpreted on Hegel’s terms, uncovers the existence of a profound paradox. On the one hand, if the Truth is the Whole, then the truth of any finite part or aspect of that Whole depends upon its (...) place within the system as a totality. In order to grasp the part and comprehend it correctly, one must already have a systematically ordered knowledge of the universe in its entirety. Yet the methodological open-endedness of dialectical thinking precludes the acceptance of any particular theoretical formulation as final or complete in itself. Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as a progression of successive formulations of the Truth, each of which improves on its predecessors by reconciling their internal contradictions, but no one of which is adequate in itself. Hence, no theoretical world view, including Hegel’s own, can rest content within its limits, for the inevitable advance of thought must in the end throw it down. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: ‘Knowing is a Belief State (or Something Similar)’ ‘Knowledge is Well Supported’ ‘Knowledge is Absolute’ ‘Knowing Includes not being Gettiered’ ‘Knowledge‐that is Fundamentally Theoretical, not Knowledge‐how’ The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge Prima Facie Core Problems.

As an important corollary of this interpretation of absolute knowledge, the dissertation concludes with the suggestion that Hegelian philosophy need not be regarded merely as an interesting curiosity in the history of ideas, but rather that it can serve as a vital and potentially rewarding source of fresh theoretical insights. ;Instead, the concrete completeness of speculative philosophy can only consist in the activity of a dynamical, ceaselessly self-examining and self-regulating intellectual community. In one sense, of course, no finite system can (...) ever be complete, insofar as it will inevitably be guilty of errors and misconceptions. Yet at the same time, the infinite System is perfect and complete, insofar as it contains within itself the means whereby its own unavoidable flaws will be discovered, corrected, and "forgiven"--i.e. aufgehoben into vanishing moments of a universal totality. ;In opposition to most traditional interpretations of Hegel, the position is maintained that Hegel himself deliberately faced this problem, and that a true understanding of his proposed solution requires a radical Aufhebung of the concept of cognition as such. Relying primarily on the penultimate chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the dissertation argues that absolute knowledge can neither be a finalized system of fully explicit content, nor an endless movement toward such an ideal state. ;This dissertation undertakes a critical examination of one central problem in Hegelian philosophy: viz., whether the final realization of "absolute knowledge" is logically consistent with significant epistemic progress in the system's continuing development. Serious consideration of the concept of systematic completeness, as interpreted on Hegel's terms, uncovers the existence of a profound paradox. On the one hand, if the Truth is the Whole, then the truth of any finite part or aspect of that Whole depends upon its place within the system as a totality. In order to grasp the part and comprehend it correctly, one must already have a systematically ordered knowledge of the universe in its entirety. Yet the methodological open-endedness of dialectical thinking precludes the acceptance of any particular theoretical formulation as final or complete in itself. Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as a progression of successive formulations of the Truth, each of which improves on its predecessors by reconciling their internal contradictions, but no one of which is adequate in itself. Hence, no theoretical world view, including Hegel's own, can rest content within its limits, for the inevitable advance of thought must in the end throw it down. (shrink)

Renaissance philosopher, mathematician, and theologian Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) said that there is no proportion between the finite mind and the infinite. He is fond of saying reason cannot fully comprehend the infinite. That our best hope for attaining a vision and understanding of infinite things is by mathematics and by the use of contemplating symbols, which help us grasp "the absolute infinite". By the late 19th century, there is a decisive intervention in mathematics and its philosophy: the philosophical mathematician (...) Georg Cantor (1845-1918) says that between the realm of the finite and the absolute infinite, there is an intermediate realm partaking in properties in a certain sense of both the finite and the infinite: the transfinite realm. Like the finite, the transfinite realm is a realm of mathematical objects, numbers, and knowledge. Like the absolute infinite, the transfinite is a form of infinity insofar as transfinite sets and numbers transcend any finite number. Echoing Cusanus and neo-Platonism, Cantor says that the transfinite sequence of all ordinals is a symbol of the absolutely infinite, that is, God. This paper considers how the doctrine of symbolism and the philosophers' different commitments to the laws of logic, especially the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), enables these thinkers to articulate a transcendental apophatic approach to divinity. (shrink)

In a companion volume on Schelling published by Yale in 1983, Alan White had considerable success in tracing the tortuous path of Schelling’s lengthy philosophical career. Here his project is even more ambitious: to rescue metaphysics from the widespread contempt and neglect that has befallen it by recasting and vindicating it in terms of Hegel’s “transcendental ontology.” This White interprets as continuing Kant’s “critical philosophy” insofar as it presents foundational categories of thought as conditions of the possibility of experience rather (...) than making dogmatic pretensions to knowledge of supersensible entities—and as overcoming the limitations of the Kantian enterprise insofar as it “grounds knowledge in the realms of the transcendental and the practical as well as in that of the empirical.” Two strategies are employed. One is to abjure trying to force from Hegel’s often ambiguous texts a consistent transcendental ontology to the exclusion of the theology of Absolute Spirit commonly said to be found there. “I rather attempt to establish that if and only if the fundament of his system is so interpreted can it stand as a consequent first philosophy.” The other is to use Schelling as foil. Schelling, after all, was Hegel’s first critic, made or anticipated all the major objections to Hegelianism developed since then, and inspired the fundamentally anti-philosophical, praxis-oriented reaction of Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and the Marxists—a mind set that still prevails. (shrink)

In a companion volume on Schelling published by Yale in 1983, Alan White had considerable success in tracing the tortuous path of Schelling’s lengthy philosophical career. Here his project is even more ambitious: to rescue metaphysics from the widespread contempt and neglect that has befallen it by recasting and vindicating it in terms of Hegel’s “transcendental ontology.” This White interprets as continuing Kant’s “critical philosophy” insofar as it presents foundational categories of thought as conditions of the possibility of experience rather (...) than making dogmatic pretensions to knowledge of supersensible entities—and as overcoming the limitations of the Kantian enterprise insofar as it “grounds knowledge in the realms of the transcendental and the practical as well as in that of the empirical.” Two strategies are employed. One is to abjure trying to force from Hegel’s often ambiguous texts a consistent transcendental ontology to the exclusion of the theology of Absolute Spirit commonly said to be found there. “I rather attempt to establish that if and only if the fundament of his system is so interpreted can it stand as a consequent first philosophy.” The other is to use Schelling as foil. Schelling, after all, was Hegel’s first critic, made or anticipated all the major objections to Hegelianism developed since then, and inspired the fundamentally anti-philosophical, praxis-oriented reaction of Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, and the Marxists—a mind set that still prevails. (shrink)

In this paper I raise three questions regarding the status and function of Absolute Knowing in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. First, can Hegel’s Absolute Knowing be understood as an epiphany? Secondly, how does epiphany make sense of the teleological elements that activate and mobilise the movement towards Absolute Knowing? And thirdly, how does such an interpretation shift the focus from a closed reading of Hegel’s text – that views Absolute Knowing as consummately realised – to an open reading that keeps (...) the Absolute within its purview, but also seeks to foreground its aporias? I pursue these questions through an examination of the key constituents of knowledge: the subject of knowledge, its object, and the process through which knowledge is attained. (shrink)

This research provides an analysis of the role of ‘natural consciousness’ and ‘absolute knowledge’ in the process of establishing the notion of philosophy in Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit. The author seeks to show that ‘natural consciousness’ does not disappear in the first approaches to The Phenomenology, but rather, it continues to act as the subject of the ‘experience of consciousness’ until the end. The material analysis directly related to the evolution of ‘natural consciousness’ in the first stages of ‘experience’ (...) particularly supports the hypothesis about the philosopher’s work on the book. The results obtained can be seen as a validation of the idea that the usual notions of overcoming ‘natural consciousness’ already in the first ‘experiences of consciousness’ do not correspond to its fundamental role in establishing the notion of philosophy in The Phenomenology of Spirit. It represents not only the starting point of the phenomenological movement but it is also involved in the ‘reversals of consciousness’ at every stage of the ‘experience,’ which is important to take into account for the correct evaluation of the specificity of The Phenomenology of Spirit and the comprehension of the nature of philosophical knowledge as the main result of this Hegelian work. (shrink)

"Absolute Beginners" is a multi-approach study of the founding role of the Absolute as the very beginning of knowledge in medieval philosophy (Henry of Ghent, Richard Conington), the subject being addressed from historical, methodological, ...

Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their (...) environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge , first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’. (shrink)

This is one of the best books on Hegel recently to have appeared in the English-speaking philosophical world. Its virtues include a commitment to intelligible argumentation and lucid exposition. In addition, it gets to the heart of some of the fundamental issues in Hegel's systematic thought. Overall, the book is written with exceptional clarity. This is especially to be noted, since treatments which focus predominantly on Hegel's logic frequently end up leaving the obscure more obscure. Moreover, White's aim is not (...) just to write for a coterie of Hegel scholars, and one can hope that the measured development of philosophical ideas he provides will open Hegel to the newcomer. (shrink)

Knowledge is analyzed in terms of the cost incurred when mistakes are made — things we should have known better, but didn’t. Following Wittgenstein at the end of On Certainty, an Epistemic Wager, similar to Pascal’s Wager, is set up to represent the cost differences not in belief vs. disbelief, but in knowledge vs. skepticism. This leads to a core class of absolutely certain knowledge, related to Moorean Facts, that is integrated into our everyday lives. This core knowledge is resistant (...) to both radical skepticism, such as a Cartesian Demon, and Gettier style objections, while providing a small, but sufficient base for future epistemological research. (shrink)

The debate about the relation between science and truth is manifestly epistemological, but latently and fundamentally metaphysical. Popper's theory of verisimilitude provides us with a striking example. According to Popper, science aims at bringing us nearer to 'absolute, objective truth'; the growth of scientific knowledge is seen as a never ending realisation of that ultimate aim. This thesis of verisimilitude can be interpreted in two ways. In the first interpretation the thesis appears as a correct, but formal and even trivial (...) statement. Here the thesis that science aims at bringing us nearer to truth is as unilluminating as the thesis that moral endeavor aims at bringing us nearer to the Moral Good or that artistic endeavor aims at bringing us nearer to Aesthetic Beauty. According to the second interpretation, however, the thesis has a more substantial and metaphysical meaning. Here it consists of three different claims : 1. scientific endeavor points to something which is beyond and actual or humanly possible scientific achievement; 2. it is in this relation with something transcendent that the ultimate purpose of science is to be sought; 3. the relation between actual science and its transcendent should be seen as a part-whole relation, i.e. the transcendent goal should be represented as the ideal of total intelligibility. In this article the first and second claim are accepted; the third is rejected. One should accept the idea (put forward by Einstein ) that science points to a mystery beyond science. One should beware, however, of equating the sense of mystery with an anticipation for yet hidden information, inaccessible to us, but 'quoad se' accessible to reason. Science's transcendent mystery should be viewed in a more radical way. That is to say, the relation between actual science and its transcendent mystery is analogous to the relation between, on the one hand, the information contained in and derivable from a (good) poem and, on the other hand something else which is poetically suggested, yet does not consist in hidden information. What is evoked by poetry and science, is not even in principle translatable in terms of an informative content. Therefore the ultimate goal of science is not the ideal of knowing everything with the clarity and precision of science ; it is rather the awareness of a mystery which does not even exist as the sort of intelligible content scientific theories attempt to mirror. (shrink)

Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their (...) environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, _Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge_, first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’. (shrink)

The two objectives of this text are: to offer a general exposition on the originality of the Phenomenology of the Spirit of Hegel in the trajectory of German Idealism, and to outline a more specific presentation on the role of the last chapter of this work, dedicated to “absolute knowledge”, in the argumentative strategy of that science of the experience of conscience. The meaning and role of the concept of Absolute in Hegel and its historical development is studied, especially from (...) its difference with Schelling’s philosophy. (shrink)

The absolute self-evidence of consciousness is due to the fact that the object of consciousness is present or immanent in it. We may therefore formulate the absolutely certain starting point of philosophy as follows: knowledge about an object immanent in consciousness is absolutely certain in so far as it is the actual testimony of the object about itself, and does not go beyond that which is present in consciousness. The criterion of the absolute certainty of such knowledge is self evidence, (...) i.e. the fact that it consists entirely of what is present in consciousness. To doubt such knowledge is absurd because it is not a copy of the object, it is not a symbol of it, but simply and directly contains the object itself as known. I designate the act of the immediate contemplation of objects by the term intuition. According to the epistemological theory which I began to work out in 1903 all our trustworthy knowledge is obtained by means of such immediate observation of objects as they are in themselves; I therefore call my theory of knowledge Intuitivism. (shrink)

This book is born out of two contradictions: first, it explores the making of meaning in a musical form that was made to lose its meaning at the turn of the nineteenth century; secondly, it is a history of a music that claims to have no history - absolute music. The book therefore writes against that notion of absolute music which tends to be the paradigm for most musicological and analytical studies. It is concerned not so much with what music (...) is, but with why and how meaning is constructed in instrumental music and what structures of knowledge need to be in place for such meaning to exist. From the thought of Vincenzo Galilei to that of Theodore Adorno, Daniel Chua suggests that instrumental music has always been a critical and negative force in modernity, even with its nineteenth-century apotheosis as 'absolute music'. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} This paper addresses ‘Absolute knowing’, the process whereby the experiences of consciousness reach heir highest point, as Hegel discusses in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The objective is to analyze this concept both in its epistemological and Cartesian (...) perspective, that is, as fundamental knowledge and in its religious meaning, that is, as knowledge of the absolute. With these two perspectives Hegel seeks to open the path towards speculative thinking where subject and object find their final identity and towards the ‘sublating’ (aufheben) of Religion into Philosophy in the threefold sense of suppressing, elevating and preserving it. This paper also deals with some of the main objections to the above mentioned twofold perspective in Phenomenology. (shrink)

The ultimate purpose of Alan White’s careful and detailed confrontation of Hegel with Schelling is to rehabilitate first philosophy itself. In this effort, White argues two subtheses: that first philosophy is possible as “Hegelian transcendental ontology”; and that Hegel’s thought makes sense only as “transcendental ontology.” Defending Hegel against Schelling is crucial in two senses: first, Schelling’s Hegel-critique contains, “in at least rudimentary form, all of the fundamental criticisms that have ever been made” of Hegel ; second, because Schelling generally (...) takes Hegel’s thought to be theological, rather than ontological, in character, showing how he often misses Hegel’s point provides an opportunity to disengage fundamental features of an “ontological” reading of Hegel. (shrink)

The ultimate purpose of Alan White’s careful and detailed confrontation of Hegel with Schelling is to rehabilitate first philosophy itself. In this effort, White argues two subtheses: that first philosophy is possible as “Hegelian transcendental ontology”; and that Hegel’s thought makes sense only as “transcendental ontology.” Defending Hegel against Schelling is crucial in two senses: first, Schelling’s Hegel-critique contains, “in at least rudimentary form, all of the fundamental criticisms that have ever been made” of Hegel ; second, because Schelling generally (...) takes Hegel’s thought to be theological, rather than ontological, in character, showing how he often misses Hegel’s point provides an opportunity to disengage fundamental features of an “ontological” reading of Hegel. (shrink)

Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their (...) environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, _Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge_, first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’. (shrink)

Deontic Logic goes back to Ernst Mally’s 1926 work, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens [Mally. E.: 1926, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens, Leuschner & Lubensky, Graz], where he presented axioms for the notion ‘p ought to be the case’. Some difficulties were found in Mally’s axioms, and the field has much developed. Logic of Knowledge goes back to Hintikka’s work Knowledge and Belief [Hintikka, J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of (...) the Two Notions, Cornell University Press] in which he proposed formal logics of knowledge and belief. This field has also developed quite a great deal and is now the subject of the TARK conferences. However, there has been relatively little work combining the two notions of knowledge (belief) with the notion of obligation. (See, however, [Lomuscio, A. and Sergot, M.: 2003, Studia Logica 75 63–92; Moore, R. C.: 1990, In J. F. Allen, J. Hendler and A. Tate (eds.), Readings in Planning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, CA]) In this paper we point out that an agent’s obligations are often dependent on what the agent knows, and indeed one cannot reasonably be expected to respond to a problem if one is not aware of its existence. For instance, a doctor cannot be expected to treat a patient unless she is aware of the fact that he is sick, and this creates a secondary obligation on the patient or someone else to inform the doctor of his situation. In other words, many obligations are situation dependent, and only apply in the presence of the relevant information. Thus a case for combining Deontic Logic with the Logic of Knowledge is clear. We introduce the notion of knowledge based obligation and offer an S5, history based Kripke semantics to express this notion, as this semantics enables us to represent how information is transmitted among agents and how knowledge changes over time as a result of communications. We consider both the case of an absolute obligation (although dependent on information) as well as the (defeasible) notion of an obligation which may be over-ridden by more relevant information. For instance a physician who is about to inject a patient with drug d may find out that the patient is allergic to d and that she should use d′ instead. Dealing with the second kind of case requires a resort to non-monotonic reasoning and the notion of justified belief which is stronger than plain belief, but weaker than absolute knowledge in that it can be over-ridden. This notion of justified belief also creates a derived notion of default obligation where an agent has, as far as the agent knows, an obligation to do some action a. A dramatic application of this notion is our analysis of the Kitty Genovese case where, in 1964, a young woman was stabbed to death while 38 neighbours watched from their windows but did nothing. The reason was not indifference, but none of the neighbours had even a default obligation to act, even though, as a group, they did have an obligation to take some action to protect Kitty. (shrink)

By the absolute Good, I understand the Idea of the Good; by the human goods, I understand pleasure and reason, which have been disqualified in Plato's "Republic" as candidates for the absolute Good (cf.R.505b-d). Concerning the Idea of the Good, we can distinguish a maximal and a minimal interpretation. After the minimal interpretation, the Idea of the Good is the absolute Good because there is no final cause beyond the Idea of the Good. After the maximal interpretation, the Idea of (...) the Good is the One. The maximal and the minimal interpretation go beyond the textual evidence. I will defend two theses: (1) Since the platonic Socrates deliberately gives no more information, it seems wise to stop with Socrates and to give only a formal, not a substantive, interpretation: The absolute good is the third item between and above knowledge and the known. (2) To mediate between the absolute Good and the human goods, Plato’s Eleatic Stranger introduced in the "Politicus" and "Philebus" an intermediate principle: "the appropriate" (to metrion). For more information concerning "the appropriate" cf. Ferber, Rafael (2010). Plato's Side Suns: Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. Comments concerning semantic monism and pluralism of the "Good" in the Philebus (65A 1-5). Elenchos, 31, p. 51-76, esp. 64-67. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Knowledge presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But Keith Hossack argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. (...) Hossack provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. He also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of a content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, Hossack argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the "I"-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The Metaphysics of Knowledge concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it. (shrink)

Each time we take a turn in conversation we indicate what we know and what we think others know. However, knowledge is neither static nor absolute. It is shaped by those we interact with and governed by social norms - we monitor one another for whether we are fulfilling our rights and responsibilities with respect to knowledge, and for who has relatively more rights to assert knowledge over some state of affairs. This book brings together an international team of leading (...) linguists, sociologists and anthropologists working across a range of European and Asian languages to document some of the ways in which speakers manage the moral domain of knowledge in conversation. The volume demonstrates that if we are to understand how speakers manage issues of agreement, affiliation and alignment - something clearly at the heart of human sociality - we must understand the social norms surrounding epistemic access, primacy and responsibilities. (shrink)

Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre of 1801/2 is considered to be the beginning of his late phase. In this phase he supposedly alters his earlier thinking and, instead of the transcendental unity of the I, conceptualizes a higher transcendent and simple unity; a unity that has been claimed to correspond to Neoplatonism. I refute these two arguments here. First, through a comparison between the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801/2 and that of 1794/5, I show that both versions contain a similar analysis of the supreme unity. (...) Second, I show that in 1801/2 Fichte explicitly dissociates the supreme unity from transcendence and simplicity. His conception of the supreme unity in fact levels a critique upon such concept of unity. Instead of the transcendent One, which is hierarchically prior to multiplicity, Fichte formulates in both 1794/5 and 1801/2 a complicated concept of the supreme unity. On Fichte’s account, this unity “hovers” between multiplicity and unity as simplicity. (shrink)

Absolute velocities in Newtonian mechanics are commonly regarded as unmeasurable. Roberts (Br J Philos Sci 59(2):143–168, 2008) provides a justification for this thesis which appeals to the observational indistinguishability of boost-related models of Newtonian mechanics. Middleton and Murgueitio Ramírez (Australas J Philos, 2020) criticise his argumentation by pointing out that his analysis of the notion of measurement is too restrictive, and that, under a weaker analysis (based on counterfactuals), absolute velocities are measurable. Jacobs (Australas J Philos, 2020) opposes their view, (...) arguing that, on a properly formulated counterfactual-based account of measurement, absolute velocities are unmeasurable. However, in his argument, observational indistinguishability plays no role, even though, intuitively, it is very relevant for the issue of (un)measurability. This paper’s aim is to bring observational indistinguishability back to this discussion. I build upon the observation that there is an analogy between possible views on knowledge and justification on the one hand, and on measurement on the other. In particular, I explore the distinction between externalist and internalist approaches. Counterfactual-based accounts are all externalist, whereas the observational indistinguishability of boost-related models becomes relevant if we are interested in an internalist concept of measurement. (shrink)

Fichte claims that it is a severe misinterpretation of his philosophy if one understands it as an absolutization of thinking or consciousness. Even more misguided is the assumption that this special thinking or consciousness can be achieved by abstracting from all empirical evidence. Nevertheless the term ‚pure knowledge‘ is of importance within the WL and it means precisely a formal knowledge which has been cleaned from all empirical contents. Therefore, Fichte’s claim shall be examined by contrasting the pure knowledge with (...) the absolute knowledge in the WL 1804-II. The hypothesis here followed is that no pure entity like the pure knowledge can be found at the head of the system of the WL 1804. The highest point within the realm of thought, meaning the first entity of knowledge, is in fact the absolute knowledge, which differs essentially from the pure knowledge.Fichte beteuert, dass es eine schwere Fehlinterpretation seiner Philosophie sei, wenn man sie als Verabsolutierung des Denkens oder des Bewusstseins verstünde. Dies gilt umso mehr, wenn angenommen wird, dass dieses Denken zudem lediglich aus der Abstraktion von allem Empirischen und auf Grund dieses vermeintlich reinigenden Abstraktionsprozesses entstanden ist. Dennoch spielt das reine Wissen eine zentrale Rolle in der WL. Entsprechend soll Fichtes Beteuerung runtergebrochen auf das Verhältnis von reinem Wissen und Absolutem Wissen in der zweiten Vorlesung zur Wissenschaftslehre aus dem Jahr 1804 überprüft werden. Die hier vertretene These lautet: Nicht eine reine Instanz, hier konkret: nicht das reine Wissen, ist das Höchste in der Wissenschaftslehre 1804. Das denkbar Höchste, bzw. die erste Instanz innerhalb des Wissens, ist vielmehr das Absolute Wissen. Und dieses ist – darauf kommt es an – wesentlich unterschieden von dem reinen Wissen. (shrink)

Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees. On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view (...) that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. This essay defends intellectualism from the argument of gradability. It is argued that the gradability of ascriptions of know-how should be discounted as a rather superficial linguistic phenomenon, one that can be explained in a way compatible with the absoluteness of the state reported. (shrink)

Ordinary skepticism is based upon some form of certainty. One may be skeptical about the claims of religion because one accepts the certainties of science or some philosophical argument. One may be skeptical about a certain investment strategy because one believes in various proven economic principles. Absoluteskepticism, on the other hand, has no such certainty upon which to rely. Every standpoint, including absolute skepticism itself, is open to doubt. Thus absolute skepticism is not another philosophical position but raises severe doubt (...) about all philosophy and all knowledge. In this paper I will explore some of the implications of absolute skepticism and how Lao Zi and Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895-1986) may serve as possible representatives of absolute skepticism. (shrink)

In this book, Stephen Hetherington attacks what he thinks are two "dogmas" of epistemology. One he calls "epistemic absolutism" which amounts to the claim that knowledge is absolute: you can be with or without it, but once you have it, it is not possible to have more or less. The other is "justificationalism" which is the view that some sort of justification is necessary for knowledge.

Absolute pitch, besides the psychological and neurological interests it has, raises some conceptual difficulties that can teach us about the richness of our notion of musical tone and various aspects of its identification. It is argued that when AP is conceived under a slim notion of identifying the pitch of a crude sound, it is hardly meaningful and has no significance in music comprehension. The rich notion, which is the meaningful and important one, involves knowing the position of a tone (...) in a tone-space and its relations. This is presented as experiential: hearing and identifying tones under concepts and relations that are experienced rather than figured out or derived on the basis of crude identification of bare tones. Since many of these concepts and relations are musically meaningful, this rich notion of identification is thus connected to musical understanding and aesthetic appreciation of a musical work. It may also be claimed to be vital in passing between different sense modalities, and can explain various aspects of AP and puzzles connected with it. (shrink)

SummaryThe author argues that there is a kind of knowledge which is fundamental or basic in the sense that it is certain, is not open to justification or doubt, and yet is – in a certain sense – based upon experience. The paper attempts to give a characterization of such knowledge, in particular showing how it differs from straightforward examples of empirical knowledge. The author's views resemble those of Wittgenstein in Über Gewissheit, but unlike Wittgenstein, he holds that such knowledge (...) is language‐game absolute, i.e., it underlies all rational practices that involve inquiries into the nature of the world, such as history and science.RésuméĽauteur montre qu'il y a un type de connaissance qui est fondamental en ce sens qu'il est certain, ne nécessite aucune justification, ne donne pas prise au doute et pourtant est – en un certain sens – basé sur ľexpérience. Cet article tente de caractériser une telle connaissance, montrant en particulier qu'elle diffère ?on;exemples banals de connaissance expérimentale. La thèse de ľauteur ressemble à celle de Wittgenstein dans Über Gewissheit, mais en diffère en ce que la connaissance définie est absolue par rapport aux jeux de langage, c'est‐à‐dire qu'elle sous‐tend toutes les pratiques rationnelles qui, telles ľhistoire et la science, supposent des recherches sur la nature du monde.ZusammenfassungDer Verfasser versucht zu zeigen, dass es eine Art von Erkenntnis gibt, die insofern für grundlegend zu gelten hat, als sie gewiss ist, d.h. weder einer Rechtfertigung bedarf noch einem Zweifel unterworfen werden kann, und trotzdem in einem gewissen Sinne auf Erfahrung beruht. Diese besondere Erkenntnis wird naher charakterisiert, indem gezeigt wird, wodurch sie sich von anderen Beispielen offensichtlich empirischer Erkenntnis unterscheidet. Die Ansicht des Verfas‐sers erinnert an diejenige von Wittgenstein in Über Gewissheit, aber – anders als dieser – hält er dafür, dass solche Erkenntnis Sprachspiel – absolut sei, d.h. dass sie alien rationalen Handlun‐gen unterliegt, die Untersuchungen über die Natur der Welt betreffen – seien diese geschichtlich oder wissenschaftlich. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only (...) be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant’s account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel’s account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with Rödl’s characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only (...) be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant’s account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel’s account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with Rödl’s characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature. (shrink)

The article offers an analysis of the concept of the Absolute in Fichte’s philosophy. Despite the difficulty of the definition, this concept receives a rich and creative rethinking in Fichte and will further influence the philosophical systems of thought. Gradually introducing this concept into his philosophical project of Wissenschaftslehre Fichte often changes its interpretation. So, starting with a somewhat vague understanding of the concept of the "absolute I" through Schelling's criticism of the Absolute, he develops the theory of the manifestation (...) of the Absolute, each time choosing new metaphors to denote it, and sometimes filling it with religious content, when the Absolute becomes a substitute for the concept of God. On the one hand, it’s important not to reduce the Absolute to a simple object of thought because this would indicate the limitation of the Absolute. On the other hand, it would be wrong to consider the Absolute as an empty or neutral concept or something completely enclosed in itself. Then, its existence will be doubtful. Fichte is careful about a clear definition of the Absolute. He solves this dilemma through the idea of the manifestation of the Absolute. Manifestation is the exit of the Absolute beyond itself while remaining unchanged. The ability to manifest itself is a prerequisite that the Absolute can be recognized and thought. This is how the Absolute manifests itself in the form of knowledge. Fichte emphasizes that the Absolute is not a projection of our mind, it may not depend on our thinking, however with such peculiarity that truth and knowledge have their basis in it. Thereby, with the theory of the Absolute, Fichte develops the idea of the foundation that is outside of ourselves, has transcendental character, and thus allows knowledge or truth not to be trapped in subjective tenets. Analyzing step by step the process of evolution of this concept, we will be able to see how in the last years of his life, Fichte states the importance of two realities: the “I” and the “Absolute” and how he explains the connection between them. (shrink)

Hume appeals to different kinds of certainties and necessities in the Treatise. He contrasts the certainty that arises from intuition and demonstrative reasoning with the certainty that arises from causal reasoning. He denies that the causal maxim is absolutely or metaphysically necessary, but he nonetheless takes the causal maxim and ‘proofs’ to be necessary. The focus of this paper is the certainty and necessity involved in Hume’s concept of knowledge. I defend the view that intuitive certainty, in particular, is certainty (...) of the invariability or necessity of relations between ideas. Against David Owen and Helen Beebee, I argue that the certainty involved in intuition depends on the activity of the mind. I argue, further, that understanding this activity helps us understand more clearly one of Hume’s most important theses, namely that experience is the source of a distinct kind of certainty and of necessity. (shrink)

Does theology belong within the academy or the church? How do Christian teachings - on God, revelation, and humanity - contribute to the activity of knowing? This volume offers a fresh reading of Bavinck's theological epistemology and argues that his Trinitarian and organic worldview utilizes an eclectic range of sources. Sutanto unfolds Bavinck's understanding of what he considered to be the two most important aspects of epistemology: the character of the sciences and the correspondence between subjects and objects. Writing at (...) the heels of the European debates in the 19th-20th century concerning theology's place in the academy, and rooted in historic Christian teachings, Bavinck's argument remains fresh and provocative. He argued that because the universe was created by the God as described in Christian thought as the Trinity (One God in three Persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and thus a God who is absolute unity-in-diversity) knowledge of the universe can be characterized as a singular organism. This volume, exploring archival material and heretofore untranslated works, then applies this reading to current debates on the relationship between theology and philosophy, nature and grace, and the nature of knowing. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the consequences of two commonsensical premises in semantics and epistemology: (1) natural language is a complex system rooted in the communal life of human beings within a given environment; and (2) linguistic knowledge is essentially dependent on natural language. These premises lead me to emphasize the process-socio-environmental character of linguistic meaning and knowledge, from which I proceed to analyse a number of long-standing philosophical problems, attempting to throw new light upon them on these grounds. In (...) particular, I criticize the use of expressions such as ‘absolute truth’, ‘absolute existence’ and ‘the thing in itself’, arguing that they lead to what I call ‘the ultralinguistic paradox’ (a fatal antinomy). In the same way, I review a number of mainstream topics in philosophical semantics, epistemology and metaphysics, reformulating them in terms much more naturalistic – and less mysterious – than usual. (shrink)

An argument that what is usually dismissed as the “mystical shell” of Hegel's thought—the concept of absolute knowledge—is actually its most “rational kernel.” This book sets out from a counterintuitive premise: the “mystical shell” of Hegel's system proves to be its most “rational kernel.” Hegel's radicalism is located precisely at the point where his thought seems to regress most. Most current readings try to update Hegel's thought by pruning back his grandiose claims to “absolute knowing.” Comay and Ruda invert this (...) deflationary gesture by inflating what seems to be most trivial: the absolute is grasped only in the minutiae of its most mundane appearances. Reading Hegel without presupposition, without eliminating anything in advance or making any decision about what is essential and what is inessential, what is living and what is dead, they explore his presentation of the absolute to the letter. The Dash is organized around a pair of seemingly innocuous details. Hegel punctuates strangely. He ends the Phenomenology of Spirit with a dash, and he begins the Science of Logic with a dash. This distinctive punctuation reveals an ambiguity at the heart of absolute knowing. The dash combines hesitation and acceleration. Its orientation is simultaneously retrospective and prospective. It both holds back and propels. It severs and connects. It demurs and insists. It interrupts and prolongs. It generates nonsequiturs and produces explanations. It leads in all directions: continuation, deviation, meaningless termination. This challenges every cliché about the Hegelian dialectic as a machine of uninterrupted teleological progress. The dialectical movement is, rather, structured by intermittency, interruption, hesitation, blockage, abruption, and random, unpredictable change—a rhythm that displays all the vicissitudes of the Freudian drive. (shrink)

In Averroes’s epistemology, knowledge is universal, but it is always singular in terms of the known. Averroes believes that there is no need for an activity, even in the sense that used by those who have the idea of "kumūn" rational forms being formed by other rational forms of the same kind, or for a power such as in the example of polishing a mirror to reflect an image. Similarly, he argues that there are no discrete abstract forms of existing (...) things because otherwise, everyone would have to know everything. Although there are different degrees and levels, the existence of absolute metaphysical forms is subject to change and increases with the multiplication of their subjects. There are three means of knowledge: sensation, imagination, and intellect. Unlike the sensation and perception modes in animals, humans perceive the outer appearance of objects as well as their unique meanings and distinctions. Like animals, the function of sensation in humans is to mediate the self. While perception is abstract and spiritual in one sense, it is material and concrete in another. Averroes does not find it correct to link the knowledge of the contingents of the world to the eternal knowledge of God. Beacuse this implies that there is a difference in God's knowledge between the state of the world's existence and non-existence. In addition, human knowledge about contingents is deficient and changeable, whereas God's knowledge is the cause of the existence of contingents and is unchanging. Ultimately, it does not seem possible for humans to comprehend the nature of God's knowledge. It is agreed with Alexander of Aphrodisias that there should be a distinction between the active and imaginative intellects, but he differs from him in the point that the imaginative intellect disappears. According to Averroes, the active intellect in action is eternal, unlike Themistius’ view. According to Averroes, the intellect is neither a pure potentiality nor a distinct substance. That is to say, if the imaginative intellect were an actual thing, it could not perceive other things. If the intellect were absolute, everyone would know the same things. Similarly, if the intellect were absolute plurality, there would be no unity and connection between intellects. If the intellect were merely an accepting capacity, it could not perceive absence. According to Averroes, the active intellect is not a distinct intellect that gives form or governs the spheres, but rather the form and purpose of the imaginative intellect. There are two powers of this intellect: to abstract the concepts in their potential state from their matter and to make them actual and accepting them. In conclusion, it can be said that Averroes made a substance-centered philosophy regarding the possibility and reality of knowledge, and while he did not deviate from the Aristotelian line, he had to make new openings. Paradoxically, he tries to explain both the actual/abstract and potential/material aspects of the intellect that are postulated by introducing an original soul theory with the imaginative intellect. Therefore, he places importance on both a priori knowledge and sensation and imagination. (shrink)

In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the hopes of the modal logicians who developed epistemic logic, and he considers the epistemology of proof with the help of the knower paradox. One solution to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. Sorensen reviews the broader history of this maneuver along with the relevant alternatives model of knowledge which (...) assumes that ”know” is an absolute term like ”flat.” Sorensen argues that the difference between epistemic absolute terms and extensional absolute terms gives rise to an asymmetry that undermines recent claims that there is a structural parallel between the supervaluational and epistemicist theories of vagueness, and he suggests that we have overestimated the ability of logical demonstration to produce knowledge. (shrink)

Scientific reasoning – presumed unique, perfect, objective – still solidly bases its foundations on the consequences of the evident success (theoretical and practical) obtained over the centuries starting from Galilean intuition. Over time, the granitic belief that scientific success can depend exclusively on a single, simple principle of method, has actually been slightly undermined; there is still a solid scientific basis about this idea, but the demands for rethinking and eclecticism also in the methodological approach begin to be "important". It (...) therefore seems absolutely compelling to note the difference between "inanimate" sciences – which have gradually seen the level of compliexity growing, however, resulting from the fact that the more the system of knowledge grows and the greater are the dark areas to be revealed – and "animated" sciences who have as their object of interest people, sensibility, ethics, behaviors and social actions. (shrink)

This book puts forward a theory of absolutization, bringing together a multi-disciplinary understanding of this central flaw in human judgement, and what we can do about it. This approach, drawing on Buddhist thought and practice, philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, embodied meaning and systems theory, offers a rigorous introduction to absolutization as the central problem addressed in Middle Way Philosophy, which is a synthetic approach developed by the author over more than twenty years in a series of books. It challenges disciplinary boundaries (...) as well as offering a substantial framework for practical application. (shrink)

The pregnant female body and, more generally, the generative process tout court have been linked with metaphors since the dawn of Western philosophy, though this history has only recently been taken up and critically discussed (Rigotti 2010; Cavarero 1995). The research hypothesis I test in this paper is that pregnancy and childbirth ought to be considered as absolute metaphors, as per their “indissoluble alogicality” (Blumenberg 2010). Following the analyses presented in Paradigms for a Metaphorology, the goal of the article is (...) to enhance dialogue between Blumenberg’s conception of the metaphor and those philosophical reflections that focus on the pervasiveness of metaphors concerning pregnancy and childbirth. This paper is therefore an investigation on the link between female reproductive functions and philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

The concept of ‘‘certitude” is central in Arabic discussions of the theory of demonstration advanced by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics. In the Arabic tradition it is ‘‘certitude,” rather than ‘‘knowledge”, that is usually identified as the end sought by demonstrations. Al-Fārābī himself devotes a short treatise, known as the Conditions of Certitude, to determining the criteria according to which a subject can claim to have absolute certitude of any proposition. In this article the author traces the roots of the (...) concept of certitude to the Arabic translation of the Posterior Analytics. She then offers a close reading of the text of al-Fārābī's Conditions and its parallels in his Epitome of the Posterior Analytics. She argues that the identification of certitude as a cognitive state distinct from knowledge enabled al-Fārābī to introduce a number of interesting and sometimes problematic innovations into Arabic epistemology. Foremost amongst his positive innovations is the recognition that contingent as well as necessary propositions allow for an attenuated form of certitude, and the introduction of reliabilism into the justification of claims to certitude. But al-Fārābī is also one of the first philosophers to articulate explicitly the idea that certitude must include an element of ‘‘knowing that one knows,” a controversial principle that tends to undermine both al-Fārābī’s reliabilism and his efforts to loosen some of the strictures in traditional Aristotelian epistemology. (shrink)

This paper presents a critical review and discussion of three recent major theories of epistemic scepticism. Odegard and Rescher both agree that real knowledge entails certain beliefs. But they both fail to see how beliefs could be absolutely certain. Klein’s book, Certainty: A Refutationof Scepticism, presents the strongest possible view in favor of absolute certainty. I pay attention to its technical details and development by Klein. My conclusion is that Klein’s theory rests on some presupposed ideas that are either counterintuitive (...) or then make the theory trivial: one’s certainty of truth becomes the same as the truth itself. (shrink)

While there are good reasons to think that Hegel would not engage with modern scepticism in the Science of Logic, this article argues that he nevertheless does so in a way that informs the text's conception of logic as the latter pertains to metaphysics. Hegel engages with modern scepticism's general concerns that philosophy should begin without unexamined presuppositions and should come to attain not only knowledge of truth, but corresponding second-order knowledge: knowledge of knowing truth. These concerns inform two needs (...) that Hegel formulates for first philosophy, which logic—by unifying with metaphysics, which is traditionally synonymous with first philosophy—is to satisfy. However, logic, for the Logic, is unified with metaphysics as a science of absolute knowing, the form of thinking involved in traditional metaphysics. As such, logic, for the Logic, is neither anti-metaphysical nor reducible to metaphysics, but is rather a science of metaphysical thinking, which, for Hegel, includes metaphysics. The article emphasizes how Hegel's construal of logic as a science of absolute knowing avoids running into the ‘swimming problem’ that Hegel raises against, broadly, epistemological forms of first philosophy. (shrink)