Baruch Spinoza

Many current Marxist debates point to a crisis of imagination as a challenge to emancipatory thoughts and actions. The naturalisation of the capitalist mode of production within the production of subjectivity is among the chief reasons behind this state of affairs. This article contributes to the debate by focusing on the notion of imagination, marked by a deep ambivalence capable of both naturalising and denaturalising social relations constitutive of the established order. Such an understanding of imagination is constructed from within (...) the framework of historical materialism, and it draws on Spinoza and Marx, taking advantage of the similarities between the two with respect to the constitution of the subject. From this stems an investigation into the imagination as a material force that partakes both in subjection and liberation. This is further demonstrated in regard to juridical forms of subjectivation and the possibility of subverting these forms through imagination. (shrink)

The work will be structured in three sections. The first of them analyzes how the different specialists in Spinozian work have studied the Dutch corpus in a dialectical way. This type of interpretation will be emphasized here not only in regard to Spinoza's own ontology, but also to his political philosophy. Secondly, this article investigates the way in which Spinozian ontology can be studied, proposing that, rather than making use of a dialectical method of Hegelian roots, it is rather possible (...) to undertake the study of Spinoza's main philosophical concepts. that are linked to the essence from the notion of sublimation, a notion that, as we will see, is closely related to the monism of Spinoza's philosophy. Finally, the way in which this sublimation procedure can also be applied to the concepts of the Dutchman that specifically refer to the political aspect of his thought is analyzed. (shrink)

Recent literature on Spinoza has emphasized his commitment to universal intelligibility, understood as the claim that there are no brute facts. We draw attention to an important but overlooked element of Spinoza's commitment to intelligibility, and thereby question its most prominent interpretation, on which this commitment results in the priority of conceptual relations. We argue that such readings are both incomplete in their account of Spinozistic intelligibility and mistaken in their identification of the most fundamental relation. We argue that Spinoza (...) is one of the first moderns to address the problem of conditions of intelligibility, and show that, in his metaphysics, expressive relations are best understood as relations of dependence for intelligibility: what a thing ‘expresses’ is its condition of intelligibility, that which determines how, through what concepts, it can be conceived. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to examine Deleuze’s fascination with “spiritual automata” as a counterpoint to his more famous notion, the “body without organs”. I shall argue that both are grounded in a deep reflection, on Deleuze’s part, on the problems and issues generated by Spinoza’s notion of parallel attributes. Ultimately, I argue, the development of the two notions is motivated by identical metaphysical worries regarding the tenability of transformation, persistence, and affective interrelations between individuals. The answer, for both thinkers, (...) is the insertion of a “third” relational term, which virtually interfaces with each without violation of their parallel development. For Spinoza, such term is the absolutely infinite substance; for Deleuze, it is instead the notion of sense and the faculty of sense-making. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone abordar la recepción de la filosofía moderna europea que se desplegó en el siglo XVIII en dos instituciones fundamentales del territorio del Río de la Plata: la Universidad de Córdoba y el Colegio de San Carlos de Buenos Aires. Nuestro objetivo es analizar dicha recepción a pensando su vínculo con una manera específica de practicar la enseñanza de la filosofía en estas instituciones, entendiéndola como parte esencial del quehacer filosófico, como una búsqueda genuina de conocimiento. (...) Nos concentraremos en el caso de Baruch Spinoza —pensador perseguido y condenado a la censura— para ilustrar las diversas formas en las que nuevos autores modernos eran incorporados paulatinamente a la enseñanza de la filosofía en las aulas rioplatenses. (shrink)

My general objective in this paper is to provide the outlines of the reception of Baruch Spinoza and Moses Mendelssohn in the Russian Enlightenment of the late 18th century as well as in the Russian-Jewish Haskalah. In part of the paper I consider Gavrila Derzhavin’s mention of Mendelssohn in his “Opinion,” the translation of Mendelssohn’s Phaedon in Nikolay Novikov’s Masonic-inspired journal Utrennyi Svet, and the readings of Spinoza’s view on God and then-shared interpretation of his views as an “atheism” in (...) Feofan Propovich, Vasily Trediakovskiy, and Alexander Sumarokov. In the part on the late Russian-Jewish Haskalah of 1860s I examine two intellectual biographies appeared in the period—Saveliy Kovner on Spinoza and Yakov Gurliand on Mendelssohn, which aim to interpret positions of Spinoza and Mendelssohn as exemplary strategies of the Jewish emancipation within the framework of claims and prospects of the modern European culture. I also rediscover and reinterpret Spinoza’s approach to religion as the late Russian Haskalah’s authors strongly object to label Spinoza’s philosophy of religion as “atheistic” and consider it as close to the “pure, or true Judaism.”. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 6, June 2022.

El presente trabajo es un intento por repensar el modo en que ha sido interpretada la primera parte de la Ética de Baruch Spinoza por la tradición. Fundamentalmente, busca alejarse de las interpretaciones que llamamos “ontológicas” -que sostienen que las distinciones conceptuales allí postuladas refieren a diferentes ámbitos de lo real-, para defender una lectura que tenga al factor gnoseológico como principio explicativo de tales distinciones. Se intentará mostrar que mediante esta hipótesis de lectura se accede a aquello que nos (...) parece ser el más auténtico espíritu spinozista: aquel donde la multiplicidad de las perspectivas del conocimiento humano se vuelve coherente con la más absoluta univocidad de lo real. (shrink)

In the present paper we propose to approach the Spinoza`s methodological project from a philosophical and historical perspective broad enough to adequately understand the reasons that led him to adopt geometric method to expose his philosophy. Even if the topic has been widely discussed by Spinoza´s commentators in the four centuries since the Ethics was published, we believe that the approaches are either inadequate or suffer from some fragmentation, in the sense that they address this or that aspect, but don`t (...) put together all pieces that make up the puzzle. Likewise, we consider that a full understanding of such application of geometric method transcends the mere question of whether it was successful or not in terms of logical rigor. So that, the fundamental task in the present work is unite various aspects that help us understand Spinoza`s methodological choice in a synoptic vision, in which both historical and systematic aspects can be included. To this end, we start from a hypothesis which allow us glimpse a certain unity behind the reasons that lead Spinoza to choose the geometric method, namely: our philosopher tries to reach an ideal of science, which combines some conceptual elements of Aristotelian tradition with others from Cartesian philosophy. (shrink)

La necesidad de recurrir a imágenes al momento de intentar realizar una problematización conceptual incisiva fue reconocida por Althusser, cuando señaló que “no se piensa en filosofía sino bajo metáforas”. Por eso, se permitió recuperar y conservar la famosa metáfora arquitectónica de Marx, en virtud de la cual se sugería que una sociedad, a la manera de un “edificio social”, debía ser pensada como una totalidad consistente en una estructura o infraestructura que, a la manera de una base, sostenía al (...) conjunto de las superestructuras que se levantaban sobre ella. Partiendo de la reconsideración del uso crítico de la metáfora marxista, nos dedicamos a indagar el juego complejo de énfasis y de distinciones que articula la política y la teoría en la filosofía crítica que se conforma en la intersección de las perspectivas de Althusser y Spinoza. (shrink)

For too long, Spinoza's ethics was misread as an ethics of ideals, in which the most virtuous life possible was said to consist of the life of pure reasoning. The "free man," Spinoza's paragon of virtue, was understood to be the individual who is neither helped nor harmed by anything external. The goal, on this view, was to transcend the life of the body, of the material, and of the political, in order to focus solely on becoming like God by (...) increasing one's store of rational ideas.This, of course, is an impoverished understanding of Spinoza's aims. Not only does it cast virtue as something unattainable for actually existing, materially and socially embedded individuals, but it overlooks a vast swath of Spinoza's... (shrink)

The driving question behind Sandra Leonie Field's exciting new book, Potentia, is: what, exactly, constitutes popular power? Field turns to two seventeenth-century political theorists, Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, to try to extract an account that might avoid Joseph Schumpeter's dismal conclusion that we should abandon all pretenses to popular power. In the process, she exposes problems with recent populist interpretations of Hobbes and Spinoza, showing that both of these figures appreciated the problems with identifying plebiscites with popular power (...) better than their "radical" interpreters. The result is a rich and stimulating work on a topic—namely, power—that remains somewhat undertheorized, at least... (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca rastrear la figura de Baruch Spinoza en el pensamiento de Judith Butler. Por ello, se analizará, en un primer momento, la tan afamada oposición entre Spinoza y Hegel para, en una segunda instancia, reparar cómo Butler entiende la propia filosofía de Spinoza y, finalmente, ver de qué manera la filósofa logra hermanarla a la de Hegel. A través de estos tres momentos podemos ver cómo es posible pensar, en el decir de Butler, una continuidad complementaria entre (...) Spinoza y Hegel. (shrink)

In a 1687 letter to Arnauld, Leibniz draws on an argument against mind-body causation that is reminiscent of one from Spinoza’s Ethics. According to this argument, mind-body causation is impossible because of the lack of proportion between thoughts and motions. This paper aims to shed light on Leibniz’s use of Spinoza’s argument by reconstructing both its internal structure and its development in Leibniz’s later works. In particular, the reconstruction focuses on the new version of this argument that Leibniz adopts against (...) Stahl’s vitalism as well as on the change that this new version reveals in Leibniz’s attitude towards occasionalism. The possible influence of Cordemoy is also taken into consideration. The epistemological and metaphysical issues surrounding this argument are an essential part of the history of Leibniz’s psycho-physical parallelism. (shrink)

This book addresses the use of Benedict Spinoza's philosophy in current attempts to elaborate an ecological basis for international environmental law. Because the question of environmental protection has not been satisfactory resolved, the legal debate concerning our responsibility for the environment has - as evidenced in the recent UN report series Harmony with Nature - come to invite calls for a new eco-centric, rather than anthropocentric, legal paradigm. In this respect, Spinoza appears as a key figure. He is one of (...) the few philosophers in the history of western philosophy who cares, and writes extensively, about the roots of anthropocentrism; the core issue of contemporary normative debates in ecology. And in response to the rapidly developing ecological crisis, his work has become central to a re-thinking of the human relationship with nature. Addressing the contention that Spinoza's ethics might provide a useful source for developing a new, eco-centred framework for environmental law, this book elaborates a more nuanced understanding of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza cannot, it is argued here, simply be reduced to an eco-ethicist. That is: his metaphysics cannot be used as basis of an essentially naturalised or extended human morality. At the same time, however, this book argues that the radicality of Spinoza's naturalism nevertheless offers the possibility of developing a more adequate ecological basis for environmental law. (shrink)

Against jurisprudential reductions of Spinoza's thinking to a kind of eccentric version of Hobbes, this book argues that Spinoza's theory of natural right contains an important idea of absolute freedom, which would be inconceivable within Hobbes' own schema. Spinoza famously thought that the universe and all of the beings and events within it are fully determined by their causes. This has led jurisprudential commentators to believe that Spinoza has no room for natural right – in the sense that whatever happens (...) by definition has a 'right' to happen. But, although this book demonstrates how Spinoza constructs a system in which right is understood as the work of machines, by fixing right as determinate and invariable, Stephen Connolly argues that Spinoza is not limiting his theory. The universe as a whole is capable of acting only in determinate ways but, he argues, for Spinoza these exist within a field of infinite possibilities. In an analysis that offers much to ongoing attempts to conceive of justice post-foundationally, the argument of this book is that Spinoza opens up right to a future of determinate interventions –as when an engineer, working with already-existing materials, improves a machine. As such, an idea of freedom emerges in Spinoza: as the artful rearrangement of the given into new possibilities. An exciting and original contribution, this book is an invaluable addition, both to the new wave of interest in Spinoza's philosophy, and to contemporary legal and political theory. (shrink)

Approaching the central themes of Spinoza's thought from both a historical and analytical perspective, this book examines the logical-metaphysical core of Spinoza's philosophy, its epistemology and its ramifications for his much disputed attitude towards religion. Opening with a discussion of Spinoza's historical and philosophical location as the appropriate context for the interpretation of his work, the book goes on to present a non-'logical' reading of Spinoza's metaphysics, a consideration of Spinoza's radical repudiation of Cartesian subjectivism and an examination of how (...) Spinoza wanted religion to be understood in the context of his wider thinking and the influence of his non-Christian background. Mason also assesses Spinoza's significance and importance for philosophy now. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza a Dutch rationalist philosopher of the 17th century and Donald Davidson one of the most distinguished contemporary American analytic philosophers, are two thinkers not usually analysed in conjunction with each other in the philosophical literature yet there are remarkable parallels in their thought. In this book Floris van der Burg identifies topics of comparison in the areas of ontology, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language and, after explaining the theory of each philosopher, examines the parallel themes (...) between Spinoza and Davidsonian theory. (shrink)

First published in 1928, The Correspondence of Spinoza is deeply interesting in many ways. It presents a pageant of the leading types of seventeenth-century mentality. It affords contemporary glimpses of important scientific researches and discoveries. It brings us into touch with some of the social and political events and tendencies of the period. This book includes correspondent letters containing things of first-rate importance for the correct interpretation of the philosophy of Spinoza.

Originally published in 1927, the publication of this volume may be regarded as a fitting contribution to the international celebrations in memory of one of the greatest of the sons of men. This biography is the oldest, and it is the only one written by one who knew Spinoza personally, and loved him well.

Mystic and Scientist: the Incompatible Components of Spinoza's Meta physics -- The Ethics of the Free Man as a Critique of the Calvinist Ethics -- The Mystic Rejection of Libertine Hedonism -- The Therapy of Self-understanding: Precursor to Freud -- Intellectual Love of God and Intellectual Hatred -- The Eternity of the Human Mind: Spinoza's Leap Beyond the Geometrical Method -- Ultimate Uncertainty: the Failure of the Geometrical Method -- Spinoza as a Left Cartesian The Infinity of God: a Masochist (...) Projection -- The Infinity of God: the Discovery of the Plurality of Attributes -- The Final Disunity of Spinoza's Thought: Linguistic Nonsense or Linguistic Transfiguration? -- Epilogue -- Notes -- Index. (shrink)

Spinoza’s own words seem to commit him to necessitarianism. Nonetheless attempts have been made to make room for contingency in Spinozism. Two impressive arguments of this kind are Curley 1969 and Newlands 2010. Both these arguments appeal to Spinoza’s claim that all finite things are locked in an infinite nexus of causal relations. The question central to this paper is whether contingency can indeed be derived from an infinity of causal ancestors. The goal of the paper is twofold. First, I (...) aim to present an alternative reading of the relation between infinity and Spinoza’s concept of contingency. On my reading, while the infinity of the causal ancestry of finite things does not ground any objective metaphysical contingency on their part, it is a condition which must obtain if they are to appear as contingent. Second, I aim to challenge the derivations of contingency from infinity mentioned above. I will do so by targeting Curley’s assumption that propositions rather than things are the main bearers of modality. On Newlands’ interpretation, the conceivability of things as either contingent or necessary makes the world more perfect than it would otherwise have been. By drawing upon Spinoza’s analysis of “negative” properties, I question whether beliefs about contingency contribute to the perfection of the world in virtue of truly attributing the property of objective contingency to things. (shrink)

Spinoza’s recognition of the unpredictable fortunes of individuals, explicable through the interplay between their intrinsic natures and their susceptibility to external causes, informs his account of political success and – what for him is the same thing – political virtue. Thus, a state may thrive because it has a good constitution (an internal feature), or because it was fortunate not to be surrounded by powerful enemies. Normally, however, it is the combination of both luck and internal qualities that determines the (...) fate of things. What is true about the fate of states holds equally of the fate of other types of individual, both human and non-human. In a sense, even the fate of a theory is determined by the interplay between its intrinsic virtues, and mere historical luck. A quarter century ago, shortly after I began my graduate studies in philosophy at Yale, I started thinking about writing a dissertation on Spinoza’s philosophy. A good and caring friend in my graduate cohort advised me against the idea, which he believed was tantamount to “professional suicide” given the oddity of Spinoza’s thought. Indeed, the environment of analytic philosophy in the mid- and even late-1990s was not particularly auspicious for the academic study of Spinoza. Spinoza was – rightly – considered as having little commitment to commonsense, and commitment to commonsense – the most stubborn of prejudices – was (and still is) considered by many a minimal requirement for entry into the club of “decent” philosophers. Yet, things have changed over the past twenty-five years. So much so, that recently a (non-Spinozist) early modernist colleague of mine complained to me about the futility of changing the description of an event he planned from a ‘Spinoza workshop’ into an ‘early modern philosophy workshop,’ since “one way or another, most of the submitted abstracts are going to deal with Spinoza.” Indeed, in many ways, the interest and intensity of the study of Spinoza’s philosophy in the Anglo-American world has eclipsed that of almost all other early modern philosophers, and we seem to be facing a circumstance in which Spinoza is gradually competing with, if not replacing, Kant as the compass of modern philosophy. One can list many reasons for these dramatic developments: from Spinoza’s radical naturalism, to his dismissal of the fairytales of anthropomorphic and anthropocentric religion – while Kant on these issues could at best be said to kick the ghosts from the front door while inviting them back as ‘ideas’ or ‘postulates of practical reason’ through the back door –- to his unequivocal rejection of the illusions of humanism. Still, we lack a full explanation of the recent Spinozist upheaval in North American philosophy. (shrink)

Like most, if not all, of his contemporaries, Spinoza never developed a full-fledged philosophy of mathematics. Still, his numerous remarks about mathematics attest not only to his deep interest in the subject (a point which is also confirmed by the significant presence of mathematical books in his library), but also to his quite elaborate and perhaps unique understanding of the nature of mathematics. At the very center of his thought about mathematics stands a paradox (or, at least, an apparent paradox): (...) mathematics provides Spinoza with an epistemic model. Mathematical knowledge is certain (II/138/9 and II/138/9), clear (IV/261/8), and free from teleological thinking (II/79/33), but the objects of mathematical knowledge – i.e., mathematical entities – are nothing but “auxila imaginationis [aids of the imagination],” (IV/57/16 and II/83/15), entities that are not real and merely assist the imagination in carving the world in manner that is suitable to our limited and distortive cognitive capacities. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza, the 17th century philosopher best known for his metaphysical rigor and the radical heterodoxy of his conception of God as Nature, did not say much about children or childhood. Nevertheless, his few mentions of children in his masterpiece, the Ethics, raise fascinating questions of autarky, rationality and mind-body relations as they are perceived in the contrast between children and adults. Generally, philosophical theories of childhood benefit greatly from a strong metaphysical foundation. Spinoza’s philosophy, which has recently been gaining (...) considerable attention by contemporary neuroscientists and psychologists, can serve as stable and fertile ground for developing a strong philosophy of childhood. In this paper I address the Spinozistic conception of a flourishing, happy human and the way this understanding of human excellence reflects on his understanding of children and childhood. I argue that the use of Spinozistic concepts can be valuable in the analysis of children and childhood—especially essence, striving to persevere in being, and the nature of the imagination. Spinoza’s epistemology can explain the unique rationality of children, and provide a metaphysical basis for normative behavior. Moreover, it can help us as caregivers better understand and empathize with children, by explaining the similarities and differences between children and adults. (shrink)