Spinoza: Epistemology

Se expone la relación entre el signo en tanto gnoseológica y semánticamente subordinado a la imaginación y el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar las verdades filosóficas por parte de Spinoza. Al respecto, se revisan tres posturas: (i) la de David Savan, quien sostiene la inadecuación del lenguaje para expresar verdades filosóficas debido a la vinculación spinoziana entre las palabras y la imaginación; (ii) la de G.H.R. Parkinson, quien afirma que el uso del lenguaje no es inconsistente con la (...) expresión de las proposiciones filosóficas por parte de Spinoza, sino que, la mayor parte de lo propuesto en la Ética pertenece al conocimiento de razón y las nociones comunes y; (iii) la de Mogens Laerke, quien defiende la posibilidad de atribuir coherencia al uso del lenguaje, por un lado, y a la filosofía spinoziana, por el otro, a partir del recurso matemático de la demostración geométrica. Finalmente, se argumenta una interpretación propia con base en el análisis semiótico del signo en Spinoza, a partir de la cual (i) es posible atribuirle al signo una función dentro del entendimiento, sin detrimento de su capacidad gnoseológica y semántica para alcanzar verdades filosóficas y, por consiguiente, (ii) validar el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar su filosofía. (shrink)

Se expone la relación entre el signo en tanto gnoseológica y semánticamente subordinado a la imaginación y el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar las verdades filosóficas por parte de Spinoza. Al respecto, se revisan tres posturas: (i) la de David Savan, quien sostiene la inadecuación del lenguaje para expresar verdades filosóficas debido a la vinculación spinoziana entre las palabras y la imaginación; (ii) la de G.H.R. Parkinson, quien afirma que el uso del lenguaje no es inconsistente con la (...) expresión de las proposiciones filosóficas por parte de Spinoza, sino que, la mayor parte de lo propuesto en la Ética pertenece al conocimiento de razón y las nociones comunes y; (iii) la de Mogens Laerke, quien defiende la posibilidad de atribuir coherencia al uso del lenguaje, por un lado, y a la filosofía spinoziana, por el otro, a partir del recurso matemático de la demostración geométrica. Finalmente, se argumenta una interpretación propia con base en el análisis semiótico del signo en Spinoza, a partir de la cual (i) es posible atribuirle al signo una función dentro del entendimiento, sin detrimento de su capacidad gnoseológica y semántica para alcanzar verdades filosóficas y, por consiguiente, (ii) validar el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar su filosofía. (shrink)

Spinoza reasons about impossibilities on a regular basis. But he also says they're unthinkable and that reasoning is a mental process. How can he do this? The paper defends a linguistic account of counterpossible inferences in Spinoza's geometrical method.

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text we (...) assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This paper argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism and naturalism. This (...) crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The paper examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies. (shrink)

Is it correct to accept an anthopological dimension in Baruch Spinoza’s doctrine? Regardless of the answer we may suggest for this point, how could be this connected to the prevailing Humanism of the immediately previous period in which our author lived? Our proposal points to a positive stance in relation to the presence of an anthropological perspective in Spinoza’s thought; perspective that may be seen as a reaction to that kind of Renaissance humanism that sees the human being in Nature (...) a privileged kind. Therefore, in this paper we are going to analyse the way the concept of man evolves from this to the Spinozian formulation as a foundation in which it can be possible to accept the study of a certain Anthropology in his work. (shrink)

In this study, I will attempt a comparison between the philosophy of Spinoza (especially his Ethics) and the systemic philosophy. Firstly, I will analyze the systemic specific terminology; then it will be compared with the Spinozian one, and I will suggest a hypothesis in order to translate Spinoza's terms into systemic ones. Of this hypothesis, I will present the strengths and weaknesses, especially about the notion of 'centralization' of a system and about Spinoza's epistemology.

This book reconstructs Spinoza's theory of the human mind against the backdrop of the twofold notion that subjective experience is explainable and that its successful explanation is of ethical relevance, because it makes us wiser, freer, and happier.

In an unsung yet excellent paper, W.Z. Harvey set out to explain how both Maimonides and Spinoza have similarly problematic views on the nature of the knowledge of good and evil. In it, he proposed an answer to solving the problem. In the many decades since, debates surrounding this topic have flourished. A recent paper by Joshua Parens, his conclusions mark a distinction between Spinoza and Maimonides that threaten to undermine Harvey’s solution to the problem. I will argue that, although (...) Parens’ distinction forces us to revise Harvey’s contention, Harvey’s argument is still generally valid. (shrink)

Michael LeBuffe explains claims about reason in Spinoza's metaphysics, theory of mind, ethics, and politics. He emphasizes the extent to which different claims build upon one another so contribute to the systematic coherence of Spinoza's philosophy.

An unparalleled collection of original essays on Benedict de Spinoza's contributions to philosophy and his enduring legacy A Companion to Spinoza presents a panoramic view of contemporary Spinoza studies in Europe and across the Anglo-American world. Designed to stimulate fresh dialogue between the analytic and continental traditions in philosophy, this extraordinary volume brings together 53 original essays that explore Spinoza's contributions to Western philosophy and intellectual history. A diverse team of established and emerging international scholars discuss new themes and classic (...) topics to provide a uniquely comprehensive picture of one of the most influential metaphysicians of all time. Rather than simply summarizing the body of existing scholarship, the Companion develops new ideas, examines cutting-edge scholarship, and suggests directions for future research. The text is structured around six thematically-organized sections, exploring Spinoza's life and background, his contributions to metaphysics and natural philosophy, his epistemology, politics, ethics, and aesthetics, the reception of Spinoza in the work of philosophers such as Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel, and more. This unparalleled research collection combines a timely overview of the current state of research with deep coverage of Spinoza's philosophy, legacy, and influence. Part of the celebrated Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, A Companion to Spinoza is an ideal text for advanced courses in modern philosophy, intellectual history, and the history of metaphysics, and an indispensable reference for researchers and scholars in Spinoza studies. (shrink)

In this book, Della Rocca traces out the conceptual links between key concepts and principles of Spinoza's system bearing on representation and the mind-body problem. In the course of doing so, he presents and defends a number of new, interesting theses about Spinoza's thought on these matters. The arguments are presented with impressive clarity and in great detail. All in all, the book is a significant contribution to the literature on Spinoza's metaphysics and epistemology, and should be read by anyone (...) with a serious interest in its historical subject or in the two perennial philosophical problems on which it focuses. (shrink)

Spinoza's Ethics, published in 1677, is considered his greatest work and one of history's most influential philosophical treatises. This volume brings established scholars together with new voices to engage with the complex system of philosophy proposed by Spinoza in his masterpiece. Topics including identity, thought, free will, metaphysics, and reason are all addressed, as individual chapters investigate the key themes of the Ethics and combine to offer readers a fresh and thought-provoking view of the work as a whole. Written in (...) a clear and accessible style, the volume sets out cutting-edge research that reflects, challenges, and promotes the most recent scholarly advances in the field of Spinoza studies, tackling old issues and bringing to light new subjects for debate. (shrink)

This chapter will discuss Spinoza’s critique of free will, though our brief study of this topic in the first part of the chapter will aim primarily at preparing us to address the main topic of the chapter, which is Spinoza’s explanation of the reasons which force us to believe in free will. At times, Spinoza seems to come very close to asserting the paradoxical claim that we are not free to avoid belief in free will. In the second part of (...) the chapter I will closely examine Spinoza’s etiological explanation of how we come to form the belief in free will. In the third part, I will raise and respond to a crucial objection to Spinoza’s explanation of the formation of our belief in free will. I will then turn to examine Fichte’s intriguing claim that Spinoza’s position on the issue of free will suffers from an internal contradiction, as evinced in Fichte’s suggestive remark: “Spinoza could not have been convinced of his own philosophy. He could only have thought of it; he could not have believed it [Er konnte seine Philosphie nur denken, nicht sie glauben].”. (shrink)

Ex nihilo nihil fit. Philosophy, especially great philosophy, does not appear out of the blue. In the current volume, a team of top scholars-both up-and-coming and established-attempts to trace the philosophical development of one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Featuring twenty new essays and an introduction, it is the first attempt of its kind in English and its appearance coincides with the recent surge of interest in Spinoza in Anglo-American philosophy.Spinoza's fame-or notoriety-is due primarily to his posthumously published (...) magnum opus, the Ethics, and, to a lesser extent, to the 1670 Theological-Political Treatise. Few readers take the time to study his early works carefully. If they do, they are likely to encounter some surprising claims, which often diverge from, or even utterly contradict, the doctrines of the Ethics. Consider just a few of these assertions: that God acts from absolute freedom of will, that God is a whole, that there are no modes in God, that extension is divisible and hence cannot be an attribute of God, and that the intellectual and corporeal substances are modes in relation to God. Yet, though these claims reveal some tension between the early works and the Ethics, there is also a clear continuity between them.Spinoza wrote the Ethics over a long period of time, which spanned most of his philosophical career. The dates of the early drafts of the Ethics seem to overlap with the assumed dates of the composition of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well Being and precede the publication of Spinoza's 1663 book on Descartes' Principles of Philosophy. For this reason, a study of Spinoza's early works can illuminate the nature of the problems Spinoza addresses in the Ethics, insofar as the views expressed in the early works help us reconstruct the development and genealogy of the Ethics. Indeed, if we keep in mind the common dictum. (shrink)

Spinoza's Ethics is a classic philosophy text but it is also one of the most difficult to understand. This latest text in the Oxford Philosophical Texts series includes a new, lucid translation of Ethics in which Parkinson provides a comprehensive guide to the understanding of Spinoza's work. An extensive introduction includes a short biography of Spinoza himself; the form of his writing including his own particular uses of definitions; an introductory guide through the philosophy of Ethics; and a summary of (...) the contents of Ethics itself. Further aids include a glossary of terms, notes to the text, and notes to the translation. (shrink)

Este artigo propõe-se a tratar dos obstáculos epistemológicos e passionais à beatitude na abertura do Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione de Espinosa, mostrando a conciliação entre os discursos retórico e epistêmico na exposição do autor. Desse modo, procuramos demonstrar que o filósofo seiscentista não produz uma cisão em sua obra com uma introdução meramente retórica do problema, mas fornece, desde as primeiras linhas, a gênese matemática do desejo, elaborando assim uma epistemologia.

This dissertation deals with Spinoza's notion of adequate ideas. From Spinoza's perspective, the adequate idea as God's essence entails absolute certainty. To know an idea adequately, one must reach the infinite and eternal aspects of God's essence. Only by doing so can one fulfill the criteria of truth, namely truth as coherence and truth as correspondence. A true idea is one which satisfies all the internal marks, and its ideatum as the physical image corresponds to every aspect of the thing. (...) ;I argue that the body plays a constitutive role in cognition. For Spinoza, the body is not subservient to the mind; mind and body are two sides of the same coin. Affects and conatus can both be attributed to the body. ;The late Descartes believes that imagination cannot reach God's infinity. I contend that on account of conatus as the strife for freedom and infinity, the Spinozistic body is capable of perceiving different modes of space and eventually attaining virtue infinity. Thereafter, the intellect can intuit actual infinity as substance. ;As for eternity, I reconstruct Spinoza's theory of belief with the intention to redeem its validity. A belief becomes true when it is objectively real and subjectively veracious. Moreover, I discuss the two laws of association. Conceiving ideas fortuitously and inadequately, the mind follows the natural law of association. As conatus intelligendi and active affects take shape at a later point, the mind relates ideas with necessity and follows the universal law of association. I further claim that in the third kind of knowledge the mind is in touch with two kinds of reality, one temporal and the other eternal. The eternal existence of the thing grounds its temporal existence. ;Knowing God's eternal essence and existence involves grasping the thing's common notions and intuiting its concrete essence. The intuition at issue is an unconditional positing. As such, it grounds all subsequent propositional and conditional positing. I identify this intuition as the experience of God's eternal existence. The problems of eternity and infinity being solved, the knowledge entails absolute certainty. (shrink)

Adequate and inadequate ideas play a central role in Spinoza’s system. A number of recent commentators have suggested that the internality or externality of an idea’s immediate cause is a necessary and sufficient condition of the idea’s adequacy or inadequacy, respectively. I show that this thesis is subject to counterexample and briefly explore the significance of this critique for recent interpretations. I offer an alternative interpretation on which adequate and inadequate ideas are characterized by the manner in which they grasp (...) their objects. Adequate ideas conceive of their objects as following from God. Inadequate ideas conceive of their objects as affecting the body at a time and place. (shrink)

It will be my business in what follows to show, in my "longwinded" manner, that we have here no callow confusion to be thus disposed of, but the very quintessence of Spinoza's solution of the otherwise insoluble problems of human epistemology and ontology.

In the Ethics, Spinoza is not expressly concerned with skepticism and the possibility envisaged by Descartes that clear and distinct ideas or conceptions may not be true. There is reason for this, as he was of the opinion that, if as in the Ethics we proceed in our thinking in the right order, doubt will not arise. In his earlier works, however, he is concerned with skepticism and, in particular, with the questioning of clear and distinct ideas. In the Prolegomenon (...) in Part One of Descartes’ Principles, he sets forth what he takes to be Descartes’ attempt to allay doubts about clear and distinct perceptions. He finds there that Descartes does not succeed in answering an objection to his procedure, and he proposes an alternative way of escape from doubt. This alternative is also stated in the Improvement of the Understanding in the section on doubt or idea dubia ; and considerable light is cast upon it by his discussion in this section of the nature of doubt. Distinguishing genuine doubt and merely verbal doubt, i.e. professions of doubt when “the soul does not doubt,” he explains what leads to genuine doubt and how such doubt is to be removed. In my paper, I shall explicate the view stated in these passages and raise questions about the relations of this view to other views of Spinoza’s. I shall also be concerned with a short and cryptic passage earlier in the Improvement of the Understanding in which he deals with professions of doubt that, farther on, he deems merely verbal. In a final section, I shall assemble the views about skeptical doubt stated in the various places and give a summary statement of Spinoza’s attitude toward philosophical skepticism. (shrink)

The Oxford Philosophical Texts series consists of authoritative teaching editions of canonical texts in the history of philosophy from the ancient world down to modern times. Each volume provides a clear, well laid out text together with a comprehensive introduction by a leading specialist, giving the student detailed critical guidance on the intellectual context of the work and the structure and philosophical important of the main arguments and explain unfamiliar references and terminology, and a full bibliography and index are also (...) included. -/- The series aims to build up a definitive corpus of key texts in the Western philosophical tradition, which will from a reliable and enduring resource for students and teachers alike. -/- Spinoza's Ethics is one of the classical texts of philosophy but is also one of the most difficult to understand because of the author's use of rigorous logical deduction and the geometrical framework within which his ideas are set. In Ethics, he discusses the nature of human beings and the way in which a rational person might live; the nature of God; and offers an account of true freedom and how it can be attained. -/- This latest text in the Oxford Philosophical Texts series includes a new, lucid translation of the Ethics by G.H.R. Parkinson along with a comprehensive guide to the understanding of Spinoza's work. An extensive introduction includes: a short biography of Spinoza himself; the form of his writing including his own particular uses of definitions; an introductory guide through the philosophy of Ethics; and a summary of the contents of Ethics itself. Further aids include a glossary of terms, extensive notes to the text. (shrink)

In this extraordinary work Gilles Deleuze reflects on one of the figures of the past who has most influenced his own sweeping reconfiguration of the tasks of philosophy.