Spinoza: Miscellaneous

This article considers the history of Soviet Spinoza studies after World War II. V.V. Sokolov, editor of the last Soviet publication of Spinoza’s works, regards him as a metaphysician, at times rising to dialectics, and a pantheist rising to materialism. E.V. Ilyenkov, Ya. A. Milner and B.G. Kuznetsov offer a radically different interpretation of Spinoza, as our advanced contemporary. The article provides a critical analysis of the concept of man as a “thinking body,” which Ilyenkov mistakenly ascribes to Spinoza and (...) then corrects on behalf of Marx. Kuznetsov, in his own words, performs a “neo-Spinozist analysis of science.” He is looking for equivalents of Spinoza’s concepts in modern physics, starting with the “physically meaningful” concept of being. Milner wrote a new Ethics, based on the concept of “free necessity” as a social duty consciously performed by the individual. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone abordar la recepción de la filosofía moderna europea que se desplegó en el siglo XVIII en dos instituciones fundamentales del territorio del Río de la Plata: la Universidad de Córdoba y el Colegio de San Carlos de Buenos Aires. Nuestro objetivo es analizar dicha recepción a pensando su vínculo con una manera específica de practicar la enseñanza de la filosofía en estas instituciones, entendiéndola como parte esencial del quehacer filosófico, como una búsqueda genuina de conocimiento. (...) Nos concentraremos en el caso de Baruch Spinoza —pensador perseguido y condenado a la censura— para ilustrar las diversas formas en las que nuevos autores modernos eran incorporados paulatinamente a la enseñanza de la filosofía en las aulas rioplatenses. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza, the 17th century philosopher best known for his metaphysical rigor and the radical heterodoxy of his conception of God as Nature, did not say much about children or childhood. Nevertheless, his few mentions of children in his masterpiece, the Ethics, raise fascinating questions of autarky, rationality and mind-body relations as they are perceived in the contrast between children and adults. Generally, philosophical theories of childhood benefit greatly from a strong metaphysical foundation. Spinoza’s philosophy, which has recently been gaining (...) considerable attention by contemporary neuroscientists and psychologists, can serve as stable and fertile ground for developing a strong philosophy of childhood. In this paper I address the Spinozistic conception of a flourishing, happy human and the way this understanding of human excellence reflects on his understanding of children and childhood. I argue that the use of Spinozistic concepts can be valuable in the analysis of children and childhood—especially essence, striving to persevere in being, and the nature of the imagination. Spinoza’s epistemology can explain the unique rationality of children, and provide a metaphysical basis for normative behavior. Moreover, it can help us as caregivers better understand and empathize with children, by explaining the similarities and differences between children and adults. (shrink)

In this paper I contrast the metaphysical philosophies of Benedict de Spinoza and the ‘sudden enlightenment’ tradition of Chan Buddhism. Spinoza’s expressivist philosophy, in which everything can be conceived via a lineage of finite causes terminating in substance as a metaphysical ground of all things, emphasises the relative sameness of all entities. By contrast, Chan’s philosophy of emptiness, which rests on the dependent co-origination of all entities, renders such comparison fundamentally meaningless. Having no source beyond dependent co-origination to generate a (...) thing’s distinct nature leads to a metaphysics in which, rather than being relatively similar or different, all things are at one and the same time absolutely the same and absolutely distinct. As a result, Spinoza grounds ethics wholly is sameness or similarity, whereas Chan transcends the dichotomy of sameness and difference and offers an environmental ethics grounded simultaneously in absolute sameness and absolute difference. As a result, in Spinoza’s case, the dissimilarity between human beings and the non-human world places limits on our concern for it. In Chan Buddhism, however, insight into the emptiness of all phenomena leads to a concern for all entities in their suchness, regardless of whether they are similar or different to human beings. As such, I argue that Chan is in a better position than Spinoza to develop a robust environmental ethic. (shrink)

This article frames the poetry of William Wordsworth and the philosophical writings of Spinoza as mutually illuminating works exploring the ethical and ontological questions raised by bodies in states of passivity and immobility. Both writers, it argues, revise our idea of what a “powerful” body might be by developing the concept of “dynamic passivity”—a passivity that does not stand in simple opposition to states of activity, and that ought to be cultivated rather than overcome in the process of empowering the (...) body. The article examines and contrasts the different ways in which Wordsworth and Spinoza conceive of this dynamic passivity, with particular attention paid to how the former embeds a cultivation of “wise passiveness” for the reader in the very form of his poems, through a variety of elements like syntax, metre, and acoustic effects. (shrink)

Se abordan las tres cuestiones principales que aparecen en la correspondencia entre Tschirnhaus y Spinoza: la libertad; la producción de los cuerpos a partir del atributo extensión; la relación entre los modos del atributo pensamiento y los modos de los demás atributos. Se analizan las dificultades que Tschirnhaus detecta y el valor y alcance de las respuestas de Spinoza.

Spinoza na modernidade: do reino da quantidade à refundação imanente da democracia Neste artigo, faz-se um panorama da recepção francesa de Spinoza, de modo a desvelar a dimensão conservadora da filosofia política do autor, na medida em que o determinismo, que geralmente reina sobre o sistema metafísico spinozano, se presta a um compatibilismo com ideias de obediência e liberdade. Nesse sentido, a obediência cética às leis democráticas, ou seja, a obediência à lei da contagem nos liberta e nos emancipa, na (...) medida em que nos liberta de toda transcendência. Parece, portanto, que as democracias contemporâneas, tão atraídas pelos valores republicanos e a dimensão transcendente, ainda têm um longo caminho a percorrer antes de chegar à democracia imanente e formal, que Spinoza chamou de regime absoluto. (shrink)

A study of selected popular literature on Spinoza for the Blackwell Companion to Spinoza.

This paper identifies an aesthetics implicit in Spinoza’s philosophy through the concept of a genesis of the aesthetic. A genesis of the aesthetic indicates that a philosophy of art is not yet fully formed in his work, but can emerge as a consequence or effect of his thought. This aesthetic theory would evaluate the work of art primarily in its relationship to truth. Following the architectonics of Spinoza’s own thought, this paper constructs a progression – moving from the imagination, to (...) reason, to intuition – toward a concept of aesthetic practices that aligns itself ever more closely with the freedom, perfection, and affirmation of infinite substance itself. The specific forms of aesthetic reception and production flowing from Spinoza’s ideal of wisdom unite two seemingly disparate paradigms: the aesthetic as essentially affirmative, as a joy in the individual power of every individuated thing, on the one hand; and the cultivation of a critical, ethically informed aesthetics of liberation, one capable of occupying different positions with respect to state or sovereign power, on the other hand. (shrink)

Se expone la relación entre el signo en tanto gnoseológica y semánticamente subordinado a la imaginación y el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar las verdades filosóficas por parte de Spinoza. Al respecto, se revisan tres posturas: (i) la de David Savan, quien sostiene la inadecuación del lenguaje para expresar verdades filosóficas debido a la vinculación spinoziana entre las palabras y la imaginación; (ii) la de G.H.R. Parkinson, quien afirma que el uso del lenguaje no es inconsistente con la (...) expresión de las proposiciones filosóficas por parte de Spinoza, sino que, la mayor parte de lo propuesto en la Ética pertenece al conocimiento de razón y las nociones comunes y; (iii) la de Mogens Laerke, quien defiende la posibilidad de atribuir coherencia al uso del lenguaje, por un lado, y a la filosofía spinoziana, por el otro, a partir del recurso matemático de la demostración geométrica. Finalmente, se argumenta una interpretación propia con base en el análisis semiótico del signo en Spinoza, a partir de la cual (i) es posible atribuirle al signo una función dentro del entendimiento, sin detrimento de su capacidad gnoseológica y semántica para alcanzar verdades filosóficas y, por consiguiente, (ii) validar el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar su filosofía. (shrink)

Se expone la relación entre el signo en tanto gnoseológica y semánticamente subordinado a la imaginación y el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar las verdades filosóficas por parte de Spinoza. Al respecto, se revisan tres posturas: (i) la de David Savan, quien sostiene la inadecuación del lenguaje para expresar verdades filosóficas debido a la vinculación spinoziana entre las palabras y la imaginación; (ii) la de G.H.R. Parkinson, quien afirma que el uso del lenguaje no es inconsistente con la (...) expresión de las proposiciones filosóficas por parte de Spinoza, sino que, la mayor parte de lo propuesto en la Ética pertenece al conocimiento de razón y las nociones comunes y; (iii) la de Mogens Laerke, quien defiende la posibilidad de atribuir coherencia al uso del lenguaje, por un lado, y a la filosofía spinoziana, por el otro, a partir del recurso matemático de la demostración geométrica. Finalmente, se argumenta una interpretación propia con base en el análisis semiótico del signo en Spinoza, a partir de la cual (i) es posible atribuirle al signo una función dentro del entendimiento, sin detrimento de su capacidad gnoseológica y semántica para alcanzar verdades filosóficas y, por consiguiente, (ii) validar el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar su filosofía. (shrink)

Spinoza has very little to say concerning the creative arts. A careful consideration of those passages in which he discusses art, however, reveals art to have an importance for him that far outstrips what his relative silence might suggest. In this paper, I argue that Spinoza situates art at the genesis of rational, philosophical knowledge. The importance of abstract reason, Spinoza’s “second kind” of knowledge to which most of philosophy belongs, has been well appreciated by scholars. In the Ethics, Spinoza (...) offers a developmental account of this kind of knowledge: reason develops out of the knowledge of sense experience. By tracing his account of this process, I argue that art has an important role to play in the transition from sense experience to philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

Versé autant dans les arts libéraux que dans les arts mécaniques, Spinoza fut aussi tailleur de verre à Amsterdam, sans doute acteur de théâtre, probablement dessinateur. Il fréquenta la boutique d'antiquaire de Franciscus Van den Enden et fut proche de la société des arts Nil volentibus arduum ; il habitait non loin de Rembrandt et Potter et appréciait la compagnie de peintres et de décorateurs. Élaborée au coeur du siècle d'or de la peinture hollandaise, cette philosophie a souvent inspiré les (...) artistes. Comment expliquer un tel regard non philosophique sur une philosophie qui ne présente pas une pensée développée sur les arts? Comment expliquer qu'on ait tenté d'emprunter les voies de l'esthétique pour pénétrer une philosophie qui ne constitue pas ce champ de réflexion en un domaine autonome? (shrink)

ABSTRACT Genevieve Lloyd’s assessment of Spinoza’s rationalism shows how imagination and sensibility are integrated with reason in his metaphysics and equally makes clear how his philosophy illuminates a number of aesthetic works and political situations. This response considers the limitations of the aesthetic analogy she draws from Flaubert and also queries the contrast she sees between Spinoza’s account of reason and finitude and Pascal’s account of the same. Turning from Pascal, it concludes with a consideration of Spinoza’s response to Augustine’s (...) doctrine of original sin in the Political Treatise in order to indicate some problems that stem from a vision of politics grounded in a Spinozist metaphysics of multiplicity. (shrink)

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In the history of philosophy, two standard critiques of the reality of modes in Spinoza’s philosophy come from Pierre Bayle and Georg Wilhelm Hegel. Both philosophers in some way assume that attributes and relations among modes constitute a shared reality in which modes participate. As a result, they assert that Spinoza’s monism leads either to an over-identification of God with contingent modes or to a limited God. In this paper, I will show how attributes and relations among modes in Spinoza’s (...) work simply explain an active modal reality; modes do not depend upon or participate in ideal relations and attributes for their existence. The result is that in Spinoza’s philosophy attributes must be seen as unreal and modal reality must be understood as primary. (shrink)

This book addresses the use of Benedict Spinoza's philosophy in current attempts to elaborate an ecological basis for international environmental law. Because the question of environmental protection has not been satisfactory resolved, the legal debate concerning our responsibility for the environment has - as evidenced in the recent UN report series Harmony with Nature - come to invite calls for a new eco-centric, rather than anthropocentric, legal paradigm. In this respect, Spinoza appears as a key figure. He is one of (...) the few philosophers in the history of western philosophy who cares, and writes extensively, about the roots of anthropocentrism; the core issue of contemporary normative debates in ecology. And in response to the rapidly developing ecological crisis, his work has become central to a re-thinking of the human relationship with nature. Addressing the contention that Spinoza's ethics might provide a useful source for developing a new, eco-centred framework for environmental law, this book elaborates a more nuanced understanding of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza cannot, it is argued here, simply be reduced to an eco-ethicist. That is: his metaphysics cannot be used as basis of an essentially naturalised or extended human morality. At the same time, however, this book argues that the radicality of Spinoza's naturalism nevertheless offers the possibility of developing a more adequate ecological basis for environmental law. (shrink)

L'équilibre, notion introuvable et omniprésente chez Spinoza. L'enfant dont le corps est "comme en équilibre" illustre le mécanisme d'imitation des affects, au coeur de la psychologie spinoziste. Mais où trouverons-nous la définition de l'équilibre? Chez l'âne de Buridan, pris entre deux désirs strictement équivalents, et modèle du "libre-arbitre"? Mais celui-ci n'est qu'une illusion, même si souvent les hommes ne savent plus où se tourner et flottent entre deux affects contraires, espérance et crainte, amour et haine, etc. A cet équilibre figé, (...) s'oppose l'équilibre en mouvement, qui est un déséquilibre rattrapé. Le spinozisme procède par de fulgurantes équivalences : entre l'âme et le corps, entre Dieu et la nature, entre la puissance et le droit, la réalité et la perfection... Mais ces équivalences, quoi qu'en disent les détracteurs du spinozisme, ne sont pas de simples parallèles fixées dans un système inerte. La pensée qui les pose donne plus de poids tantôt à l'un, tantôt à l'autre des plateaux du balancier, de manière à produire en nous l'équilibre de l'âme, "l'équanimité" qui fait droit à la double postulation de la raison : connaître le monde dans sa nécessité, prendre la mesure de notre puissance d'agir. Cet ouvrage tente de penser, à partir de quelques figures exemplaires et sans souci de systématicité, cette économie pendulaire qui fait que "l'automate spirituel" que nous sommes peut pratiquer et vivre le spinozisme, et l'aimer. (shrink)

Nombreux sont les auteurs contemporains qui dénoncent l'individualisme auquel nous livre le marché. En un sens, ils n'ont pas tort. Mais il est tout à fait remarquable que les penseurs du marché aient toujours fait de celui-ci un système social, une structure paradoxale dans laquelle c'est au moment même où chacun ne pense qu'à ses seuls intérêts que le collectif est le plus solide et le plus compact. Ainsi, c'est par un mouvement de retrait hors du collectif, et donc par (...) une méconnaissance de la présence des autres et de leurs intérêts, que chacun participe malgré lui à la formation du marché en tant que structure collective. La méconnaissance fonde et permet la reconnaissance. Le marché nous impose donc de penser le paradoxe d'une structure individualiste qui se socialise en différant les relations sociales entre les hommes sur des relations individuelles avec les choses. Cela ne peut s'expliquer qu'à la seule condition de comprendre que bien au-delà de leurs seuls intérêts, les individus, sur le marché, poursuivent avant tout des biens spirituels, et donc de la reconnaissance. Ce n'est que parce que tout le monde pense que la poursuite des richesses nous rend sympathiques que cette sympathie s'auto-réalise dans la valorisation sociale réelle de notre image. (shrink)

Historians of philosophy are well aware of the limitations of what Butterfield called ‘Whig history’: narratives of historical progress that culminate in an enlightened present. Yet many recent studies retain a somewhat teleological outlook. Why should this be so? To explain it, I propose, we need to take account of the emotional investments that guide our interest in the philosophical past, and the role they play in shaping what we understand as the history of philosophy. As far as I know, (...) this problem is not currently much addressed. However, it is illuminatingly explored in the work of Spinoza. Spinoza aspires to explain the psychological basis of our attachment to histories with a teleological flavour. At the same time, he insists that such histories are epistemologically flawed. To study the history of philosophy in a properly philosophical fashion we must overcome our Whiggish leanings. (shrink)

In the article the question of Spinoza’s ideological heritage fate in Soviet Russia in the 20-30-ies of the last century has been reviewed. The author has attempted to examine this problem in terms of metaphysical outlook, i.e., to indicate by what of the historical and philosophical value orientations the criticism of Soviet ideologists and propagandists has been guided. After 1917 during the company against the religion, a new image of anti-religious Spinoza was created, the question of being and authentic meaning (...) of life were moved out of sight. The consequence was that the Soviet ideologists become guided by special ‘political economy‘ of truth. In other words, knowledge and knowledge production in the political and economic reality of Soviet Russia were subjected to permanent exposure from the power of party groups. That is why the requirement for realize desired acts of ideological disclosure and tearing the masks from former philosophers, who could not properly accept the philosophical legacy of the great Dutchman become the common thread of all the arguments of Soviet Marxists about Spinoza. Therefore, the proletarian ideologies have "to clean" Spinoza from the ‘ugly‘ interpretations of the past and the present bourgeois thinkers, to highlight the grimaces of ‘decrepit‘ bourgeois thought. (shrink)

Practices of the self are prominent in Spinoza, both in the Ethics and On the Emendation of the Intellect. The same can be said of Descartes, e.g., his Discourse on the Method. What, if anything, distinguishes their practices of the self? Michel Foucault’s concept of “spirituality” isolates how Spinoza ’s practices are relatively unusual in the early modern era. Spirituality, as defined by Foucault in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, requires changes in the ethical subject before one can begin philosophizing, (...) and claims to result in a complete transfiguration or perfection of the subject. Both these characteristics are present in Spinoza ’s Emendation while both are lacking in Descartes’ Discourse. Turning to the Ethics’ practices of the self, I show how affects can be moderated through other affects, and that this text establishes a thorough training of the self which will strengthen one’s overall power well into the future. My treatment of the Ethics differs in emphasis from many other readings which focus on reason’s power over affects, or on cognitive therapy which moderates individual affects to lessen current sadness. In both works, Spinoza ’s practices of the self promise significant changes to those who undergo them. (shrink)

Some critics have claimed that Spinoza's philosophy has nothing to offer aesthetics. I argue that within his conception of an ars vivendi one can discern a nascent theory of art. I bring the figure of the prophet in relation to that of the artist and, alongside a consideration of Spinoza's views on goodness and beauty, show that the special talent of the artist should be understood in terms of the entirely natural expression of the conatus.

Spinoza: Basic Concepts explores key concepts involved in Spinoza’s thinking, relating it to his understanding of philosophy, outlining the arguments and explaining the implications of each concept. Together, the chapters cover the full range of Spinoza’s interdisciplinary system of philosophy.

This article offers an account of the philosophy of language expounded in the Cogitata de interpretatione (1692) of the Dutch philosopher Johannes De Raey (1620-1702). In this work, De Raey provided a theory of the formation and meaning language based on the metaphysics of René Descartes. De Raey distinguished between words signifying passions and sensations, ideas of the intellect, or external things. The aim of this article is to shift away the discussion of De Raey’s critique on the application of (...) the language of practical matters by Lodewijk Meijer and Spinoza, and to redirect modern interpretations to the originality of De Raey’s own reflections on the uses of language. In his linguistic thought, De Raey criticized philosophers such as Hobbes, who supposedly deprived Aristotelian terminology of any reference and meaningful use. The analysis of De Raey testifies to the emergence of the philosophy of language out of the double traditions of logic and metaphysics. It is to be interpreted as an effect of the emergence of an alternative worldview to Aristotelianism. This called for an update of the semantic catalogue of philosophy and practical disciplines. (shrink)

Following a trajectory of thinking from the philosophy of Spinoza via the work of Nietzsche and through Deleuze’s texts, this article explores the possibility of framing a contemporary pedagogical practice by an ontological order that does not presuppose the superiority of the mind over the body and that does not rely on universal morals but that considers instead, as its ontological point of departure, the actual bodies of children and pedagogues through what has come to be known as affective learning. (...) When considering the potentiality of a pure ontology, as outlined by Spinoza, I argue that Nietzsche’s critique of higher values and universal morals allows for a deeper understanding of the limitations of a traditional image of thought. Furthermore, I argue that Deleuze’s conception of the dogmatic image of thought can provide a helpful framework when connecting the work of the two aforementioned philosophers and when conceptualizing a possible image of thought based on the body as a singularity harboring flows of power, rather than one where the body is considered a necessary obstacle to be overcome in the quest for higher values that are situated always beyond the reach of the experiencing body.This philosophical discussion is then situated within the field of educational philosophy via the concept of affective learning which enables the incorporation of these ideas into a concrete educational setting. (shrink)

Chapter 5 addresses the provisional morality of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TIE). The young Spinoza proposes that even as one works at emending the intellect, one should live by certain rules, which one must assume to be good. One should accommodate ordinary ways of speaking and living to the extent that one can without compromising one’s project. One should enjoy pleasures in moderation. Finally, one should seek instrumental goods only insofar as they are necessary for health (...) and social acceptability. In order to explain shifts in Spinoza’s views about the way that individuals should live while pursuing the good, the chapter traces developments in his accounts of ideas and of the relationship between the philosopher and society. (shrink)

A relação entre os modos e a substância na filosofia de Espinosa é tida tradicionalmente como de inerência, de maneira semelhante, grosso modo, à relação entre os acidentes e as substâncias na filosofia aristotélica. Essa concepção de inerência foi contestada por Edwin Curley a partir de 1969. Esta monografia, no primeiro capítulo, procura defender que a relação entre os modos e a substância em Espinosa é de inerência, contra Curley, explicando em que consiste essa relação e diferenciando-a da concepção aristotélica (...) de inerência. No segundo capítulo, são apresentadas e respondidas objeções elaboradas por Pierre Bayle ainda no século XVIII contra a concepção de inerência dos modos na substância em Espinosa e que serviram como apoio para os ataques de Curley. (shrink)

Baruch, or Benedictus, Spinoza (1632–77) is the author of works, especially the Ethics and the Theological-Political Treatise, that are a major source of the ideas of the European Enlightenment. The Ethics is a dense series of arguments on progressively narrower subjects – metaphysics, mind, the human affects, human bondage to passion, and human blessedness – presented in a geometrical order modeled on that of Euclid. In it, Spinoza begins by defending a metaphysics on which God is the only substance and (...) is bound by the laws of his own nature. Spinoza then builds a naturalistic ethics that is constrained by, and to some extent is a product of, his strong metaphysics. Human beings are individuals that causally interact with other individuals and are extremely vulnerable to external influence. They are not substances. Moreover, human beings are bound by the same laws that bind all other individuals in nature, so Spinoza presents accounts of goodness, virtue, and perfection that are consistent with these perfectly general laws. Spinoza’s principal influences include René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes (see hobbes, thomas), Moses Maimonides (see maimonides, moses), the Roman Stoics (see stoicism), and Aristotle (see aristotle). Although his innovative philosophical views undoubtedly contributed to the strong writ of cherem, or ostracism, that Spinoza received from the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656, his work nevertheless also shows the influence of the study of Scripture and of Jewish law. (shrink)

Le tragique n'est pas uniquement à l'Age classique une catégorie théâtrale ; il est également un concept philosophique, et si pour des auteurs comme Corneille ou Racine, il est une donnée littéraire reçue de l'Antiquité, il est chez des philosophes comme Descartes, Pascal ou Spinoza, un concept à construire ou à élaborer. Cette relation idéale entre hommes de théâtre et philosophes a un enjeu important : quelles solutions apporter au tragique?

Through an analysis of Kafka's "Before the Law," Vardoulakis considers both various philosophical responses to Kafka's story and philosophical conceptions of the law. In particular, Vardoulakis suggests an affinity between Kafka and Spinoza's conceptions of the law.

Preface de Pierre-Francois Moreau Beaucoup l'ont constate: il y a un air de famille entre spinozisme et psychanalyse. Meme remise en cause des attributs classiques de la subjectivite (libre-arbitre et transparence de la conscience a elle-meme); meme valorisation de l'affectivite du sujet (et notamment de la force de son desir); meme apprehension materialiste des phenomenes theologico-politiques (a travers l'analyse de la puissance de l'imaginaire); et dans une certaine mesure, meme visee therapeutique... Les deux grands noms de la psychanalyse, Freud et (...) Lacan, n'ont d'ailleurs pas cache, au moins a une certaine periode de leur parcours intellectuel, une proximite avec la pensee spinoziste. Soit. Mais ces grandes lignes de rapprochement entre psychanalyse et spinozisme permettent-elles autre chose que de dessiner une vague parente, dont il serait tout aussi aise, sinon plus, de souligner les lignes de fracture? Pour ne pas en rester a ce niveau de generalite, il est necessaire d'analyser precisement les notions, les problemes, les theses et les textes a travers lesquels cette confrontation entre spinozisme et psychanalyse prend sens et devient fructueuse. C'est le defi qu'entend relever le present recueil, le premier consacre a une telle confrontation. (shrink)

A filosofia de Benedictus de Spinoza tem oferecido a estudiososcontemporâneos da ética ambiental uma valiosa fonte de inspiração.Pesquisadores como Arne Naess, por exemplo, têm usado a firme críticade Spinoza ao antropocentrismo como uma base teórica para a formulaçãode uma ética eco-cêntrica. Neste artigo, argumentarei que a apropriaçãoque Naess faz da filosofia de Spinoza para justificar que o não-humano édepositário de ‘valor intrínseco’ contém problemas. Meu objetivo principalé o de elucidar o sentido no qual a crítica de Spinoza ao antropocentrismonão contradiz (...) uma visão da ética que seja fortemente centrada no humano.The philosophy of Benedictus de Spinoza has providedcontemporary environmental ethicists with invaluable inspiration. Scholarssuch as Arne Naess, for instance, have used Spinoza’s resolute critique ofanthropocentrism as a theoretical basis for the formulation of an eco-centricethics. In this paper I argue that Naess’ appropriation of Spinoza’s philosophyin order to justify that the non-human are depository of ‘intrinsic value’contains problems. My main objective is to elucidate the sense in whichSpinoza’s critique of anthropocentrism does not contradict a strongly humancentredethicalview. (shrink)

Spinoza and Rembrandt were contemporaries and in fact they were neighbours in Amsterdam. Even though there is no record that they ever met, it is hard to imagine that they never crossed paths. This article seeks to explore common ideas that we can find in the philosopher and the painter. This contributes both to a philosophical examination of Rembrandt and examines the possibility of an aesthetics in Spinoza.