George Berkeley

This selection of George Berkeley's most important philosophical works contains--Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision; Principles of Human Knowledge; Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous; Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained; De Motu (in translation); Philosophical Correspondence between Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, 1729-30; and Philosophical Commentaries.

Throughout history, but most especially during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, great minds of philosophy grappled with two thorny questions: What are the objects of knowledge? and How do we come to know them? Using the revealing dialogue technique, Berkeley shakes the very ground of those who believe that something called matter exists to support the sensible qualities we perceive. In his critique of this view, Berkeley argues for ideas in the mind as the only true reality about which one can have (...) knowledge. His arguments for these conclusions, and for the ultimate foundation of all sensible things, can be found in this essential work of early modern philosophy. (shrink)

The Oxford Philosophical Texts series consists of authoritative teaching editions of canonical texts in the History of Philosophy from the ancient world down to modern times. Each volume, issued in a uniform and affordable paperback format, provides a clear, well laid out text together with acomprehensive introduction by a leading specialist, giving the student detailed critical guidance on the intellectual context of the work and the structure and philosophical importance of the main arguments. Endnotes are supplied to expand further on (...) the arguments and explain unfamiliar referencesand terminology, and a full bibliography and index are also included. The series aims to build up a definitive corpus of key texts in the Western philosophical tradition, which will form a reliable and enduring resource for students and teachers alike. This volume contains Leibniz's most important texts, starting with the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), which marks the beginning of maturity in Leibniz's ideas, and ending with the Monadology (1714), written in response to requests for a systematic, organized account of his overall philosophy. Inbetween fall other key works including the New System of Nature (1695), the Specimen of Dynamics (1695), Nature Itself (1698), and the Principles of Nature and Grace (1714). Also included in the volume are critical reactions to the Discourse and the New System by Leibniz's contemporaries, AntoineArnauld, Pierre Bayle, and Simon Foucher, together with Leibniz's responses. All the texts are newly translated into English for this edition, and each is preceded by a summary explaining its background, structure, and content. Also containing a substantial introduction, notes, and bibliography, the volume offers a comprehensive introduction to Leibniz's philosophy. (shrink)

George Berkeley (1685-1753) was one of the most important and influential philosophers in the history of Western thought. He is most famous for his controversial denial of the existence of matter, and for his 'idealism' - the claim that everyday objects are simply collections of ideas in the mind. -/- Starting with Berkeley provides a detailed overview of Berkeley's philosophy, a user-friendly guide to the interpretation of his arguments, and the opportunity for the reader to critically engage with Berkeley's philosophical (...) moves via an examination of some of the common objections which have been raised against them. The book also introduces the major philosophical figures and theories that influenced and inspired Berkeley's thinking and gives a clear sense of the controversy that surrounds the interpretation and evaluation of his ideas. (shrink)

I provide a report of the International Berkeley Conference in Mexico City, hosted by UNAM in 2019.

An unreasonably long review of James Hill's book 'The Notions of George Berkeley: Self, Substance, Unity and Power.'.

In this paper, I present and analyze Berkeley’s sporadic claims on the animal‒human divide, concentrating on his early works, especially his Notebooks. Before drawing our attention to the importance of imagination, I start by contextualizing Berkeley’s views on animal cognition more generally. More specifically, I aim to clarify that though he verbally agrees with Descartes that animals cannot imagine like we do, Berkeley’s view is motivated by fundamentally different considerations. What he ultimately denies is that animals can imagine in a (...) sense that requires the sort of spontaneous and creative activity we share more with God than animals. (shrink)

In Seeing Things as They Are (Searle 2015), Searle developed a direct realist’s theory of perception. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly and immediately perceived. Searle claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception goes against direct realism. For Searle, Berkeley’s theory suggests that only subjective experiences (ideas) are directly and immediately perceived, not physical objects. Contrary to Searle, G. S. Pappas claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception is consistent with the view that physical objects are immediately perceivable (Pappas 1982; (...) Pappas 1987). Given the conflicting interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of perception, this paper attempts to defend Searle’s position on Berkeley’s theory of perception. It refutes Pappas’ interpretation by arguing that he is inconsistent with Berkeley’s theses of ontological phenomenalism and heterogeneity thesis. (shrink)

Studies of the Early Modern debate concerning absolute and relative space and motion often ignore the significance of the concept of true motion in this debate. Even philosophers who denied the existence of absolute space maintained that true motions could be distinguished from merely apparent ones. In this paper, I examine Berkeley's endorsement of this distinction and the problems it raises. First, Berkeley's endorsement raises a problem of consistency with his other philosophical commitments, namely his idealism. Second, Berkeley's endorsement raises (...) a problem of adequacy, namely whether Berkeley can provide an adequate account of what grounds the distinction between true and merely apparent motion. In this paper, I argue that sensitivity to Berkeley's distinction between what is true in the metaphysical, scientific, and vulgar domains can address both the consistency and the adequacy problems. I argue that Berkeley only accepts true motion in the scientific and vulgar domains, and not the metaphysical. There is thus no inconsistency between his endorsement of true motion in science and ordinary language, and his metaphysical idealism. Further, I suggest that sensitivity to these three domains shows that Berkeley possesses resources to give an adequate account of how true motions are discovered in natural science. (shrink)

Review of Kerkmann, J. (2024). Unendliches Bewusstsein. Berkeleys Idealismus und dessen kritische Weiterentwicklung bei Kant und Schopenhauer. Berlin & Boston: de Gruyter.

The resemblance theory of representation is the view that one thing represents another by virtue of resembling it. Typically, it is taken as non-controversial that Berkeley accepts the resemblance theory of representation – even if the plausibility of the resemblance theory itself comes under scrutiny. One piece of evidence in favour of this reading of Berkeley is his commitment to the ‘likeness principle’: the view that ‘an idea can be like nothing but an idea’ (PHK § 8). The likeness principle (...) is typically seen as a rejection of the kind of indirect theory of perception that is often attributed to Locke. However, by paying particular attention to Berkeley’s account of how mental representation via the imagination works, Dávid Bartha casts doubt on the consensus view that Berkeley does accept the resemblance theory of representation. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo las críticas que presenta George Berkeley, filósofo y Obispo de Cloyne, a la noción de fluxón que Newton introduce en su desarrollo delcálculo fluxional. En su propuesta Isaac Newton considera que se puede hablar dedos tipos de puntos: los puntos sin dimensiones y aquellos que surgen del movimiento y que pueden tener alguna clase de medida/magnitud/métrica, es gracias a la existencia de estos últimos que Newton puede realizar el cálculo de la fluxión aun cuando al final (...) del procedimiento, vuelva a considerarlo como un punto sin dimensiones. Una vez expuesta la propuesta de Newton sobre las fluxiones,presentaré la crítica de Berkeley a diversos elementos tanto conceptuales como metodológicos del trabajo de su predecesor, Finalmente ofreceré algunas conclusiones acerca de la validez de las críticas del obispo de Cloyne a Newton. -/- . (shrink)

Se buscará mostrar que las críticas de Berkeley son pertinentes al mostrar que Newton utiliza una justificación que se bása en: 1) La experiecia sensible y 2)En una noción de Dios como poder activo. Con respecto a 1) si bien se puede justificar un método con la experiencia sensible, este no dejara este ámbito y no es posible pasar a las matemáticas con este metodo. Con respecto a 2) Dios es una fuente de justificación posbile para la época, sin embargo (...) en Newton se convierte en un poder activo que se contrapone a otras fomas de entender a Dios como garante de las leyes, más no como un poder que intervenga en el mundo. (shrink)

Se puede considerar que Berkeley y Hume son antecedentes filosóficos del Formalismo Matemático. Ambos sostienen una visión instrumentalista y no-realista de las matemáticas. En la conferencia se explora las diferencias y similitudes de ambos autores, así como el porque se les puede considerar ser antecesores del Formalismo.

A survey of work on the philosophy of perception, mind, and mental representation by Berkeley and his early modern predecessors, notably Descartes, Hobbes, Malebranche, and Locke.

A survey of work on perception, mind, and mental representation by 18th century philosophers after Berkeley, notably Robert Smith, William Porterfield, David Hume, Etienne de Condillac, and Thomas Reid.

Translation and Edition of George Berkeley's "Notebooks".

Excerpt from The Principle of Synthetic Unity in Berkeley and Kant This little volume was prepared as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. By the advice of Dr. John Dewey I have undertaken to interpret the Metaphysical Notes of Berkeley's Commonplace Book, and as far as possible discover the Principle of Unity which occasionally manifests itself in Berkeley's works and which formed a basis for a Treatise on the Will which Berkeley contemplated (...) but never produced. I wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. Dewey for his assistance in the selection of collateral reading and for his suggestions in the development of the thesis. No literature could be secured bearing upon the interpretation of the Notes, hence the Notes have been classified and such as bear upon the theme under discussion have been used. Often the phraseology has been preserved but where that could not be done the thought has been expressed in phraseology as nearly Berkeleian as the author could select so as to preserve the unity that runs through the Notes. This principle of unity found in Berkely has been compared and contrasted with the Unity of Kant. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

L’analyse comparative du Traité des principes de la connaissance humaine (1710) et des Trois dialogues entre Hylas et Philonous (1713), qui se présentent comme les deux phases successives de la première mise en forme doctrinale de l’immatérialisme, permet de formuler l’hypothèse suivante : le dialogisme que ne cesse de susciter le Traité semble spontanément conduire aux Dialogues, comme si Berkeley adoptait enfin la rhétorique adéquate à son projet philosophique. Or l’étude quantitative de la distribution de la parole dans les Dialogues (...) montre au contraire qu’ils n’assument le dialogisme latent qui transparaissait dans le Traité que pour l’annuler : en réalité, le personnage de Philonous détient une écrasante maîtrise de la parole, qui lui permet de disposer de véritables pièces doctrinales, tandis qu’Hylas s’épuise en de multiples objections contradictoires. Le dialogisme n’est donc qu’un outil ponctuel de la réforme rhétorique du propos de Berkeley, destiné à susciter l’interlocuteur pour mieux le dissoudre. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

El llamado “argumento maestro” de Berkeley, por el cual demuestra su principio _esse est percipi_, ha recibido críticas mixtas por parte de los comentaristas: algunos defienden su validez desde sus propias interpretaciones y otros lo acusan de falaz con base en diversas objeciones. El presente artículo defiende al argumento maestro de tres objeciones por parte de Russell, Pitcher y Tipton, las cuales son referidas como _“objeción de la confusión entre el acto perceptivo y el objeto percibido”, “objeción de la confusión (...) entre el concepto del objeto y el objeto mismo” y “objeción del solipsismo del presente”_. El autor propone su propia lectura del argumento maestro para evitar malentendidos y sostiene que dicho argumento cobra su verdadero sentido a partir de los siguientes puntos: la aclaración de los conceptos berkeleyanos de _idea y percepción_; la explicitación de la_ intencionalidad_ de la percepción en el sentido de su _dirección intencional_ hacia objetos intencionales (ideas); y la distinción entre los _dos niveles de dirección intencional de la percepción mediata_ (de una idea _por medio_ de otra), a saber: uno dirigido al _concepto o representación mental como su objeto intencional inmediato_ y el otro dirigido al _objeto representado_ como su _objeto intencional mediato_. (shrink)

1. The aim of my paper is to correct the longstanding misperception of the relationship between two key figures of the Irish intellectual milieu of the seventeenth / eighteenth century: the bishop...

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I show that the observation of the objects of the observer-dependent world - that by virtue of which they are given - is not itself given as another object. The peculiarity of observation is that it is irreducible to either an object or an abstract concept. We see the content of the observation, but we do not see the observation itself, it is not an object (...) or an object for us. Therefore, we can apply the category of “virtuality” to the observation itself, as well as to the observer. (shrink)

David Berman has studied Berkeley for over fifty years and has published three original books on the Irish philosopher (1996, 1997, and 2005). His most recent b.

This study and the topic of George Berkeley and common sense is challenging: Berkeley claims that matter does not exist and at the same time he writes a whole book (Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous) on how his system agrees with common sense. Berkeley was a successful scientist and his book defined the topic of psychology of vision for the next two centuries.

Este texto procura apontar na ontologia das leis naturais de George Berkeley elementos teóricos afeitos à Semiótica e ao Pragmatismo clássico de Charles S. Peirce, tendo por base a possível identidade de propósitos entre os idealismos subjetivo berkeleyano e o de teor objetivo peirciano, ambos comungando a refutação de um dualismo mente-matéria de extração cartesiana. Por outro lado, reflete-se, também, sobre o papel da experiência nestes autores, em que a percepção em Berkeley, fundamental para sua epistemologia encontraria sua condição homóloga (...) em Peirce, a saber, a necessária cognoscibilidade de todo objeto fenomênico. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper examines the American sojourn of the Enlightenment philosopher and theologian George Berkeley. While living in coastal Rhode Island between 1729 and 1731, Berkeley penned his longest philosophical tract, Alciphron: Or, the Minute Philosopher (1732), which criticized “freethinking,” mechanical conceptions of nature in favor of those that emphasized God's providence. To illustrate these two ways of knowing nature, Berkeley, a careful prose stylist, evoked nearby coastal landscapes for contrast. Accordingly, his work broke down dichotomies between ideas and matter and, (...) by extension, culture and nature, which could, this paper argues, inform an environmental ethic for a “hybrid” world. (shrink)