Berkeley: Philosophy of Religion, Misc

I argue that Berkeley's distinctive idealism/immaterialism can't support his view that objects of sense, immediately or mediately perceived, are causally inert. (The Passivity of Ideas thesis or PI) Neither appeal to ordinary perception, nor traditional arguments, for example, that causal connections are necessary, and we can't perceive such connections, are helpful. More likely it is theological concerns,e.g., how to have second causes if God upholds by continuously creating the world, that's in the background. This puts Berkeley closer to Malebranche than (...) to Hume. -/- As far the what I call the "first strategy;" defending the passivity of ideas by ordinary introspection, I refer to the work of the French psychologist Albert Michotte,(1940) and those now extending his experiments, to show that (1) there is an immediate and quite robust visual impression of causality, (admitted in fact by Berkeley, Malebranche and Hume) and (2) of more importance, the impression isn't due to projecting into nature expectations gained from experienced regularities. (shrink)

Berkeley “argues with the learned and speaks with the vulgar.” I use his double maxim to interpret his ethics. My approach is new. The Sermons and Guardian Essays mainly speak to the vulgar and Passive Obedience and Alciphron reason with the learned. The reward of ethics is eternal bliss in a future state: religion and ethics are connected. I study a set of problems: resurrection, eternal life, happiness, benevolence, the goodness of God, and self-love. Divine bliss is unlike any earthly (...) happiness. The idea of law does not support benevolence, even if it is a Christian duty and virtue. God is good, but how to prove it? The learned must study the complex theodicy problem; the vulgar need assurance based on their sensuous experience and fervent hope of eternal bliss. Self-love may be a vital issue to the learned, although the vulgar may not realize their need to overcome it. The main questions concern Berkeley’s two approaches to ethical problems: first, how do their topics differ, and second, are they mutually consistent? (shrink)

This essay consists of two parts. Part I offers an explanation of Berkeley's understanding of the relationship between materialism and evil. Berkeley regards materialism as the chief instrumental cause of evil in the world. It is the belief in matter that encourages us to believe that God is not immediately, intimately present in every aspect of our life. Immaterialism, by contrast, makes God's immediate presence vivid and thereby serves to undermine the motivation to vice. Part II locates Berkeley's view on (...) matter and evil within the Christian Neoplatonic tradition. I compare Plotinus' minimalist approach to matter and his identification of matter with evil to Berkeley's eliminitivism about matter and his corresponding identification of materialism as the chief source of evil. (shrink)

An interpretation of Berkeley’s theory of meaning must account for operative utility as well as Berkeley’s commitment to the truth of Christian scriptures. I argue that formalist and use-theoretic...

This article argues that George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) interpretation of scientific and religious language was significantly received in C.S. Peirce’s (1839–1914) pragmatist semiotic.1 To this end, their similar views against transubstantiation in the Eucharist (Lord’s Supper, Holy Communion) will be considered. Berkeley being an Anglican bishop and Peirce’s life being linked to the Episcopal Church,2 a chief emphasis will be placed upon Peirce’s deriving his pragmatic method from Berkeley’s philosophy of language. At least three times, Peirce reviewed Berkeley’s works, including Manuscript (...) Introduction (to the Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710), in which he identified his version of Berkeleyan nom- inalism. (shrink)

This paper argues that a debate between Toland and Clarke is the intellectual context to help understand the motive behind the critic and the significance of Berkeley's response to the critic in PHK 60-66. These, in turn, are responding to Boyle's adaptation of a neglected design argument by Cicero. The paper shows that there is an intimate connection between these claims of natural science and a once famous design argument. In particular, that in the early modern period the connection between (...) the scientific revolution and a certain commitment to final causes, and god's design, is more than merely contingent. The details of PHK 60-66 support the idea that the critic is responding to concerns that by echoing features of Toland's argument Berkeley undermines the Newtonian edifice Clarke has constructed. (shrink)

There is a long-standing dispute among scholars concerning Berkeley’s supposed commitment to an emotivist theory of meaning as the very first instance of non-cognitivism. According to this position, the domains of religious and moral language do not refer to facts about the world, but rather express the emotional attitudes of religious or moral language users. Some scholars involved in the dispute argue for taking Berkeley to be an emotivist, while others hold that we should not do so. This paper puts (...) forward an interpretation that lends support to the non-cognitivist reading of his stance, but in expressivist rather than emotivist terms. It argues that the label “expressivism” does more justice to the textual evidence concerning his understanding of moral language, as what is distinctive where this philosopher is concerned is his interest in explaining the nature of our practice of employing moral language, rather than whether morality is just a matter of our emotions or feelings. (shrink)

John DePoe takes issue with Christians who accept Berkeleyan idealism, essentially arguing that there is a special problem from evil for the Christian idealist. While DePoe’s treatment of idealism is commendable, his argument ultimately fails in one of two ways. It either turns on common misunderstandings of idealism or results in consequences unacceptable to Christians. In our article, we respond to DePoe’s argument by remotivating idealism, pointing out ways in which DePoe misunderstands idealists’ responses to the charge of a special (...) problem of evil, and pointing out problems with DePoe’s proposals of materialist solutions to the problem of evil. (shrink)

Recent political events suggest that there is more political, religious, and moral division than many had previously realized. Since people on all sides think they’re in the right, mitigating division is in everyone’s interest. But overcoming division requires changing minds, and changing minds requires advocacy. These considerations raise important questions in the epistemology of advocacy. In particular, who are the best advocates? After making some general remarks about the epistemology of advocacy, I explore the thought, found in Berkeley’s dialogue Alciphron, (...) that an important variable to consider when assessing advocates is whether they are converts. I argue that this is indeed an important variable to consider, as certain kinds of converts can avoid some attempts to dismiss advocates. However, non-converts score better than converts in other respects. I conclude by suggesting that empirical work must be done to assess the role conversion plays in assessing advocates. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper responds to two issues in interpreting George Berkeley’s Analyst. First, it explains why the text contains no discussion of religious mysteries or points of faith, despite the claims of the text's subtitle; I argue that the subtitle must be understood, and its success assessed, in conjunction with material external to the text. Second, it’s unclear how naturally the arguments of the Analyst sit with Berkeley’s broader views. He criticizes the methodology of calculus and conceptually problematic entities, and the (...) extent to which they require one to bend the rules of classical mathematics. Yet, elsewhere, Berkeley’s opinion of classical mathematics and its intelligibility is low, and he defends a pragmatic approach to word meaning that should not find fault with so functionally successful a theory. The ad hominem intention of the text makes it difficult to discern to what extent Berkeley is committed to the sincerity of these criticisms. This component of the text is rarely discussed, but I argue that when trying to decide what Berkeley’s true position is in the Analyst, we should treat its ad hominem component as its primary intention. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, our purpose is to show what George Berkeley really said about ethics and the background conditions of religious life. The point is that true happiness is only possible in a religious sense; it means happiness in afterlife. The major threat to this is freethinking, or what we see as emerging enlightened modernism. His rather quixotic fix against freethinking shows the man as he is behind all the conventional panegyrics. He is a real Anglican soldier who anticipated but (...) never admitted a critical defeat in the most important of all battles. Interest in George Berkeley’s life’s work has been exceptionally selective. Yet his revolutionary immaterialism is only an early episode in his struggles towards a better society and religious life for all the people, regardless of their denomination. From this point of view, Alciphron is central. But he also develops his ethical ideas in his various minor writings, which have been largely overlooked. (shrink)

In response to the recent resurgence of idealism among a cluster of Christian theologians and philosophers, this article raises a difficulty for Christians to be idealists. Unlike traditional accounts of Christianity that must explain why God permits or allows evil, idealists face a different and more difficult problem—namely why does God willfully and directly produce experiences of evil. Because the metaphysics of idealism requires God to produce experiences of evil directly and willfully, it is difficult to reconcile it with the (...) essential goodness of God. The existence of matter, therefore, may play an important role in maintaining God’s innocence while allowing creatures to exercise free will. (shrink)

Traditionally, religious doctrines and practices have been divided into two categories. Those that purport to be justified by natural reason alone are said to be part of natural religion, while those which purport to be justified only by appeal to supernatural revelation are said to be part of revealed religion. One of the central aims of Berkeley's philosophy is to understand and defend both the doctrines and the practices of both natural and revealed (Christian) religion. This chapter will provide a (...) survey of this aspect of Berkeley's thought. (shrink)

Berkeleyan idealism, or ‘immaterialism,’ has had an enormous impact on the history of philosophy during the last three centuries. In recent years, Christian scholars have been especially active in exploring ways that Berkeley's thesis may be fruitfully applied to a variety of issues in philosophy and theology. This essay provides an overview of some of the ways Christian philosophers have deployed immaterialism to solve problems and generate insights in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, and philosophical (...) theology. (shrink)

Os dois ensaios aqui traduzidos: “Uma visita a uma glândula pineal”, publicado originalmente em 21 de abril de 1713 no número 35 do Guardian e a “A glândula pineal (continuação)”, publicado no dia 25 de abril, no número 39, formam uma unidade não apenas pela referência a ideia de glândula pineal concebida por Descartes como ponto de interação entre a alma e o corpo, mas também pela forma literária e pelo pseudônimo comum. Eles fazem parte de um conjunto de quatorze (...) ensaios atribuídos a George Berkeley, reunidos e publicados pela primeira vez apenas em 1871, no volume III da edição organizada por A. C. Fraser. Os ensaios publicados no Guardian foram escritos durante a permanência de Berkeley em Londres em 1713, quando Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) e Richard Steele (1672-1729), seus conterrâneos, contribuiriam para lhe abrir caminho no ambiente literário inglês. O principal objetivo de Berkeley ao publicar os ensaios foi o de defender o teísmo cristão contra os “livre-pensadores” da época, assumidos como materialistas e ateus. A tradução aqui apresentada foi realizada com base na edição organizada por Luce e Jessop. The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. Luce, A. A. and Jessop, T. E. London and Edimburgh: Nelson, 1948, v. 7, 185-192. (shrink)

Berkeley writes in his ThreeDialogues Between Hylas and Philonous that he “acknowledge[s] a twofold state of things, the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal[.] The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God”. On a straightforward reading of this passage, it looks as though Berkeley is an indirect perception theorist, who thinks that our sensory ideas are copies or resemblances of archetypal divine ideas. But this is problematic because Berkeley’s rejection (...) of scepticism seems partly to rest on a rejection of indirect perception. In this paper, I consider, and reject, three different approaches to solving this problem: that Berkeley’s remarks on archetypes are unrepresentative; that Berkeley is indeed committed to divine archetypal ideas ; and that Berkeley thinks divine archetypal ideas are identical to human ideas. I finally settle on a fourth strategy, which involves reading Berkeley’s archetypes as divine powers to produce ideas. I claim that this reading is consistent with the texts, that it has an etymological basis and philosophical precedent, and that it resolves the problems associated with the other three approaches to archetypes. (shrink)

Is not easy to explain how God is known according to Berkeley. However, from his works one may infer that philosophically Berkeley oscillates between two conceptions of God: (i) as an indispensable and necessary assumption for his theory of ideas and (ii) as a being analogous to the man. From these conceptions, I present here a route for the knowledge of God, which emerges from Berkeley´s concept of finite spirit. As this possess the ideas of imagination and memory and is (...) able to reflect on itself, it is possible to talk about an internal route of knowledge, through oneself, which comes from the own spirit (finite) and leads directly to the knowledge of God. (shrink)

El filósofo inglés John Locke es más conocido por su Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano y por sus escritos sobre la tole-rancia, esto es, por su aportación epistemológica, psicológica y política, que por su profundo interés en la religión cristia-na; empero, como muchos de sus contemporáneos Locke tuvo especial interés en el estudio de la religión. Justamente en este artículo hago una primera aproximación a esta cues-tión, es decir, al interés lockeano por la religión que plasmó rotundamente en su obra (...) The Reasonableness of Christianity. Sus estudios sobre la Biblia y sobre algunos de los dogmas cristianos, como el de la Trinidad, influyeron decisivamente en los movimientos heterodoxos de la época, sobre todo en el llamado deísmo del siglo XVII, cuyas ideas y posturas tras-cendieron al siglo XVIII con los librepensadores; ya en ese siglo el deísmo, que para entonces también era llamado mo-vimiento del librepensamiento, fue cuestionado y criticado por muchos filósofos y pensadores, dentro de los cuales des-taca el filósofo irlandés George Berkeley, quien vio en las ideas de esos grupos el germen de la decadencia de la socie-dad de su tiempo. Berkeley y su obra Alcifrón son abordados en la segunda parte del artículo, en donde se retoma la críti-ca berkeleyana al librepensamiento porque representa y ejemplifica, mediante la actitud crítica del irlandés, la in-fluencia de Locke en los movimientos deístas y librepensa-dores de épocas posteriores. (shrink)

This paper describes Berkeley’s ethics and analyses its metaphysical presuppositions. His ethical though is based on the theological idea of virtue that means obedience to God’s will and, hence, all ethically relevant concepts contain a reference to God. Berkeley also says that happiness in this vale of tears is God’s gift to us and a reward of virtue in heaven. Happiness is a sign and criterion of virtuous conduct. Obviously this kind of supernatural ethics can work only if its metaphysical (...) foundation is so obvious that all decent people can figure it out. This is to say that revealed religion must be replaced by natural religion. According to Berkeley, the existence of God, his goodness, the reality of heaven, and its supreme happiness can be proved philosophically and in terms of natural religion. The main part of the paper describes and evaluates Berkeley’s logic, especially analogical reasoning and his inferences from conclusions to premises, or effects to causes. Another major theme is the mutual independence of revealed and natural theology. Berkeley’s minor writings are in a major role here. Due to the unsystematic nature of its sources the conclusions of this paper are open-ended and speculative. (shrink)

Berkeley's main aim in his well-known early works was to identify and refute "the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and irreligion." This appears to place Berkeley within a well-established tradition of religious critics of Locke's epistemology, including, most famously, Stillingfleet. I argue that these appearances are deceiving. Berkeley is, in fact, in important respects an opponent of this tradition. According to Berkeley, Locke's earlier critics, including Stillingfleet, had misidentified the grounds of irreligion in Locke's philosophy while all the while endorsing the (...) true grounds of irreligion themselves. Locke's epistemology is innocent; matter and abstraction are to blame. (shrink)

In a familiar limerick attributed to Ronald Knox, the narrator asks how a “tree/should continue to be/when there’s no one about in the Quad,” and is subsequently reassured that its continuous existence is guaranteed by God’s being “always about in the Quad” observing it. This is meant to capture Berkeley’s so‐called ‘continuity argument’ for the existence of God, on which the claim that objects exist continuously over time is supposed to entail the existence of a Divine Mind that continuously perceives (...) the ideas that constitute those objects. But the continuity argument is not an uncontroversial one. For one thing, we might ask what divine perception is supposed to be like – does God perceive all of the ideas that we do, and in the same way that we do? And if so, does this mean that God perceives pain – that God suffers? For another thing, we might ask whether Berkeley is entitled to the claim that objects exist continuously to begin with. In this paper, I look at some of the problems associated with the continuity argument, and then present a reading of divine perception that attempts to prevent these problems from arising at the outset. (shrink)

Does George Berkeley provide an argument for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God at Principles of Human Knowledge, part I, section 29? The standard answer is that he does. In this paper, we challenge that interpretation. First, we look at section 29 in the context of its preceding sections and argue that the most the argument establishes is that there are at least two minds, that is, that the thesis of solipsism is false. Next, we examine the argument in section (...) 29 in light of the conclusions Berkeley draws in sections 30–33. There Berkeley concludes that there is one cause of the ordered world of ideas, a cause he calls the "Author of Nature." We argue that Berkeley's Author of Nature is conceptually distinct from, although numerically identical with, the Judeo-Christian God, for whose existence Berkeley argues in section 146. Finally, we ask whether, if our conclusion is correct, it is significant that Berkeley drew a conceptual distinction between the Author of Nature and the Judeo-Christian God. (shrink)

The purpose of this text is to analyze the debate between Berkeley’s Alciphron and Mandeville’s The fable of the bees and Letter to Dion, focusing on the questions indirectly raised by Berkeley to his opponent: Would there be a place for religion in Mandeville’s society or in his social, political and economic system? If so, what role would it play? Without religion, on what foundations would morality in social life be based? Key words: Berkeley, Mandeville, morality.

Berkeley's Siris is a chain of arguments which ends in God. First God is a metaphysical principle causally regulating the world or Macrocosm. But in the final paragraphs of Siris, God is treated in a theological perspective. This is to say that Berkeley introduces the idea of the Trinity and relates it to the rest of his chain argument. He says that Father, Son, and Spirit correspond to the philosophical notions of sun, light, and heat. I study the final theological (...) paragraphs of Siris and try to relate them to the preceding arguments of this book, especially the corpuscular theory of light. La Siris est une série d'arguments qui aboutit à Dieu. D'abord, Dieu est un principe métaphysique qui, par causalité, régit le monde, ou macrocosme. Mais les paragraphes terminaux de la Siris traitent de Dieu dans une perspective théologique : Berkeley introduit la notion de Trinité et la relie à ses raisonnements antérieurs. Il dit que le Père, le Fils et l'Esprit correspondent aux notions philosophiques de soleil, de lumière et de chaleur. J'étudie ces paragraphes théologiques et leur articulation avec ce qui, dans les développements antérieurs, concerne plus particulièrement la théorie corpusculaire de la lumière. (shrink)

My paper concerns Berkeley’s notion of theology. After brief considerations on the general attitude toward religion by Berkeley, I try to assess the immaterialistic approach to three main topics of theology: the ground of any theological knowledge, natural theology, revealed theology. My argument takes in consideration particularly Berkeley’s criticism of Scholasticism. My claim is the following: Berkeley holds that all men have an immediate experience of God’s presence, but this experience is not direct conceptual knowledge. I shortly compare my views (...) with D.Berman’s in section two of the paper. The third section deals with the lines of direction of immaterialistic theology. I claim that Berkeley argues for a twofold source of the experience of the divine. The first is natural and regards all human kind. Platonism is the context of Berkeley’s treatment. The second is historical and concerns just Christians. Reference is to the Bible. I treat the problem of the consistency of these two different ways to make an experience of God, comparing my position with that by J.S.Spiegel. Finally I briefly consider Berkeley’s defence of historico-critical reading of the Bible, as a consequence of his attitude towars the second source of theology. (shrink)

Berkeley's sermons on passive obedience in the Irish context -- Science and sociability: Berkeley's "bond of society" -- Piety, perception, and the free-thinkers -- Luxury, moderation, and the south sea bubble -- Planting religion in the New World, 1722 - 1732 -- Improving Ireland: luxury, virtue, and economic development -- Bishop of Cloyne: protestantism, patriotism, and a national panacea.

I argue that Berkeley has reasonable grounds for believing both that (a) the supposition of the existence of material substance leads to atheism and (b) endorsing immaterialism provides a better support for the Christian faith than any rival that posits the existence of matter. Together, those claims lead to the conclusion that if one wants to be a Christian, there is good reason to think that one ought to be an immaterialist. Je montre que Berkeley a raison de croire que (...) l'existence de la matière conduit à l'athéisme et que la reconnaissance de l'immatérialisme donne un meilleur support à la croyance chrétienne que n'importe quelle autre assertion qui défend l'existence de la matière. Ensemble ces thèses mènent à la conclusion que pour qui veut être chrétien, il y a une bonne raison de croire qu'il faut être immatérialiste. (shrink)

In this article we argue that an immaterialist ontology -- a metaphysic that denies the existence of material substance -- is more consonant with Christian dogma than any ontology that includes the existence of material substance. We use the philosophy of the famous eighteenth-century Irish immaterialist George Berkeley as a guide while engaging one particularly difficult Christian mystery: the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ. The goal is to make plausible the claim that, from the analysis of this one example, (...) there are strong reasons for thinking that if one wants to be a Christian one ought to be an immaterialist. (shrink)

There is a problem regarding God and perception right at the heart of Berkeley ’s metaphysics. With respect to this problem, I will argue for : It is intractable. Berkeley has no solution to this problem, and neither can we hope to offer one on his behalf. However, I will also argue for : The truth of need not be seen as threatening the viability of Berkeley ’s metaphysics. In fact, it may even be seen as speaking in its favor.

This paper aims to offer a sympathetic reading of Berkeley’s often maligned account of human agency. The first section briefly revisits three options concerning the relationship between human and divine agency available to theistically minded philosophers in the medieval and early modern eras. The second argues that, of those three views, only the position of concurrentism is consistent with Berkeley’s texts. The third section explores Berkeley’s reasons for adopting concurrentism by highlighting three motivating considerations drawn from his larger philosophical system. (...) Finally, the fourth section attempts to flesh out Berkeley’s understanding of human activity by looking at how we might understand his claim that “we move our legs ourselves” in light of his commitments to idealism and concurrentism. (shrink)

Did George Berkeley, as I argued long ago in Belfrage (1986), defend a theory of "emotive meaning" in his Manuscript Introduction (an early version of the introduction to the Principles)? This question has raised a broad spectrum of different issues, which I think it is important to keep apart, such as rhetorical, psychological, semantic, ethical, metaphysical, and theological aspects. In the present paper, I hope to clear the ground of ambiguities, which have led to serious misunderstandings on this interesting point (...) in Berkeley's unpublished philosophy. I open with a summary account of the historical context. (shrink)

: Establishing and defending the Christian faith serves as both a guide and a limit to Berkeley's intriguing metaphysics. I take Berkeley seriously when he says that his aim is to promote the consideration of God and the truth of Christianity. In this paper I discuss and engage Berkeley's superficially weak argument (which I call the natural analogy argument) in defense of the plausibility of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. When his immaterialist resources are properly applied, the argument has more (...) merit than one might initially believe. I conclude by speculating that Berkeley had reason to believe that immaterialism was a better fit with Christianity than materialism. (shrink)

In this article I consider George Berkeley's Alciphron from the standpoint of the literary techniques and rhetorical procedures employed, as evidence for placing this composition within the tradition of Christian apologetic rhetoric. The argument develops around three main issues: 1) Berkeley's employment of the traditional rhetorical tool of attacking his opponents using their own weapons; 2) Berkeley's resort to a perennial tradition of pre‐Christian or non‐Christian wisdom, in order to validate his Christian‐theistic claims; and 3) Berkeley's ‘argument from utility’ . (...) These three theses are discussed in light of the history of Christian apologetic rhetoric, with references to the works of St. Augustine, St. Justin Martyr, Origen, St. Thomas Aquinas and other Christian authors. (shrink)

: A number of critics have argued that Berkeley's metaphysics can offer no tenable account of human agency. In this paper I argue that Berkeley does have a coherent account of action. The paper addresses arguments by C.C. W. Taylor, Robert Imlay, and Jonathan Bennett. The paper attempts to show that Berkeley can offer a theory of action, maintain many of our common intuitions about action, and provide a defensible solution to the problem of evil.