Anne Conway

This paper aims to resolve an unremarked-upon tension between Anne Conway’s commitment to the moral responsibility of created beings, or creatures, and her commitment to emanative, constant creation. Emanation causation has an atemporal aspect according to which God’s act of will coexists with its effect. There is no before or after, or past or future in God’s causal contribution. Additionally, Conway’s constant creation picture has it that all times are determined via divine emanation. Creaturely agency, by contrast, is fundamentally temporal, (...) occurring successively over time. It is unclear how creatures can count as emanative causes, which coexists with its effect, given that their agency is limited by time, proceeding from before to after, or past to future. Conway’s account of divine justice in the progress of time, however, requires that creatures are causally responsible. That is, moral responsibility requires causal responsibility. I propose that Conway’s distinction between vital motion and local motion enables a resolution of the tension. Vital motion contributes an atemporal aspect to creaturely agency so that creatures can count as secondary emanative causes. (shrink)

Anne Conway (1631–1679) was one of the most intellectually adventurous and well-read philosophers of religion in the seventeenth century. Her unfinished systematic treatise, posthumously published as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, moves from the divine attributes through a theodicy based on universal salvation to a rejection of substance dualism. Her approach demonstrates a syncretist approach to religion that blends multiple intellectual traditions, including Cambridge Platonism, Quakerism, and the Kabbalah. Her admirers included Henry More, Francis von Helmont, (...) and G.W. Leibniz. (shrink)

This paper proposes a panpsychist interpretation of Anne Conway’s (1631-1679) metaphysics, as elucidated in 'The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy.' Contemporary versions of panpsychism attempt to explain how consciousness is realised in the natural world. They posit that matter is intrinsically experiential, such that when it is arranged into the form of a human brain, it gives rise to human consciousness. Similarly, Conway argues that substance is constituted by both Body and Spirit. The former serves as an (...) explanation of a substance’s material properties, whereas the latter explains how a substance can have various kinds of perceptual experiences, as well as experiencing sensation and emotion. I argue that Conway uses her concept of Spirit to refer to the same set of experiential properties as our contemporary concept of consciousness does. Understood thus, Conway’s metaphysical framework appears to embrace a form of panpsychism. (shrink)

Anne Conway rejects the view that creatures are essentially members of any natural kind more specific than the kind 'creature'. That is, she rejects essentialism about species membership. This chapter provides an analysis of one of Anne Conway's arguments against such essentialism, which (as I argue) is drawn from metaethical rather than metaphysical premises. In her view, if a creature's species or kind were inscribed in its essence, that essence would constitute a limit on the creature's potential to participate in (...) the divine good. It is this consideration that ultimately leads her to reject essentialism about species membership. The chapter concludes with an examination of some of the metaethical consequences of Conway's view as well as a lesson it can teach us about ideal adviser accounts of the good. (shrink)

in the steadily growing body of secondary literature on Anne Conway, it has frequently been claimed that Conway anticipated, and maybe even influenced, Leibniz's theory of monads. This trend got going with a 1979 article by Carolyn Merchant, entitled "The Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz's Concept of the Monad."1 It subsequently came to dominate the field; even now, many commentors still just take it for granted that Conway believed in monads. For example, this commitment is considered sufficiently (...) central to her philosophy to earn a mention in the opening paragraph of the preface to Carol Wayne White's book on Conway, listed among just three things that are supposed to mark her out as... (shrink)

This introductory article outlines the themes and aims of this special issue, which offers new perspectives on early modern debates about agency in two ways: First, it recovers writings on agency and liberty that have been widely neglected or that have received insufficient attention, including writings by Anne Conway, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, William King, Gabrielle Suchon, Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, Mary Astell, and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. Second, it reveals the richness of early modern debates about (...) agency and liberty. (shrink)

Anne Conway is an English philosopher (1631-1679) whose only work, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, was published posthumously in 1690. Although her philosophy is a highly original response to the period's main philosophical problems and although her contemporaries offered the work high praise, Conway was left out of the history of philosophy by later thinkers, like so many other significant early modern women. Her treatise is a highly original philosophical work that contains her wide ranging and (...) heterodox ideas on divine justice, moral perfection, animal generation and many other issues that were at the forefront of philosophical debates at that time. The present volume contains a new Latin edition of the work as well as the first Lithuanian translation by Laurynas Adomaitis (Scuola Normale Superiore) and an introduction by Christia Mercer (Columbia University). (shrink)

Spinoza is in a potentially untenable position. On the one hand, he argues that those who claim to see harmony in the universe are badly mistaken; they are falsely imagining rather than properly reasoning. On the other hand, harmony is positively discussed in his ethical writings and even serves as the basis for his vision of society. How can both be maintained? In this chapter l argue that this prima facie conflict between the two treatments of harmony is resolvable, but (...) that in resolving it, a new set of questions for Spinoza is raised. In doing so, I explore how harmony was used in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, which will help us better situate Spinoza. In doing so, we can recognize new possibilities and new connections between Spinoza and philosophers who are not often discussed in connection with him. (shrink)

Anne Conway disagrees with substance dualism, the thesis that minds and bodies differ in nature or essence. Instead, she holds that “the distinction between spirit and body is only modal and incremental, not essential and substantial”. Yet several of her arguments against dualism have little force against the Cartesian, since they rely on premises no Cartesian would accept. In this paper, I show that Conway does have at least one powerful objection to substance dualism, drawn from premises that Descartes seems (...) bound to accept. She argues that two substances differ in nature only if they differ in their “original and peculiar” cause ; yet all created substances have the same original and peculiar cause; so, all created substances have the same nature. As I argue, the Cartesian is under a surprising amount of pressure to accept Conway’s argument, since its key premise is motivated by a conception of substance similar to one endorsed by Descartes in his Principles of Philosophy. (shrink)

Anne Conway argues that all substances are spiritual. Yet, she also claims that all created substance has some type of body. Peter Loptson has argued that Conway didn’t carefully consider her view that all created beings have bodies for it seems God could have created only disembodied spirits. There are several reasons to think Loptson is right. First, Conway holds that God is all‐good and will do the best for his creation. She also holds that spirit is better than body. (...) So, how is it that creatures always have bodies? Second, although she maintains that incorporation is punishment for sin, Conway holds that some creatures can fall without acquiring visible corporality. I argue that when we examine these views more closely, we will see that not only did Conway give them careful consideration, but that there is no inconsistency. Finally, I show that Conway’s views concerning the nature and function of body provides further evidence of her carefully crafted system. Conway holds that bodies play an important role in a finite beings’ ability to change and interact with others. Even more surprising is Conway’s view that the body is the repository of thoughts, memories, and knowledge. (shrink)

Overviews -- Hildegard of Bingen -- Anne Conway -- Mary Astell -- Mary Wollstonecraft -- Harriet Taylor Mill -- Edith Stein -- Simone Weil -- Simone de Beauvoir -- Conclusions.

Eileen O'Neill - Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 122-124 Sarah Hutton. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 271. Cloth, $75.00. In 1690 a Latin translation of a philosophical treatise, originally written in English by Anne Conway , was published anonymously. The English manuscript did not survive, but in 1692 the Latin version of Conway's text was translated into (...) English as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Conway was widely known by seventeenth-century philosophers and religious writers, including the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More; Descartes's correspondent, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia; Robert Boyle; physician and vitalist philosopher, Francis Mercury van Helmont; as well as numerous Quaker leaders. And her Principles were read with critical approbation by such figures as Leibniz. Further, Conway's text is probably the most anthologized of the writings of seventeenth-century women philosophers. It is curious, then, to discover a dearth of critical literature on the Principles. When Peter Loptson produced the first modern edition of the Principles , he attempted to interest contemporary philosophers in Conway's essentialist metaphysics. He did a superb job of elucidating Conway's position that: there are individual essences.. (shrink)

In an age when women were not formally admitted to Cambridge, Conway was tutored by mail by Henry More, who had also taught her half-brother John Finch. Her notebooks, now lost, were published post-humously in 1690 in Latin translation by men who respected her and who with self-effacement introduced her work without mentioning their own names. Conway proposed replacing the doctrine of the Trinity with a metaphysical metaphor in which God is the Creator, Christ is mediating “Middle Nature,” and the (...) third element is Creation. Hobbes and Spinoza she critiques for failing to distinguish between Creator and creation. She also criticized the dualism of Descartes and of More, developing instead a “vitalistic monism”. More himself had written of “Monad or Unite” in 1653. (shrink)

This 2004 book was the first intellectual biography of one of the very first English women philosophers. At a time when very few women received more than basic education, Lady Anne Conway wrote an original treatise of philosophy, her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, which challenged the major philosophers of her day - Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza. Sarah Hutton's study places Anne Conway in her historical and philosophical context, by reconstructing her social and intellectual milieu. She traces (...) her intellectual development in relation to friends and associates such as Henry More, Sir John Finch, F. M. van Helmont, Robert Boyle and George Keith. And she documents Conway's debt to Cambridge Platonism and her interest in religion - an interest which extended beyond Christian orthodoxy to Quakerism, Judaism and Islam. Her book offers an insight into both the personal life of a very private woman, and the richness of seventeenth-century intellectual culture. (shrink)

In this rich and detailed study of early modern women's thought, Jacqueline Broad explores the complexity of women's responses to Cartesian philosophy and its intellectual legacy in England and Europe. She examines the work of thinkers such as Mary Astell, Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway and Damaris Masham, who were active participants in the intellectual life of their time and were also the respected colleagues of philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz and Locke. She also illuminates the continuities between (...) early modern women's thought and the anti-dualism of more recent feminist thinkers. The result is a more gender-balanced account of early modern thought than has hitherto been available. Broad's clear and accessible exploration of this still-unfamiliar area will have a strong appeal to both students and scholars in the history of philosophy, women's studies and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy: Series Editors, Karl Ameriks and Desmond M. Clarke. Ren Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies . Translated and edited by John Cottingham. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xlvi + 120. 25., 7.95 pb. ISBN 0-521-55252-4 (hb.). ISBN 0-521-55818-2 (pb.). Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A Treatise of Freewill . Edited by Sarah Hutton. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xxxvi + 218. (...) 37.50 hb., 13.95 pb., ISBN 0-521-47362-4 (hb.). ISBN 0-521-47918-5 (pb.). Anne Conway: The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy . Translated and edited by Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xxxix + 73. 35.00 hb., 12.95 pb. ISBN 0-521-47335-7 (hb.). ISBN 0-521-47904-5 (pb.). Julien Offray de La Mettrie: Machine Man and Other Writings . Translated and edited by Ann Thomson. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xxx + 179. 35.00 (hb.), 12.95. ISBN 0-521-47258-X (hb.). ISBN 0-521-47849-9 (pb.). (shrink)

Anne Conway was an extraordinary figure in a remarkable age. Her mastery of the intricate doctrines of the Lurianic Kabbalah, her authorship of a treatise criticising the philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza, and her scandalous conversion to the despised sect of Quakers indicate a strength of character and independence of mind wholly unexpected (and unwanted) in a woman at the time. Translated for the first time into modern English, her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy is the (...) most interesting and original philosophical work written by a woman in the seventeenth century. Her radical and unorthodox ideas are important not only because they anticipated the more tolerant, ecumenical, and optimistic philosophy of the Enlightenment, but also because of their influence on Leibniz. This fully annotated edition includes an introduction which places Conway in her historical and philosophical contexts, together with a chronology of her life and a bibliography. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of letters by Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their friends. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

The work of Spinoza, Descartes and Leibniz is cited in an attempt to develop, both expositorily and critically, the philosophy of Anne Viscountess Conway. Broadly, it is contended that Conway's metaphysics, epistemology and account of the passions not only bear intriguing comparison with the work of the other well-known rationalists, but supersede them in some ways, particularly insofar as the notions of substance and ontological hierarchy are concerned. Citing the commentary of Loptson and Carolyn Merchant, and alluding to other commentary (...) on the Cambridge Platonists whose work was done in tandem with Conway's, it is contended that Conway's conception of the "monad" preceded and influenced Leibniz's, and that her monistic vitalism was in many respects a superior metaphysics to the Cartesian system. It is concluded that we owe Conway more attention and celebration than she has thus far received. (shrink)

Copyright ©2010–2015 All rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. (...) Longer omissions are reported within [brackets] in normal-sized type.—This work was posthumously published in a Latin translation, and the original (English) manuscript was lost; so the Latin is all we have to work with.—The division into chapters and sections is presumably Lady Conway’s; the titles of chapters 2–9 are not. (shrink)