The ideal of value free science states that the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values. It has been criticized on the grounds that scientists have to employ moral judgements in managing inductive risks. The paper seeks to defuse this methodological critique. Allegedly value-laden decisions can be systematically avoided, it argues, by making uncertainties explicit and articulating findings carefully. Such careful uncertainty articulation, understood as a methodological strategy, is exemplified by the current (...) practice of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (shrink)

Die Traume und Visionen aus der antiken Literatur, die die romischen Kaiser und ihr Umfeld betreffen, wurden bislang noch nicht auf ihre Bedeutung hin untersucht. Die vorliegende Arbeit schliesst diese Lucke, indem sie das Material von Caesar bis Maurikios analysiert. Dabei ergeben sich spezifische Motive, die besonders mit Traumen und Visionen verbunden sind: Geburt und Kindheit, Verheissung der Herrschaft, Erringung eines Sieges und gottliches Eingreifen, Ausubung der Herrschaft, besondere Befahigung und gottliche Begunstigung, nahendes Ende. Durch den breiten zeitlichen Ansatz gelingt (...) es, fur die Motive unterschiedliche Schwerpunkte auszumachen: Sie stehen alle in der Spannung zwischen einer gezielten Verbreitung zur Schaffung von Akzeptanz und der Literarisierung durch die antiken Autoren. Fur die Behandlung der Thematik waren nicht nur definitorische Vorarbeiten notwendig, sondern auch der mentale Horizont moglicher Rezipienten musste durch die Interpretation von Inschriften, Papyri und Selbstaussagen antiker Autoren in den Blick genommen werden. (shrink)

I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal binding. 2, (...) Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)

Metaphysical anti-realism is a large and heterogeneous group of views that do not share a common thesis but only share a certain family resemblance. Views as different as mathematical nominalism—the view that numbers do not exist—, ontological relativism—the view that what exists depends on a perspective—, and modal conventionalism—-the view that modal facts are conventional—all are versions of metaphysical anti-realism. As the latter two examples suggest, relativist ideas play a starring role in many versions of metaphysical anti-realism. But what does (...) it mean for the existence of something to “depend on” a perspective, or for a modal fact to “depend on” a convention? We can distinguish between various dependence relations, giving rise to an array of drastically different forms of metaphysical anti-realism. This article offers a guided tour. I develop a systematic distinction between various forms of metaphysical anti-realism with a focus on the role of relativist ideas in this landscape. (shrink)

One dimension of cognitive success concerns getting it right: having many true beliefs and no false ones. Another dimension of cognitive success concerns using the right concepts. For example, using a concept of a person that systematically excludes people of certain demographics from its extension is a sort of cognitive deficiency. This view, if correct, tasks inquirers with critically examining the concepts they are using and perhaps replacing those concepts with new and better ones. This task is often referred to (...) as “conceptual engineering”. However, so far it is unclear what exactly happens in cases of conceptual engineering. How does language change when we engineer a concept? This article offers an answer. I propose a view on which, when speakers assess the truth of propositions, they often rely on assumptions with regard to what is required for their truth. For example, when speakers assess whether unborn fetuses are people, they rely on assumptions with regard to what is required to be a person. Based on this idea, I develop a model of conceptual engineering according to which speakers “engineer concepts” when they change how they assess the truth of propositions. For example, speakers engineer the concept of a person when they change how they assess the truth of the proposition that unborn fetuses are people. (shrink)

Do numbers exist? Carnap (1956 [1950]) famously argues that this question can be understood in an “internal” and in an “external” sense, and calls “external” questions “non-cognitive”. Carnap also says that external questions are raised “only by philosophers” (p. 207), which means that, in his view, philosophers raise ”non-cognitive” questions. However, it is not clear how the internal/external distinction and Carnap’s related views about philosophy should be understood. This paper provides a new interpretation. I draw attention to Carnap’s distinction between (...) purely external statements, which are independent from all frameworks, and pragmatic external statements, which concern which framework one should adopt, and argue that the latter express noncognitive mental states. Specifically, I argue that “frameworks” are systems of rules for the assessment of statements, which are utterances of ordinary language sentences. Pragmatic external statements express noncognitive dispositions to follow only certain rules of assessment. For instance, “numbers exist” understood as a pragmatic external statement expresses a noncognitive disposition to use only rules of assessment according to which numbers do exist. Carnap can thereby be understood as proposing a distinctive form of noncognitivism about ontology that is in some respects analogous to norm-expressivism in metaethics. (shrink)

Ontological expressivism is the view that ontological existence claims express non-cognitive mental states. I develop a version of ontological expressivism that is modeled after Gibbard’s (2003) norm-expressivism. I argue that, when speakers assess whether, say, composite objects exist, they rely on assumptions with regard to what is required for composition to occur. These assumptions guide their assessment, similar to how norms may guide the assessment of normative propositions. Against this backdrop, I argue that “some objects have parts”, uttered in the (...) context of an ontological disagreement, expresses a noncognitive disposition to assess the truth of propositions by using only rules of assessment according to which the proposition that some objects have parts is to be evaluated as true. (shrink)

When does a human being begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard have argued that it is possible, through a combination of biological fact and philosophical analysis, to provide a definitive answer to this question. In their view, a human individual begins to exist at gastrulation, i. e. at about sixteen days after fertilization. In this paper we argue that even granting Smith and Brogaard's ontological commitments and biological assumptions, the existence of a human being can be shown to (...) begin much earlier, viz., with fertilization. Their interpretative claim that a zygote divides immediately into two substances and therefore ceases to exist is highly implausible by their own standards, and their factual claim that there is no communication between the blastomeres has to be abandoned in light of recent embryological research. (shrink)

Easy Ontologists, most notably Thomasson (2015), argue that ontological questions are shallow. They think that these questions can either be answered by using our ordinary conceptual competence—of course tables exist!—or are meaningless, or else should be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Ontology thus is “easy”, requiring no distinctively metaphysical investigation. This paper raises a two-stage objection to Easy Ontology. We first argue that questions concerning which entities exist are inextricably bound up with “ontological category questions”, which are questions concerning the identity (...) of and differences between kinds of entities. We then argue that ontological category questions do not have trivial answers, are meaningful, and cannot be answered through conceptual re-engineering. Easy Ontology hence does not constitute a comprehensive ontological methodology. While some of ontology might be easy, category questions form a central part of ontology and are not answered easily. (shrink)

In the debate about the moral status of human embryos, it is not always clear which arguments are actually disputed. This book offers students and researchers, but also laypersons interested in the current debate, the opportunity to inform themselves about the current state of discussion and to learn about the most important arguments in a clear and concise form. These arguments are as follows: Since embryos as members of the species homo sapiens sapiens are human beings, they possess dignity (species (...) argument); embryos develop continuously, i.e. without morally relevant incisions, into adult human beings possessing dignity (continuum argument); embryos are identical with adult human beings possessing dignity (identity argument); embryos have the potential to become human beings, and this potential is without restriction worth protecting (potentiality argument). These arguments are each represented by a pro position and a contra position and defended or criticized. In an accompanying contribution by the editors, the four arguments in context are reconstructed, evaluated, and supported by new arguments. (shrink)

By means of multi-agent simulations, it investigates the truth and consensus-conduciveness of controversial debates. The book brings together research in formal epistemology and argumentation theory.

Jean Baudrillards Kulturphilosophie läßt sich durch die Behauptung charakterisieren, daß die Medien in der modernen Kultur vorherrschend geworden sind. Seine These, die Medien hätten jeden Bezug zu einer von ihnen unabhängigen Realität verloren, haben zahlreiche Autorinnen und Autoren nihilistisch genannt. Das Zutreffende dieser Kennzeichnung verdankt sich im Wesentlichen einem eingeschränkten, auf das 19. Jahrhundert zurückweisenden Begriff des Nihilismus. Allerdings nimmt Baudrillard auf Phänomene Bezug, die er historisch später verortet und die sich ihrer Struktur nach kategorial von den Funktionen der Medien (...) im 19. Jahrhundert unterscheiden. Es gelingt ihm hierbei nicht, den allgemeinen Realitätsverlust, den er vor allem auf den wachsenden Einfluß von Wissenschaft und Technik im 20. Jahrhundert zurückführt, überzeugend nachzuweisen. -/- Als wolle er diesen Mangel beheben, führt Baudrillard in späteren Schriften weitere Struktureigenschaften der kulturellen Mediendominanz ein. Zu diesen Fortentwicklungen gehört die durch Medienmacht erzeugte „Transparenz“, die nicht zuletzt die restlose Durchsichtigkeit aller Zustände und Prozesse meint. Es ist dieses Merkmal, das Baudrillard 1981 selbst mit einem Nihilismusbegriff in Verbindung bringt. Der Nihilismus der Transparenz beansprucht, das spezifisch Neue der Sinnlosigkeit in zunehmend wissenschafts- und technikbestimmten Gesellschaften zu erfassen. Obwohl sich die Schwächen der Medientheorie in seiner Auffassung des Nihilismus reflektieren, gelingt es ihm, Phänomene der Nichtigkeit zu beschreiben, für die man gute Gründe hat anzunehmen, daß sie sich durch keinen Werte- oder Einstellungswandel mehr aufheben lassen. Um diese Einsicht zu begründen, muß man Baudrillards Medientheorie allerdings gleichsam vom Kopf auf die Füße stellen. Nicht auf einen evidenten, alles umfassenden Realitätsverlust, sondern umgekehrt auf einen Teil der vermutlichen Realitätsgehalte der Medien läßt sich die drohende Ausdehnung der Transparenz zurückführen. (shrink)

As climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty, being based on a range of future climate change scenarios, it becomes a crucial question how to set up this scenario range. Failing to comply with the precautionary principle, the scenario methodology widely used in the Third Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) seems to violate international environmental law, in particular a provision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To place climate policy advice on a (...) sound methodological basis would imply that climate simulations which are based on complex climate models had, in stark contrast to their current hegemony, hardly an epistemic role to play in climate scenario analysis at all. Their main function might actually consist in ‘foreseeing future ozone-holes’. In order to argue for these theses, I explain first of all the plurality of climate models used in climate science by the failure to avoid the problem of underdetermination. As a consequence, climate simulation results have to be interpreted as modal sentences, stating what is possibly true of our climate system. This indicates that climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty. Two general methodological principles which may guide the construction of the scenario range are formulated and contrasted with each other: modal inductivism and modal falsificationism. I argue that modal inductivism, being the methodology implicitly underlying the third IPCC report, is severely flawed. Modal falsificationism, representing the sound alternative, would in turn require an overhaul of the IPCC practice. (shrink)

This article discusses how inference to the best explanation can be justified as a practical meta - argument. It is, firstly, justified as a practical argument insofar as accepting the best explanation as true can be shown to further a specific aim. And because this aim is a discursive one which proponents can rationally pursue in — and relative to — a complex controversy, namely maximising the robustness of one’s position, IBE can be conceived, secondly, as a meta - argument. (...) My analysis thus bears a certain analogy to Sellars ’ well - known justification of inductive reasoning ; it is based on recently developed theories of complex argumentation. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the structure of knowledge and the precise relationship between propositional "knowledge that" and dispositional "knowledge how." In the first part of my essay, I provide an analysis of the term 'knowing how' and argue that the usual alternatives in the recent epistemological debate – knowing how is either a form of propositional or dispositional knowledge – are misleading. In fact it depends on the semantic and pragmatic context of the usage of this term (...) whether 'knowing how' refers to a type of dispositional knowledge, to propositional knowledge, or to a hybrid form of both. Only in the first case, can one say that dispositional know how cannot be reduced to any form of propositional knowledge. Yet, this case is the most interesting one to consider in the investigation of the nature of knowledge, if one assumes that knowing that p presupposes "having found out that p." Having found something out, however, presupposes certain acts of epistemic inquiry and corresponding epistemic abilities. Examined more carefully, it is shown that the dispositional knowledge-how is a necessary condition for propositional knowledge-that, hence propositional knowledge-that is a species of the dispositional knowledge-how. Accordingly, dispositional knowledge has to be understood as being at the very core of our notion of knowledge, including propositional knowledge. (shrink)

The conception that the world can be represented as a system of levels of being can be traced back to the beginnings of European philosophy and has lost little of its plausibility in the meantime. One of the important modern conceptions of levels was developed by Nicolai Hartmann. It exhibits remarkable similarities and contrasts with the classification of the real developed by Werner Heisenberg in his paper Ordnung der Wirklichkeit (Order of Reality). In my contribution I will introduce these two (...) conceptions of levels and compare their salient features. I will discuss them as variants of a scientific worldview that attempts to forge a link to the perspective of the lifeworld. Then I will go on to argue that the shortcomings of these conceptions can be remedied by extending them with the level of the very small and that of the very large. The introduction of these ontologically fundamental levels is based on scientific knowledge that for the most part eludes he intuitively representable character of lifeworld experience. Historical changes in science and the lifeworld could lead to the notion that reality can be represented as a system of levels being challenged in future. (shrink)

Lifeworld realism and quantum-physical realism are taken as experience-dependent conceptions of the world that become objects of explicit reflection when confronted with context-external discourses. After a brief sketch of the two contexts of experience—lifeworld and quantum physics—and their realist interpretations, I will discuss the quantum world from the perspective of lifeworld realism. From this perspective, the quantum world—roughly speaking—has to be either unreal or else constitute a different reality. Then, I invert the perspective and examine the lifeworld from the standpoint (...) of quantumphysical realism. This conception of the lifeworld has gained momentum from new research results in recent decades. Despite its experiential basis, quantum-physical realism bears an ambiguity akin to that of lifeworld realism. While the perspectival inversion serves to highlight the problem, it also contributes to an improved understanding of lifeworld-realism. (shrink)

This chapter goes into crucial questions related to the impact of technology on our privacy, our personal identity and our social relationships. While technology often seems extremely convenient in helping us remember things and share our experiences with others, this episode shows that it can have highly undesirable side‐effects as well. Technologies like the grain put inevitable pressures not only on privacy and trust but also on our ability to create and tell our life stories. In this chapter, we show (...) how getting to know each other's entire history and achieving full transparency about ourselves and others will likely destroy crucial and valuable aspects of our social lives. (shrink)

Die im 6. Jh. v. Chr. von Pythagoras ausgehende politisch mystische Lehre erlebte in der Spätantike vor allem im Umfeld des Neuplatonismus eine wirkmächtige Renaissance, die am eindrücklichsten im Werk des Iamblichos von Chalkis dokumentiert ist. Zum Verständnis seiner noch häufig verkannten Vorlesung "Über das Pythagoreische Leben" bahnt die Studie zum ersten Mal einen Weg, indem sie den vielgestaltigen geistes- und literaturgeschichtlichen Hintergrund entfaltet, vor dem sich Konzeption und Intention des Textes im zeitgenössischen Kontext erschließen lassen. Eine kommentierende Strukturanalyse macht (...) deutlich, welche Schlüsselrolle der neuplatonische Lehrer dem altehrwürdigen Weisen innerhalb seines ethisch-philosophischen Erziehungskonzeptes beimisst. (shrink)

Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, however, (...) that no relevant ethical implications can be drawn from the thought experiment. It demonstrates neither that one always ought to let the embryos die, nor does it allow for any general conclusion concerning the moral status of human embryos. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Fußballfans bilden eine eigene Subkultur, die sich selbst noch einmal im Fußballstadion von den anderen Zuschauern als soziale Gruppierung unterscheidet. Ausgehend von Schütz’s Lebensweltbegriff wird die Fankultur als ein geschlossenes Sinngebiet mit einem eigenen Realitätsakzent sowie einem besonderen Erkenntnis- und Erlebnisstil aufgefasst. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die konstitutiven Elemente dieser fanspezifischen Lebenswelt am Beispiel der Fangemeinschaft des FC Energie Cottbus. Die dort beobachteten Rituale, symbolischen Darstellungsmittel, Selbstinszenierungen und Kollektivausdrücke stellen die Konstitutionsbedingungen für einen gemeinsamen Wirklichkeitsentwurf dar. Es wird gezeigt, (...) dass es der Fankultur, trotz der ständigen Spielerwechsel und fortschreitenden Ökonomisierung im Fußball, keineswegs an Vielfalt und identitätsstiftenden Orientierungen fehlt. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

Im Herbst des Jahres 20– breiten sich Gerüchte aus, dass am Genfer Kernforschungszentrum CERN, den gegenteiligen Versicherungen führender Teilchenphysiker zum Trotz, stabile schwarze Löcher erzeugt wurden. Daraufhin kommt es vielerorts zu Plünderungen. Auch vermelden zahlreiche Firmen und öffentliche Arbeitgeber, dass ein erheblicher Anteil der Belegschaft nicht am Arbeitsplatz erschienen ist. Rund um den Globus fragen sich Menschen ob der Hiobsbotschaften aus Genf: Steht nun der Weltuntergang tatsächlich kurz bevor? In der Sendung „Kontrovers“ im Deutschlandfunk diskutieren ein Teilchenphysiker, eine Juristin, ein (...) Wissenschaftsjournalist und ein Philosoph diese Ereignisse. Wir freuen uns, hier einen Mitschnitt der Sendung vorab veröffentlichen zu können. (shrink)

Die dritte, vollständig überarbeitete Auflage des bewährten Studienbuches wurde um elf Einträge erweitert: Abduktion (Schluss auf die beste Erklärung), Clusterdefinition, Experimentelle Philosophie, Explikation, Kontextdefinition, Kriterien, Methode, Naturalistischer Fehlschluss, Neologismus, notwendig und hinreichend – mengentheoretisch und Stipulative Definition. Zudem enthält der Band einen wertvollen Anhang mit einem philosophischen Kanon, den wichtigsten logischen Regeln und einem umfangreichen Register, das neben den deutschen auch alle wichtigen englischen Fachbegriffe umfasst. Wer philosophieren will, muss, methodisch betrachtet, vor allem drei Dinge tun: analysieren, argumentieren und interpretieren. (...) Jede Person – ob Anfänger/in, Schüler/in, Student/in oder fortgeschrittene/r Wissenschaftler/in – kann mit diesem Buch lernen, Begriffe zu analysieren, Argumente zu verstehen, zu bewerten und zu entwickeln. Im Unterschied zu anderen Einführungsbüchern kommt auch die Interpretation zu ihrem vollen Recht. Mit diesem Buch können die Methoden der Philosophie praxisnah gelernt und geübt werden. Es präsentiert deshalb so etwas wie einen methodischen Werkzeugkasten, der sich ausgezeichnet für die Schule, die Universität und auch das Selbststudium eignet. (shrink)

I will offer a conceptual analysis of different notions of structure and function of viral immunogens and of different structure-function relationships. My focus will then be on the mechanisms by which the desired immune response is induced and why strategies based on three-dimensional molecular antigen structures and their rational design are limited in their ability to induce the desired immunogenicity. I will look at the mechanisms of action of adjuvants (thus the wordplay with Janeway's "immunologist's dirty little secret"). Strategies involving (...) adjuvants and other (more successful) vaccination strategies rely on taking into account activities and functions ("what is going on"), and not just the structures involved ("who is there"), in binding in a "lock and key" fashion. Functional patterns as well as other organizational and temporal patterns, I will argue, are crucial for inducing the desired immune response and immunogenicity. The 3D structural approach by itself has its benefitsand its limits, which I want to highlight by this philosophical analysis, pointing out the importance of structure-function relationships. Different functional aspects such as antigenicity, immunogenicity, and immunity need to be kept separate and cannot be reduced to three-dimensional structures of vaccines. Taking into account different notions of structure and function and their relationships might thus advance our understanding of the immune system and rational HIV vaccine design, to which end philosophy can provide useful tools. (shrink)

We give a construction of the square principle by means of forcing with finite conditions.

Wo Meinungen aufeinanderprallen, um Verständnis geworben und Überzeugungsarbeit geleistet wird, sind Begründungen nicht weit. Für jede Überzeugung gibt es immer ein, zwei Gründe, die mit Gegengründen konfrontiert und, im Gegenzug, mit weiteren Überlegungen verteidigt werden usw. usf. Schnell sind wir verwirrt und drohen, ohne uns der "Grammatikregeln" vernünftigen Argumentierens zu besinnen, nicht mehr durchzublicken. Die Theorie dialektischer Strukturen leistet einen Beitrag zur Grammatik vernünftigen Argumentierens. Sie stellt Begriffe und Verfahren bereit, um Fragen, die sich angesichts einer komplexen Argumentation stellen können, (...) zu beantworten: Wie beziehen sich die einzelnen Argumente der Debatte aufeinander? Welche Positionen vertreten die verschiedenen Proponenten, und wie lassen sich diese bewerten? Wie gut ist die zentrale These der Kontroverse alles in allem begründet? Ist die und die Argumentationshandlung angesichts des Debattenstandes tatsächlich zweckmäßig und rational? Liegt hier eine zirkuläre - und damit fehlerhafte - Argumentation vor? Die klassische Logik, die sogenannte informal logic und argumentationstheoretische Ansätze der Künstlichen Intelligenz bilden Anknüpfungspunkte der Theorie dialektischer Strukturen. Exemplarisch werden die entwickelten argumentationstheoretischen Methoden zur Analyse umfangreicher philosophischer Kontroversen eingesetzt. (shrink)

Based on a unique data set on US direct microloans, we study the funding determinants of interest-free peer-to-peer crowdlending aimed at borrowers in the US. By performing logistic regressions on funding success and Tobit regressions on the reversed funding time, the existence of a social underwriting by a third-party trustee and information in the description texts fostering the investors’ trust are shown to be the main predictors of successful funding. Regarding social impact, the possibility to empower women and groups of (...) borrowers appeals to the investors, whereas empowerment of the family or community beyond the borrowers themselves appears to remain unappreciated. When examining the vulnerability of the borrowers as a predictor, the results manifest differences amongst the attitudes of the investors towards social impact. In the subsample of non-endorsed loans, the investors appear to prefer to support borrowers with an immigration background. In contrast, this is not the case with endorsed loans. (shrink)

A definition of a property P is impredicative if it quantifies over a domain to which P belongs. Due to influential arguments by Ramsey and Gödel, impredicative mathematics is often thought to possess special metaphysical commitments. It seems that an impredicative definition of a property P does not have the intended meaning unless P already exists, suggesting that the existence of P cannot depend on its explicit definition. Carnap (1937 [1934], p. 164) argues, however, that accepting impredicative definitions amounts to (...) choosing a "form of language" and is free from metaphysical implications. This paper explains this view in its historical context. I discuss the development of Carnap’s thought on the foundations of mathematics from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, concluding with an account of Carnap’s (1937 [1934]) non-Platonistic defense of impredicativity. This discussion is also important for understanding Carnap’s influential views on ontology more generally, since Carnap’s (1937 [1934]) view, according to which accepting impredicative definitions amounts to choosing a "form of language", is an early precursor of the view Carnap presents in "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" (1956 [1950]), according to which referring to abstract entities amounts to accepting a "linguistic framework". (shrink)

Cellular processes are highly dependent on a dynamic proteome that undergoes structural and functional rearrangements to allow swift conversion between different cellular states. By inducing proteasomal degradation of inhibitory or stimulating factors, ubiquitylation is particularly well suited to trigger such transitions. One prominent example is the remodelling of the centrosome upon cell cycle exit, which is required for the formation of primary cilia – antenna‐like structures on the surface of most cells that act as integrative hubs for various extracellular signals. (...) Over the last decade, many reports on ubiquitin‐related events involved in the regulation of ciliogenesis have emerged. Very often, these processes are considered to be initiated ad hoc, that is, directly before its effect on cilia biogenesis becomes evident. While such a temporal restriction may hold true for the majority of events, there is evidence that some of them are initiated earlier during the cell cycle. Here, we provide an overview of ubiquitin‐dependent processes in ciliogenesis and discuss available data that indicate such an early onset of proteolytic regulation within preceding cell cycle stages. (shrink)

The Contingency Postulate of Truth. - Is there a statement that cannot be false under any contingent conditions? Two well-known philosophical schools have given contradictory answers to this question about the existence of a necessarily true statement: Fallibilists (Albert, Keuth) have denied its existence, transcendental pragmatists (Apel, Kuhlmann) and objective idealists (Wandschneider, Hösle) have affirmed it. Dieter Wandschneider has (following Vittorio Hösle) translated the principle of fallibilism, according to which every statement is fallible, into a thesis which he calls the (...) contingency postulate of truth (CPT). It says: <For every true statement there are contingent conditions.> If this postulate were true, it would mark an insurmountable boundary of knowledge: a final epistemic justification would then not be possible. Wandschneider has therefore developed a counterargument to show that the contingency postulate of truth cannot be formulated without contradiction and implies the thesis that there is at least one necessarily true statement. This essay deals with the systematic question whether the contingency postulate of truth really cannot be presented without contradiction. To this end I will first present the contingency postulate and the associated problems (I.). Then I will analyze Wandschneider's argument against the consistency of the contingency postulate (II.) and finally reject it with the help of some considerations from the field of epistemic logic (III.). (shrink)

In his "Ontological proof", Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property φ: If φ is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given (...) axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false. (shrink)

‘Dancing mania’ has often been understood as an expression of purportedly ‘typical medieval’ mass hysteria. Yet evidence suggests that a better interpretation would be to see it as a disease, the idea of which was shaped by patterns tracing back to antique cosmology. During the later Middle Ages, this concept became reality as a form of suffering primarily determined by spiritual forces which typically struck only individuals or small groups in narrowly defined regions. This article closely examines a key shift (...) in the semiotic setting of how this disease was interpreted: During the 15th and early 16th centuries, it became medicalised and desacralized. Evidence of this development can be found in isolated instances of ‘dancing mania’ in towns of the Rhine and Moselle area which at first glance would appear to be of little significance. As a medical concept, ‘dancing mania’ would survive the Reformation, and as a concept of primarily medical understanding it would later be re-integrated into the renewed Catholic culture of the late 16th and 17th centuries. (shrink)

Climate models don’t give us probabilistic forecasts. To interpret their results, alternatively, as serious possibilities seems problematic inasmuch as climate models rely on contrary-to-fact assumptions: why should we consider their implications as possible if their assumptions are known to be false? The paper explores a way to address this possibilistic challenge. It introduces the concepts of a perfect and of an imperfect credible world, and discusses whether climate models can be interpreted as imperfect credible worlds. That would allow one to (...) use models for possibilistic prediction and salvage widespread scientific practice. (shrink)

Gregor Betz explores the following questions: Where are the limits of economics, in particular the limits of economic foreknowledge? Are macroeconomic forecasts credible predictions or mere prophecies and what would this imply for the way economic policy decisions are taken? Is rational economic decision making possible without forecasting at all?