Human space exploration requires massive budgets every fiscal year. Especially under severe financial constraint conditions, governments are forced to justify to society why spending so much tax revenue for human space exploration is worth the cost. The value of human space exploration might be estimated in many ways, but its social significance and cost-effectiveness are two key ways to gauge that worth. Since these measures should be applied country by country because sociopolitical conditions differ in each country and must be (...) taken into consideration, the study on the social significance of human space exploration must take the coloration of a case-study. This paper, focusing on the case of Japan with surveying Japanese literary and national documents as well as taking its sociopolitical conditions into account, examines the social significance of human space exploration. -/- First, we give an overview of the circumstances surrounding Japan's human space exploration program. Derived from the statements of such relevant parties as scholars, journalists, policy makers, and astronauts, this overview indicates that the main concerns about human space exploration in Japan are its social significance and cost-effectiveness (Section 1). Next, an overview of behavioral science—an essential field for human space exploration (referred to in this paper as space behavioral science) that provides support for astronauts—is presented from the perspective of stress research in isolated and confined environments (Section 2). We then give two examples of where such knowledge from space behavioral science research has been applied to terrestrial isolated and confined environments. One is JAXA’s support in 2009 for people who were vulnerable to infection by a new strain of flu and accordingly placed in an isolated and confined facility under the Infectious Disease Law and the Quarantine Law. The other is NASA's support in 2010 for Chilean mine workers who were trapped 700 m underground after a mining accident (Section 3). Based on these case studies, we illustrate the further social utility of such knowledge through a discussion of potential applications in other situations in Japan. Focusing on Japan for its geographical and social features in being an earthquake-prone archipelago and having the world's preeminent aging society, we show that refugees living in evacuation centers and people in an elderly-elderly homecare situation pose socially problematic situations specific to Japan. We then argue that space behavioral scientific knowledge can be applied to support people under these and other isolated and confined environments in various ways (Section 4). Finally, we demonstrate that such an application can be understood as an ethical contribution to Japanese society and that this contribution can be embedded in Japan's space policy (Section 5). We conclude that human space exploration can be a socially significant and cost-effective endeavor that is worthy of tax revenue expenditures because space behavioral science is highly likely to provide unique and useful knowledge to help address various social problems concerning terrestrial isolated and confined environments and support people in sufferings there. (shrink)

Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, (...) I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate that, by virtue of its traditional or conservative features, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be incorporated into the traditional moral education network. Finally, I conclude that, being a part of the traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be a unique and ethically acceptable option of moral neuroenhancement. (shrink)

Some skeptics question the very possibility of moral bioenhancement by arguing that if we lack a widely acceptable notion of morality, we will not be able to accept the use of a biotechnological technique as a tool for moral bioenhancement. I will examine this skepticism and argue that the assessment of moral bioenhancement does not require such a notion of morality. In particular, I will demonstrate that this skepticism can be neutralized in the case of recent neurofeedback techniques. This goal (...) will be accomplished in four steps. First, I will draw an outline of the skepticism against the possibility of moral bioenhancement and point out that a long-lasting dispute among moral philosophers nourishes this skepticism. Second, I will survey recent neurofeedback techniques and outline their three features: the variety of the target human faculties, such as emotion, cognition, and behavior; the flexibility or personalizability of the target brain state; and the nonclinical application of neurofeedback techniques. Third, I will argue that, by virtue of these three unique features, neurofeedback techniques can be a tool for moral bioenhancement without adopting any specific notion of morality. Fourth, I will examine the advantages and threats that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement may have. Finally, I will conclude that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can become a new and promising tool for moral bioenhancement and requires further ethical investigations on its unique features. (shrink)

Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, considers how one becomes virtuous. However, when asking the question of how, he does not refer to ‘by friend’ as an option; all he refers to are ‘by learning’, ‘by training’, ‘by habituation’, ‘by god’ and ‘by luck’. Why does he not do so? First, I point out the fact that both Aristotle and Plato do not refer to the option of ‘by friend’ when asking the question of how. Second, I argue that Aristotle does (...) not overlook the educational role of friendship. He understands that one needs friends. Third and finally, I consider the reason why Aristotle hesitates to emphasize the educational role of friendship and indicate that his theory of the mean causes it. This reveals the strained relationship between his theory of the mean and that of friendship in his ethical theory. (shrink)

Recent neuroscience studies have reported that neurofeedback training with the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging enables the regulation of an individual’s cognitive, emotion-related, and behavioral states through a real-time representation of her brain activities. Since this technique has been applied not only to clinical research to, for example, mitigate mental or psychiatric symptoms but also to non-clinical research to, for example, change the cognition or preferences of a so-called healthy participant, neurofeedback-based cognitive and/or moral enhancements may be realized in (...) the future. However, neurofeedback-based human enhancement is not the only issue that requires neuroethical consideration. I examine why and to what extent the dual application of neurofeedback technique will blur the lines between the mental, the social, and the moral, threatening some social norms, such as individual freedom and diversity. First, I consider the link between the mental and the social in psychiatry. Examining the definition of “mental disorder” provided by the American Psychiatric Association, I show that the mental is partly defined through social performance. Second, I make explicit the link between the social and the moral and argue that moral evaluation of an activity is gently but positively correlated with its social evaluation. Third, I demonstrate the links between the mental, the social, and the moral. In spite of a great deal of effort to distinguish these notions, the possibility of the dual application of this technique blurs the lines between them. Fourth, I examine whether such blurred lines signal sociocultural evolution or dystopia and argue that it can be understood as a beginning of the second advent of ethical virtue. I conclude that further cautious consideration of neuroethics is required because the establishment of this technique may have unique influences on our society. (shrink)

Neuroscientific claims have a significant impact on traditional philosophy. This essay, focusing on the field of moral neuroscience, discusses how and why philosophy can contribute to neuroscientific progress. First, viewing the interactions between moral neuroscience and moral philosophy, it becomes clear that moral philosophy can and does contribute to moral neuroscience in two ways: as explanandum and as explanans. Next, it is shown that moral philosophy is well suited to contribute to moral neuroscience in both of these two ways in (...) the context of the problem of ecological validity. Philosophy can play the role of an agent for ecological validity, since traditional philosophy shapes and reflects part of our social reality. Finally, based on these arguments, I tentatively sketch how a Kantian account of moral incentive can play this role. (shrink)

This short article is based on my special lecture entitled "Aristotle and the Philosophy of Education" at Tamagawa University Research Institute in Tokyo on September 19, 2015, through a recording of the spoken language transcribed in written form with some corrections. The lecture delivered on that day consists of two parts: referring to historical research and a statistical survey, the first half focuses on uncovering the fact that the philosophy of education has been slighted both in Japanese and Western academia (...) and that this fact is valid for both Aristotle's and contemporary studies on the philosophy of education; the second half endeavors to describe two possible research projects - namely, a classical-philosophical and interpretative study of Aristotle's philosophy of education and a contemporary-philosophical and Aristotelian study of the philosophy education. Some of these topics have been published but others have not. This short article concerns the first half of the lecture and measures the gap between philosophy and the philosophy of education in Japan through a statistical survey of the largest competitive research funding database in Japan: KAKEN. (shrink)

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La figure du chat fait son apparition dans la littérature japonaise au ixe siècle, mais son image évoluera de manière inattendue à l’époque médiévale. Des témoignages littéraires du xie et du xiie siècle, tels que les Notes de chevet de Sei Shônagon et Le Dit du Genji de Murasaki Shikibu, montraient clairement l’intérêt porté aux chats par les dames de cour. Pourtant, à partir du xiiie siècle, le félidé fera au contraire l’objet d’une forme de « diabolisation », et c’est (...) cette dimension plus inquiétante du chat que nous aimerions évoquer ici, à travers trois exemples tirés du Kokon chomon-jû, vaste recueil de contes et légendes. Cette œuvre méconnue en Europe est attribuée à Tachibana no Narisue et achevée en 1254. The figure of the cat made its appearance in Japanese literature in the 9th century, but its image evolved unexpectedly in medieval times. Literary evidence from the 11th and 12th centuries, such as the Bedside Notes by Sei Shônagon and The Tale of Genji by Murasaki Shikibu clearly showed the interest of court women in cats. However, from the 13th century, the feline became the object of a form of “demonization”, and it is this more disturbing dimension of the cat that we would like to describe here, through three examples taken from Kokon chomon-Jû, a vast collection of tales and legends. This work, unknown in Europe, has been attributed to Tachibana no Narisue and was completed in 1254. (shrink)

Neurorights, as “new human rights,” have been increasingly recognized in the literature. In the Neurorights Initiative, these rights are supposed to be directed toward mental privacy, free will, pe...

In his book review of Graham Priest's The Fifth Corner of Four, Mark Siderits, while criticising Priest's philology, suggests that Priest's work is 'of considerable interest' for two reasons. First, 'when two independent traditions use similar methods to work on similar issues, it is always possible that one may have hit on approaches that the other missed'. Second, 'the decentering that can be induced by looking at another tradition may trigger fresh insights, even if those insights are not ones that (...) were actually developed by the tradition marked 'other''. The main task of this paper is to unpack Siderits' thought. By analysing some of Priest's work, I will suggest a decentering that must have taken place in China when Buddhism was 'exported to China in Buddhist shipping containers'. For anyone familiar with the forms of Buddhist philosophy developed in India, various forms of Chinese Buddhism can often look strange. Some ideas that were debated and defended by Indian Buddhists do not appear anywhere in Chinese Buddhism and some assumptions have been quietly added to Buddhism by Chinese Buddhists. By showing that Priest's work brings out the 'innovation' that Chinese Buddhists gave to Buddhism, I will suggest that it is this decentering that Siderits suggests Priest makes use of. (shrink)

This is the 'Middle Way', with eight qualities or virtues - understanding, thought, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness and concentration - that ...

We propose a new information sharing system, named ``BisNet'', which automatically gathers information about the bookmarks stored in users' web browsers and helps the users exchange URIs of possibly interesting web pages with others who have similar interest with them. Being different from other typical agent services that gather and provide information according to pre-registered user profiles, BisNet is expected to share more relevant information because of its use of web browser bookmarks that are actively selected and ordered by many (...) humans. To enhance the relevance of information being shared, we developed a novel algorithm for directory evaluation. This algorithm only looks at the local referential structure between bookmark directories and URIs and calculates for each directory the ``order index'' that represents how well its content URIs are put in order with a focus on specific areas of interest. Then each directory receives new URIs from other related directories with large order indexes. The repetition of such URI exchanges makes the whole directory-URI networks dynamically form directory groups according to the commonness of the URIs they refer to. Our method is unique in that it pays no attention to the actual contents of web pages, and thus is much simpler and faster than other methods based on the result of content analysis. We carried out a field trial that involved 45 people who used a prototype version of BisNet clients. The result indicated that the relevance of shared URIs positively correlated with the ``order index'' of surrounding related directories, demonstrating the effectiveness of the method we proposed. (shrink)

Feinberg and Mallatt, in their presentation of neurobiological naturalism, have suggested that visual consciousness was acquired by early vertebrates and inherited by a wide range of descendants, and that its neural basis has shifted to nonhomologous nervous structures during evolution. However, their evolutionary scenario of visual consciousness relies on the assumption that visual consciousness is closely linked with survival, which is not commonly accepted in current consciousness research. We suggest an alternative idea that visual consciousness is linked to a specific (...) class of agency, consequently justifying their phylogenetic claim. We also examine the implication of their phylogenetic claim: visual consciousness is homologous across vertebrates, but its neural basis is not. This apparent incongruence illustrates a general phenomenon of homology, and that the resulting hierarchical view of visual consciousness and its neural basis can be straightforwardly accommodated by neurobiological naturalism. Throughout these discussions, we aim to address the potential theoretical issues in neurobiological naturalism and refine the picture illustrated by Feinberg and Mallatt regarding phylogenetic distribution and trajectories of visual consciousness. (shrink)

Proof-theory has traditionally been developed based on linguistic (symbolic) representations of logical proofs. Recently, however, logical reasoning based on diagrammatic or graphical representations has been investigated by logicians. Euler diagrams were introduced in the eighteenth century. But it is quite recent (more precisely, in the 1990s) that logicians started to study them from a formal logical viewpoint. We propose a novel approach to the formalization of Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in which diagrams are defined not in terms of regions as in (...) the standard approach, but in terms of topological relations between diagrammatic objects. We formalize the unification rule, which plays a central role in Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in a style of natural deduction. We prove the soundness and completeness theorems with respect to a formal set-theoretical semantics. We also investigate structure of diagrammatic proofs and prove a normal form theorem. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel (...) way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic. (shrink)

There was a time when 'logic' just meant classical logic. The climate is slowly changing and non-classical logic cannot be dismissed off-hand. However, a metatheory used to study the properties of non-classical logic is often classical. In this paper, we will argue that this practice of relying on classical metatheories is problematic. In particular, we will show that it is a bad practice because the metatheory that is used to study a non-classical logic often rules out the very logic it (...) is designed to study. (shrink)

We introduce a simple inference system based on two primitive relations between terms, namely, inclusion and exclusion relations. We present a normalization theorem, and then provide a characterization of the structure of normal proofs. Based on this, inferences in a syllogistic fragment of natural language are reconstructed within our system. We also show that our system can be embedded into a fragment of propositional minimal logic.

What does it mean for the laws of logic to fail? My task in this paper is to answer this question. I use the resources that Routley/Sylvan developed with his collaborators for the semantics of relevant logics to explain a world where the laws of logic fail. I claim that the non-normal worlds that Routley/Sylvan introduced are exactly such worlds. To disambiguate different kinds of impossible worlds, I call such worlds logically impossible worlds. At a logically impossible world, the laws (...) of logic fail. In this paper, I provide a definition of logically impossible worlds. I then show that there is nothing strange about admitting such worlds. (shrink)

Considerando que a mulher que se encontra numa relação amorosa violenta, muitas vezes, persiste na manutenção dessa conjugalidade, este estudo objetivou investigar a experiência emocional de mulheres que vivenciam ou já vivenciaram uma relação conjugal violenta. Foram realizadas entrevistas individuais com seis mulheres beneficiárias de uma ONG dedicada à violência intrafamiliar. Cada entrevista foi mediada pela apresentação de uma narrativa interativa, a partir da qual a participante era convidada a inventar o desfecho. Após cada entrevista, a entrevistadora redigiu uma narrativa (...) transferencial sobre o encontro. O conjunto das narrativas transferenciais foi analisado psicanaliticamente à luz da Teoria dos Campos. Foi identificado o campo “Infeliz(es) para sempre”, em que as participantes manifestaram sofrimento radical frente à possibilidade de ficarem sozinhas, “preferindo” compartilhar a infelicidade com o cônjuge agressor a lidarem com o desamparo. Considera-se que tais achados podem auxiliar na intervenção dos profissionais que atuam junto a esse grupo social específico. (shrink)

Logic in Buddhist Philosophy concerns the systematic study of anumāna (often translated as inference) as developed by Dignāga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakīti (600-660 c.e.). Buddhist logicians think of inference as an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and, thus, logic is considered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. According to the prevalent 20th and early 21st century ‘Western’ conception of logic, however, logical study is the formal study of arguments. If we understand the nature of logic to be formal, (...) it is difficult to see what bearing logic has on knowledge. In this paper, by weaving together the main threads of thought that are salient in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīti’s texts, I shall re-conceive the nature of logic in the context of epistemology and demarcate the logical part of epistemology which can be recognised as logic. I shall demonstrate that we can recognise the logical significance of inference as understood by Buddhist logicians despite the fact that its logical significance lies within the context of knowledge. (shrink)

The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a logical framework for belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to apply (...) to Grove’s sphere system, a semantical representation of the AGM theory, logics that do not infer everything from contradictory premises, viz., paraconsistent logics. I use three paraconsistent logics and discuss three sphere systems that are based on them. I then examine the completeness of the postulates of the AGM theory with respect to the systems. At the end, I discuss some philosophical implications of the examination. (shrink)

Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is our intuitions about the (...) validity of inferences. In order to make sense of this claim, I will appeal to the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti. I will then pose a problem for Priest’s anti-exceptionalism. Finally, I will suggest a way out of the problem for Priest. Whether or not he accepts my solution, I will let him decide. (shrink)

CETTE THESE SE VEUT UNE CONTRIBUTION A LA COMPREHENSION DE LA DERNIERE PHILOSOPHIE DE MERLEAU-PONTY, EN PRENANT COMME FIL CONDUCTEUR LA NOTION D'INSTITUTION. NOUS ESSAYONS D'ABORD DE DELIMITER LE CHAMP D'INTERROGATION DE LA NOTION D'INSTITUTION, TELLE QU'ELLE EST PRESENTEE DANS SES DEUX PREMIERS OUVRAGES. DEUXIEMEMENT, LA DESCRIPTION DE QUATRE ORDRES DE L'INSTITUTION SYMBOLIQUE (ANIMALITE ET VIE; STYLE ARTISTIQUE; LANGUE ET IDEALITE; SYSTEME SOCIAL) QUE NOUS NOUS EFFORCONS DE RECONSTITUER A L'AIDE DES MANUSCRITS INEDITS CONDUIT A DEVOILER LES MOTIVATIONS DE LA (...) RADICALISATION DE LA QUESTION PHENOMENOLOGIQUE. ENFIN, NOTRE PROBLEMATIQUE SE PRESENTE DANS LE DERNIER OUVRAGE COMME UN PROJET DE L'INSTITUTION DE LA PHILOSOPHIE ELLE-MEME. CE PROJET A SA PORTEE HISTORIQUE, SE PROPOSANT DE METTRE EN EVIDENCE LES MOMENTS FECONDS DANS L'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE, DE MANIERE A LEVER LES DIFFICULTES DE L'ONTOLOGIE ACTUELLE. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe a collaborative information retrieval method among personal repositorie and an implementation of the method on a personal agent framework. We propose a framework for personal agents that aims to enable the sharing and exchange of information resources that are distributed unevenly among individuals. The kernel of a personal agent framework is an RDF(resource description framework)-based information repository for storing, retrieving and manipulating privately collected information, such as documents the user read and/or wrote, email he/she exchanged, (...) web pages he/she browsed, etc. The repository also collects annotations to information resources that describe relationships among information resources and records of interaction between the user and information resources. Since the information resources in a personal repository and their structure are personalized, information retrieval from other users' is an important application of the personal agent. A vector space model with a personalized concept-base is employed as an information retrieval mechanism in a personal repository. Since a personalized concept-base is constructed from information resources in a personal repository, it reflects its user's knowledge and interests. On the other hand, it leads to another problem while querying other users' personal repositories; that is, simply transferring query requests does not provide desirable results. To solve this problem, we propose a query equalization scheme based on a relevance feedback method for collaborative information retrieval between personalized concept-bases. In this paper, we describe an implementation of the collaborative information retrieval method and its user interface on the personal agent framework. (shrink)

Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) seem to elicit the intuitive judgment that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP). Recent empirical studies have shown that the inclination toward this intuitive judgment is shared among people, which seems to reinforce the argument against the PAP. However, some scholars have argued for Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism (DAI) — intuitive judgments have never played an evidential role in philosophy — and thus denied (...) the philosophical significance of such empirical findings. I point out that although DAI fails in its literal claim for FSCs, an associated insight remains potent: an intuitive judgment is so fragile that it can be easily defeated by further arguments. Nevertheless, I argue, empirical studies are significant in uncovering the general principles to which we are committed in our practice concerning moral responsibility. I clarify how such findings can play a robust evidential role in philosophical debates concerning moral responsibility by tracing the literature written by Frankfurt and philosophers. (shrink)

Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make `sense' of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians (...) and ask what sense can be made of explosive reasoning. While I acknowledge a bias on this issue, it is not clear that even classical logicians can answer this question. (shrink)