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Summary Free will is partially an issue in the philosophy of mind, so growing knowledge of the brain - which obviously has some kind of intimate relationship with the mind - might prove relevant to our understanding of free will. Most of the interest in neuroscience by philosophers and scientists has concerned whether neuroscience might show that free will is an illusion; the focus has especially been on whether conscious intentions are epiphenomenal. Neuroscientist might also illuminate how the powers required for free will - rational reflection and decision-making, centrally - are implemented.
Key works Benjamin Libet's [Libet 1999 ] claims about the timing of conscious states has been a central focus of work on this topic. This work has spawned a mini-industry; landmarks here include the papers collected in Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel 2010 and - especially - Mele 2009, a monograph that carefully sets out the limits ofLibet's claims. Some neuroscientists have argued that neuroscience eliminates responsibility because the brain is deterministic; Balaguer 2010 is a book-length examination of this claim.
Introductions Banks & Pockett 2007;Mele 2011
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  1. Free will? What’s that?Marco Masi - manuscript
    The question of whether we have free will is a longstanding philosophical debate that has led to divided fronts and interpretations. The first ambiguity arises due to a misconception about the relation between causal determinism, as formulated in classical physics, and the notion of free will, which, once clarified, undermines not only compatibilism but also naïve formulations of libertarianism. We show that either one maintains a material monistic physical causal determinism and must give up free will, or one must give (...)
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  2. Free will and (in)determinism in the brain: a case for naturalized philosophy.Louis Vervoort & Tomasz Blusiewicz - manuscript
    In this article we study the question of free will from an interdisciplinary angle, drawing on philosophy, neurobiology and physics. We start by reviewing relevant neurobiological findings on the functioning of the brain, notably as presented in (Koch 2009); we assess these against the physics of (in)determinism. These biophysics findings seem to indicate that neuronal processes are not quantum but classical in nature. We conclude from this that there is little support for the existence of an immaterial ‘mind’, capable of (...)
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  3. The relationship between free will and consciousness.Lieke Joske Franci Asma - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    Reflection on the relationship between free will and consciousness has mainly revolved around Libet-style experiments, for example by criticizing the claim that conscious intentions never cause what we do. Less attention has been paid to whether this response captures the sense in which consciousness is relevant for free will, however. In this paper I argue that scholars seem to accept two assumptions they should reject: (1) that the relationship between free will and consciousness is best characterized in terms of conscious (...)
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  4. Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew J. Latham - forthcoming - Noûs.
    In this paper I will introduce a new compatibilist account of free action: indirect conscious control compatibilism, or just indirect compatibilism for short. On this account actions are free either when they are caused by compatibilist-friendly conscious psychological processes, or else by sub-personal level processes influenced in particular ways by compatibilist-friendly conscious psychological processes. This view is motivated by a problem faced by a certain family of compatibilist views, which I call conscious control views. These views hold that we act (...)
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  5. The naturalistic case for free will.Christian List - forthcoming - In Stavros Ioannidis, Gal Vishne, Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker (eds.), Levels of Reality in Science and Philosophy. Cham: Springer.
    The aim of this expository paper is to give an informal overview of a plausible naturalistic case for free will. I will describe what I take to be the main naturalistically motivated challenges for free will and respond to them by presenting an indispensability argument for free will. The argument supports the reality of free will as an emergent higher-level phenomenon. I will also explain why the resulting picture of free will does not conflict with the possibility that the fundamental (...)
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  6. Vetoing and Consciousness.Alfred Mele - forthcoming - In T. Vierkant, J. Kiverstein & A. Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter’s topic is Benjamin Libet’s position on vetoing. To veto a conscious decision, intention, or urge is to decide not to act on it and to refrain, accordingly, from acting on it. Libet associates veto power with some fancy metaphysics. This chapter sets the metaphysical issues aside and concentrates on the empirical ones, focusing on neuroscientific research that bears on vetoing.
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  7. Your Brain as the Source of Free Will Worth Wanting: Understanding Free Will in the Age of Neuroscience.Eddy Nahmias - forthcoming - In Gregg Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical debates about free will have focused on determinism—a potential ‘threat from behind’ because determinism entails that there are conditions in the distant past that, in accord with the laws of nature, are sufficient for all of our decisions. Neuroscience is consistent with indeterminism, so it is better understood as posing a ‘threat from below’: If our decision-making processes are carried out by neural processes, then it might seem that our decisions are not based on our prior conscious deliberations or (...)
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  8. Neuroscientific threats to free will.Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - In Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
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  9. The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism.Bradford Stockdale - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that though physical events may cause mental events, those mental events never cause physical events. In this paper, I will be concerned with the claim that our thoughts, intentions, and awareness play no causal role in producing actions. Though epiphenomenalism has been defended with a priori philosophical arguments, the majority of the support that it has gained in recent years has come from advances in neuroscience. At the center of these experiments is the Libet paradigm that (...)
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  10. The Role of Consciousness in Free Action.Philip Woodward - forthcoming - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley Companion to Free Will. Wiley.
    It is intuitive that free action depends on consciousness in some way, since behavior that is unconsciously generated is widely regarded as un-free. But there is no clear consensus as to what such dependence comes to, in part because there is no clear consensus about either the cognitive role of consciousness or about the essential components of free action. I divide the space of possible views into four: the Constitution View (on which free actions metaphysically consist, at least in part, (...)
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  11. Transformation of medical care through gene therapy and human rights to life and health -balancing risks and benefits.Anne Kjersti Befring - 2023 - In Santa Slokenberga, Timo Minssen & Ana Nordberg (eds.), Governing, Protecting, and Regulating the Future of Genome Editing: The Significance of Elspi Perspectives. Brill/Nijhoff.
  12. Epilogue: Showing How he Means - Thinking Along with Gene Gendlin.Robert G. Fox - 2023 - In Eric R. Severson & Kevin C. Krycka (eds.), The Psychology and Philosophy of Eugene Gendlin: Making Sense of Contemporary Experience. Routledge.
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  13. A room with a view (and with a gene therapy drug) : gene therapy medicinal products and genetic tourism in Europe.Vera Lucia Raposo - 2023 - In Santa Slokenberga, Timo Minssen & Ana Nordberg (eds.), Governing, Protecting, and Regulating the Future of Genome Editing: The Significance of Elspi Perspectives. Brill/Nijhoff.
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  14. Consider the tumor: Brain tumors decrease punishment via perceptions of free will.Alec J. Stinnett & Jessica L. Alquist - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):162-185.
    Two experiments tested the hypothesis that neurological abnormalities decrease punishment by decreasing perceptions of free will. Experiment 1 found that a brain tumor decreased punishment for criminal behavior by decreasing perceptions of the afflicted criminal’s free will. This effect was stronger for liberal and non-religious participants than for conservative and religious participants. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 and additionally found that a brain tumor decreased perceptions of the afflicted criminal’s conscious decisions and true self, thereby decreasing perceptions of his free (...)
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  15. Implications of Neuroplasticity to the Philosophical Debate of Free Will and Determinism.Panagiotis Kormas, Antonia Moutzouri & Evangelos D. Protopapadakis - 2022 - Handbook of Computational Neurodegeneration.
    Neuroplasticity, the capacity of the brain to induce changes in response to environmental stimuli, entails a continuous rearrangement of the neural network through a complex interaction between genetics and environment. Within this process, the plastic brain uses its internal representations to predict future conditions and proactively proceed to actions. It can be said that plasticity demands a rethinking of the concept of determinism as the process of coming-to-be is directly related to modifications produced by experience. Pure determinism and complete randomness (...)
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  16. Free will: philosophers and neuroscientists in conversation.Uri Maoz & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.) - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have been debating these questions for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to (...)
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  17. Moral enhancement, the virtues, and transhumanism : moving beyond gene editing.Braden Molhoek - 2022 - In Arvin M. Gouw, Brian Patrick Green & Ted Peters (eds.), Religious Transhumanism and its Critics. Lexington Books.
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  18. Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.
    Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or (...)
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  19. The Experimental Approach to Free Will: Freedom in the Laboratory.Katherin A. Rogers - 2022 - Routledge.
    Rogers canvases the literature critical of recent experiments, adding new criticisms of her own. She argues these experiments should not undermine belief in human freedom and lists ethical and practical problems facing the attempt to study free will experimentally.
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  20. Mijn intenties en ik. Filosofie van de vrije wil.Lieke Asma - 2021 - Amsterdam, Niederlande: Boom uitgevers Amsterdam.
    Vrije wil is een raadselachtig fenomeen. Wij mensen hebben de indruk dat we zelf keuzes maken, maar de wetenschap vertelt een heel ander verhaal: onze handelingen zijn slechts het resultaat van onze persoonlijke eigenschappen, onbewuste associaties en hersenprocessen. Ons bewuste zelf is niets meer dan een passieve toeschouwer. Het is dan ook niet verrassend dat wetenschappelijk onderzoek vaak uitmondt in determinisme of ‘willusionisme’. -/- Maar wat is vrije wil eigenlijk? En wat betekent het om zelf te kiezen? In Mijn intenties (...)
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  21. Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will.Danko D. Georgiev - 2021 - Biosystems 208:104474.
    Capacity of conscious agents to perform genuine choices among future alternatives is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Determinism that pervades classical physics, however, forbids free will, undermines the foundations of ethics, and precludes meaningful quantification of personal biases. To resolve that impasse, we utilize the characteristic indeterminism of quantum physics and derive a quantitative measure for the amount of free will manifested by the brain cortical network. The interaction between the central nervous system and the surrounding environment is shown to (...)
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  22. Consciousness and mental causation: Contemporary empirical cases for epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious men­ tal states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically would have thought consciousness to causally contribute to. Two of these contemporary, empirically based challenges to the efficacy of the mental are the (...)
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  23. We Have Always Been Cyborgs: Digital Data, Gene Technologies, and an Ethics of Transhumanism.Stefan Lorenz Sorgner - 2021 - Policy Press.
    Transhumanism : in a nutshell -- On a silicon-based transhumanism -- On a carbon-based transhumanism -- A fictive ethics -- The end of the beginning.
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  24. "Beyond Rooted Digressions: The Concept of Moral; Reclaiming the Universality of its Objective Reality".Joely Villalba - 2021 - In "New Visions on Old Views; Philosophical Essays". Outskirts Press, Inc.. pp. 106.
    The endeavor of this proposal seeks to engage the intellect in a new perspective of Moral along those characteristic operations of human nature/faculties elucidated to periodically delineate -in accordance with a theoretical framework-, the evolutional outcome of four distinct sets of free willed actions capable of denoting the gradual advancement of conduct, herein deemed as the universal path to moral conduct. In addition, the distinctive particularities defining the singularities of their outcome were perceived to duly sustain the moral guidance that (...)
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  25. Consciousness, Naturalism, and Human Flourishing.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Bongrae Seok (ed.), Naturalism, Human Flourishing, and Asian Philosophy. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 113–130.
    This chapter pursues the question of naturalism in the context of non-Western philosophical contributions to ethics and philosophy of mind: First, what conception of naturalism, if any, is best suited to capture the scope of Buddhist Reductionism? Second, can such a conception still accommodate the distinctive features of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., subjectivity, intentionality, first-person givenness, etc.). The first section reviews dominant conceptions of naturalism, and their applicability to the Buddhist project. In the second section, the author provides an example of (...)
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  26. Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 3-20.
    While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, (...)
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  27. Causal Efficiency of Intentional Acts.Maria A. Sekatskaya - 2020 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 57 (1):79-95.
    Willusionists claim that recent developments in psychology and neuroscience demonstrate that consciousness is causally inefficient [Carruthers, 2007; Eagleman, 2012; Wegner, 2002]. In section 1, I show that willusionists provide two types of evidence: first, evidence that we do not always know the causes of our actions; second, evidence that we lack introspective awareness of the causal efficiency of our intentional acts.In section 2, I analyze the first type of evidence. Recent research in the field of social psychology has shown that (...)
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  28. Free will and (in)determinism in the brain: a case for naturalized philosophy.Louis Vervoort & Tomasz Blusiewicz - 2020 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 35 (3):345-364.
    In this article we study the question of free will from an interdisciplinary angle, drawing on philosophy, neurobiology and physics. We start by reviewing relevant neurobiological findings on the functioning of the brain, notably as presented in ; we assess these against the physics of determinism. These biophysics findings seem to indicate that neuronal processes are not quantum but classical in nature. We conclude from this that there is little support for the existence of an immaterial ‘mind’, capable of ruling (...)
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  29. Neurowetenschappen en de Illusie van Vrije Wil.Lieke Asma - 2019 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (3):339-358.
    Neuroscience and the Illusion of Free WillCurrently, few neuroscientists and philosophers still defend the claim that neuroscience has shown the brain ‘decides’ what we do and that free will is an illusion. This does not imply, however, that this kind of neuroscientific researchcould notsay anything about the existence of free will. Neuroscience can offer insights in the unconscious causes and underlying processes of our actions and, because of this, could perhaps show whether we act out of free will or not. (...)
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  30. Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Marcus Missal and Andrew Cameron Sims Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims Bernard Feltz (eds.) - 2019 - Brill / Rodopi.
    This book aims to show that recent developments in neuroscience permit a defense of free will. Through language, human beings can escape strict biological determinism.
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  31. Why Libet-Style Experiments Cannot Refute All Forms of Libertarianism.László Bernáth - 2019 - In Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.), Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience. Leiden, Hollandia: pp. 97-119.
    In my paper, I spell out which types of libertarian theories can be refuted by Libet-style experiments and which cannot. I claim that, on the one hand, some forms of deliberative libertarianism and restrictive libertarianism cannot even in principle be denied on the basis of these experiments; and on the other hand, standard libertarianism, along with some versions of restrictive and deliberative libertarianism, can in principle be refuted by these experiments. However, any form of restrictive libertarianism can be refuted in (...)
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  32. Brain Interventions, Moral Responsibility, and Control over One’s Mental Life.Gabriel De Marco - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (3):221-229.
    In the theoretical literature on moral responsibility, one sometimes comes across cases of manipulated agents. In cases of this type, the agent is a victim of wholesale manipulation, involving the implantation of various pro-attitudes (desires, values, etc.) along with the deletion of competing pro-attitudes. As a result of this manipulation, the agent ends up performing some action unlike any that she would have performed were it not for the manipulation. These sorts of cases are sometimes thought to motivate historical views (...)
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  33. Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.
    This book aims to show that recent developments in neuroscience permit a defense of free will. Through language, human beings can escape strict biological determinism.
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  34. Placing Pure Experience of Eastern Tradition into the Neurophysiology of Western Tradition.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2019 - Cognitive Neurodynamics 13 (1):121-123.
    While the presence or absence of consciousness plays the central role in the moral/ethical decisions when dealing with patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), recently it is criticized as not adequate due to number of reasons, among which are the lack of the uniform definition of consciousness and consequently uncertainty of diagnostic criteria for it, as well as irrelevance of some forms of consciousness for determining a patient’s interests and wishes. In her article, Dr. Specker Sullivan reexamined the meaning of (...)
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  35. La hipótesis del marcador somático y la neurobiología de las decisiones.Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma - 2019 - Psycological Writings 12 (1):20-29.
    La hipótesis del marcador somático (SMH) ha sido una de las teorías más influyentes en las neurociencias desde principios de los años 90s en que fue formulada por Antonio Damasio en su libro El error de Descartes (1994). Desde entonces, diversos estudios, a favor y en contra se han escrito, sin un veredicto. En este trabajo se propone una explicación abarcadora de lo que es la hipótesis del marcador somático. En segundo lugar, se hace una valoración sucinta del peso que (...)
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  36. Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.
    Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a (...)
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  37. Review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ by John Searle (2008) (review revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 425-444.
    Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. (...)
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  38. The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, personality, rationality, higher order thought, intentionality) (revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In The Logical Structure of Human Behavior. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 1-7.
    After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have created the following table as a heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary (...)
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  39. Scientismo sobre los esteroides: un resena de ‘Freedom Evolves’ (Libertad Evoluciona) por Daniel Dennett (2003) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4a Edición. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 189-204.
    "La gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos. Pero la gente que dice esto no entiende por qué tiene que ser así. Es porque nuestro lenguaje ha permanecido igual y nos sigue seduciendo para que hagan las mismas preguntas. Mientras siga habiendo un verbo "ser" que parezca como si funciona de la misma manera que "comer y beber", siempre y cuando todavía tengamos los (...)
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  40. Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview.Alisa Carse, Hilary Bok & Debra J. H. Mathews - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):237-244.
    Given dramatic increases in recent decades in the pace of scientific discovery and understanding of the functional organization of the brain, it is increasingly clear that engagement with the neuroscientific literature and research is central to making progress on philosophical questions regarding the nature and scope of human freedom and responsibility. While patterns of brain activity cannot provide the whole story, developing a deeper and more precise understanding of how brain activity is related to human choice and conduct is crucial (...)
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  41. Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience.Gregg Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.) - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Neuroexistentialism brings together some of the world's leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose.
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  42. Free Will, Subjectivity and the Physics of the Nervous System.Mauro Ceroni & Giovanni Maria Prosperi - 2018 - Open Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):317-341.
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  43. Foreword.Christian Coseru - 2018 - In Rick Repetti (ed.), Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will : A Theory of Mental Freedom. New York, USA: Routledge.
    The question of whether freedom is incompatible with determinism frames much of the contemporary conversation on agency and moral responsibility. Those who look to science for answers reason that it is just a matter of time before science settles the question of free will once and for all (and settles it against deeply entrenched beliefs about libertarian freedom). Even incompatibilists, who think freedom is incompatible with determinism, are weary that concepts such as intention, deliberation, decision, and the weighing of reasons, (...)
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  44. Gilberto Gomes é mesmo um compatibilista?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):179-188.
    This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...)
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  45. Enhancing responsibility: Directions for an interdisciplinary investigation.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
    [Note: articles 1-5 are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is (...)
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  46. Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - 2018 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 89-91.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or (...)
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  47. Intentionality as a Driving Force.H. Liljenstrom - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (1-2):206-229.
    Intentionality -- in the sense of purposiveness-- is essential for the action-perception cycle, which is central in Walter Freeman's work. In this paper, I will reflect upon Walter Freeman's view on intentionality and its relation to mesoscopic neurodynamics, also quoting him from a couple of unique dialogues. Further, I will elaborate on the role of intentionality for decision making and free will, in particular focusing on intentionality as a driving force in evolution and in life in general. I will also (...)
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  48. Introduction to the Special Theme on Philosophy and Science of Mind.Daniel Lim - 2018 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 13 (3):297-299.
  49. Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David Gordon Limbaugh & Robert Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.
    Saigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have free will. They support this with evidence from experimen- tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis- tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence from experimental psychology is less than determinate in this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In light of (...)
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  50. Dalla filosofia dell’azione alla filosofia della mente – Riflessioni in onore di Sandro Nannini.Christoph Lumer & Giacomo Romano (eds.) - 2018 - Roma; Messina (Italy): corisco.
    “Dalla filosofia dell’azione alla filosofia della mente” è stato il percorso di alcuni filosofi di nazionalità varia degli anni 1980 – come Paul Churchland negli Stati Uniti o Ansgar Beckermann in Germania – che prima si sono interessati agli aspetti più teorici nella filosofia dell’azione, come il modo di funzionamento delle azioni e la loro spiegazione scientifica, e che poi, con l’arrivo e la diffusione dei personal computers e delle scienze cognitive, hanno ampliato e approfondito questo interesse di ricerca e (...)
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