Objectives: Clinical trials in humans in Germany—as in many other countries—must be approved by local research ethics committees . The current study has been designed to document and evaluate decisions of chairpersons of RECs in the problematic field of non-therapeutic research with minors. The authors’ purpose was to examine whether non-therapeutic research was acceptable for chairpersons at all, and whether there was certainty on how to decide in research trials involving more than minimal risk.Design: In a questionnaire, REC chairpersons had (...) to evaluate five different scenarios with non-therapeutic research. The scenarios described realistic potential research projects with minors, involving increasing levels of risk for the research participants. The chairpersons had to decide whether the respective projects should be approved.Methods: A total of 49 German REC chairpersons were sent questionnaires; 29 questionnaires were returned. The main measurements were approval or rejection of research scenarios.Results: Chairpersons of German RECs generally tend to accept non-therapeutic research with minors if the apparent risk for the participating children is low. If the risk is clearly higher than “minimal”, the chairpersons’ decisions differ widely.Conclusion: The fact that there seem to be different attitudes of chairpersons to non-therapeutic research with minors is problematic from an ethical point of view. It suggests a general uncertainty about the standards of protection for minor research participants in Germany. Therefore, further ethical and legal regulation of non-therapeutic research with minors in Germany seems necessary. (shrink)

Das Menschliche ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass der Mensch über sich selbst und seine Verfasstheit sowie seine Gemeinschaft und Kultur nachdenken kann, ja, muss. Er ist das Wesen, das sich selber immer wieder zum Problem geworden ist und wird, das nicht selbstverständlich einfach so dahinlebt oder -existiert, sondern in gewisser Weise ein reflektierendes Wesen ist, das sich nach sich selber befragt, nach dem Sinn seiner Existenz, seines Lebens, seiner Verfasstheit als eines geschlechtlichen Wesens usw. Das sind Gesichtspunkte, die natürlich immer nur (...) in einer kulturellen und einer traditions-gesellschaftlichen Welt eingenommen bzw. gewonnen werden können. Aufgabe einer philosophischen Anthropologie ist es nun - so Hans Lenk - das Wissen um die Lage und die Fähigkeiten des Menschen in ein Gesamtbild zu bringen. Mit anderen Worten, sie muss sich interdisziplinär verstehen und die Ergebnisse der Wissenschaften, soweit sie für das Thema Mensch und die umfassende Behandlung und Integration aller Aspekte in diesem Zusammenhang wichtig sind, mit einbeziehen. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungJeder extrahierte Zahn ist primär Eigentum des betreffenden Patienten und unterliegt dessen autonomiebasiertem Selbstbestimmungsrecht. Diesem weitgehend unstrittigen Sachverhalt steht die praktische Notwendigkeit gegenüber, extrahierte Zähne für Forschung und Lehre bereitzustellen. So ist z. B. die Erprobung neuer Wurzelfüllmaterialien und -techniken ohne den Einsatz extrahierter Zähne ebenso wenig denkbar wie eine zahnbezogene praktische Ausbildung angehender Zahnärzte im Rahmen des universitären Studiums. In jüngster Zeit wurde vermehrt Kritik an der konventionellen Praxis der Rekrutierung und Nutzung extrahierter Zähne geübt. Vor diesem Hintergrund widmet (...) sich der vorliegende Beitrag der Frage nach den ethischen und rechtlichen Voraussetzungen für die Verwendung extrahierter Zähne in Lehre und Forschung. Damit verbunden sind die Fragen nach 1) der Indikationsstellung zur Extraktion, 2) dem Umgang mit Kommerzialisierungsgefahren und äußerem Druck, 3) dem geeigneten Zeitpunkt der Aufklärung, 4) der Reichweite der Aufklärungspflicht und 5) Art und Umfang der Dokumentation. Der Beitrag fußt auf einer ethisch-rechtlichen Analyse der vorgenannten Problemkreise unter Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen rechtlichen Bestimmungen und der verfügbaren Fachliteratur und führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Rekrutierung und Nutzung extrahierter Zähne unter bestimmten, klar definierten Rahmenbedingungen ethisch und rechtlich zulässig ist. (shrink)

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

Risks and burdens in the study participation, as well as an adequate risk-benefit balance, are key concepts for the evaluation of clinical studies by research ethics committees. An adequate assessment and continuous monitoring to ensure compliance of risks and burdens in clinical trials have long been described as a central task in research ethics. However, there is currently no uniform and solid theoretical approach to risk assessment by RECs. Regulatory standards of research ethics such as the Declaration of Helsinki provide (...) only minimal guidance on how risk decisions are considered. Due to discrepancies in the existing literature and guidance documents, adequate risk assessment by RECs remains to be elusive. In this article, we address current definitions of risk and present our own concept of aggregate risk definition. Moreover, we highlight the concept of benefit, the standard of reasonableness with respect to ethics literature and different approaches of risk-benefit assessment. In order to present a comprehensive theoretical approach of risk assessment by RECs, further understanding of the definitions of risk may improve adequate decision-making tasks by RECs. To improve the process of risk assessment by RECs, a dynamic framework will be illustrated, showing step-by-step risk assessment functions. This approach may be a promising tool to ensure adequacy in risk assessment by RECs. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

We offer an account of the generic use of the term “porn”, as seen in recent usages such as “food porn” and “real estate porn”. We offer a definition adapted from earlier accounts of sexual pornography. On our account, a representation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with primarily for the sake of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the represented content. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic (...) porn by using it to isolate a new type of such porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn is representations of moral outrage, engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting gratification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with morally outrageous content. Moral outrage porn is dangerous because it encourages the instrumentalization of one’s empirical and moral beliefs, manipulating their content for the sake of gratification. Finally, we suggest that when using porn is wrong, it is often wrong because it instrumentalizes what ought not to be instrumentalized. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...) and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as “ludologists,” argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a “magic circle.” Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of games—what guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

Täglich verwenden wir Ausdrücke, mit denen wir etwas anderes meinen, als wir sagen. Wir ersetzen Unaussprechliches, wir bleiben höflich, und manche suchen unangenehme Wahrheiten oder ihre tatsächlichen Absichten zu verschleiern. Solche verhüllenden Ausdrücke wurden schon in der Antike als Euphemismen bezeichnet. Ihr Gegenteil, meist krasse Negativbezeichnungen, heißen Dysphemismen. Ob sie als Tabubruch, als Verstoß gegen Konventionen oder als unangemessenes Verhalten gelten, hängt von den Textsorten, den Situationen und Diskursen ab, in denen sie gebraucht werden. Oft geht es um Tod oder (...) Krankheiten, um den Mediendiskurs über Immigranten oder Minderheiten, aber auch um Arbeitszeugnisse oder die Werbung für Produkte und Dienstleistungen. Das alles sind Themen der Beiträge in diesem Buch. (shrink)

Non-available common goods or: private non-availability of merit common goods The traditional emphasis on the individualistic concept of property stressed and analyzed by Locke and Kant led to a devaluation in philosophy and economy of traditionally usual forms of collective property, in particular of land, e. g., in form of the so-called "commons". Under the auspices of successful liberal and social market economy - though at times with the emphasis on "property obliges the owner" - private capitalism as the dominant (...) economy and a certain kind of value-neutral conception - and thus free availability - of nature consequently implied that the merit character of collective goods pertaining to nature and natural landscapes etc. was not taken seriously anymore New developments in jurisprudence and economy however show that even in principle a total private allocation of collective goods like the environment is neither possible nor meaningful, e. g. as regards the protection of the environment as an extremely important orientation at the common weal, in particular with respect to succeeding generations. In media coverage regarding environment problems, external effects and social traps should be taken into consideration regarding the aspect of a collective good including the necessary evaluation under common interests, i. e. the merit aspect should be more explicitly taken into account than hitherto. Das positive gesetzte Recht, in der Gesetzgebung festgelegt, ist weitgehend - zumindest was die Menschen- und Grundrechte angeht - von allgemeinen sittlichen Werten geprägt. So ist das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit ethischer Maßstab des positiven Rechts und findet als Gebot der Gleichbehandlung Eingang in die Verfassung. Ethische Normen werden soziokulturell relativ sanktioniert; es sind soziokulturell relative Aussagen, die jedoch mit dem Anspruch auf allgemeine Geltung und Verbindlichkeit formuliert werden. Auch das Recht als Teil der Kultur ist sozial konventionalisiertes Menschenprodukt, obgleich doch jeder einzelne davon geprägt ist. (shrink)

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the just war literature suggest that soldiers have a duty to assume certain risks in order to protect the lives of all innocent civilians. I challenge this principle of risk by arguing that it is justified neither as a principle that guides the conduct of combat soldiers, nor as a principle that guides commanders in the US military. I demonstrate that the principle of risk fails on the first account because it requires soldiers both to violate their (...) strict duty of obedience and loyalty and to exceed their special obligations to protect their fellow comrades, the state, the state's constituents and other protected civilians. I then illustrate that the principle of risk fails on the second account since it conflicts with the commander's primary obligation to protect and promote the welfare and lives of his or her soldiers. I conclude by arguing that we cannot reasonably expect soldiers and commanders to adhere to the principle of risk until there is a radical, institutional-level transformation of militaristic goals, values, strategies, policies, warrior codes and expectations of service members in the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

Монографія "Функціональність релігії: український контекст".

This classic and controversial book examines the roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in modern life, and proposes a path for its recovery.

God and moral obligations -- What is a divine command theory of moral obligation? -- The relation of divine command theory to natural law and virtue ethics -- Objections to divine command theory -- Alternatives to a divine command theory -- Conclusions: The inescapability of moral obligations.

A selection of speeches and essays from the author's second decade as president of Yale University.

Стаття С. Присухіна «Іван Павло ІІ про логіку діалогу між Католицькою Церквою та ісламом» присвячена філософськобогословським напрацюванням Папи Римського Івана Павла ІІ щодо аналізу змістовних характеристик поняття «діалог між католицизмом і ісламом», а також логіки його здійснення в непростому й суперечливому сьогоденні.

The goal of this study was to determine whether it is possible to teach children with serious decoding problems four text comprehension strategies in listening contexts. The subjects were 9-11 year old students from special schools for children with learning disabilities. All the students were very poor at decoding; half of the group were also poor listeners, whereas the other half consisted of normal listeners. The experimental children were trained in strategies of clarifying, questioning, summarising and predicting through a combination (...) of reciprocal teaching and direct instruction. The results indicated significant programme effects on a strategic listening comprehension test. A transfer effect on general listening comprehension and general reading comprehension tests was not found. The poor listeners within the experimental group did not perform better than the normal listeners. (shrink)

Games have a complex, and seemingly paradoxical structure: they are both competitive and cooperative, and the competitive element is required for the cooperative element to work out. They are mechanisms for transforming competition into cooperation. Several contemporary philosophers of sport have located the primary mechanism of conversion in the mental attitudes of the players. I argue that these views cannot capture the phenomenological complexity of game-play, nor the difficulty and moral complexity of achieving cooperation through game-play. In this paper, I (...) present a different account of the relationship between competition and cooperation. My view is a distributed view of the conversion: success depends on a large number of features. First, the players must achieve the right motivational state: playing for the sake of the struggle, rather than to win. Second, successful transformation depends on a large number of extra-mental features, including good game design, and social and institutional features. (shrink)