Plato's Meno and Phaedo are two of the most important works of ancient western philosophy and continue to be studied around the world. The Meno is a seminal work of epistemology. The Phaedo is a key source for Platonic metaphysics and for Plato's conception of the human soul. Together they illustrate the birth of Platonic philosophy from Plato's reflections on Socrates' life and doctrines. This edition offers new and accessible translations of both works, together with a thorough introduction that explains (...) the arguments of the two dialogues and their place in Plato's thought. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick Ferré. These essays, informed by the insights of Ferré and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

This collection seeks to excavate the tradition of radical liberal class analysis, which predated and inspired Marx's reflections on class. Liberal class theory is distinctive because it regards relationship with the state as constitutive rather than just indicative of social class membership. Along with an introduction that frames the discussion historically and conceptually, Social Class and State Power provides readers with easy access to provocative texts from the early modern period to the present.

This book reassesses the contribution to international thought of some of the most important thinkers of the inter-war period. It takes as its starting point E.H. Carr's famous critique which, more than any other work, established the reputation of the period as the "utopian" or "idealist" phase of international relations theorizing. This characterization of inter-war thought is scrutinized through ten detailed studies of such writers as Norman Angell, J.A. Hobson, J.M. Keynes, David Mitrany, and Alfred Zimmern. The studies demonstrate (...) the diversity of perspectives within so-called "idealism" and call into question the descriptive and analytical value of the entire notion. It is concluded that "idealism" is an overly general term, useful for scoring debating points rather than providing a helpful category for analysis. (shrink)

Background and purpose Changes to deceased organ donation policy in the USA, including opt-out and priority systems, have been proposed to increase registration and donation rates. To study attitudes towards such policies, we surveyed healthcare students to assess support for opt-out and priority systems and reasons for support or opposition. Methods We investigated associations with supporting opt-out, including organ donation knowledge, altruism, trust in the healthcare system, prioritising autonomy and participants’ evaluation of the moral severity of incorrectly assuming consent in (...) opt-in systems or opt-out systems, by conducting an online survey among healthcare students at a large academic institution. Results Of 523 respondents, 86% supported opt-out, including 53% who strongly supported the policy. The most popular reason for supporting opt-out was the potential for increased donation rates, followed by convenience for those not registered but willing to donate. The most popular reason for opposing opt-out was the belief that presuming consent is morally wrong. Those strongly supporting opt-out viewed the opt-in error as more morally unacceptable, and had higher knowledge and altruism scores. Those opposing opt-out viewed the opt-out error as more unacceptable, and had higher autonomy scores. 48% of respondents supported priority within opt-in systems; 31% supported priority in opt-out. Conclusions There is strong support for opt-out organ donation among healthcare students, influenced by both practical and moral considerations. (shrink)

This essay examines the strengths and weakness of Newman’s argument in “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine” that the lay faithful throughout history are the guarantors of orthodox doctrine by examining Newman’s understanding of the lay faithful, the sensus and consensus fidelium, and his historiographical methodology.

Evolution and Religion in American Education shines a light into one of America’s dark educational corners, exposing the regressive pedagogy that can invade science classrooms when school boards and state overseers take their eyes off the ball. It sets out to examine the development of college students’ attitudes towards biological evolution through their lives. The fascinating insights provided by interviewing students about their world views adds up to a compelling case for additional scrutiny of the way young people’s educational experiences (...) unfold as they consider—and indeed in some cases reject—one of science’s strongest and most cogent theoretical constructs. Inevitably, open discussion and consideration of the theory of evolution can chip away at the mental framework constructed by Creationists, eroding the foundations of their faith. The conceptual battleground is so fraught with logical challenges to Creationist dogma that in a number of cases students’ exposure to such dangerous ideas is actively prevented. This book provides a detailed map of this astonishing struggle in today’s America—a struggle many had thought was done and dusted with the onset of the Enlightenment. (shrink)

This book reconstructs in detail some of the formative episodes of the field's early development and arrives at the conclusion that, in actuality, the early ...

This essay charts the parallel growth of Newman's theory of doctrinal development, and infallibility within that doctrinal development, with its author's movement from a via media in Anglicanism to recognition of the truth in the Roman Church. This essay analyzes the theological need for a theory of doctrinal development, the failure of Newman's via media project, and his role as a creative theologian. Then this essay examines in detailed Newman's 1845 Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, looking specifically at (...) the second section of the second chapter, ‘On the Probability of a Developing Authority in Christianity.’ The main body of the paper treats the expansion of the scope and feasibility of infallibility in Newman's 1845 Essay. (shrink)

This essay charts the parallel growth of Newman's theory of doctrinal development, and infallibility within that doctrinal development, with its author's movement from a via media in Anglicanism to recognition of the truth in the Roman Church. This essay analyzes the theological need for a theory of doctrinal development, the failure of Newman's via media project, and his role as a creative theologian. Then this essay examines in detailed Newman's 1845 Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, looking specifically at (...) the second section of the second chapter, ‘On the Probability of a Developing Authority in Christianity.’ The main body of the paper treats the expansion of the scope and feasibility of infallibility in Newman's 1845 Essay. (shrink)

This cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural paper explores and critiques scientific, philosophical, and psychological concepts of consciousness. It embodies many of the ideas I presented at the First International Conference for the Study of Consciousness Within Science in 1990, a gathering of physicists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, all of whom were trying to come to grips with both the experience and the idea of consciousness in their work.

Ingratiation is an impression management strategy whereby actors try to curry favor with targets, and is one of the more pervasive social activities in a workplace. An assumption in the literature is that a target’s awareness of the tactical purposes behind ingratiation is an ethical concern which triggers suspicions of ulterior motives and casts the actor as distrustful. However, this assumption fails to consider alternative explanations in that ingratiation may also be perceived as occurring for authentic purposes. This alternative view (...) may cause targets to cast the actor differently, and thus presents an intriguing ethical paradox where actors could be recognized by targets as trustful, distrustful, or some level in-between. This research draws on behavioral ethics and attributional models to investigate supervisor trust of employees who engage in ingratiation. We report two studies that examine perceived tactical ingratiation, perceived authentic ingratiation, and their interaction as predictors of supervisor trust using multisource data from two field samples. Across the two studies, we find positive interactions between tactical and authentic ingratiation as predictors of trust and trustworthiness. Study 2 also shows that combined tactical and authentic ingratiation predicts the trustworthiness dimensions of benevolence and integrity, but not ability. The results suggest that ingratiation is portrayed somewhat bleaker than necessary in the literature, and that when actors engage in tactical ingratiation that is also deemed authentic, targets respond with less concern than the literature would suggest. (shrink)

Ethical issues about children’s rights in respect of matters concerning resource allocation or treatment opportunities are now a matter for public consumption and concern. Alongside this exists a long-frustrated desire by children’s nurses to promote children’s health. Long-held assumptions about the legal and moral status of children within the health care system in this country are now rightly scrutinized and challenged. Those of us who claim to represent children now possess an opportunity to exploit public attention for the (...) benefit of these children. This article will explore selected major relevant legal and moral concepts that relate to children with the aim of making transparent some of the important and often confusing information available. It is anticipated that debates about the legal and ethical status of children may be stimulated and fuelled from the following discussion. It is strongly recommended that entering into dialogue with families and children about their perceived needs will go a long way towards advancing thoughtful nursing care of individual children, their families and the general population. (shrink)

There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim , from there to a modal claim , and from there to a metaphysical claim.

The proliferation of electronic databases is raising someimportant questions about how the evolving access to new or previously inaccessible information is likely to change the practice of law. This paper discusses TRAC, an interesting electronic source of previously inaccessible information that is currently used by members of the media, public interest groups, lawyers, and the federal government. Summaries, reports, and snapshots of TRAC's data can be accessed through a series of public web sites. TRAC's subscription service allows users access to (...) the data warehouse and data mining tools (see http://tracfed.syr.edu/info.html for more information). Additionally the paper examines how AI can be employed to assist for the legal profession in utilization of TRAC's data. Finally, it speculates about how TRAC and other new electronic data sources may impact the practice of law. (shrink)

I remember being a child, wondering where I would be—wondering who I would be—when the year 2000 arrived. I hoped I would live that long. I hoped I would be in reasonable health. I would not have guessed I would have a white collar job, or that I would live in the United States. I would have laughed if you had told me the new millennium would find me giving a public lecture on the meaning of life. But that (...) is life, unfolding as it does, meaning whatever it means. I am grateful to be here. I also am simply amazed. I am forty-four. Not old, but old enough that friends and family are beginning to provide more occasions for funerals than for weddings. Old enough to love life for what it is. Old enough to see that it has meaning, even while seeing that it has less than I might wish. I am an analytic philosopher. Analytic philosophers are trained to spot weaknesses in arguments. Unfortunately, that sort of training does not prepare us for questions about life’s meaning. A perfect argument, Robert Nozick suggests in jest, would leave readers with no choice but to agree with the conclusion.1 When we think about life’s meaning, though, we are not trying to win a debate. Success in grappling with the question is less like articulating and defending a position and more like growing up.2 Perhaps that is why academics have written so little on the meaning of life, despite it being arguably the central topic of philosophy.3 Speaking to analytic philosophers about life’s meaning would be like stepping into a boxing ring in search of a dance partner. Or so we fear. Perhaps there is no excuse for venturing into an area where we cannot meet our usual standards. More likely, one way of respecting philosophical standards is by not trying to apply them when they are not apt, thus refusing to let them become a straitjacket—a caricature of intellectual rigor. So, I do not here seek the kind of argumentative closure that we normally think of as the hallmark of success in analytic philosophy.. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

This paper presents methods to visualize the structure of trees that occur in genetic programming. These methods allow for the inspection of structure of entire trees even though several thousands of nodes may be involved. The methods also scale to allow for the inspection of structure for entire populations and for complete trials even though millions of nodes may be involved. Examples are given that demonstrate how this new way of “seeing” can afford a potentially rich way of understanding dynamics (...) that underpin genetic programming. The examples indicate further studies that might be enabled by visualizing structure at these scales. (shrink)

Invertebrate genetic models with their tractable neuromuscular systems are effective vehicles for the study of human nerve and muscle disorders. This is exemplified by insights made into spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) using the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster and the nematode worm Caenorhabditis elegans. For speed and economy, these invertebrates offer convenient, whole‐organism platforms for genetic screening as well as RNA interference (RNAi) and chemical library screens, permitting the rapid testing of hypotheses related to disease mechanisms and the exploration of new (...) therapeutic routes and drug candidates. Here, we discuss recent developments encompassing synaptic physiology, RNA processing, and screening of compound and genome‐scale RNAi libraries, showcasing the importance of invertebrate SMA models.Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssays: SMN and Gemins: ‘We are family’... or are we? Abstract. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of a week-long philosophy summer camp on middle and high school-age youth with specific attention paid to the development of intellectual humility in the campers. In June 2016 a university in Texas hosted its first philosophy summer camp for youth who had just completed sixth through twelfth grades. Basing our camp on the pedagogical model of the Philosophy for Children program, our aim was specifically to develop a community of inquiry among the campers, providing (...) them with a safe intellectual space to be introduced to philosophy and philosophical discussion. In 2017 we launched a formal longitudinal study to determine what impact a week-long philosophy summer camp would have on teens and tweens. Examining quantitative and qualitative data collected from 2016–2020, we found that the camp has had a significant impact on the teenagers who have attended. In particular, we found that intellectual humility increased over the duration of their camp experience and that this increase correlates with an increased affinity for philosophy and philosophical discussion. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been attracted to a restricted version of the principle of indifference in the case of self-locating belief. Roughly speaking, this principle states that, within any given possible world, one should be indifferent between different hypotheses concerning who one is within that possible world, so long as those hypotheses are compatible with one’s evidence. My first goal is to defend a more precise version of this principle. After responding to several existing criticisms of such a principle, I (...) argue that existing formulations of the principle are crucially ambiguous, and I go on to defend a particular disambiguation of the principle. According to the disambiguation I defend, how we should apply this restricted principle of indifference sensitively depends on our background metaphysical beliefs. My second goal is to apply this disambiguated principle to classical skeptical problems in epistemology. In particular, I argue that Eternalism threatens to lead us to external world skepticism, and Modal Realism threatens to lead us to inductive skepticism. (shrink)

More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects (...) of human cognition may in principle be captured in a computational model. This assumption stems from the belief that beyond a certain level, implementational details are irrelevant to cognition. According to this belief, neurons, and biological wetware in general, have no preferred status as the substrate for a mind. As it happens, the best examples of minds we have at present have arisen from a carbon-based substrate, but this is due to constraints of evolution and possibly historical accidents, rather than to an absolute metaphysical necessity. As a result of this belief, many cognitive scientists have chosen to focus not on the biological substrate of the mind, but instead on the abstract causal structure_ _that the mind embodies (at an appropriate level of abstraction). The view that it is abstract causal structure that is essential to mentality has been an implicit assumption of the AI research program since Turing (1950), but was first articulated explicitly, in various forms, by Putnam (1960), Armstrong (1970) and Lewis (1970), and has become known as _functionalism_. From here, it is a very short step to _computationalism_, the view that computational structure is what is important in capturing the essence of mentality. This step follows from a belief that any abstract causal structure can be captured computationally: a belief made plausible by the Church–Turing Thesis, which articulates the power. (shrink)

For the inaugural Workshop on Philosophy & Engineering (WPE-2007), this abstract asks why engineers are turning now to philosophy. Upon reflection, philosophy and engineering are very different occupations, and engineering has rarely turned to philosophy in the long history of the systematic design and production of complex artifacts. After briefly examining events since World War 2, the extended abstract carries over Kuhn's explanation of the rise of philosophy of science during the intellectual tumult of relativity and quantum physics in (...) the opening moments of the 20th century to the case of engineering in the early moments of the 21st century. Specifically, the paper argues that the crisis of the rapid pace of technological change, reflected in the centripetal forces of the O's (bio, nano, and info) may help explain increased interest in a philosophy of engineering at this time. The abstract concludes by citing a number of ways that philosophy may help clarify what otherwise might be confusing times. (shrink)

This long-awaited book sets out the implications of Habermas's theory of communicative action for moral theory. "Discourse ethics" attempts to reconstruct a moral point of view from which normative claims can be impartially judged. The theory of justice it develops replaces Kant's categorical imperative with a procedure of justification based on reasoned agreement among participants in practical discourse.Habermas connects communicative ethics to the theory of social action via an examination of research in the social psychology of moral and interpersonal (...) development. He aims to show that our basic moral intuitions spring from something deeper and more universal than contingent features of our tradition, namely from normative presuppositions of social interaction that belong to the repertoire of competent agents in any society. Jürgen Habermas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Frankfurt. (shrink)

A month ago, I bought an iPhone. The iPhone has already taken over some of the central functions of my brain. It has replaced part of my memory, storing phone numbers and addresses that I once would have taxed my brain with. It harbors my desires: I call up a memo with the names of my favorite dishes when I need to order at a local restaurant. I use it to calculate, when I need to figure out bills and tips. (...) It is a tremendous resource in an argument, with Google ever present to help settle disputes. I make plans with it, using its calendar to help determine what I can and can’t do in the coming months. I even daydream on the iPhone, idly calling up words and images when my concentration slips. Friends joke that I should get the iPhone implanted into my brain. But if Andy Clark is right, all this would do is speed up the processing, and free up my hands. The iPhone is part of my mind already. Clark is a connoisseur of the myriad ways in which the mind relies on the world to get its work done. The first part of this marvelous book explores some of these ways: the extension of our bodies, the extension of our senses, and crucially, the use of language as a tool to extend our thought. The second part of the book defends the thesis that in at least some of these cases, the world is not serving as a mere instrument for the mind. Rather, the relevant parts of the world have become parts of my mind. My iPhone is not my tool, or at least it is not wholly my tool. Parts of it have become parts of me. This is the thesis of the extended mind: when parts of the environment are coupled to the brain in the right way, they become parts of the mind. The thesis has a long history: I am told that there are hints of it in Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. But no-one has done as much to give life to the idea as Andy Clark. In a series of important books and articles—Being There, Natural-Born Cyborgs, “Magic words: How language augments human computation”, and many others—he has explored the many ways in which the boundaries between mind and world are far more flexible than one might have thought.. (shrink)

The disciplines within biology which have upheld neo-Darwinism are now in a state of Kuhnian crisis, the puzzle solving power of normal science being replaced with long debates about the interpretation of data, competition between rival articulations of the once universal paradigm, the re-opening of long solved problems, explicit discontent on the part of scientists and frequent appeals to philosophy and history. Similar features of distress are found when scientific research attempts to serve policy decisions. It is argued (...) that the dramatic reduction in the efficiency of the consensus building machinery of science in areas relevant to public policy and in periods of Kuhnian crisis are explained in the same way; by the scientists' loss of autonomy, the weakening of disciplinary boundaries, and the elevation of the degree of critical scrutiny to which conjectures are submitted. (shrink)

A curious and comparatively neglected element of death penalty jurisprudence in America is my target in this paper. That element concerns the circumstances under which severely mentally disabled persons, incarcerated on death row, may have their sentences carried out. Those circumstances are expressed in a part of the law which turns out to be indefensible. This legal doctrine—competence-for-execution —holds that a condemned, death-row inmate may not be killed if, at the time of his scheduled execution, he lacks an awareness of (...) his impending death or the reasons for it. I argue that the law of CFE should be abandoned, along with the notion that it is permissible to kill the deeply disturbed just so long as they meet some narrow test of readiness to die. By adopting CFE, the courts have been forced to give independent conceptual and moral significance to a standard for competence that simply cannot bear the weight placed upon it. To be executable, CFE requires that a condemned prisoner meet a standard demonstrating an awareness of certain facts about his death. Yet this standard both leads to confusing and counter-intuitive results and is unsupported either by the reasons advanced by the courts on its behalf or by any of the standard theoretical justifications of criminal punishment. If executing the profoundly psychotic or delusional is wrong the law needs a better account of the wrong done when prisoners like Ford are killed. I suggest wherein that wrong might be located. (shrink)

According to the most popular theories of intentionality, a family of theories we will refer to as “functional intentionality,” a machine can have genuine intentional states so long as it has functionally characterizable mental states that are causally hooked up to the world in the right way. This paper considers a detailed description of a robot that seems to meet the conditions of functional intentionality, but which falls victim to what I call “the composition problem.” One obvious way to (...) escape the problem (arguably, the only way) is if the robot can be shown to be a moral patient – to deserve a particular moral status. If so, it isn’t clear how functional intentionality could remain plausible (something like “phenomenal intentionality” would be required). Finally, while it would have seemed that a reasonable strategy for establishing the moral status of intelligent machines would be to demonstrate that the machine possessed genuine intentionality, the composition argument suggests that the order of precedence is reversed: The machine must first be shown to possess a particular moral status before it is a candidate for having genuine intentionality. (shrink)