In this work, Collingridge offers a general philosophy of criticism. Many philosophers influenced by the ideas of Karl Popper have hoped to see an expansion from his view of the operation of criticism within science to a more general account of criticism, and, until now, moves in this direction have had only limited success. This book extends Popper's account of the role of criticism in science to many other areas of inquiry.

In this paper I wish to take my earlier analysis of the relationship between facts and preferences further to cast light on how some types of preference claims might be assessed. I have argued that both Hume's Rule and the doctrine of the autonomy of values must be rejected on grounds of elementary logic. To take a well worn example: Re-arranging gives.

An incrementalist view of the R&Dprocess is developed, according to which R&D consists of informed trial and error. One way of avoiding expensive mistakes is to avoid choices within the R&D program that are highly sensitive to a particular scientific claim, because a great deal of time and money may have been spent to no avail should the claim turn out to befalse. The incremental view of R&D therefore entails that no choice within any R&D program is sensitive to any (...) scientific claim made at the time. Two tests are presented, antiseptic surgery and the first atomic pile, both of which confirm the incrementalist thesis. (shrink)