This article critically engages a recent essay Jeffrey Alexander has published on ‘societalization’, whose conceptualization it finds problematic; first, because in contrast to the impression conveyed by the essay, the term itself is anything but new (as shown in a summary of six theories of societalization which precede Alexander’s by decades, in two cases, by more than a century), and, second, because the way Alexander employs the term is highly aporetic, while also being emblematic of much deeper problems that afflict (...) the whole discipline. Following a reconstruction of the term’s morphology and the transmutations it underwent during its gradual incorporation into the English language, the article identifies an undertheorized concept of society as the root cause behind the difficulties into which Alexander maneuvers himself. It concludes with a brief sketch of an alternative that can contribute to overcoming these difficulties. (shrink)

This paper deals with a problem which has received a great deal of attention in the ethical literature, but about which very little is known empirically: the selection of recipients for organs in transplant medicine. Based on a larger study, it is shown how this problem is practically resolved in one European country, Germany. It is demonstrated that most of the criteria used to determine recipients are non-medical in nature, even though they generally tend to be rationalized in medical terms. (...) Moreover, the choice of criteria depends as much on prognostic considerations as on personal indiosyncrasies and values held by individual physicians who are in charge at the various programs. Several examples of the extremely diverse policies in which this results are presented. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz widmet sich dem Wohlfahrtseffekt öffentlicher Ausgaben unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bereiche Gesundheitswesen und Bildungswesen. Ausgangspunkt ist die Feststellung des bemerkenswert geringen Ertrags hoher Aufwendungen für öffentliche Gesundheit, der insbesondere im Vergleich von Ländern mit teils deutlich variierenden Gesundheitsbudgets auffällt. Da das Gesundheitswesen aufgrund der Opportunitätskostenproblematik mit anderen Bereichen sozialpolitischer Sicherheitsgewähr um knappe öffentliche Mittel konkurriert, ist darauf zu achten, dass deren Allokation bestmöglich optimiert wird. Im deutschen Fall mit seinem ungewöhnlich hohen Anteil öffentlicher Gesundheitsausgaben legt das eine Verschiebung (...) der Prioritäten zugunsten des Bildungswesens nahe, wofür neben potentiellen Verbesserungen des Gesundheitsstatus der Bevölkerung und funktionalen, die gesellschaftliche Integration betreffenden Erwägungen auch solche der sozialen Gerechtigkeit sprechen. Ein Programm zur Reformierung des Gesundheitswesens, das diesen Leitlinien folgt, wird skizziert. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz widmet sich dem Wohlfahrtseffekt öffentlicher Ausgaben unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bereiche Gesundheitswesen und Bildungswesen. Ausgangspunkt ist die Feststellung des bemerkenswert geringen Ertrags hoher Aufwendungen für öffentliche Gesundheit, der insbesondere im Vergleich von Ländern mit teils deutlich variierenden Gesundheitsbudgets auffällt. Da das Gesundheitswesen aufgrund der Opportunitätskostenproblematik mit anderen Bereichen sozialpolitischer Sicherheitsgewähr um knappe öffentliche Mittel konkurriert, ist darauf zu achten, dass deren Allokation bestmöglich optimiert wird. Im deutschen Fall mit seinem ungewöhnlich hohen Anteil öffentlicher Gesundheitsausgaben legt das eine Verschiebung (...) der Prioritäten zugunsten des Bildungswesens nahe, wofür neben potentiellen Verbesserungen des Gesundheitsstatus der Bevölkerung und funktionalen, die gesellschaftliche Integration betreffenden Erwägungen auch solche der sozialen Gerechtigkeit sprechen. Ein Programm zur Reformierung des Gesundheitswesens, das diesen Leitlinien folgt, wird skizziert. (shrink)

The article concerns itself with normative aspects of public health in light of recent debates. It starts out by introducing a few terminological and conceptual distinctions that set the stage for the subsequent discussion. This is followed by critical remarks on two proposals for developing an adequate public health ethics and the way that the growing health inequalities observed in much of the OECD-world are dealt with in parts of the pertinent literature. The article concludes with a cautionary note on (...) the ‘dangers’ of over-identification with a public health agenda and of over-moralization of empirical findings that give cause for concern. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: The article discusses the ways in which sociological analyses can contribute to the problem of a just allocation of scarce donor organs.Arguments: It is argued that this contribution consists primarily in the demonstration of the ethical, rather than medical nature of the problem itself. Only if its ethical nature is acknowledged will it be possible to come to a proper understanding of the several dilemmas involved and to consider adequate means for handling them.

In the mid-1980s, German social democracy was revived like a Phoenix from the ashes. In the individual federal states, it proved its governing capability which had been lost in the final years of the Schmidt Administration: The Social Democrats not only controlled the city-states of Bremen and Hamburg widi an absolute majority, but were able to win die 1985 elections so overwhelmingly, both in the largest state of North Rhine-Westphalia and also in Saarland, that they were not forced to (...) form any coalitions. But where die Social Democrats needed a partnership, as in Hesse, diey showed diat they would wager a red-green coalition. In special political areas, the Opposition made dramatic changes, above all in peace and security policy. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and in ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. Responsibility for Rationality is the first book that connects recent debates on responsibility and on rationality in a unifying dialectic. It achieves four main goals: first, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility (...) for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality; second, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by defending a hybrid view; third, it provides novel support to recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by arguing that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons; fourth, it sets the foundations and the research agenda for an ‘ethics of mind’, including an illustration of how to approach applied issues in epistemology within the presented framework. After spelling out connections between responsibility and rationality (part I), the book engages in debates in normative epistemology (part II) and brings them to bear on the broader field of an ethics of mind (part III). -/- Full draft of current version available on request, comments welcome! (shrink)

In this paper, I explicate pragmatic encroachment by appealing to pragmatic considerations attenuating, or weakening, epistemic reasons to believe. I call this the ‘Attenuators View’. I will show that this proposal is better than spelling out pragmatic encroachment in terms of reasons against believing – what I call the ‘Reasons View’. While both views do equally well when it comes to providing a plausible mechanism of how pragmatic encroachment works, the Attenuators View does a better job distinguishing practical and epistemic (...) reasons to believe. First, this view does not appeal to the costs of believing falsely as reasons against believing; second, because of this, it does not run the risk of tearing down the wall between practical and epistemic reasons bearing on belief. I underpin the Attenuators View with a virtue-theoretic account of how pragmatic encroachment attenuates epistemic reasons and close my discussion by considering some objections against such a view. (shrink)

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...) make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate. (shrink)

Freedom is among the central values in political philosophy. Freedom also features heavily in normative arguments in ethics, politics, and law. Yet different sides often invoke freedom to establish very different conclusions. Some argue that freedom imposes strict constraints on state power. For example, when promoting public health, there is a limit on how far the state can interfere with individual freedom. Others, in contrast, argue that freedom is not just a constraint but also an important goal of state power (...) and collective action. Good public health policy, for example, promotes people’s freedom. Of course, different arguments often draw on different theories of freedom. So, to evaluate such arguments, we need to analyze these different theories and their implications and assess their plausibility. -/- The broadly liberal tradition views freedom as being about external options. Such theories typically start with an account of when someone has a specific freedom or unfreedom to do something. For example, some argue that only a narrow set of interpersonal interferences count as constraints on freedom. Others argue that a far broader set of factors, including ill health and natural constraints, can reduce one’s freedom. -/- Since the 1980s and 1990s, scholarship has increasingly recognized that to use liberal freedom in normative arguments, one must move beyond specific freedom and unfreedom. Most laws and policies both subtract and add specific freedoms. What matters is how a person’s freedom is affected overall. Philosophers and economists have thus engaged in intricate debates about how to measure overall freedom. Moreover, policies and law affect not only one person at one point in time but also multiple persons across time. So, liberal freedom-based arguments also require distributive criteria for intertemporal and interpersonal distributions of freedom. -/- In the early 21st century, republicanism has developed into a prominent alternative to liberal theories. Republicans argue that being a free person is not just, or not even primarily, about liberal option-freedom. Freedom requires being free from dominating power. Republicans and liberals have engaged in a lively debate on who offers the better theory. In developing the republican ideal, republicans also engage in intramural debates. For example, is domination primarily an interpersonal or structural phenomenon? And what economic institutions does republicanism imply? -/- Theorizing around freedom has become richer and moved from narrower questions regarding specific freedom and unfreedom to overall freedom and to republican theories of nondomination. But recent theorizing also seeks to extend its focus and scope. Historically, theorizing started with the freedom of able-bodied male citizens within nation states. Recent theorizing shifts the focus to include issues around gender, disability, freedom at the international level, and the freedom of nonhuman animals and future generations. Beyond fascinating implications of existing theories, a more inclusive focus is likely to also yield important lessons on how current theories can be improved. (shrink)

We analyze axioms and postulates as speech acts. After a brief historical appraisal of the concept of axiom in Euclid, Frege, and Hilbert, we evaluate contemporary axiomatics from a linguistic perspective. Our reading is inspired by Hilbert and is meant to account for the assertive, directive, and declarative components of modern axiomatics. We will do this by describing the constitutive and regulative roles that axioms possess with respect to the linguistic practice of mathematics.

In the past decade, the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) have seen unprecedented developments that raise human-machine interactions (HMI) to the next level.Smart machines, i.e., machines endowed with artificially intelligent systems, have lost their character as mere instruments. This, at least, seems to be the case if one considers how humans experience their interactions with them. Smart machines are construed to serve complex functions involving increasing degrees of freedom, and they generate solutions not fully anticipated by humans. (...) Consequently, their performances show a touch of action and even autonomy. HMI is therefore often described as a sort of “cooperation” rather than as a mere application of a tool. Some authors even go as far as subsuming cooperation with smart machines under the label ofpartnership, akin to cooperation between human agents sharing a common goal. In this paper, we explore how far the notion of shared agency and partnership can take us in our understanding of human interaction with smart machines. Discussing different topoi related to partnerships in general, we suggest that different kinds of “partnership” depending on the form of interaction between agents need to be kept apart. Building upon these discussions, we propose a tentative taxonomy of different kinds of HMI distinguishing coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and social partnership. (shrink)

Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal conse- quences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality’s intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity’s (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations (...) and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality’s short-term con- sequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality. (shrink)

Danielle Celermajer advocates for reconceptualizing responsibility in light of the climate crisis. I argue instead that we must understand current concepts of responsibility which are implicit in actual responsibility practices. I illustrate this by appeal to the practice of holding each other responsible for our beliefs-a practice in which we are constantly involved, but which is often obscured. It extends our responsibility to involuntary aspects of our own mind and involves socially distributed cognitive duties. Cognitive responsibility is part and parcel (...) of shared human conceptual frameworks that we should work to uncover and fully understand rather than revise. (shrink)

We set out longtermist political philosophy as a research field by exploring the case for, and the implications of, ‘institutional longtermism’: the view that, when evaluating institutions, we should give significant weight to their very long-term effects. We begin by arguing that the standard case for longtermism may be more robust when applied to institutions than to individual actions or policies, both because institutions have large, broad, and long-term effects, and because institutional longtermism can plausibly sidestep various objections to individual (...) longtermism. We then address points of contact between longtermism and some central values of mainstream political philosophy, focusing on justice, equality, freedom, legitimacy, and democracy. While each value initially seems to conflict with institutional longtermism, we find that these conflicts are less clear-cut upon closer inspection, and that some political values might even provide independent support for institutional longtermism. We end with a grab bag of related questions that we lack space to explore here. (shrink)

We respond to recent comments on our proposal to improve justice in ventilator triage, in which we used as an example New Jersey’s publicly available and legally binding Directive Number 2020-03. We agree with Bernard Lo and Doug White that equity implications of triage frameworks should be continually reassessed, which is why we offered six concrete options for improvement, and called for monitoring the consequences of adopted triage models. We disagree with their assessment that we mis-characterised their Model Guidance, as (...) included in the NJ Directive, in ways that undermine our conclusions. They suggest we erroneously described their model as a two-criterion allocation framework; that recognising other operant criterion reveals it ‘likely mitigate[s] rather than exacerbate[s] racial disparities during triage’, and allege that concerns about inequitable outcomes are ‘without evidence’. We highlight two major studies robustly demonstrating why concerns about disparate outcomes are justified. We also show that White and Lo seek to retrospectively—and counterfactually—correct the version of the Model Guideline included in the NJ Directive. However, as our facsimile reproductions show, neither the alleged four-criteria form, nor other key changes, such as dropping the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score, are found in the Directive. These points matter because our conclusions hence stand, because the public version of the Model Guidance had not been updated to reduce the risk of inequitable outcomes until June 2021 and NJ’s Directive still does not reflect these revisions, and, hence, represents a less equitable version, as acknowledged by its authors. We comment on broader policy implications and call for ways of ensuring accurate, transparent and timely updates for users of high-stakes guidelines. (shrink)

We are extremely grateful for the insightful and thought-provoking commentaries on our feature article.1 We have distilled four themes emerging from the commentaries, and we would also like to address one misunderstanding of our argument that has appeared. In our article, we explicitly acknowledge that major decisions relevant for climate protection take place at the mesolevels and macrolevels of healthcare, a point raised again in some of the commentaries.2–4 Climate protection is a societal issue, and we thank these authors for (...) the concrete proposals of potential models to guide action. Yet, to us, it still makes sense to reflect simultaneously on the responsibilities that physicians have themselves. Without wanting to put the main responsibility on them, we argue it is important to start thinking about the scope of action that physicians actually have (or not have). As we have argued the need for climate action comes ever more into focus of society, we wanted to explore whether the professional ethics of the medical professionals needs to be amended. Our argument is that this is the case, based on the reasons that climate change has a big health impact while simultaneously the health system has a strong climate impact. Based on the World Medical Association (WMA) Declaration of Geneva the focus on the individual patient is clear, but this and other important codices do also include a public health perspective. The (model) Professional Code for Physicians in Germany, for example, states in its first article that ‘Physicians serve the health of …. (shrink)

Die Reformation von 1517 wird oft genug monumentalisch als Auftakt der Moderne erinnert. Demgegenüber setzt Nietzsches Kritik an der Revitalisierung des Christentums durch Luther und die Gegenreformation einen Gegenakzent. Wer sich in der Vergangenheit auf dieses Thema eingelassen hat, verfolgte oft nicht bloß gelehrte Interessen, sondern eine eigene weltanschauliche Agenda. Während manche Luther gegen die Kritik Nietzsches verteidigten, sahen andere im ‚Tod Gottes’ die konsequente Fortsetzung des reformatorischen Zerstörungswerkes. Zugleich erkannte Nietzsche die Reformation als fragwürdiges und folgenreiches Ereignis, rühmte die (...) Sprachgewalt Luthers und strebte selbst nach einer grundlegenden Umgestaltung der Kultur. Das Thema ist daher noch immer nicht nur von historischem, sondern auch von aktuellem Interesse. Was lässt sich an der Beschäftigung Nietzsches mit der Reformation über Nietzsche, über die Reformation, über das Christentum und über unsere Gegenwart lernen? Diesen und weiteren Fragen widmen sich Volker Gerhardt, Beatrix Himmelmann, Gerald Hödl, Sebastian Kaufmann, Dagmar Kiesel, Duncan Large, Enno Rudolph, Michael Schmidt-Salomon, Christoph Türcke und weitere Forscher aus aller Welt. (shrink)

In ihrer systematischen Interpretation des philosophischen Werkes Schleiermachers richtet Schmidt ihren Fokus auf den Begriff der "Wechselwirkung". Hier findet sich seine Antwort auf die Frage nach einer möglichen Orientierung in einer Welt des Endlichen. Dieser besondere Blickpunkt unterstreicht Schleiermachers Aktualität und erweist sich als ausgesprochen fruchtbar, um die noch wenig beachtete Einheit seines philosophischen Werkes hervorzuheben.

An interdisciplinary collection of papers (from German Studies, History, Education, Philosophy, Romance Studies, Theology) concentrating on Herder’s theological works. The topics covered range from Herder’s exegetical work to the issue of pantheism and his activities in the church and school life of Weimar.

Friedrich Nietzsche, den Gottfried Benn als das "grosste Ausstrahlungsphanomen der Geistesgeschichte" bezeichnete, steht im Zentrum dieses Buches. Es enthalt die Vortrage der Ringvorlesung, welche die Freiburger Forschungsstelle "Nietzsche-Kommentar" zum 100. Geburtstag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften organisierte. - In der konstruktiven Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche beleuchten die Aufsatze Nietzsches Bedeutung als Leitfigur moderner Lebensphilosophie, Kulturdiagnose und Anthropologie. Nietzsches Kritik an der philosophischen Tradition, sein Konzept der Umwertung, seine Psychologie, sein Geschichtsdenken, seine Beziehung zu Darwin, Schopenhauer, Wagner und Heidegger, seine Lyrik sowie (...) die Charakteristika seines Stils gehoren zum breitgefacherten Themenspektrum.Der Band enthalt Beitrage von Dieter Borchmeyer, Gunter Figal, Hans-Martin Gauger, Volker Gerhardt, Katharina Gratz, Lore Huhn, Helmuth Kiesel, Ludger Lutkehaus, Klaus Monig, Barbara Neymeyr, Annemarie Pieper, Jochen Schmidt und Andreas Urs Sommer. (shrink)

As part of the SYNBIOSAFE project, we carried out an open electronic conference (e-conference), with the aim to stimulate an open debate on the societal issues of synthetic biology in a proactive way. The e-conference attracted 124 registered participants from 23 different countries and different professional backgrounds, who wrote 182 contributions in six different categories: (I) Ethics; (II) Safety; (III) Security; (IV) IPR; (V) Governance and regulation; (VI) and Public perception. In this paper we discuss the main arguments brought up (...) during the e-conference and provide our conclusions about how the community thinks, and thinks differently on the societal impact of synthetic biology. Finally we conclude that there is a chance for an open discourse on the societal issues of synthetic biology happening, and that the rules to govern such a discourse might be set up much easier and be respected more readily than many would suggest. (shrink)