Background Nurses providing care to patients with end-of-life or terminal illnesses often encounter ethically challenging situations leading to moral distress. However, existing quantitative studies have examined moral distress using instruments that address general clinical situations rather than those specific to end-of-life care. Furthermore, qualitative studies have often been limited to participants from a single unit or those experiencing moral distress-induced circumstances. A comprehensive and integrated understanding of the overarching process of moral distress is vital to discern the unique circumstances surrounding (...) end-of-life care and its consequential impacts. Research objectives To explore the moral distress experiences of nurses who are frequently involved in caring for patients with end-of-life or terminal illnesses and apply it to two existing theories: the model of moral distress and the ecological model. Research design A qualitative descriptive approach was employed. Participants and research context Seven focus group interviews involving 30 nurses were performed. The subsequent transcriptions underwent rigorous content analysis. Ethical considerations We obtained Institutional Review Board approval from a university. Focus group interviews were conducted with nurses who agreed to participate and signed the consent form. Findings The moral distress-inducing factors and nurses’ perceived impact of moral distress were identified and categorized based on moral distress theories and ecological models. A total of 15 categories and 30 subcategories across the following 4 domains were derived: (1) intrapersonal, (2) interpersonal, (3) organizational, and (4) structural factors. Conclusions End-of-life-specific circumstances induced moral distress among nurses, with both negative and positive impacts identified. Effective organizational and policy support is essential to manage conflicts, form a healthy organizational culture, provide training, and prevent unnecessary expenses due to the negative consequences of moral distress. (shrink)

Mainstream interpretations of the Phaedo take the dialogue to have a metaphysical theory at its core, primarily disagreeing on whether this theory is assumed without argument in the dialogue, or whether an attempt is made to justify it. This disagreement particularly bears on the interpretation of the ‘equals argument’ at 74a–c. The present discussion brings out a commitment shared by these different interpretations: they adopt a ‘top-down’ method, according to which the Phaedo must be understood in terms of premises and (...) arguments thought to be set out systematically in a wider group of Plato’s works. A rival ‘groundup’ approach is presented here, one which remains neutral on such questions, and instead makes use of material in the Phaedo itself to provide a philosophically interesting and plausible alternative. This interpretation develops a distinction between dramatic and philosophical levels of argument, and argues for a close connection between the discussion of equality and the ‘final argument’ at 100b–107b; it concludes that in the Phaedo Plato is primarily concerned with questions about explanation, rather than with presenting a metaphysical theory, and that the charges of dogmatism and obscurity occasioned by current interpretations are the result of distorted expectations about Plato’s aims. (shrink)

A distinction between knowledge and belief is set out and justified at the end of Book V of Plato’s Republic. The justification is intended to establish the claim of the philosophers to rule in an ideal state. I set out the argument and explain why considerable disagreement remains about the nature of the distinction and the assumptions on which it rests. I discuss the main options for interpreting the justification, briefly assessing their strengths and weaknesses. I conclude with comments on (...) recent developments, and by drawing attention to a neglected aspect of Plato’s distinction. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

In the past 20 years, the concept of instinct has been discussed in respect to various disciplines such as evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, linguistics, ethics, aesthetics, and phenomenology, etc. However, the meaning of instinct still remains unclarified in many respects. In order to overcome this situation, it is necessary to elucidate the genuine meaning of instinct so that the discussion of instinct in these disciplines can be carried out systematically. The objective of this paper is to establish the genuine concept (...) of instinct on the basis of a phenomenological criticism of A. Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction. Moreover, it seeks to show that this concept is the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. According to Gehlen, instinct is defined as Instinkthandlung. However, this definition of instinct is problematic in the formal logical sense, since the definiendum is already included in the definiens. Moreover, it faces different kinds of serious material problems. Criticizing Gehlen’s theory of instinct systematically, I will show that instinct should be redefined as “the innate living force that urges a species of living being to pursue a certain kind of object,” and I will attempt to clarify this definition of instinct in a more detailed manner by offering 11 points. Thereafter, I will argue that Gehlen’s theory of instinct-reduction has to be replaced by the theory of instinct-enlargement in human beings. Finally, I will point out that the genuine concept of instinct is nothing other than the genetic origin of the embodied consciousness. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl published in his lifetime only works which represent a compilation of individual phenomenological analyses or which have the character of an introduction to his phenomenology. It always made him uneasy that he did not publish any systematic work in phenomenology. In his later years, from the beginning of the 1920s, he tried several times to write such a work, but in vain. The masterplan for this work, which his assistant Eugen Fink sketched out in 1930/31 is preserved. According (...) to this plan, the Phänomenologie der Instinkte has attracted very little attention in Husserl studies until now, takes a central and fundamental position in the whole system of his mature transcendental phenomenology. In this book, Nam-In Lee reconstructs the Phänomenologie der Instinkte on the basis of the already published works and, above all, of the unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. Moreover, he draws out the consequences which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte bears for the whole system of phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology, in its form of a genetic phenomenology of which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte is the concluding part, can, according to him, no longer be considered as one-sided philosophy of consciousness in the traditional sense, as it has often been thought of hitherto. Thus, the author presents a new face of phenomenology; one which has scarcely been noticed in the field of Husserl studies until now. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

The life-world is a central topic of Husserl’s phenomenology. He addresses this issue in some of the works published during his lifetime and attempts to analyze the life-world extensively in many of his works and posthumously published research manuscripts. The life-world is one of the topics that have been discussed most extensively in phenomenology. However, there are many misunderstandings of Husserl’s phenomenology of the life-world. One misunderstanding concerns the variety of concepts of the life-world in Husserl and the possibility of (...) developing various fields of the phenomenology of the life-world. It is the aim of this paper to show that Husserl has a pluralistic concept of the life-world, which makes it possible to develop various fields of the phenomenology of the life-world. I will introduce the monistic view and the pluralistic view of the concept of the life-world in Husserl and will clarify what the life-world is, thereby showing that the monistic view of the concept of the life-world in Husserl is not legitimate. However, even though Husserl has a pluralistic concept of the life-world, nowhere does he systematically clarify the various concepts of the life-world. Hence I will sort out and clarify various concepts of the life-world such as the narrower concept and the wider concept, the general concept and the particular concept, the natural concept and the transcendental concept, and the empirical concept and the eidetic concept. Based on the discussion of the various concepts of the life-world in Husserl, I will assess the monistic view and the pluralistic view of Husserl’s concept of the life-world so that we can better understand his various concepts of the life-world. (shrink)

We argue that the current ethical and regulatory framework for permissible risk levels in pediatric research can be helpfully understood in terms of children’s moral right to adequate protection from harm. Our analysis provides a rationale for what we propose as the highest level of permissible risk in pediatric research without the prospect of direct benefit: what we call “relatively minor” risk. We clarify the justification behind the usual standards of “minimal risk” and “a minor increase over minimal risk” and (...) explain why it is permissible to impose any risks at all on child participants who do not stand to benefit directly from enrollment in research. Finally, we illuminate some aspects of the concept of “best interests.”. (shrink)

Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl''s earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl''s works written after the 1920''s, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized (...) as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 1, I will summarize Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence. In Sect. 2, I will delineate Husserl’s concept of experience and in Sect. 3, I will try to define the concept of evidence in Husserl. In Sect. 4–6, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concepts of evidence and show that Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s concept of evidence is out of the (...) mark, since it is based on a total misunderstanding of Husserl’s concepts of evidence. (shrink)

Although we have learned much about the neuropsychological control of facial expressions of emotion, there is still much work to do. We suggest that future work integrate advances in our theoretical understanding of the roles of volition and consciousness in the elicitation of emotion and the production of facial expressions with advances in our understanding of its underlying neurophysiology. We first review the facial musculature and the neural paths thought to innervate it, as well as previous attempts at understanding the (...) neural control of facial expressions of emotion, focusing on the voluntary-involuntary dichotomy and studies of hemispheric specialization. In the second section, we discuss four major aspects of the psychology of facial expressions of emotion that have particular import to their neurophysiological substrates. We offer these as a starting point for a better integration of psychological and neurophysiological perspectives in considering the neuropsychological control of facial expressions of emotion. (shrink)

Previous studies have shown that the perception of neutral emotion stimuli can be negative rather than absolutely neutral. In the current study, we examined the negative bias of both neutral faces...

Painting -- Photography and film -- Architecture and the third dimension -- Music -- Literature -- Performance -- Popular art and everyday aesthetics -- Classic sources -- Contemporary sources.

This paper aims to clarify the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology upon Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In developing his phenomenologicalsociology, even though Schutz was deeply influenced by Weber, he considers that the interpretative sociology developed by the latter has some difficulties. It is Husserl’s phenomenology that enabled him to overcome the difficulties of Weber’s interpretative sociology and to found a phenomenological sociology as an interpretative sociology in a true sense. In section 1, I will deal with the significance and difficulties of Weber’s (...) interpretative sociology. In section 2, I will deal with the influence of Husserl’s phenomenological psychology and furthermore, in section 3, the influence of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology on Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. In section 4, I will mention that there are some motives in Husserl’s later phenomenology that could be useful for the development of the phenomenological sociology. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to sketch the basic idea of the phenomenology of moral drive through a dialogue with Dasan and Fichte. In section 1, I will delineate Fichte’s theory of moral drive; in...

Smartphone app-use patterns will predict professional golfers’ athletic performance, and the use time of serious apps would be associated with improved performance. This longitudinal 4-week observation of 79 professional golfers assessed golf handicaps and smartphone app-use patterns at the start of the Korean professional golf season and 2 and 4 weeks later. We classified use as social networking, entertainment, serious apps, and others. Use time of entertainment apps increased for non-improved golfers but did not change for improved golfers. Use time (...) of serious apps increased for improved golfers and decreased for non-improved ones. Changes in golf handicaps were positively correlated with changes in entertainment app use time and negatively correlated with changes in serious app use time. Professional golfers’ sports performance was not associated with smartphone use time but was with the smartphone app type. The management of smartphone app-use patterns is important for professional golfers’ performance. (shrink)

In this article, the author attempts to explain, the occurrence of Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of phenomenology there is a fundamental similarity. I have taken the approach is to analyze the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger's interpretation of the occurrence of the phenomenon of learning among the "place" concept. The author describes the place as a transcendental phenomenology of Husserl's main themes occur, and occur as the body phenomenology of Heidegger's interpretation of the main issues between the two fundamentally (...) identical. As between the two identical, Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the transcendental place of the load are, in Heidegger's place as a body load there who have basically similar. Furthermore, Husserl and Heidegger on the concept of the world the concept of the transcendental field, as well as Husserl's "consciousness of the world and the occurrence of the construct" and Heidegger's "understanding and interpretation", a fundamentally similar. In this paper, I will attempt to show that there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's genetic phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will do this by analyzing the concept of "genesis" in Husserl's genetic phenomenology and also in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. I will show that there is a fundamental similarity between the transcendental genesis as the main topic of Husserl's genetic phenomenology and the ontological genesis as the main topic of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. Due to the similarity between them, there is a fundamental similarity between Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as the bearer of the transcendental genesis and Heidegger's Dasein as the bearer of the ontological genesis. Moreover, there is a fundamental similarity Husserl's concept of the world and Heidegger's concept of the a priori field, between "world consciousness and genetic constitution" in Husserl and "understanding and interpretation "in Heidegger. (shrink)

Max Scheler and Mencius both take feeling to be the origin of value and could therefore be considered to be proponents of axiological sentimentalism. Despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that are mainly derived from some difficulties with their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value (...) could be developed. It is accordingly the aim of this paper to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. In Sects. 1, 2, I will first delineate Scheler’s theory of value and feeling, then that of Mencius. In Sect. 3, I will point out some difficulties with the two theories and promote a dialogue between them that would improve each theory. In Sect. 4, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the future task of the phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius. (shrink)

It is the aim of this paper to develop the phenomenology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis by employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions. In section 1, I will show that phenomenological reduction is identical with a change of attitude and that we have to employ different kinds of phenomenological reductions in order to interpret Aristotle’s theory of phronesis phenomenologically. In section 2, employing different kinds of phenomenological reductions, I will attempt to develop the phenomenological (...) psychology of phronesis through a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 3, employing different kinds of intersubjective reductions, I will clarify intersubjective aspects of phronesis. In section 4, adopting these insights, I will try to resolve two of the many difficulties of Aristotle’s theory of phronesis. In section 5, I will conclude with two remarks concerning the future tasks of the phenomenology of phronesis. (shrink)

In Speech and Phenomena and other works, Derrida criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology and attempts to pave the way to his deconstructive philosophy. The starting point of his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is his assessment of the latter’s phenomenology of language developed in the Logical Investigations. Derrida claims that Husserl’s phenomenology of language in the Logical Investigations and the subsequent works is guided by the premise of the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it (...) aims to show that Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of language is off the mark and, on the other hand, it aims to reveal that the phenomenology of language goes far beyond the scope of the Derridian deconstructive philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine the possibility of first philosophy from a phenomenological point of view. I will do this by assessing Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 1, I will delineate Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 2, I will introduce Levinas’s conception of ethics as first philosophy and sketch out his criticism of Husserl’s conception of first philosophy. In Sect. 3, I will assess Levinas’s criticism of Husserl’s conception and show that from (...) a phenomenological point of view, it is possible to develop first philosophy only in a relative sense and not in an absolute sense. The possibility of first philosophy in a relative sense implies that both Husserl’s and Levinas’s conceptions of first philosophy have some limitations and should be revised, since in a certain way, they are each conceived from an absolute point of view. In Sect. 4, I will show that the conception of first philosophy in a relative sense is a phenomenological one and sketch out some basic features of first philosophy in a relative sense. (shrink)

This editorial outlines the articles included in the special thematic symposium on corporate social responsibility and employees and highlights their contributions to the literature. In doing so, it highlights the novel theoretical and empirical insights provided by the articles, how the articles inform and expand the methods and research designs researchers can use to study phenomena in this area, and identifies promising directions for future research.

Postgraduate research has undergone unprecedented change in the past ten years, in response to major shifts in the role of the university and the disciplines in knowledge production and the management of intellectual work. New kinds of doctorates have been established that have expanded the scope and direction of doctoral education. A new audience of supervisors, academic managers and graduate school personnel is engaging in debates about the nature, purpose and future of doctoral education and how institutions and departments can (...) best respond to the increasing demands that are being made. Discussion of the emerging issues and agendas is set within the context of the international policy shifts that are occurring and considers the implications of these shifts on the changing external environment. This engaging book acquaints the readers with new international trends in doctoral education identifies new practices in supervision, research, teaching and learning enables practitioners of doctoral education to contribute to the debates and help shape new understandings questions the purposes of doctoral study and how they are changing considers the balance between equipping students as researchers and the conduct of original research Including contributions from both those who have conducted formal research on research education and those whose own practice is breaking new ground within their universities, this thought-provoking book draws on the expertise of those currently making a stimulating contribution to the literature on doctoral education. (shrink)