In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage (...) in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)
Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)
Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)
Is behavioral integration (i.e., which occurs when a subjects assertion that p matches her non-verbal behavior) a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from nearly 6,000 people across twenty-six samples, spanning twenty-two countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we suggest that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely (...) asserts that p, non-linguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)
The goal of the dissertation is, first, to develop in the tradition of conventional quantum mechanics what I call a propensity view of quantum properties, and to examine its coherence. Conventional quantum mechanics assumes the completeness of quantum mechanics. Taking the ontic version of the completeness assumption, which says that a state vector completely describes an individual quantum system as it is, I argue that the propensity view of quantum properties, i.e., the attribution of certain irreducible propensities to a quantum (...) system, is not only demanded but also can be coherently maintained. ;Second, I evaluate the relation between a propensity view of quantum properties and the demands of Einstein's program of realism, the backbone of which is the requirement that physical systems, as described by a theory, have properties independently of measurement. In doing so, I argue for a non-relational version of the quantum propensity view, which amounts to attributions propensities to individual quantum systems, and claim that conventional quantum mechanics together with the non-relational propensity view of quantum properties realizes physical realism, which is a particular version of Einstein's realist thesis and which reads that a physical system, as described by a theory, has at least some of its extrinsic properties independently of measurement. ;Third, quantum mechanics, in spite of its empirical success, has suffered from certain well-known conceptual puzzles, viz., the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocality as it arises in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. So we ask whether the propensity view of quantum properties can help us the resolve these problems. I argue that the so-called reduction of the wave packet is the source of both problems and suggest that there is a sense in which the propensity view of quantum properties explains the reduction of the wave packet and its nonlocal nature. On the other hand, the propensity view by itself fails to resolve the question of when or in what circumstances the reduction of the wave packet occurs, indicating that we do not as yet possess a complete understanding of quantum propensities. (shrink)
In the contemporary intellectual scene, one prominent question is this, what made science and its success possible? One tempting strategy for dealing with this question as a philosopher of science is to use science (or more broadly, empirical inquiry) and its methods to investigate the nature of science and its success. This strategy is what used to be called naturalism. For a philosopher of science, it amounts to naturalizing her philosophical inquiry for understanding the nature of science and its success. (...) The project of naturalizing philosophy of science has not been without its own problems. Some of the concerns are as follows. Willphilosophy of science maintain its traditional normative character after going through the process of naturalization? If it does, what form(s) will its normative content take? Can that normative content be secured without appealing to methods other than those usually used in empirical inquiries? In this essay, I will call these issues collectively the problem of normativity. First of all, I’ll look into the two most representative attempts to naturalize philosophy of science, namely L. Laudan’s and R. Giere’s attempts, focusing on the views that could be taken as their answers to the questions constituting the problem of normativity. Then I’ll examine these views in the light of some prominent criticisms and potential problems, and argue that some of those views could be defended by developing one or other additional conceptual arsenals but still others need to be curbed down admitting the apparent weaknesses of their supporting arguments. This reevaluative process will give us a better idea about what have been achieved by the attempts to naturalize philosophy of science and what their limitations are. (shrink)
In this work, I attempt to develop what I call a co-evolutionary model of scientific change, which I expect to afford a more balanced view on both the continuous and discontinuous aspects of scientific change. Supposing that scientific goals, methods and theories constitute the main components of scientific inquiry, I focus on the relationships among these components and their changing patterns. First of all, I identify explanatory power and empirical adequacy as primary goals of science and explore the possibility of (...) evaluating scientific goals. Then I try to bring out the major features of how the main components of science are related to each other. One major feature is that they mutually constrain each other, and as such each main component operates as a selective force on the other components. Another major feature is that the main components of science induce changes reciprocally, but with certain intervals. Other important features are the modes and tempos of changes in the main components of scientific inquiry. All these features together, I conclude, suggest that scientific change is evolutionary, as well as co-evolutionary. Finally I argue that this co-evolutionary model of scientific change does not yield to what I call the problems of circularity and scientific progress. (shrink)