Japan has absorbed many western ideas since the late nineteenth century, but Japanese philosophers have often been reluctant to accept the western idea of the “I” in its entirety. The I transgresses to the Other more easily than western philosophies think and imports what belongs to the Other as his own. How is this possible? Husserl attempted to explain the constitution of the Other by the intentionality that goes from the I to the Other, mediated by the body. However, Husserl (...) later discovered that the constitution of both the I and the Other is more of a two-way movement. This double-movement is essential for all constitutions and departs from a deep (primal) dimension that is not yet egological. Even in the self-reflection of the I, a similar double-movement between the primal and egological dimensions can be seen. The I is supported, but at the same time threatened, by this movement. (shrink)

In Voir l'invisible Michel Henry applies his philosophy of autoaffection (which is both inspired by, and critical of, Husserl) to the realm of aesthetics. Henry claims that autoaffection, as non-objective experience, is essential not only to self-experience, but also to the experience of objects and their qualities. Intentionality tempts us to experience objects merely from the 'outside', but aesthetic experience returns us to the inner life of objects as a lived experience. On the basis of an examination of Henry's aesthetic (...) theory in the light of Husserl's analysis of our experience of visible objects, I conclude that revisions are required in both Husserl's and Henry's approaches: Husserl's noema must be considered to be a lived-through experience, and non-objective lived-through experience must be recognized as primordial evidence; Henry's claim that intentionality makes unreal all that it objectifies must be replaced by a recognition of the interdependence between autoaffection and heteroaffection. (shrink)

In seiner Fünften Cartesianischen Meditation entwickelt Husserl eine transzendentale Theorie der Fremderfahrung, der sogenannten ,,Einfühlung . Diese Theorie charakterisiert er in dieser Schrift als ,,statische Analyse . Genau besehen werden darin jedoch mehrere genetische Momente der Fremderfahrung in Betracht gezogen. In diesem Aufsatz versucht der Verfasser, zuerst aufgrund einiger nachgelassener Texte Husserls die wesentlichen Charaktere der statischen und der genetischen Methode und auch den Zusammenhang der beiden festzustellen, um dann aus der Analyse der Fünften Meditation die statischen und die genetischen (...) Momente konkret herauszuarbeiten. Aus dieser Untersuchung wird deutlich, dass die Theorie der Fremderfahrung in der Fünften Meditation als statische Analyse angesehen werden kann, insofern sie die ,,Fundierungsstruktur der Fremderfahrung klärt. Es ergibt sich aber auch, dass sie bereits in die genetische Sphäre eingetreten ist, sofern sie durch den ,,Abbau der höheren Sinnesschicht der Fremderfahrung die primordiale Eigenheitssphäre als Unterschicht freilegt, und wenn sie dann versucht, von dieser Eigenheitssphäre her die höhere Konstitution des fremden Leibes und des alter ego durch die ,,paarende Assoziation als ,,passive Genesis aufzuklären. Dieser halb-genetischen Theorie fehlt jedoch ein weiteres notwendiges Verfahren der genetischen Methode (das der Rückfrage nach der ,,Urstiftung ), das überprüfen soll, ob und wie alle zur primordialen Sphäre gehörigen Sinne (,,mein Leib , ,,mein Menschen-Ich usw.) wirklich ohne konstitutive Leistungen der auf fremde Subjektivität bezogenen Intentionalität urgestiftet werden können. Einige Stellen der Fünften Meditation weisen darauf hin, dass eine solche Urstiftung unmöglich wäre. In der Tat hat der späte Husserl seine ehemalige Konzeption, die die statische Fundierungsabfolge zugleich als notwendiges genetisches Nacheinander auffasste, revidiert. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl’s ultimate aim was to give an overall philosophical explanation of the totality of Being. In this endeavour, the term “absolute” was crucial for him. In this paper, I aim to clarify the most important ways in which Husserl used this notion. I attempt to show that, despite his rather divergent usages, eventually three fundamental meanings and coordinated levels of the “absolute” can be differentiated in his thought: the epistemological, the ontological, and the theological or metaphysical level. According to (...) Husserl, we can approach this ultimate level of the Absolute, through the method of phenomenological construction. A closer reading of Husserl’s texts shows that his conception of the absolute was astonishingly modern. The main features of the conception—on all three levels—were non-foundationalism, contextualism, openness, and circularity. Each level mutually founds and determines the others. It is a non-foundational Absolute, the moments of which constitute an organic and open totality which is essentially processual. In my interpretation, this theory opens a fruitful working area, which has enormous philosophical potential and is surprisingly up-to-date. (shrink)

In Speech and Phenomena and other works, Derrida criticizes Husserl’s phenomenology and attempts to pave the way to his deconstructive philosophy. The starting point of his criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology is his assessment of the latter’s phenomenology of language developed in the Logical Investigations. Derrida claims that Husserl’s phenomenology of language in the Logical Investigations and the subsequent works is guided by the premise of the metaphysics of presence. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, it (...) aims to show that Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology of language is off the mark and, on the other hand, it aims to reveal that the phenomenology of language goes far beyond the scope of the Derridian deconstructive philosophy of language. (shrink)

Max Scheler and Mencius both take feeling to be the origin of value and could therefore be considered to be proponents of axiological sentimentalism. Despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that are mainly derived from some difficulties with their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value (...) could be developed. It is accordingly the aim of this paper to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. In Sects. 1, 2, I will first delineate Scheler’s theory of value and feeling, then that of Mencius. In Sect. 3, I will point out some difficulties with the two theories and promote a dialogue between them that would improve each theory. In Sect. 4, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the future task of the phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius. (shrink)

Summary Within Husserl’s theory of perception, the role attributed to kinesthetic sensations determines a phase of the perceptive constitution that marks the boundary between pure receptivity and a first form of self-determination of consciousness. Kinesthetic experiences are, in fact, characterized not just as acts that are performed but rather that can be performed, albeit according to predetermined paths. This primitive form of ‘instinctive’ spontaneity of the Ego (linked to primal impulses) as realization of pre-established potentialities, characterizes what Husserl defines the (...) ‘ idiopsychic’ dimension of consciousness (Husserl, 1952, p. 135). However, although this level of consciousness unity presupposes a spontaneous activity, it can be investigated according to the ‘causal’ laws of motivation. The phenomenon of motivation was notoriously introduced by Husserl in §56 of Ideen II, as a specific law of spiritual life. However, there are two possible forms of motivation, one in which the Ego is actively involved, and a second one, called “associative motivation.” The latter basically indicates the passive tendency of creating associations between unities of the immanent sphere. In other terms, Husserl acknowledges the existence of “motivated relations” within the immanent sphere of mental acts which do not necessarily call for an active participation of the Ego. In this sense, the relation between motivating factors and motivated elements could be considered a kind of conditioning of the form “because-therefore,” in which the two elements arrange themselves in a succession of experiences. This work aims to show that this very kind of association is the same that pre-determines the unfolding possibility of kinesthetic chains. (shrink)

Several commentators have argued that with his concept of anonymity Merleau-Ponty breaks away from classical Husserlian phenomenology that is methodologically tied to the first person perspective. Many contemporary commentators see Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity as a break away from Husserl’s framework that is seen as hopelessly subjectivistic and solipsistic. Some judge and reproach it as a disastrous misunderstanding that leads to a confusion of philosophical and empirical concerns. Both parties agree that Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of anonymity mark a divergence from classical (...) Husserlian phenomenology. I will question this view and demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity remains Husserlian in two important senses: it analyses senses in terms of constituting selves and communities of such selves, and it accounts for the formation of experience by the temporal sedimentation of intentional activity. The argument proceeds in four steps. The first section argues against the widely spread notion according to which Merleau-Ponty’s anonymous subject is collective. In the second section, I offer an alternative reading by demonstrating that Merleau-Ponty uses the term “anonymous” primarily to characterize the lived body of a personal subject. In section three, I introduce Merleau-Ponty’s idea of trace and show that for him both the perceived thing and the perceiving body are traces and as such refer to earlier constitutive acts of alien subjects. I then argue that Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation are crucial for the understanding of this idea. Finally, in section four, I show how Husserl’s theory of depresentation informs Merleau-Ponty’s discourse on anonymity. (shrink)

On Dan Zahavi’s Husserlian account of the subject, the self-temporalization of subjectivity presupposes what he calls an “immediate impressional self-manifestation.” It follows from this view that self-awareness is an inherent power of the one who will be subject, rather than a product of sociality introduced into life from without. In this paper, I argue against Zahavi’s position by going over the development of Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, examining the positions Husserl takes and the reasons that he comes to these positions. (...) Once we reach Husserl’s ultimate account, it becomes evident that Zahavi’s position is untenable. (shrink)

This essay accomplishes two goals. First, I explore Husserl’s study of “tension” from his 1893 manuscript, “Notes Towards a Theory of Attention and Interest,” to reveal that it comprises his de facto first analysis of instinct. Husserl there describes tension as the innate pull to execute ever new objectifications. He clarifies this pull of objectification by contrasting it to affective and volitional experiences. This analysis surprisingly prefigures a theory of drive-feelings and anticipates the idea that consciousness is both teleological and (...) autotelic. Second, I show how Husserl’s de facto account of instincts from 1893 inspires his robust philosophy of instincts from Studies concerning the Structures of Consciousness and other late manuscripts. While Husserl maintains many 1893 insights, he now claims that the instinct towards objectification comprises affective and volitional moments. Finally, I demonstrate that Husserl’s analyses of instincts throughout his life are united by the idea that consciousness possesses an essential structural lack. (shrink)

In this paper I piece present an account of Husserl’s approach to the phenomenological reconstruction of consciousness’ immemorial past, a problem, I suggest, that is quite pertinent for defenders of Lockean psychological continuity views of personal identity. To begin, I sketch the background of the problem facing the very project of a genetic phenomenology, within which the reconstructive analysis is situated. While the young Husserl took genetic matters to be irrelevant to the main task of phenomenology, he would later come (...) to see their importance and, indeed, centrality as the precursor and subsoil for the rationality of consciousness. I then argue that there is a close connection between reconstruction and genetic phenomenology, such that reconstruction is a necessary component of the program of genetic phenomenology, and I set out an argument of Husserl’s compelling one to enter into reconstructive territory. With that impetus, I schematically lay out the main contours one finds in Husserl’s practice of reconstructive techniques. We find him taking two distinct approaches, that of the individual viewed egologically (through the abstract lens of a single individual’s consciousness) and as embedded in interpersonal relations. Husserl occasionally calls these the approach “from within” and “from without,” respectively. Ultimately, the two approaches are not only complementary, but require one another. In closing, I argue that these considerations lead to a blurring of lines between the genetic and generative phenomenological registers, which challenges the prevalent view that there is a sharp demarcation of the two. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to motivate the need for and then present the outline of an alternative explanation of what Dan Zahavi has dubbed “open intersubjectivity,” which captures the basic interpersonal character of perceptual experience as such. This is a notion whose roots lay in Husserl’s phenomenology. Accordingly, the paper begins by situating the notion of open intersubjectivity – as well as the broader idea of constituting intersubjectivity to which it belongs – within Husserl’s phenomenology as an approach (...) distinct from his more well-known account of empathy in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. I then recapitulate and criticize Zahavi’s phenomenological explanation of open intersubjectivity, arguing that his account hinges on a flawed phenomenology of perceptual experience. In the wake of that criticism, I supply an alternative phenomenological framework for explaining open intersubjectivity, appealing to the methodological principles of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and his theory of developmentally primitive affect. Those principles are put to work using the resources of recent studies of cognitive developmental and social cognition. From that literature, I discuss how infants learn about the world from others in secondary intersubjectivity through natural pedagogy. Lastly, the paper closes by showing how the discussion of infant development explains the phenomenon of open intersubjectivity and by highlighting the relatively moderate nature of this account compared to Zahavi’s. (shrink)

This Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity first clarifies the sense of affectivity that is at stake here, then shows how Husserl’s distinctive approach to kinaesthetic experience provides evidential access to the interkinaesthetic field. After describing several structures of interkinaesthetic-affective experience, I indicate how a Husserlian critique of the presupposition that we are “psychophysical” entities might suggest a more inclusive approach to a biosocial plenum that includes all metabolic life.