Teoriju anticke komedije Hegel neprestano razvija tokom svoje akademske karijere, od ranog spisa o prirodnom pravu, preko Fenomenologije duha do svojih berlinskih predavanja iz estetike. Hegel uvek razmatra komediju u bliskoj vezi sa svojom teorijom tragedije, te otuda u kontekstu politickih, religioznih i filozofsko-istorijskih odredjenja. Imajuci to u vidu, ovaj rad istrazuje Hegelov pojam dramskog zanra komedije u odnosu na duhovno-filozofske kategorije obicajnosti i supstancijalnosti kao kraja klasicne umetnosti i ujedno nastanka moderne subjektivnosti u njenom slobodnom samoodnosenju. Centralno pitanje je, (...) na koji nacin se razvijanje apsolutnog duha reflektuje u domenu estetskog na razvijanje objektivnog duha u sferi drzave i drustva, kao sto je, recimo, u grckoj komediji dovedena do svesti buduca propast svetsko-obicajnog statusa polisa. Samo razvijanje Hegelove filozofije umetnosti, od ranih spisa do zrelog filozofskog sistema, daje nam mogucnost da uvidimo estetsku formu komedije kao jednog vanrednog oblika umetnosti kao i da razmotrimo duhovno-filozofske linije rascepa moderne. (shrink)

Teoriju anticke komedije Hegel neprestano razvija tokom svoje akademske karijere, od ranog spisa o prirodnom pravu, preko Fenomenologije duha do svojih berlinskih predavanja iz estetike. Hegel uvek razmatra komediju u bliskoj vezi sa svojom teorijom tragedije, te otuda u kontekstu politickih, religioznih i filozofsko-istorijskih odredjenja. Imajuci to u vidu, ovaj rad istrazuje Hegelov pojam dramskog zanra komedije u odnosu na duhovno-filozofske kategorije obicajnosti i supstancijalnosti kao kraja klasicne umetnosti i ujedno nastanka moderne subjektivnosti u njenom slobodnom samoodnosenju. Centralno pitanje je, (...) na koji nacin se razvijanje apsolutnog duha reflektuje u domenu estetskog na razvijanje objektivnog duha u sferi drzave i drustva, kao sto je, recimo, u grckoj komediji dovedena do svesti buduca propast svetsko-obicajnog statusa polisa. Samo razvijanje Hegelove filozofije umetnosti, od ranih spisa do zrelog filozofskog sistema, daje nam mogucnost da uvidimo estetsku formu komedije kao jednog vanrednog oblika umetnosti kao i da razmotrimo duhovno-filozofske linije rascepa moderne. (shrink)

Genetic determinism can be described as the attribution of the formation of traits to genes, where genes are ascribed more causal power than what scientific consensus suggests. Belief in genetic determinism is an educational problem because it contradicts scientific knowledge, and is a societal problem because it has the potential to foster intolerant attitudes such as racism and prejudice against sexual orientation. In this article, we begin by investigating the very nature of belief in genetic determinism. Then, we investigate whether (...) knowledge of genetics and genomics is associated with beliefs in genetic determinism. Finally, we explore the extent to which social factors such as gender, education, and religiosity are associated with genetic determinism. Methodologically, we gathered and analyzed data on beliefs in genetic determinism, knowledge of genetics and genomics, and social variables using the “Public Understanding and Attitudes towards Genetics and Genomics” instrument. Our analyses of PUGGS responses from a sample of Brazilian university freshmen undergraduates indicated that belief in genetic determinism was best characterized as a construct built up by two dimensions or belief systems: beliefs concerning social traits and beliefs concerning biological traits; levels of belief in genetic determination of social traits were low, which contradicts prior work; associations between knowledge of genetics and genomics and levels of belief in genetic determinism were low; and social factors such as age and religiosity had stronger associations with beliefs in genetic determinism than knowledge. Although our study design precludes causal inferences, our results raise questions about whether enhancing genetic literacy will decrease or prevent beliefs in genetic determinism. (shrink)

Massimiliano Tomba’s Insurgent Universality traces a global history of revolutionary institution-building as ‘theory in action’, pushing radical democracy beyond an ontology of the political. This contribution aims to clarify the place of ‘insurgent institutions’ in Tomba’s work and suggests that an unresolved tension persists between insurgent universality as popular institutions on the one hand, and as a negative dis-ordering on the other. Exploring the promise and limitations of ‘insurgent institutions’ in light of their durability, its first part reads Insurgent Universality (...) alongside Santi Romano, the legal pluralist whose concept of the institution Tomba adopts. Secondly, the article turns to Hannah Arendt’s understanding of authority and Miguel Abensour’s discussion of ‘insurgent institutions’ as two potentially helpful accounts of democratic practice within durational time. Where Tomba remains focused on constellations between moments of rupture, Arendt and Abensour offer a politically generative understanding of durability specific to radical-democratic institutions. (shrink)

This book involves an in-depth analysis of the ethical, political and philosophical issues related to health-oriented screening programs.

This chapter discusses some concerns regarding the effects of enhancement technologies on autonomy and authenticity, insofar as authenticity relates to autonomy. As a preliminary, it describes how enhancement and autonomy should be understood in this context along with some examples of enhancement. The chapter moves on to explain why enhancement can promote autonomy. Three types of concerns regarding the effect of enhancement technologies on autonomy are raised: (i) that medical technologies should not be used to enhance autonomy, since this is (...) not the proper use of such technologies; (ii) that some enhancement technologies are inimical to our authenticity; and (iii) that the widespread use of some enhancement technologies have negative overall consequences on people's autonomy. Different kinds of enhancements typically arouse different kinds of concerns as regards autonomy. These include cognitive, mood, physical, and aesthetic enhancement. (shrink)

What challenges must a principle of need for prioritisations in health care meet in order to be plausible and practically useful? Some progress in answering this question has recently been made by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. This article continue their work by suggesting that the characteristic feature of principles of needs is that they are sufficientarian, saying that we have a right to a minimally acceptable or good life or health, but nothing more. Accordingly, principles of needs must answer two (...) distributive questions: when do we have sufficient and how should we prioritise among those who do not yet have a sufficiency? Furthermore, it is argued that Roger Crisp’s theory of need, which combines sufficientarianism with prioritarianism below the threshold of need, is better equipped than alternatives to answer these questions as well as meeting the challenges formulated by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. However, Crisp’s theory faces two major challenges. First, it has to say something about the currency of distribution: a principle of need must be complemented either with a theory on the human good or a theory about the proper goals of health care. Second, it has to say something about where the threshold should be set. However, any attempt to set a threshold seems morally arbitrary in the light of the sufficientarian idea that those just above the threshold never should be given priority over those just below the threshold. (shrink)

El autor afirma que la ciencia y la tecnología son hoy dos poderosas instituciones sociales y culturales internacionales que apuntan a producir conocimiento universalmente válido y productos para el consumo mundial. A partir de esto, se interroga sobre el supuesto de que lo cultural es una esfera separada y secundaria, meramente superestructural. Y postula que la cultura es el ámbito en que se producen las ideas por las que regimos nuestras vidas y que ellas penetran la ciencia. Dado el carácter (...) cultural de la ciencia, permite plantear que llegar a ser científicamente desarrollados podría no necesariamente significar volverse como Europa y/o los Estados Unidos. Tras ello se pregunta por las características que debiera tener la tecnología en América Latina. (shrink)

The requirement that theoretical and empirical research is to sustainably benefit not only the nominal researcher, but also the other research participants, is deeply embedded in the conceptual-analytical framework of Psychology from the Standpoint of the Subject and its co-researcher principle. PSS research is thus to be of emancipatory relevance to those others the researcher comes to collaborate with. Meanwhile, the question of how this requirement can be prospectively integrated into the design of a research project remains subject to debate. (...) This question emerges as particularly difficult to tackle in research projects that engage in co-research with young children: How can a researcher ensure that the young children s-he works togethe with benefit from the research project? Based on the critical analysis of an earlier research project implemented by the author, the contribution at hand suggests that PSS’ foundational notion of emancipatory relevance needs to be revisited. It argues that if a research project is to sustainably benefit young co-researchers, the technical relevance of the expected mutual emancipation should as well be explicitly considered in the project design. A discussion of recent methodological developments in child-targeted Participatory Design and Human-Computer Interaction serve as inspiration for this conceptual specification. The contribution thereby invites co-research to further investigate how emancipatory relevance cannot only to be methodologically attained via dissemination of research results and conceptual developments, but also via the actual research process it attempts to engage the co-researchers in irrespective of their age. (shrink)

This article is about the justifiability of accepting worse cost effectiveness for orphan drugs, that is, treatments for rare diseases, in a publicly financed health care system. Recently, three arguments have been presented that may be used in favour of exceptionally advantageous economic terms for orphan drugs. These arguments share the common feature of all referring to considerations of justice or fairness: the argument of the irrelevance of group size, the argument from the principle of need, and the argument of (...) identifiability. It is argued that all of these arguments fail to support the conclusion that orphan drugs should be subsidized to a larger extent than treatments for common diseases. The argument of the irrelevance fails to distinguish between directly and indirectly relevant considerations of fairness or justice. The recent attempt to revive the moral relevance of identifiability has provided no novel reasons to think that identifiability is morally relevant in itself or due to considerations of fairness and justice. The argument from the principle of need does not fail due to any inherent flaw in the principle as such. Rather, this principle can be interpreted in different ways, and none of these interpretations support exceptionally advantageous terms economically for treating rare diseases specifically. It is concluded that we are awaiting justice based reasons for the preferential treatment of orphan drugs. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it’s impossible for there to be a single universal theory of meaning for a language. First, I will consider some minimal expressiveness requirements a language must meet to be able to express semantic claims. Then I will argue that in order to have a single unified theory of meaning, these expressiveness requirements must be satisfied by a language which the semantic theory itself applies to. That is, we would need a language which can express (...) its own meaning. It has been well-known since Tarski that theories of meaning whose central notion is truth can’t be expressed in a language which they apply to. Here, I develop Quine’s formulation of the Liar Paradox in grammatical terms and use this to extend Tarski’s result to all theories of meaning. This general version of the paradox can be formalised as a special case of the Lawvere Fixed-Point Theorem applied to a categorial grammar. Taken together with the initial arguments, I infer that a universal theory of meaning is impossible and conclude the paper with a brief discussion on what alternatives are available. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a continual rise of interest in the empirical study of questions traditionally located in moral philosophy, i.e., studies in Experimental Ethics. In this chapter we briefly outline the recent history of this field. To do so we have to cross disciplinary borders to quite some extent. Tracing the beginnings of Experimental Ethics back to early works in moral psychology, we delineate a sequence of theories which eventually flow into current Experimental Ethics. We then briefly review four (...) topics which are intensively investigated in Experimental Ethics at the moment: moral relativism, individual and cross-cultural differences in moral judgment, and interactions of moral evaluation with other philosophical concepts. We conclude with a short historically informed comment on the demarcation problem of Experimental Ethics. (shrink)

AimsTo examine attitudes towards physician-assisted suicide (PAS) among physicians in Sweden and compare these with the results from a similar cross-sectional study performed in 2007.ParticipantsA random selection of 250 physicians from each of six specialties (general practice, geriatrics, internal medicine, oncology, surgery and psychiatry) and all 127 palliative care physicians in Sweden were invited to participate in this study.SettingA postal questionnaire commissioned by the Swedish Medical Society in collaboration with Karolinska Institute in Stockholm. ResultsThe total response rate was 59.2%. Slightly (...) fewer than half [47.1% (95% CI 43.7–50.5)] of the respondents from the six specialties accepted PAS, which is significantly more than accepted PAS in the 2007 study [34.9% (95% CI 31.5–38.3)]. Thirty-three percent of respondents were prepared to prescribe the needed drugs. When asked what would happen to the respondent’s own trust in healthcare, a majority [67.1% (95% CI 63.9–70.3)] stated that legalizing PAS would either not influence their own trust in healthcare, or that their trust would increase. This number is an increase compared to the 2007 survey, when just over half [51.9% (95% CI 48.0–55.2)] indicated that their own trust would either not be influenced, or would increase.ConclusionsThe study reveals a shift towards a more accepting attitude concerning PAS among physicians in Sweden. Only a minority of the respondents stated that they were against PAS, and a considerable proportion reported being prepared to prescribe the needed drugs for patient self-administration if PAS were legalized. (shrink)

The advent of ChatGPT by OpenAI has prompted extensive discourse on its potential implications for science and higher education. While the impact on education has been a primary focus, there is limited empirical research on the effects of large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based chatbots on science and scientific practice. To investigate this further, we conducted a Delphi study involving 72 researchers specializing in AI and digitization. The study focused on applications and limitations of LLMs, their effects on the science (...) system, ethical and legal considerations, and the required competencies for their effective use. Our findings highlight the transformative potential of LLMs in science, particularly in administrative, creative, and analytical tasks. However, risks related to bias, misinformation, and quality assurance need to be addressed through proactive regulation and science education. This research contributes to informed discussions on the impact of generative AI in science and helps identify areas for future action. (shrink)

This article explores one central assumption that is guiding large portions of contemporary (analytic) moral philosophy: the idea that moral philosophy has to be forward-looking and action-guiding. By paying attention to a number of examples, it is argued that this guiding assumption flies in the face of important aspects of actual moral life. Moral situations are not (always) of the nature that we can plan for them, and reason about them in advance. Rather, the moral reality, or the moral contexts, (...) are often such that the moral situation is created in the scene, and hence something that is only available to reflect upon in hindsight. There are, at least, two central reasons why this is so: The first is that the sense, meaning, of the actions and the concepts we use in reflection about them, are not locked beforehand, and our understanding of them are formed in the process. The second reason is that moral situations come about in a responsive, rather than planned, way. That is, we discover our moral world by means of our reactive interactions, rather than in theoretical reflection that aims to produce “anticipated beliefs.” Thus, this article suggests a way of exploring morality’s backward-looking nature that does not misrepresent moral reality. (shrink)

In this article I try to show in what sense Emmanuel Levinas’ ‘ethics as first philosophy’ moves our ethical thinking away from what has been called ‘centrist ethics’. Proceeding via depictions of the structure of Levinasian ethics and including references to examples as well as to some empirical research, I try to argue that human beings always already find themselves within an ethical universe, a space of meaning. Critically engaging with the writings of David Gunkel and Lucas Introna, I try (...) to argue that these thinkers, rather than clarifying, distort our ethical understanding of how we stand in relation to artefacts. Drawing a distinction between how pervasive our ethical relationship to other human beings, and living animals, is and how the nature of artefacts is tied to us, I conclude by indicating that the aspiration to give artefacts an ethical face suggests a fantasy to avoid ethical responsibility and generates what I call a ‘compensatory logic’. (shrink)

Das Buch untersucht die Relation der Ahnlichkeit in ihrer Bedeutung fur Asthetik und Epistemologie der Moderne. HAtte Michel Foucault in Die Ordnung der Dinge die These formuliert, dass die Ahnlichkeit ihre Rolle als strukturierende Form des Wissens im Laufe des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts verloren habe, so geht die vorliegende Untersuchung davon aus, dass das Ahnlichkeitsdenken auch in der Moderne von grundlegender Bedeutung ist. LEitend ist dabei die Annahme, dass die Ahnlichkeit ihre besondere Relevanz nun in einem Diskurs uber asthetische Erfahrung entfaltet, (...) wobei sich von dort aus wiederum fundamentale Fragestellungen der Erkenntnistheorie eroffnen. DEn Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung bildet die Philosophie Immanuel Kants in ihrer maSSgeblichen Bedeutung fur asthetische Theorien der Moderne. ANhand detaillierter Lekturen von Texten von Walter Benjamin, Paul Valéry und Theodor W. ADorno wird die Argumentation weiter entfaltet, womit auch die in der Forschung bislang nicht berucksichtigte Konstellation Valéry - Benjamin - Adorno erstmals genauer in den Blick genommen ist. DIe Arbeit ist im Fach der Literaturwissenschaft angesiedelt, jedoch grundsatzlich interdisziplinar auf Fragen der Asthetik und Kunsttheorie ausgerichtet. (shrink)

In Alzheimer's disease (AD), pathological processes start in the brain long before clinical dementia. Biomarkers reflecting brain alterations may therefore indicate disease at an early stage, enabling early diagnosis. This raises several ethical questions and the potential benefits of early diagnosis must be weighted against possible disadvantages. Currently, there are few strong arguments favouring early diagnosis, due to the lack of disease modifying therapy. Also, available diagnostic methods risk erroneous classifications, with potentially grave consequences. However, a possible benefit of early (...) diagnosis even without disease modifying therapy is that it may enable early decision making when patients still have full decision competence, avoiding problems of hypothetical consents. It may also help identifying patients with cognitive dysfunction secondary to other diseases that may be responsive to treatment already today. (shrink)

In recent years, the issue of accepting a higher cost per health improvement for orphan drugs has been the subject of discussion in health care policy agencies and the academic literature. This article aims to provide an analysis of broadly egalitarian arguments for and against accepting higher costs per health improvement. More specifically, we aim to investigate which arguments one should agree upon putting aside and where further explorations are needed. We identify three kinds of arguments in the literature: considerations (...) of substantial equality, formal equality, and opportunity cost. We argue that considerations of substantial equality do not support higher costs per health improvement orphan drugs, even if such considerations are considered valid. On the contrary, arguments of formal equality may support accepting a higher cost per health improvement for orphan drugs. However, in order to do so, a number of both normative and empirical issues must be resolved; these issues are identified in the article. For instance, it must be settled to what extent the opportunity cost in terms of foregone health for other patients is acceptable in order to uphold formal equality. We conclude that certain arguments can be set aside, and future focus should be put on the unresolved normative and empirical issues related to formal equality and opportunity cost. (shrink)