El autor afirma que la ciencia y la tecnología son hoy dos poderosas instituciones sociales y culturales internacionales que apuntan a producir conocimiento universalmente válido y productos para el consumo mundial. A partir de esto, se interroga sobre el supuesto de que lo cultural es una esfera separada y secundaria, meramente superestructural. Y postula que la cultura es el ámbito en que se producen las ideas por las que regimos nuestras vidas y que ellas penetran la ciencia. Dado el carácter (...) cultural de la ciencia, permite plantear que llegar a ser científicamente desarrollados podría no necesariamente significar volverse como Europa y/o los Estados Unidos. Tras ello se pregunta por las características que debiera tener la tecnología en América Latina. (shrink)

The advent of ChatGPT by OpenAI has prompted extensive discourse on its potential implications for science and higher education. While the impact on education has been a primary focus, there is limited empirical research on the effects of large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based chatbots on science and scientific practice. To investigate this further, we conducted a Delphi study involving 72 researchers specializing in AI and digitization. The study focused on applications and limitations of LLMs, their effects on the science (...) system, ethical and legal considerations, and the required competencies for their effective use. Our findings highlight the transformative potential of LLMs in science, particularly in administrative, creative, and analytical tasks. However, risks related to bias, misinformation, and quality assurance need to be addressed through proactive regulation and science education. This research contributes to informed discussions on the impact of generative AI in science and helps identify areas for future action. (shrink)

Teoriju anticke komedije Hegel neprestano razvija tokom svoje akademske karijere, od ranog spisa o prirodnom pravu, preko Fenomenologije duha do svojih berlinskih predavanja iz estetike. Hegel uvek razmatra komediju u bliskoj vezi sa svojom teorijom tragedije, te otuda u kontekstu politickih, religioznih i filozofsko-istorijskih odredjenja. Imajuci to u vidu, ovaj rad istrazuje Hegelov pojam dramskog zanra komedije u odnosu na duhovno-filozofske kategorije obicajnosti i supstancijalnosti kao kraja klasicne umetnosti i ujedno nastanka moderne subjektivnosti u njenom slobodnom samoodnosenju. Centralno pitanje je, (...) na koji nacin se razvijanje apsolutnog duha reflektuje u domenu estetskog na razvijanje objektivnog duha u sferi drzave i drustva, kao sto je, recimo, u grckoj komediji dovedena do svesti buduca propast svetsko-obicajnog statusa polisa. Samo razvijanje Hegelove filozofije umetnosti, od ranih spisa do zrelog filozofskog sistema, daje nam mogucnost da uvidimo estetsku formu komedije kao jednog vanrednog oblika umetnosti kao i da razmotrimo duhovno-filozofske linije rascepa moderne. (shrink)

Teoriju anticke komedije Hegel neprestano razvija tokom svoje akademske karijere, od ranog spisa o prirodnom pravu, preko Fenomenologije duha do svojih berlinskih predavanja iz estetike. Hegel uvek razmatra komediju u bliskoj vezi sa svojom teorijom tragedije, te otuda u kontekstu politickih, religioznih i filozofsko-istorijskih odredjenja. Imajuci to u vidu, ovaj rad istrazuje Hegelov pojam dramskog zanra komedije u odnosu na duhovno-filozofske kategorije obicajnosti i supstancijalnosti kao kraja klasicne umetnosti i ujedno nastanka moderne subjektivnosti u njenom slobodnom samoodnosenju. Centralno pitanje je, (...) na koji nacin se razvijanje apsolutnog duha reflektuje u domenu estetskog na razvijanje objektivnog duha u sferi drzave i drustva, kao sto je, recimo, u grckoj komediji dovedena do svesti buduca propast svetsko-obicajnog statusa polisa. Samo razvijanje Hegelove filozofije umetnosti, od ranih spisa do zrelog filozofskog sistema, daje nam mogucnost da uvidimo estetsku formu komedije kao jednog vanrednog oblika umetnosti kao i da razmotrimo duhovno-filozofske linije rascepa moderne. (shrink)

In the past, the European social sciences labelled and discredited knowledge that did not follow the definition for scientific knowledge as applied by the European social sciences as an alternative concept of knowledge, as “indigenous” knowledge. Perception has changed with time: Not only has indigenous knowledge become an entrance ticket to the European social science world, but the indigenization of European theories is seen by some as the contribution of “peripheral” social sciences to join the theories of the “centers”. This (...) book offers contributions to the discourses about alternative concepts of knowledge, inviting the reader to decide if they are alternative, indigenous, or European types of knowledge. However, in order to make this decision, the reader must know what the nature of the European concepts of science and of scientific knowledge is; this might be a motivation to read a book that presents thoughts claiming to be alternative concepts of knowledge, alternative to the European concept of science. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse aux relations entre connaissance et pratiques sociales, et l’objectif de ces relations. C’est à travers le thème de la transdisciplinarité que sont identifiées dans le quotidien des stratégies qui pourraient contribuer au fait que les nouvelles générations apprennent à vivre ensemble avec leurs idées, sans risquer d’être neutraliser pour les défendre. Pour cela la Loi de Services Communautaires d’Etudiants Universitaires du Venezuela – LSCEES – est analysée pour explorer les espaces orientés vers le développement de l’apprentissage interculturel (...) et transdisciplinaire. Pour conclure l’analyse, il est préciser que pour contribuer à la transformation des structures socio-institutionnelles vers un développement endogène, cette loi devra affecter la capacité de certaines des IES – dites de « capital social » - de s’articuler avec l’ensemble des actions de l’Administration Publique, qui s’orientent vers cette intentionnalité politique, dans le Venezuela actuel, visant à générer l’inclusion sociale sous la figure de l’action publique appelée « las Misiones ». (shrink)

People frequently judge how they are viewed by others during social interactions. These judgments are called metaperceptions. This study investigates the relationship between eagerness to determine the evaluation of others and metaperceptions. We propose that eagerness, which reflects approach motivation, induces positive emotions. We apply feelings-as-information theory and hypothesize that positive emotions cause optimistic self-evaluations and metaperceptions. Participants in three studies interact with judges during a singing contest (Study 1), a speech (Study 2), and an interview (Study 3). Results corroborate (...) that eagerness to learn the evaluation of others is overall related to optimistically biased metaperceptions. This effect is mediated sequentially by positive emotions, optimistic self-evaluations, and increased metaperceptions. (shrink)

El presente informe fue realizado por el Grupo Consultivo ad hoc del Consorcio sobre Ciencia y Tecnología(CyT) para el Desarrollo Sustentable, que fue establecido y patrocinado por tres organizaciones científicas internacionales: ICSU, ISTS, y TWAS. Este informe es una evaluación independiente que ha sido presentado a las tres organizaciones patrocinantes. El informe representa las opiniones y recomendaciones de los miembros del Grupo de Consultores, y no necesariamente de las organizaciones..

I offer a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). After discussing some taxonomic considerations, I specify two ways of parsing HEE: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). I argue that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, I support one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on (...) music and emotion regulation. However, I register skepticism about a second and more radical form of HEEE. (shrink)

(English abstract further below.) -/- Wer denkt, Polyamorie erfordere ein geringeres Maß an Verpflichtung als Zweierbeziehungen, der liegt gründlich daneben. Wie aber gestaltet sich polyamoröse wechselseitige Verpflichtung idealerweise? In diesem Beitrag untersuche ich, ob sich ein bestimmtes, auf Iris Murdochs Konzeption von Liebe als gerechter Aufmerksamkeit beruhendes Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung in romantischen Partnerschaften fruchtbar auf polyamoröse Beziehungsgeflechte anwenden lässt. Ich beginne damit, Murdochs im deutschsprachigen Raum kaum rezipierte Liebeskonzeption ausführlich darzustellen und diese dabei von Simone Weils Position abzugrenzen, der Murdoch (...) wesentliche Elemente entnimmt. In einem zweiten Schritt skizziere ich das von Murdochs Position inspirierte Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung. In Auseinandersetzung mit Überlegungen, die John Enman-Beech und Julienne Obadia mit Blick auf die in polyamorösen Beziehungsgeflechten verbreitete Praxis angestellt haben, Beziehungsvereinbarungen einzugehen, werbe ich drittens für die skizzierte Idealkonzeption, indem ich zeige, dass sich mit ihr den von Enman-Beech und Obadia aufgeworfenen Herausforderungen, die sich im Zuge intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen stellen, in zwei Hinsichten mit Erfolg begegnen lässt. Erstens hebe ich hervor, dass eine am skizzierten Ideal orientierte Praxis bereits die Art von prozeduralen Normen implementiert, auf deren Bedeutung Enman-Beech zu Recht hinweist. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass das skizzierte Ideal nicht den Schwierigkeiten ausgesetzt ist, die sich nach Obadia mit denjenigen Elementen intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen verbinden, die sie als Vertragskomplex bezeichnet, und ein weniger pessimistisches Bild davon nahelegt, wie vermittelst solcher Beziehungsvereinbarungen konstituierte Individuen aufzufassen sind. -/- ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this paper, I focus on a certain ideal conception of how lovers may commit to each other in polyamorous relationships. Drawing on an analysis of Iris Murdoch’s adaptation of Simone Weil’s ideas, I sketch what I have elsewhere called the ideal lovers’ pledge—a conception of a commitment between lovers that is spelled out in terms of Weil’s and Murdoch’s shared notion of love as just attention. I then argue that this conception is well-suited to meet certain challenges that arise in the context of thinking about relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships, challenges that have been brought out in recent work by John Enman-Beech and Julienne Obadia. First, I show that practices of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships that are oriented toward the ideal I propose will naturally implement the kind of procedural norms that Enman-Beech rightly highlights. Second, I argue that the ideal I propose does not generate the kinds of problems that according to Obadia arise due to a constellation of assumptions that she thinks underlie the practice of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships – a constellation she dubs the contract complex. The proposed ideal thus suggests an alternative under-standing of such agreements and implies a less pessimistic account of what kind of individuals are constituted by way of forging such agreements. (shrink)