What is it to be a woman? What is it to be a man? We start by laying out desiderata for an analysis of 'woman' and 'man': descriptively, it should link these gender categories to sex biology without reducing them to sex biology, and politically, it should help us explain and combat traditional sexism while also allowing us to make sense of the activist view that gendering should be consensual. Using a Putnam-style 'Twin Earth' example, we argue that none of (...) the existing analyses in the feminist literature succeeds in meeting all of our desiderata. Finally, we propose a positive account that we believe can satisfy all the desiderata outlined. According to our theory, the genders 'woman' and 'man' are individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with classes that were originally closely connected to sex biology. (shrink)

This article presents a new criticisms of reductive approaches to knowledge-‘wh’ (i.e., those approaches on which whether one stands in the knowledge-‘wh’ relation to a question is determined by whether one stands in the knowledge-‘that’ relation to some answer(s) to the question). It argues in particular that the truth of a knowledge-‘wh’ attribution like ‘Janna knows where she can buy an Italian newspaper’ depends not only on what Janna knows about the availability of Italian newspapers, but on what she believes (...) about the matter. This dependence of Janna's knowledge-‘wh’ on her (possibly false) beliefs is incompatible with the reductive approach. (shrink)

(Added April 2023: This draft is superseded by Briggs, R.A., & George, B.R. (2023). 'What Even Is Gender?'. Routledge. DOI 10.4324/9781003053330, and in particular by the first three chapters thereof. While this much earlier draft remains available for archival purposes, you are encouraged to read and cite the 2023 book and to use its terminology.) -/- This paper presents a new taxonomy of sex/gender concepts based on the idea of starting with a few basic components of the sex/gender system, (...) and exhausting the possible types of simple associations and identities based on these. The resulting system is significantly more fine-grained than most competitors, and helps to clarify a number of points of confusion and conceptual tension in academic and activist conversations about feminism, transgender politics, and the social analysis of gender. (shrink)

In this paper we use the contemporary example of trans youth panics to introduce the notion of hermeneutical backlash, in which defenders of an established, unjust hermeneutical regime actively work to undermine and discredit hermeneutical liberation. We argue that the strategies and tropes of the trans youth panic illustrate a general propaganda vulnerability of epistemic liberation movements, and so are troubling for reasons that go beyond their application to trans youth. This exploration of a few specific cases of hermeneutical liberation (...) and hermeneutical backlash calls attention to the need for further theoretical work on the dynamics of struggles for hermeneutical justice. (shrink)

This paper considers two of the most prominent kinds of evidence that have been used to argue that certain embedded questions receive weakly exhaustive interpretations. The first kind is exemplified by judgments of consistency for declarative sentences that attribute knowledge of a wh-question and ignorance of the negation of that question to the same person, and the second concerns asymmetries between the role of positive and negative information in validating question-embedding surprise ascriptions, and similar judgments for other attitudes. I argue (...) that neither type suffices to show weak exhaustivity. The first can be analyzed in terms of strong exhaustivity in combination with domain restriction effects, while the second can be analyzed in terms of a mention-some interpretation. These kinds of evidence have served as the empirical basis for many claims about weakly exhaustive readings, so the observation that they are unreliable calls into questions a large body of established work on the semantics of question embedding. (shrink)

This squib attempts to constrain semantic theories of agree wh constructions by broadening the data set and collecting naive speakers’ intuitions. Overall, our data suggest relatively permissive truth-conditions for these constructions. They also suggest a previously undiscussed presupposition for agree wh and also indicate that agree wh is not straightforwardly reducible to agree that. Although some accounts suggest differences in truth conditions among different asymmetrical agree with constructions and symmetrical agree constructions, we do not find any indication of such truth-conditional (...) distinctions. In the course of our exploration of the data, we offer a new approach to distinguishing between truth, falsity and presuppositional failure. (shrink)

Within bioethics as well as in broader clinical practice, support for transgender and gender‐questioning adolescent access to pubertal suppression has often relied heavily on the desire to prevent risky, self‐destructive, and suicidal behavior. We argue that framing justifications for access to puberty suppression in this way can actually be harmful to both individual patients as well as to the broader trans population. This justification for access to care makes such access precarious, limits its scope, and introduces perverse incentives to the (...) patient population that is being served. We go on to offer an alternative, positive defense of access to puberty‐blocking treatment for transgender youth grounded in the child's right to an open future. We argue that decisions related to pubertal suppression are both importantly weighty and potentially irreversible, and show why this justification is preferable to so‐called “informed consent” approaches. (shrink)

This chapter explores how what is dismissed as “trans activism” is often public philosophy. It considers how so‐called “public philosophy” on trans issues often does a substantially worse job of living up to the name. The chapter discusses how the dichotomy between “trans activism” and “public philosophy” provides a pretext for marginalizing trans voices. To draw on Black feminist philosophical thought, lived experience is a criterion for knowledge of the needs of marginalized people. Like other marginalized communities, trans communities have (...) encountered many areas in which hermeneutical liberation is needed. Public philosophy as trans activism is often systemically and systematically ignored or willfully misinterpreted as being biased and motivated by self‐interest, whereas anti‐trans (public) philosophy is seen as asking the important questions. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 51-53.

Kuklick traces the history of philosophic thought in the United States "as typified and dominated by Harvard" from 1860 to 1930. He provides an analysis both of the thought of this period and of the development of Harvard University and its philosophy department. These two types of analyses are interwoven throughout the book, for Kuklick finds that the second type provides an important key to the interpretation that unfolds within the first type. Among the philosophers included are Francis Bowen, Chauncey (...) Wright, John Fiske, F. E. Abbot, C. S. Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, Hugo Munsterberg, George Palmer, George Santayana, Ralph B. Perry, E. B. Holt, Ernest Hocking, Alfred N. Whitehead, and C. I. Lewis. Royce and James receive the most lengthy examination, and while there is a surprisingly unappreciative discussion of Whitehead’s position, it is followed by an unusually enthusiastic analysis of the philosophy of C. I. Lewis, whom Kuklick considers to be, "with the exception of Peirce... the most capable philosopher in the school we have studied." Though such a counterbalance to the more common tendency to slight the enduring achievements of Lewis’s philosophical insights is refreshing, even his most avid supporters might well hesitate to affirm such a view. Kuklick’s attitude toward Lewis, as well as his focus of attention on James and Royce, may be guided by a dominant theme of the book in general. One of the major philosophic threads which Kuklick uses to weave a unifying bond among many of the philosophers of this period is idealism, while the realistic strains of the philosophers involved are at best slighted, at worst distorted. James as well, of course, as Royce, is interpreted within the framework of idealism. Lewis, as heir to the debate between neo-realism and idealism as carried on by Perry and Royce, is seen by Kuklick as unsuccessfully attempting to repudiate the idealism bequeathed to him by Royce, thus representing the ultimate triumph of idealism over realism. (shrink)

Explains the intersubjective nature of the self and the function of role taking in the development of the personal level of intersubjectivity out of primordial, pre-personal sociality or corporeal intersubjectivity of the lived body. Pragmatic philosophy of George Herbert Mead; Existential-phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty; Fundamental and pervasive rapport; More.

PurposeTo use the power of knowledge acquisition and machine learning in the development of a collaborative computer classification system based on the features of age-related macular degeneration (AMD).MethodsA vocabulary was acquired from four AMD experts who examined 100 ophthalmoscopic images. The vocabulary was analyzed, hierarchically structured, and incorporated into a collaborative computer classification system called IDOCS. Using this system, three of the experts examined images from a second set of digital images compiled from more than 1000 patients with AMD. Images (...) were annotated, and features were identified and defined. Decision trees, a machine learning method, were trained on the data collected and used to extract patterns. Interrelationships between the data from the different clinicians were investigated.ResultsSix drusen classes in the structured vocabulary were largely sufficient to describe all the identified features. The decision trees classified the data with 76.86% to 88.5% accuracy and distilled patterns in the form of hierarchical trees composed of 5 to 15 nodes. Experts were largely consistent in their characterization of soft, and to a lesser extent, hard drusen, but diverge in definition of other drusen. Size and crystalline morphology were the main determinants of drusen type across all experts.ConclusionsMachine learning is a powerful tool for the characterization of disease phenotypes. The creation of a defined feature set for AMD will facilitate the development of an IDOCS-based classification system. (shrink)

At the forefront of international concerns about global legislation and regulation, a host of noted environmentalists and business ethicists examine ethical issues in consumption from the points of view of environmental sustainability, economic development, and free enterprise.

Trust has been identified as an indicator within Social Quality theory. As an important component of social quality, trust has become increasingly important in modern society because literature suggests that trust in a number of democratic countries is declining. Modern technologies and specialties are often beyond the understanding of lay individuals and thus, the need for trusting relations between lay individuals and organizations/individuals has grown. The purpose of the study was to examine the extent to which Australians (dis)trust individuals and (...) organizations/institutions. A national postal survey was conducted with 1,044 respondents recruited using the electronic white pages directory. Findings from multivariate analyses suggest that income, age, sex, and health status are associated with trust in groups of individuals and trust in organizations/institutions. The findings highlight populations where trust needs to be (re)built. Future government policy and practice should utilize these findings as a means of facilitating social quality. (shrink)

Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about (...) the attitudes of others, an inference that has the advantage in our own case ofonlyour own sensory data and memories, our behavior, and of the context we are in; i.e. we are all substantially self‐ blind. After sorting out a number of methodological and verbal issues, I argue, first, that thea prioriarguments against Objectivism don't succeed, and that Gopnik and Carruthers are right to regard the issue as an empirical one. On the other hand, I think they seriously underestimate the difficulty of establishing Objectivism. It is unlikely there is an inferential procedure from the data of pure sensation, behavior and context to the relevant self‐attributions that would be as spectacularly reliable as people manifestly seem to be. Moreover, there is a simpler model: the mind very likely consists of a panoply of sub‐routines some of whose outputs are ‘tagged’ for their having been so processed, rather in the way that software ‘documents’ are on standard computers. Introspection plausibly consists in a person's simply attending to distinctive constellations of these tags, even though they may lack phenomenal feels. This draws attention to an important independent fact: that much of phenomenology (or ‘what it's like’ to be in a certain state) may be constituted by facts that are not phenomenal. (shrink)

A quick question! Who’s the first name that comes to mind when the periodic table is mentioned? Dmitrii Ivanovich Mendeleev is the obvious and universal answer. And the second name? Most of you would probably agree with my answer: Eric R. Scerri, Lecturer in Chemistry and History and Philosophy of Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and founding editor of this journal, devoted to the philosophy of chemistry, another of his specialties.Through the years I have followed Scerri’s work (...) on the periodic table, reading his numerous articles and reviewing his two previous books (Scerri 2007; Laing and Kauffman 2007; Scerri 2009; Kauffman 2011). In his latest book he comprehensively but succinctly examines this true cultural iconic symbol of science that is used by artists, advertisers, and of course, scientists in all fields. It is almost as familiar to the general public as the chemical formula for water, and an understanding and appreciation for it is essential to the physi. (shrink)

This paper discusses some formal properties of trivalent approaches to presupposition projection, and in particular of the middle Kleene system of Peters (1977) and Krahmer (1998). After exploring the relationship between trivalent truth-functional accounts and dynamic accounts in the tradition of Heim (1983), I show how the middle Kleene trivalent account can be formulated in a way which shows that it meets the explanatory challenge of Schlenker (2006, 2008a,b), and provide some results relating to the application of the middle Kleene (...) approach to generalised quantifiers. (shrink)

Author list: H. Frey; A. Willwoll; Georg Wunderle; E. Raitz V. Frentz; Q. Wihstutz; G. Wihstutz; R. Walter; A. Bolley; E. Steinwand; R.H. Thouleß; B. Vasady; A. Bolley.