Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein had an enormous influence on twentieth-century philosophy even though only one of his works, the famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was published in his lifetime. Beyond this publication the impact of his thought was mainly conveyed to a small circle of students through his lectures at Cambridge University. Fortunately, many of his ideas have survived in both the dictations that were subsequently published, and the notes taken by his students, among them Alice Ambrose and the late Margaret Macdonald, from (...) 1932 to 1935. These notes, now edited by Professor Ambrose, are here published, and they shed much light on Wittgenstein's philosophical development. Among the topics considered are the meaning of a word and its relation to common usage, rules of grammar and their relation to fact, the grammar of first person statements, language games, and the nature of philosophy. This volume is indispensable to any serious discussion of Wittgenstein's work. (shrink)

The goal of our work has been to better understand how Engaged Philosophical Inquiry can be used with young children on topics related to our local forest environment as part our foundation curriculum on sustainability. Theoretically we draw on the work of Matthew Lipman ; Philosophy for Children ; Phillip Cam, ; John Dewey, ; Gunilla Dahlberg and Peter Moss to discuss democratic community building, and ethical pedagogical approaches related to EPI and young children. Working with children of this age (...) holistically on the topic of sustainability has not been systematically researched to date. Our findings therefore contribute to better understandings of EPI and: 1) democratic community building processes; 2) the use of context to focus our discussions; 3) group membership and group size; and 4) turn taking and the role of the moderator. (shrink)

This research paper shares findings related to our use of Engaged Philosophical Inquiry with a group of young children as a pedagogical method taken up to extend young children’s thinking about human use of forest parkland and to determine the children’s ontological positions related to environmental sustainability. The study was conducted in a forested area adjoining a ‘living building’ childcare centre. Here researchers, along with a core group of 9-13 children, their teachers, and a Philosopher-in-Residence visited the forest environment on (...) a fortnightly basis over a four-month period from January to May 2016 to explore the forested area, play games and discuss issues related to forest use and human habitation. Video records of the EPI sessions were transcribed and analysed to determine the children’s propositions and related ontological stance across sessions. Findings from this study include: evidence that young children’s views on stewardship are situated within socio-material manifestations of belonging, ownership, and entitlement within the forest; and that absurdities, along with other more traditional EPI and P4C strategies, can be used successfully to playfully challenge young children’s thinking about the rigour of their propositions and to provoke deeper thoughts related to belonging and care. (shrink)

The article examines the convergence of studies on the Pastoral Epistles, with greater attention to the theme of education as a key to the purpose of the documents. The close association between the household and education is considered in an effort to shed light on the presentations of Timothy and Titus, emerging leadership roles, intergenerational instruction, and constructions of gender.

Philosophical theories of perception are generally admitted to be responses to certain problems or puzzles allied to the ancient dichotomy between Appearance and Reality. For they have been mainly provoked by the incompatibility of the common–sense assumption that an external, physical world exists and is revealed to the senses with the well–known facts of perceptual variation and error. If only what is real were perceived just as if only what is right were done it is possible that many of those (...) questions would never have been asked which lead to moral philosophy and a metaphysics of the external world. But sense perceptions of the same object vary so that it appears to have contradictory qualities and are sometimes completely deceptive. Nor do illusory differ internally from veridical perceptions. Moreover, perceptual variation and error can be unmasked only by such procedures as looking more carefully, listening harder, trying to touch, asking others, in short by more sense experience. So the senses are, as it were, both accused and judge in these disputes and why should a venal judge be trusted more than the criminal he tries? Such “correction” of one experience by another of the same kind seems no more reliable than the original “error.” Philosophers have found all this very puzzling. (shrink)