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Paul Humphreys
University of Virginia
  1.  89
    Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method.Paul Humphreys - 2004 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    Computational methods such as computer simulations, Monte Carlo methods, and agent-based modeling have become the dominant techniques in many areas of science. Extending Ourselves contains the first systematic philosophical account of these new methods, and how they require a different approach to scientific method. Paul Humphreys draws a parallel between the ways in which such computational methods have enhanced our abilities to mathematically model the world, and the more familiar ways in which scientific instruments have expanded our access to the (...)
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  2.  36
    Emergence: A Philosophical Account.Paul Humphreys - 2016 - New York, NY, United States of America: Oup Usa.
    Emergence develops a novel account of diachronic ontological emergence called transformational emergence and locates it in an established historical framework. The author shows how many problems affecting ontological emergence result from a dominant but inappropriate metaphysical tradition and provides a comprehensive assessment of current theories of emergence.
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  3. The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods.Paul Humphreys - 2009 - Synthese 169 (3):615 - 626.
    Reasons are given to justify the claim that computer simulations and computational science constitute a distinctively new set of scientific methods and that these methods introduce new issues in the philosophy of science. These issues are both epistemological and methodological in kind.
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  4.  41
    Emergence: A Philosophical Account.Paul Humphreys - 2016 - New York, NY, United States of America: Oup Usa.
    Emergence develops a novel account of diachronic ontological emergence called transformational emergence and locates it in an established historical framework. The author shows how many problems affecting ontological emergence result from a dominant but inappropriate metaphysical tradition and provides a comprehensive assessment of current theories of emergence.
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  5. How properties emerge.Paul Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17.
    A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow.
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  6.  26
    The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical, and Physical Sciences.Paul Humphreys - 1992 - Princeton Up.
    This book provides a post-positivist theory of deterministic and probabilistic causality that supports both quantitative and qualitative explanations. Features of particular interest include the ability to provide true explanations in contexts where our knowledge is incomplete, a systematic interpretation of causal modeling techniques in the social sciences, and a direct realist view of causal relations that is compatible with a liberal empiricism. The book should be of wide interest to both philosophers and scientists. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy (...)
  7. The Chances of Explanation.Paul Humphreys - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):353-374.
     
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  8. Why propensities cannot be probabilities.Paul Humphreys - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (4):557-570.
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  9. Emergence, not supervenience.Paul W. Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
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  10. Knowledge transfer across scientific disciplines.Paul Humphreys - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 77:112-119.
  11.  48
    Emergence, Not Supervenience.Paul Humphreys - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (S4):S337-S345.
    I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
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  12. Computer Simulations.Paul Humphreys - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:497 - 506.
    This article provides a survey of some of the reasons why computational approaches have become a permanent addition to the set of scientific methods. The reasons for this require us to represent the relation between theories and their applications in a different way than do the traditional logical accounts extant in the philosophical literature. A working definition of computer simulations is provided and some properties of simulations are explored by considering an example from quantum chemistry.
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  13. Synchronic and diachronic emergence.Paul Humphreys - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (4):431-442.
    I discuss here a number of different kinds of diachronic emergence, noting that they differ in important ways from synchronic conceptions. I argue that Bedau’s weak emergence has an essentially historical aspect, in that there can be two indistinguishable states, one of which is weakly emergent, the other of which is not. As a consequence, weak emergence is about tokens, not types, of states. I conclude by examining the question of whether the concept of weak emergence is too weak and (...)
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  14. Computational models.Paul Humphreys - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S1-S11.
    A different way of thinking about how the sciences are organized is suggested by the use of cross‐disciplinary computational methods as the organizing unit of science, here called computational templates. The structure of computational models is articulated using the concepts of construction assumptions and correction sets. The existence of these features indicates that certain conventionalist views are incorrect, in particular it suggests that computational models come with an interpretation that cannot be removed as well as a prior justification. A form (...)
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  15.  44
    Computational Models.Paul Humphreys - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S1-S11.
    A different way of thinking about how the sciences are organized is suggested by the use of cross-disciplinary computational methods as the organizing unit of science, here called computational templates. The structure of computational models is articulated using the concepts of construction assumptions and correction sets. The existence of these features indicates that certain conventionalist views are incorrect, in particular it suggests that computational models come with an interpretation that cannot be removed as well as a prior justification. A form (...)
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  16.  77
    Aspects of emergence.Paul Humphreys - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):53-71.
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  17.  21
    Aspects of Emergence.Paul Humphreys - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):53-70.
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  18.  74
    What Price Changing Laws of Nature?Olivier Sartenaer, Alexandre Guay & Paul Humphreys - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-19.
    In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood—(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) ‘best system analysis’—and expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to leave (...)
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  19.  49
    Greater Unification Equals Greater Understanding?Paul Humphreys - 1993 - Analysis 53 (3):183 - 188.
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  20. Some considerations on conditional chances.Paul Humphreys - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):667-680.
    Four interpretations of single-case conditional propensities are described and it is shown that for each a version of what has been called ‘Humphreys' Paradox’ remains, despite the clarifying work of Gillies, McCurdy and Miller. This entails that propensities cannot be a satisfactory interpretation of standard probability theory. Introduction The basic issue The formal paradox Values of conditional propensities Interpretations of propensities McCurdy's response Miller's response Other possibilities 8.1 Temporal evolution 8.2 Renormalization 8.3 Causal influence Propensities to generate frequencies Conclusion.
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  21.  76
    Aleatory explanations.Paul W. Humphreys - 1981 - Synthese 48 (2):225 - 232.
  22. Computational science and scientific method.Paul Humphreys - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (4):499-512.
    The process of constructing mathematical models is examined and a case made that the construction process is an integral part of the justification for the model. The role of heuristics in testing and modifying models is described and some consequences for scientific methodology are drawn out. Three different ways of constructing the same model are detailed to demonstrate the claims made here.
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  23. Scientific explanation-the causes, some of the causes, and nothing but the causes.Paul W. Humphreys - 1989 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13:283-306.
  24. Computational and conceptual emergence.Paul Humphreys - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):584-594.
    A twofold taxonomy for emergence is presented into which a variety of contemporary accounts of emergence fit. The first taxonomy consists of inferential, conceptual, and ontological emergence; the second of diachronic and synchronic emergence. The adequacy of weak emergence, a computational form of inferential emergence, is then examined and its relationship to conceptual emergence and ontological emergence is detailed. †To contact the author, please write to: Corcoran Department of Philosophy, 120 Cocke Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904‐4780; e‐mail: [email protected].
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  25.  64
    Explanation as Condition Satisfaction.Paul Humphreys - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):1103-1116.
    It is shown that three common conditions for scientific explanations are violated by a widely used class of domain-independent explanations. These explanations can accommodate both complex and noncomplex systems and do not require the use of detailed models of system-specific processes for their effectiveness, although they are compatible with such model-based explanations. The approach also shows how a clean separation can be maintained between mathematical representations and empirical content.
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  26. Are there algorithms that discover causal structure?David Freedman & Paul Humphreys - 1999 - Synthese 121 (1-2):29-54.
    There have been many efforts to infer causation from association byusing statistical models. Algorithms for automating this processare a more recent innovation. In Humphreys and Freedman[(1996) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47, 113–123] we showed that one such approach, by Spirtes et al., was fatally flawed. Here we put our arguments in a broader context and reply to Korb and Wallace [(1997) British Journal for thePhilosophy of Science 48, 543–553] and to Spirtes et al.[(1997) British Journal for the (...)
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  27. Models, Simulations, and Representations.Paul Humphreys & Cyrille Imbert (eds.) - 2011 - New York: Routledge.
    Although scientific models and simulations differ in numerous ways, they are similar in so far as they are posing essentially philosophical problems about the nature of representation. This collection is designed to bring together some of the best work on the nature of representation being done by both established senior philosophers of science and younger researchers. Most of the pieces, while appealing to existing traditions of scientific representation, explore new types of questions, such as: how understanding can be developed within (...)
     
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  28. Protecting rainforest realism: James Ladyman, Don Ross: Everything must go: metaphysics naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 368 £49.00 HB.P. Kyle Stanford, Paul Humphreys, Katherine Hawley, James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2010 - Metascience 19 (2):161-185.
    Reply in Book Symposium on James Ladyman, Don Ross: 'Everything must go: metaphysics naturalized', Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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  29.  78
    Speculative Ontology.Paul Humphreys - 2013 - In Don Ross, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (eds.), Scientific metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 51.
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  30.  18
    Philosophical Papers.Paul Humphreys - 2018 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    This volume contains fifteen papers by Paul Humphreys, who has made important contributions to the philosophy of computer simulations, emergence, the philosophy of probability, probabilistic causality, and scientific explanation. It includes detailed postscripts to each section and a philosophical introduction. One of the papers is previously unpublished.
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  31.  45
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science.Paul Humphreys (ed.) - 2014 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This handbook provides both an overview of state-of-the-art scholarship in philosophy of science, as well as a guide to new directions in the discipline. Section I contains broad overviews of the main lines of research and the state of established knowledge in six principal areas of the discipline, including computational, physical, biological, psychological and social sciences, as well as general philosophy of science. Section II covers what are considered to be the traditional topics in the philosophy of science, such as (...)
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  32.  28
    Network Epistemology.Paul Humphreys - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):221-229.
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  33. Network Epistemology.Paul Humphreys - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):221-229.
    A comparison is made between some epistemological issues arising in computer networks and standard features of social epistemology. A definition of knowledge for computational devices is provided and the topics of nonconceptual content and testimony are discussed.
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  34.  45
    Computational Science and its Effects.Paul Humphreys - 2011 - In M. Carrier & A. Nordmann (eds.), Science in the Context of Application. Springer. pp. 131--142.
  35.  5
    Cutting the Causal Chain.Paul Humphreys - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):305-314.
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  36. Aleatory Explanations Expanded.Paul Humphreys - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:208 - 223.
    Existing definitions of relevance relations are essentially ambiguous outside the binary case. Hence definitions of probabilistic causality based on relevance relations, as well as probability values based on maximal specificity conditions and homogeneous reference classes are also not uniquely specified. A 'neutral state' account of explanations is provided to avoid the problem, based on an earlier account of aleatory explanations by the author. Further reasons in support of this model are given, focusing on the dynamics of explanation. It is shown (...)
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  37.  80
    Causation in the social sciences: An overview.Paul Humphreys - 1986 - Synthese 68 (1):1 - 12.
  38.  10
    Computer Simulations.Paul Humphreys - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (2):496-506.
    A great deal of attention has been paid by philosophers to the use of computers in the modelling of human cognitive capacities and in the construction of intelligent artifacts. This emphasis has tended to obscure the fact that most of the high-level computing power in science is deployed in what appears to be a much less exciting activity: solving equations. This apparently mundane set of applications reflects the historical origins of modem computing, in the sense that most of the early (...)
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  39.  40
    Invariances in transformational emergence.Paul Humphreys - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2745-2756.
    This paper examines some possibilities for the laws of nature changing over time. This is done within the context of recent literature on transformational emergence. Transformational emergence is a diachronic account of emergence that does not require the invariance of fundamental objects, properties, and laws. The requirement that no new laws are introduced after the first instance of the universe seems to indicate that all the laws of the universe are present from the outset. By using a dispositional approach to (...)
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  40. Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher.Paul Humphreys (ed.) - 1992 - Kluwer.
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  41.  83
    Computational empiricism.Paul Humphreys - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (1):119-130.
    I argue here for a number of ways that modern computational science requires a change in the way we represent the relationship between theory and applications. It requires a switch away from logical reconstruction of theories in order to take surface mathematical syntax seriously. In addition, syntactically different versions of the same theory have important differences for applications, and this shows that the semantic account of theories is inappropriate for some purposes. I also argue against formalist approaches in the philosophy (...)
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  42.  60
    Invariance, explanation, and understanding.Paul Humphreys - 2006 - Metascience 15 (1):39-66.
  43. Why propensities cannot be probabilities.Paul W. Humphreys - 2011 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
     
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  44.  75
    Understanding in the Not-So-Special Sciences.Paul Humphreys - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):99-114.
  45.  8
    Hans Reichenbach: Logical Empiricist.Paul Humphreys - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (1):140-142.
  46.  13
    Consensus Institute Staff.Ned Block, Richard Boyd, Robert Butts, Ronald Giere, Clark Glymour, Adolf Grunbaum, Erwin Hiebert, Colin Howson, David Hull & Paul Humphreys - 1990 - In C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 417.
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  47.  4
    Causation.Paul Humphreys - 2017 - In W. H. Newton‐Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 31–40.
    Ordinary language is saturated with causal concepts, with talk of tendencies, consequences, mechanisms, and a host of other thinly disguised causal terms. But ordinary language is no reliable guide to ontology, and for scientific purposes we must ask whether advanced sciences need to refer to causes in their theories and methods. Then, if we find that they do need to make such causal references, we must ask what the nature of the causal relation is and how we can discover instances (...)
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  48. Probabilistic Causality and Multiple Causation.Paul Humphreys - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:25 - 37.
    It is argued in this paper that although much attention has been paid to causal chains and common causes within the literature on probabilistic causality, a primary virtue of that approach is its ability to deal with cases of multiple causation. In doing so some ways are indicated in which contemporary sine qua non analyses of causation are too narrow (and ways in which probabilistic causality is not) and an argument by Reichenbach designed to provide a basis for the asymmetry (...)
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  49.  44
    Self‐Assembling Systems.Paul Humphreys - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):595-604.
    Starting with the view that methodological constraints depend upon the nature of the system investigated, a tripartite division between theoretical, semitheoretical, and empirical discoveries is made. Many nanosystems can only be investigated semitheoretically or empirically, and this aspect leads to some nanophenomena being weakly emergent. Self-assembling systems are used as an example, their existence suggesting that the class of systems that is not Kim-reducible may be quite large.
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  50.  21
    Scientific knowledge.Paul Humphreys - 2004 - In M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 549--569.
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