According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers (...) hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems. (shrink)

In the first book of its kind, Garland-Thomson defines staring, explores the factors that motivate it, and considers the targets and the effects of the stare.

Knowledge-first theories of justification are theories of justification that give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this article is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out, there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and what follows is a survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the early 21st century (...) since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s *Knowledge and Its Limits*. This article traces several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. This is followed by an examination of existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways to give knowledge priority in the theory of justified belief than are covered here, but the survey is instructive because it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory. This entry concludes with a reflection about the extent to which the short history of, arguably, failed attempts to secure an unproblematic knowledge-first account of justified belief has begun to resemble the older Gettier dialectic. (shrink)

Busca-se neste artigo problematizar a manifestação da colonialidade nas práticas pedagógicas de uma instituição de educação infantil situada em contexto periférico a partir da percepção de professoras e famílias. A argumentação e análise teórica adotada partem dos estudos da infância e teoria decolonial/contracolonial. Serão analisadas as conversas estabelecidas com adultos participantes da pesquisa, sendo quatro entrevistas realizadas com professoras e mães de crianças de uma instituição de educação infantil de contexto periférico e negro, localizada no município de Betim – MG. (...) A partir dos sujeitos da pesquisa são apresentadas denúncias que configuram o que chamamos de colonialidade da educação infantil. A alimentação das crianças foi destacada, pelas professoras e mães, como um dos momentos da rotina pedagógica que gerava grande incômodo devido a práticas de violência com as crianças. Esta violência compõe o que se denomina como adultocentrismo, que existe para posicionar as crianças às margens do projeto civilizatório ocidental, sendo que nestes termos o adultocentrismo pode ser também compreendido como a peste branca produzida pela matriz eurocêntrica e colonial. Atuar contra a colonialidade e contra o adultocentrismo é defender uma experiência concreta e histórica para a educação infantil e não apenas teórica. Cada vez mais é preciso avançar na formação das professoras de forma conscientizadora quanto a emergência da contracolonização da educação infantil em articulação com o projeto de sociedade emancipatória para todos e todas. (shrink)

In this paper we claim that pragmatist philosophical practice is incompatible with scientistic philosophy. The kind of pragmatism used for making this case follows the spirit and method of philosophical pragmatists such as William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and a related pragmatic tradition, Confucian Philosophy. Pragmatism starts from immediate experience, and refuses to cleave off the reality and salience of what is found in such experience in the process of thinking. Pragmatism also concerns itself with social problems, broadly conceived. (...) In contrast to this focus on immediate experience, the influence of science in much philosophizing involves a kind of scientism through which the relevance, value, and even reality of experience is brought into question. It also concerns itself with a narrowly defined set of so-called philosophical problems. In this regard, pragmatist philosophical practice is fundamentally opposed to scientistic philosophical practice. We will start by modelling the kind of philosophical practice that stems from pragmatism, and the role of immediate experience in it. Subsequently, we will introduce two modes of philosophizing that diminish if not negate the role of experience. One is bald naturalist philosophizing, and the other is a priori scientific philosophizing. In the last section, we will show how main commitments of both of these traditions are incompatible with a pragmatist philosophy that remains committed to the original impulse of pragmatism. (shrink)

The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss (...) concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off. (shrink)

The main objective of the article is to understand the notion of power in Foucault as an action on action in a relationship of forces. In principle, the power of sovereignty and biopower in classical times are investigated. Where it is perceived that the former has negative and repressive connotations, while this one has positive and productive connotations of facts, happenings. Then, an analysis of Foucault's power is analyzed, where it is possible to verify that there is no construction of (...) a Theory of Power in Foucault, but only an ascending analysis of power, thus departing from specificity for general aspects. Finally, we will analyze the power relationship, seen as an action over action, in this action-reaction movement, there is its need, its becoming, its truth, which is the exercise of power, functioning. Thus, from the molecular to the complex composition, from the invisible to the visible, from the body to the population, power is understood, that is, power relations in the Foucaultian web. (shrink)

The fascination with the process inherent to understanding has always been something that has disturbed Philosophy with its question: what makes understanding possible? On the contrary, little attention has been paid to the use we make of this term. This took it out of its context and investigated it as related to a mental process, situated in the subject. This approach generated some questions, among them: if understanding and the processes involved in it take place in the mind, how can (...) one have access to them? How do you know what’s on the other’s mind? This text intends to present the role played, both by the verb meinen (to mean), in its disconnection with mental processes, in terms of its grammar, and by the expression lebensform (form of life), in Philosophical Investigations, as a condition in which, both the meinen has its most authentic use, as well as the background that makes it possible to understand the Investigations as a whole. (shrink)

This essay seeks to move on from the critical debates that have followed the publication of The Culture of Control by taking up constructive suggestions, refining or extending the book’s claims, and sketching out new lines for future research. After a preliminary discussion of the proper role of theory in historical and sociological research it seeks to clarify and develop the following ideas: the concept of the field and its role in the study of crime control and criminal justice; the (...) field as a contested balance of forces; situated rationality and conflicted action; gender relations and the culture of control; national characteristics and responses to late modernity; American exceptionalism; analysis and critique in the study of social control. (shrink)

Clinicians have good moral and professional reasons to contribute to pragmatic clinical trials (PCTs). We argue that clinicians have a defeasible duty to participate in this research that takes place in usual care settings and does not involve substantive deviation from their ordinary care practices. However, a variety of countervailing reasons may excuse clinicians from this duty in particular cases. Yet because there is a moral default in favor of participating, clinicians who wish to opt out of this research must (...) justify their refusal. Reasons to refuse include that the trial is badly designed in some way, that the trial activities will violate the clinician’s conscience, or that the trial will impose excessive burdens on the clinician. (shrink)

Platão, em seus diálogos de juventude, apresenta Sócrates recorrendo a uma prática de perguntas e respostas direcionada aos seus interlocutores que visa o teste das pretensões de conhecimento e de sabedoria dos membros da pólis. Essa prática é a refutação socrática, frequentemente associada ao termo grego élenkhos e seus cognatos. Embora se utilize dessa prática de forma frequente, nenhum diálogo a trata como elemento central. Entretanto, podemos encontrar comentários de Platão ao longo de sua obra que nos remetem essa reflexão (...) de cunho mais metodológico. Por conta disso, comentamos reflexões que Platão apresenta em um sentido metadialético acerca do élenkhos e refletimos sobre a refutação socrática a partir desses comentários. Palavras-chave: refutação socrática; élenkhos; Platão. (shrink)

Resumen:El artículo propone una lectura de las Cartas para la educación estética de la humanidad desde la sociabilidad, concepto con el que el autor, en la última de las cartas, señala el terreno en el que se abriría la vía estética hacia libertad. Se muestra la propagación del concepto de sociabilidad a través de la antropología kantiana y la sociología simmeliana. Se postula la afinidad de este enfoque con los planteamienos contemporáneos del acontecimiento.Palabras clave: Schiller; Kant; Simmel; sociabilidad; políticas emancipatorias; (...) comensalidad; acontecimiento. (shrink)

This article considers the claim that gender diverse minors and their families should not be able to consent to hormonal treatment for gender dysphoria. The claim refers particularly to hormonal treatment with so-called ‘blockers’, analogues that suspend temporarily pubertal development. We discuss particularly four reasons why consent may be deemed invalid in these cases: the decision is too complex; the decision-makers are too emotionally involved; the decision-makers are on a ‘conveyor belt’; the possibility of detransitioning. We examine each of these (...) reasons and we show that none of these stand up to scrutiny, and that some are based on a misunderstanding of the nature and purposes of this stage of treatment and of the circumstances in which it is usually prescribed. Moreover, accepting these claims at face value could have serious negative implications, not just for gender diverse youth, but for many other minors and families and in a much broader range of healthcare settings. (shrink)

This article offers the critical concept misfit in an effort to further think through the lived identity and experience of disability as it is situated in place and time. The idea of a misfit and the situation of misfitting that I offer here elaborate a materialist feminist understanding of disability by extending a consideration of how the particularities of embodiment interact with the environment in its broadest sense, to include both its spatial and temporal aspects. The interrelated dynamics of fitting (...) and misfitting constitute a particular aspect of world-making involved in material-discursive becoming. The essay makes three arguments: the concept of misfit emphasizes the particularity of varying lived embodiments and avoids a theoretical generic disabled body; the concept of misfit clarifies the current feminist critical conversation about universal vulnerability and dependence; the concept of misfitting as a shifting spatial and perpetually temporal relationship confers agency and value on disabled subjects. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that disability disqualifies people from full participation in or recognition by society. This view is rooted in eugenic logic, which tells us that our world would be a better place if disability could be eliminated. In opposition to this position, I argue that that disability is inherent in the human condition and consider the bioethical question of why we might want to conserve rather than eliminate disability from our shared world. To do so, I draw together (...) an eclectic, rather than systematic, configuration of counter-eugenic arguments for conserving disability. The idea of preserving intact, keeping alive, and even encouraging to flourish denoted by conserve suggests that disabilities would be better understood as benefits rather than deficits. I present, then, a reading of disability as a potentially generative resource rather than unequivocally restrictive liability. In other words, what I consider here is the cultural and material contributions disability offers to the world. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique Jahrgang: 2013 Heft: 197 Seiten: 203-231.

Apresentamos como tema, a Pedagogia Radical Inclusiva nas provocações da Educação Estética em Museus de Ciência. Objetivamos discutir, como o museu de ciências pode ser também espaço, de suscitar níveis mais elevados de consciência provocados pela educação estética. Museus de arte são indiscutivelmente lugares de educação estética e os museus de ciências geralmente são relacionados a espaços de conhecimento, com foco no inteligível e não no sensível. O aporte teórico de sustentação contou com Franklin (2019), Gascón (2014,2018), Kant (2003, 2012, (...) 2013a, 2013b), Neitzel (2012), Searle (2015) e Schiller (2013, 2002a, 2002b), entre outros. Como resultados, foi possível evidenciar que: o Museu de Ciências Naturais possui espaços esteticamente planejados para sensibilizar o público. O Museu de Ciências Naturais possibilita experiências estéticas que promovem maiores níveis de consciência do sujeito.__. (shrink)

According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions that (...) afford one propositional justification in the absence of an ability to acquire doxastic justification. In what follows I show Turri’s novel position to be problematic and go on to suggest a more modest revision to orthodoxy. The first section presents the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification and Turri’s counterexample to it. The second section introduces Turri’s novel view of that relationship and draws out some of its epistemological implications. The third section gives counterexamples to Turri’s proposal. The fourth section defends a modest revision to orthodoxy. (shrink)

The term ‘mechanism’ has been used in two quite different ways in the history of biology. Operative, or explanatory mechanism refers to the step-by-step description or explanation of how components in a system interact to yield a particular outcome . Philosophical Mechanism, on the other hand, refers to a broad view of organisms as material entities, functioning in ways similar to machines — that is, carrying out a variety of activities based on known chemical and physical processes. In the early (...) twentieth century philosophical Mechanism became the foundation of a ‘new biology’ that sought to establish the life sciences on the same solid and rigorous foundation as the physical sciences, including a strong emphasis on experimentation. In the context of the times this campaign was particularly aimed at combating the reintroduction of more holistic, non-mechanical approaches into the life sciences . In so doing, Mechanists failed to see some of the strong points of non-vitalistic holistic thinking. The two approaches are illustrated in the work of Jacques Loeb and Hans Spemann. (shrink)

‘It feels like I have lost a part of myself’ is frequently uttered by those grieving the death of a loved one. Despite the ubiquity of such utterances, and the palpable sense that they express something true, few philosophers have considered what, if anything, accounts for their truth. Here, I develop a suggestion from Donald Baxter according to which Composition as Identity provides us a means to understand the grief utterances literally. In doing so, I identify and develop a version (...) of Leibniz's Law required for Composition as Identity to account for the truth of the grief utterances. In turn, this principle helps shed light on Composition as Identity's central claim: that the parts are identical to the whole. By considering objections to the resulting view, I construct a list of desiderata for other philosophers interested in accounting for the grief utterances. (shrink)

A justificativa para um trabalho de análise epistemológica das pesquisas-ações deve-se ao caráter desse método de pesquisa, ciência emergente que possui base dupla, uma ancorada no senso comum e a outra na justificação pela comunidade cientifica. O objetivo da pesquisa é estudar um conjunto específico de pesquisas selecionadas, identificando e analisando suas apropriações ou ressignificações e indicar as tendências e as potencialidades que se apresentam à área de educação frente a esse tipo de pesquisa. Os resultados da análise dos trabalhos (...) indicam que os problemas apontados e suas soluções expressas em intervenções são realizados sem uma recuperação histórica da dinâmica do local de estudo. (shrink)

[Significantly updated in Chapter 6 of Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge] In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P (...) is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a novel theory of the epistemic requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is also better placed to explain the extent of the reasons we possess in certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environmental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how my arguments generate a dilemma for Errol Lord’s view that possessing reasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one’s knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can simultaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession. (shrink)

SummaryFrom 1996 to 2006, Nepal experienced a substantial fertility decline, with the total fertility rate dropping from 4.6 to 3.1 births per woman. This study examines the associations between progress towards universal primary and secondary schooling and fertility decline in rural Nepal. Several hypotheses regarding mechanisms through which education affects current fertility behaviour are tested, including: the school environment during women's childhood; current availability of schools; knowledge of educational costs; and women's own educational attainment. Data for the analysis come from (...) the 2003–04 Nepal Living Standards Survey, a nationally representative random sample of households, which includes detailed data on fertility, household expenditure, educational attainment, demographic characteristics and the use of social services. Census and administrative data are also used to construct district-level gross enrolment ratios for primary and secondary schools during the women's childhood. Discrete dependent variable modelling techniques are used to estimate the effects of the following variables on the probability of women giving birth in a given year: district-level gross enrolment ratios for primary and secondary schools during women's childhood; having had a child previously in school; women's own educational level; current school availability; and other covariates. Separate models are estimated for the overall sample of rural women of reproductive age, and for parity-specific sub-samples. The results suggest that district-level gross enrolment ratios for secondary schools and, in some instances, having had a previous child enrolled in school are significant determinants of fertility in rural areas. These results are highly independent of women's own educational levels. Overall, the results suggest that, in the rural Nepal context, mass schooling influences the fertility transition through both community- and household-level pathways. (shrink)