Judges in multiple US states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, California, and Florida, receive a prediction of defendants’ recidivism risk, generated by the COMPAS algorithm. If judges act on these predictions, they implicitly delegate normative decisions to proprietary software, even beyond the previously documented race and age biases. Using the ProPublica dataset, we demonstrate that COMPAS predictions favor jailing over release. COMPAS is biased against defendants. We show that this bias can largely be removed. Our proposed correction increases overall (...) accuracy, and attenuates anti-black and anti-young bias. However, it also slightly increases the risk that defendants are released who commit a new crime before tried. We argue that this normative decision should not be buried in the code. The tradeoff between the interests of innocent defendants and of future victims should not only be made transparent. The algorithm should be changed such that the legislator and the courts do make this choice. (shrink)

Heuristics make decisions not only fast and frugally, but often nearly as well as “full” rationality or even better. Using such heuristics should therefore meet health care standards under liability law. But an independent court often has little chance to verify the necessary information. And judgments based on heuristics might appear to have little legitimacy, given the widespread belief in formal rationality.

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars discuss when is deliberate ignorance a virtue, and what type of environment does it require.

Max Stirner pioneered a radically existentialist thinking in which the ego or the Unique One is able to appropriate its “predicates” or determinations as objects of consumption. In this sense the singular event is privileged over the intellectual “spooks” that express the predicate’s independence from and mastery over its subject. Karl Marx’s thinking was decisively altered by his encounter with Stirner, to whom he replied at length in The German Ideology. I propose that Marx and Engels’s critique and appropriation of (...) Stirner provides the basis for what I call “communist existentialism,” and that this is the proper standpoint for radical philosophy today. After giving an account of this position, I briefly adopt it to critique two of the communist standpoints associated with “communization,” those of Tiqqun and Theorie Communiste. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 100 Heft: 2 Seiten: 527-528.

Cette contribution examine les rapports entre le matérialisme des intérêts que revendique Bakounine dans ses derniers textes et la critique qu’il propose des notions d’intérêt général, de représentation politique et de centralisation dans La théologie politique de Mazzini et l’Internationale. Son objet est de montrer que la prise en compte du rôle social et historique des intérêts rend caduque toute possibilité d’un intérêt général qui viendrait à son tour fonder la légitimité d’une représentation politique dans une assemblée centraliste. La première (...) partie de l’article examine le rapport entre ce matérialisme des intérêts et la conception matérialiste de l’histoire proposée par Marx et Engels. La seconde insiste sur la critique de l’intérêt général comme fiction et sur l’impossibilité qui en découle de toute représentation dans le cadre d’un système centralisé, la reconnaissance de cette impossibilité débouchant même sur une critique du mandat impératif. (shrink)

In scholarship on the history of philosophy, it is widely assumed that Charles Fourier was a utopian socialist who could not have exerted a significant influence on the development of Karl Marx's thought. Indeed, both Marx and Engels seem to have advanced this view. In contrast, I argue that in 1844 when Marx was developing his anthropology and social critique, he relied upon Fourier's thought to supply a key assumption. After establishing this connection, I explain why Marx's tacit reliance on (...) Fourier creates a problematic undercurrent in his thought. (shrink)

'Ethik ist auf deskriptives Wissen angewiesen. Das ist nichts Neues: Bereits Aristoteles betont, die Ethik müsse berücksichtigen, dass der Mensch von Natur aus ein soziales Wesen sei. Wie viel Gewicht aber kann und sollte man dem deskriptiven Wissen in normativen Fragen zugestehen? Eine naturalistische Ethik hält es für möglich, dass deskriptives Wissen nicht nur Hilfsmittel für die Anwendung ethischer Normen sein, sondern einen großen Teil der bisher erforderlichen Normen ersetzen kann. Eine naturalistische Ethik fordert außerdem: Möglichst wenig metaphysische Annahmen! Statt (...) Metaphysik möchten Naturalisten Ergebnisse und Methoden der Wissenschaften einsetzen, mit dem Ziel, den Bestand an Normen in der Ethik und damit den Begründungsbedarf zu verkleinern. Lassen sich also Normen durch Fakten ersetzen? Und wenn ja, wie weit? In diesem Band kommen zu dieser Frage Philosophie, Ökonomik, Soziologie, Psychologie, Soziobiologie, Rechtswissenschaft und Spieltheorie zu Wort. Es geht hierbei gerade nicht um eine ethisch-moralische Bewertung von Resultaten oder Methoden dieser Disziplinen, sondern - umgekehrt - um die Frage, welchen Beitrag diese Wissenschaften zur Ethik leisten können.' (Autorenreferat). Inhaltsverzeichnis: Gerhard Vollmer, Christoph Lütge: Fakten statt Normen? Einleitung und Überblick (VII-XIV); Dieter Birnbacher: Prognosen statt Normen? Das Zusammenspiel von Normen und Fakten in der Angewandten Ethik (3-13); Gerhard Schurz: Zur Rolle von Brückenprinzipien in einer faktenorientierten Ethik (14-27); Uwe Czaniera: Vernünftige Normen statt moralischer Fakten (28-42); Gerhard Engel: Von Fakten zu Normen: Zur Ableitbarkeit des Sollen aus dem Sein (43-59); Dagmar Borchers: Träume von Tatsachen und Tugenden: Stärken und Schwächen des tugendethischen Naturalismus (60-77); Wolfgang Buschlinger: Hinter verschlossene Türen: Ethik in die Hand von Experten? (78-87); Eric Hilgendorf: Fakten und Normen in der Rechtstheorie Tatsachenfragen und Wertungsfragen: Bausteine zu einer naturalistischen Jurisprudenz (91-102); Karl Homann: Fakten und Normen: Der Fall der Wirtschaftsethik (105-116); Christoph Lütge: Ordnungsethik - naturalistisch konzipiert (117-127); Ken Binmore: Natural Justice (128-150); Michael Baurmann: Mehrheit ohne Moral? Warum demokratische Entscheidungen ethische Prinzipien erfordern (153-176); Eckart Voland: Normentreue zwischen Reziprozität und Prestige-Ökonomie: Eine soziobiologische Interpretation kostspieliger sozialer Konformität (177-189); Günter Dux: Das Sein des Sollens (190-204); Heiko Breit, Lutz Eckensberger: Fakten und Normen in der Psychologie. Die Faktizität des Normenbewusstseins: Eine entwicklungspsychologische Perspektive (207-224). (shrink)

Cette contribution examine les rapports entre le matérialisme des intérêts que revendique Bakounine dans ses derniers textes et la critique qu’il propose des notions d’intérêt général, de représentation politique et de centralisation dans La théologie politique de Mazzini et l’Internationale (1871). Son objet est de montrer que la prise en compte du rôle social et historique des intérêts rend caduque toute possibilité d’un intérêt général qui viendrait à son tour fonder la légitimité d’une représentation politique dans une assemblée centraliste. La (...) première partie de l’article examine le rapport entre ce matérialisme des intérêts et la conception matérialiste de l’histoire proposée par Marx et Engels. La seconde insiste sur la critique de l’intérêt général comme fiction et sur l’impossibilité qui en découle de toute représentation dans le cadre d’un système centralisé, la reconnaissance de cette impossibilité débouchant même sur une critique du mandat impératif. (shrink)

In scholarship on the history of philosophy, it is widely assumed that Charles Fourier was a utopian socialist who could not have exerted a significant influence on the development of Karl Marx's thought. Indeed, both Marx and Engels seem to have advanced this view. In contrast, I argue that in 1844 when Marx was developing his anthropology and social critique, he relied upon Fourier's thought to supply a key assumption. After establishing this connection, I explain why Marx's tacit reliance on (...) Fourier creates a problematic undercurrent in his thought. (shrink)

De 1815 - avec le Congrès de Vienne qui inaugure une ère de Restauration - à mars 1848, avec les répercussions de la révolution de février en Europe, la période du Vormârz ("avant mars") se caractérise, au sein du monde germanique, par une vie intellectuelle d'une particulière effervescence. Les grandes philosophies qui se sont construites pour dépasser Kant, avec Fichte, Schelling et Hegel, autorisent bon nombre de penseurs allemands à considérer l'Allemagne comme étant philosophiquement en avance sur son temps, ou (...) tout au moins à la pointe de la modernité. Cette avance théorique tranche pourtant avec la réalité politique et sociale de l'époque, façonnée par Metternich. Une solution de cette contradiction dans laquelle se trouve l'Allemagne semble alors résider, aux yeux de certains auteurs, dans l'idée suivant laquelle il ne resterait plus à l'Allemagne qu'à réaliser sa philosophie. Le présent ouvrage entend contribuer à l'analyse de la façon dont le thème de la réalisation de la philosophie est élaboré par, ou à partir des réflexions de plusieurs auteurs de l'époque. Il s'agit des Jeunes Hégéliens, et principalement : Eduard Gans, Heinrich Heine, Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner, David Strauss, les frères Bruno et Edgar Bauer, Moses Hess, Michel Bakounine, August von Cieszkowski, Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This paper argues that we should replace the common classification of theories of welfare into the categories of hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories. The tripartite classification is objectionable because it is unduly narrow and it is confusing: it excludes theories of welfare that are worthy of discussion, and it obscures important distinctions. In its place, the paper proposes two independent classifications corresponding to a distinction emphasised by Roger Crisp: a four-category classification of enumerative theories (about which items constitute (...) welfare), and a four-category classification of explanatory theories (about why these items constitute welfare). (shrink)

This chapter surveys hybrid theories of well-being. It also discusses some criticisms, and suggests some new directions that philosophical discussion of hybrid theories might take.

Are we witnessing progress or regress in the recent increasing popularity and electoral success of populist politicians and parties in consolidated democratic nations? ... Is the innovative use of popular referendum in Great Britain to settle fundamental constitutional questions a progressive or regressive innovation? ... Similarly, is the increasing use of constituent assemblies to change constitutions across the world evidence of progress in democratic constitutionalism, or, a worryingly regressive change back toward unmediated popular majoritarianism? ... This paper reflects on some (...) of the perils and promise of framing such questions with the conceptual couplet of progress and regress. It considers four compelling critiques of the use of ‘progress’ and its cognates in sociopolitical theory, as well as arguing that such concepts are nevertheless ineliminable for our normative theories. The paper concludes by suggesting that we can avoid the most serious problems by employing only conceptions of political progress and regress that are piecemeal, pragmatic, and processual. (shrink)

Group-based reasons are reasons to play one’s part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based reasons in cases where the relevant group is not or would not be itself an agent. According to the behaviour-first conception, what matters is that the other members of the group would play their (...) parts in the relevant pattern, not whether they would have the cooperative intentional states constitutive of group agency in doing so. This paper argues against these conceptions and in favour of the powers-first conception, according to which what matters is that the members of the group have practically relevant powers. (shrink)

Difficult Atheism shows how contemporary French philosophy is rethinking the legacy of the death of God in ways that take the debate beyond the narrow confines of atheism into the much broader domain of post-theological thinking. Christopher Watkin argues that Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux each elaborate a distinctive approach to the post-theological, but that each approach still struggles to do justice to the death of God.

Authentizitat ist ein in unserem kulturellen Raum allgegenwartiges Phanomen. Doch wem oder was begegnen wir, wenn wir meinen, uns selbst verwirklichen oder alternativ einfach uns selbst treu sein zu mussen? Christoph Wiesinger zeigt, dass wir auf ein Selbst geworfen werden, das zwar als homogener Nukleus der Person projiziert werden kann, sich aber bei genauerem Hinsehen als komplexe sozial verinnerlichte Struktur entpuppt. Das Selbst ist keineswegs objektiv zu fassen, sondern unterliegt sozialen Genesen und wird durch soziale Adressierung unterschiedlich formiert. Das (...) Ereignis von Authentizitat gibt somit Anlass zur Reflexion der Differenz zwischen Erwartung und Erfahrung. Christoph Wiesinger legt die Strukturen des Phanomens der Authentizitat frei, zeigt die theologischen Implikationen auf und diskutiert die praktisch-theologischen Konsequenzen. (shrink)

This article proposes a way of understanding Kantianism, act-utilitarianism and some other important ethical theories according to which they are all versions of the same kind of theory, sharing a common structure. I argue that this is a profitable way to understand the theories discussed. It is charitable to the theories concerned; it emphasizes the common ground between them; it gives us insights into the differences between them; and it provides a method for generating new ethical theories worth studying. The (...) article briefly discusses the relationship between these ideas and some other recent proposals that emphasize the common ground between Kantianism and versions of consequentialism. (shrink)

Theories of binding have recently come into the focus of the consciousness debate. In this review, we discuss the potential relevance of temporal binding mechanisms for sensory awareness. Specifically, we suggest that neural synchrony with a precision in the millisecond range may be crucial for conscious processing, and may be involved in arousal, perceptual integration, attentional selection and working memory. Recent evidence from both animal and human studies demonstrates that specific changes in neuronal synchrony occur during all of these processes (...) and that they are distinguished by the emergence of fast oscillations with frequencies in the gamma-range. (shrink)

Theorists of public reason such as John Rawls often idealize constitutional courts as exemplars of public reason. This paper raises questions about the seduction and limits of analogies between theorists’ account of public reason and actual constitutional jurisprudence. Examining the work product of the United States Supreme Court, the paper argues that while it does engage in reason-giving to support its decisions—as the public reason strategy suggests— those reasons are (largely) legalistic and specifically juristic reasons—not the theorists’ idealized moral-political reasons (...) on matters of fundamental principle. But if constitutional courts do not engage on matters of fundamental principle, then a public reason strategy for assuaging democratic worries about judicial review would no longer be open: prominent liberal and deliberative democratic theorists could no longer point to the alleged superiority of constitutional courts to speak in the name of, and for, the people’s shared political principles. The paper extends beyond the U.S. case study by pointing to three institutional factors explaining the disanalogy between what some constitutional courts do and what public reason theories require them to do. It concludes with considerations about whether the public reason strategy might be more successfully applied to international courts. (shrink)

Die Kernthese der Paracelsischen Naturphilosophie, die Ahnlichkeit von Mensch und Welt, festgelegt in der Analogie von Mikro- und Makrokosmos, enthullt einen -Code-, der als konstitutives Moment samtliche Aussagen auf einer prakonzeptionellen Ebene organisiert, samtliche Teilbereiche in ihrer funktionalen Bedeutung fur das -Ganze- markiert und schliesslich im Sinne Foucaults zu einer -diskursiven Formation- werden lasst. Die auf diese Weise vorgefuhrte Erfahrungsform von Welt und Natur steht zu dem neuzeitlich-technischen Verfugungswissen in einer historischen Diskontinuitat.".

One recently popular strategy for avoiding the moral error theory is via a ‘companions in guilt’ argument. I focus on those recently popular arguments that take epistemic facts as a companion in guilt for moral facts. I claim that there is an internal tension between the two main premises of these arguments. It is a consequence of this that either the soundness or the dialectical force of the companions in guilt argument is undermined. I defend this claim via (i) analogy (...) with philosophical debates concerning the indispensability of mathematical objects to natural science, and (ii) discussion of the ‘entanglement’ of epistemic concepts and moral concepts in deliberation. I conclude by proposing a positive view of what kind of argument must be used if moral error theories are to be successfully undermined. (shrink)

Is it ever morally wrong to enjoy fantasizing about immoral things? Many video games allow players to commit numerous violent and immoral acts. But, should players worry about the morality of their virtual actions? A common argument is that games offer merely the virtual representation of violence. No one is actually harmed by committing a violent act in a game. So, it cannot be morally wrong to perform such acts. While this is an intuitive argument, it does not resolve the (...) issue. -/- Focusing on why individual players are motivated to entertain immoral and violent fantasies, Video Games, Violence, and the Ethics of Fantasy advances debates about the ethical criticism of art, not only by shining light on the interesting and under-examined case of virtual fantasies, but also by its novel application of a virtue ethical account. Video games are works of fiction that enable players to entertain a fantasy. So, a full understanding of the ethical criticism of video games must focus attention on why individual players are motivated to entertain immoral and violent fantasies. -/- Video Games, Violence, and the Ethics of Fantasy engages with debates and critical discussions of games in both the popular media and recent work in philosophy, psychology, media studies, and game studies. (shrink)

The present work carries us back to a period which, although chronologically no more than a generation or so behind us, has become as foreign to the present generation in Germany as if it were already a full hundred years old. Yet it was the period of Germany's preparation for the Revolution of 1848; and all that has happened in our country since then has been merely a continuation of 1848, merely the execution of the last will and testament of (...) the revolution. Just as in France in the eighteenth century, so in Germany in the nineteenth, a philosophical revolution ushered in the political collapse. But with what a difference! The French were in open combat with all official science, with the church and often also the state; their writings were printed beyond the frontier, in Holland or England, while they themselves were often on the point of landing in the Bastille. But the Germans were professors, state-appointed instructors of youth; their writings were recognized textbooks, and the system rounding off the whole development---the Hegelian system---was even raised, in some degree, to the rank of a royal Prussian philosophy of state! Was it possible that a revolution could hide behind these professors, behind their pedantically obscure phrases, their ponderous, wearisome sentences? Were not the liberals, the very people who then passed as the representatives of the revolution, the bitterest opponents of this brain-befuddling philosophy? But what neither governments nor liberals saw was seen by at least one man as early as 1833, and indeed by a man called Heinrich Heine. (shrink)

Basing his view on the object relations theories of the "British School" of psychoanalysis, Christopher Bollas examines the human subject's memories of its earliest experiences (during infancy and childhood) of the object, whether it be mother, father, or self. He explains in well-written and non-technical language how the object can affect the child, or "cast in shadow," without the child being able to process this relation through mental representations of language.

In this article Cristoph Wulf examines the basic concepts of pedagogy and educational science in the German-speaking world, looking at education and socialization from the perspective of educational anthropology. He makes evident that the complex German concept of Bildung, in particular, can only be fully understood by means of a historical and philosophical analysis.

Introduction Quine was born in. He studied as a graduate student at Harvard, and apart from short visits to Oxford, Paris and other centres of learning, ...