Dans l’Epître aux Méditations, Descartes affirme que toute l’utilité de sa philosophie réside dans la « solidité » des preuves de l’existence de Dieu qu’elle propose. C’est par un effort de détachement de l’esprit des sens et par un retour sur soi, sur des raisons tout « intérieures », que ces démonstrations s’élaborent et acquièrent évidence et certitude. Cette méthode n’est-elle pas la reprise, en philosophie moderne, de l’itinéraire augustinien de l’âme vers Dieu?

Quel sens la philosophie a-t-elle donné à la définition biblique de l’homme comme image de Dieu ? Au cours du XVIIe siècle, que l’on qualifie d’augustinien, la reprise de ce thème scripturaire se fait-elle en fidélité à l’évêque d’Hippone ? Le point de départ de notre analyse sera Descartes et le texte injustement négligé de la Troisième Méditation, tout entier consacré à cette notion de l’homme comme image de Dieu. Nous passerons ensuite à l’étude de Pascal, pour constater que, paradoxalement, (...) c’est l’auteur que l’on qualifie le plus indiscutablement d’augustinien qui donne le moins d’ampleur à cette notion. A travers ces exemples, et en y ajoutant le contre point que représente, par rapport à Pascal, la philosophie de Fénelon, c’est ce que signifie être augustinien à l’Âge classique que nous souhaiterions pouvoir éclaircir.What specific meaning can Philosophy gives to the biblical assertion of human being as an image of God ? During the XVIIth century, which is recognized as an Augustinian one, is the interpretation of this topic made in reference to Augustine ? We will begin our analysis with Descartes and the text of the Third Meditation, unjustly disregarded by scholars, but all dedicated to this notion of human being as imago Dei. We will follow our study with Pascal, and we will have to notice that, paradoxically, he is the author who is considered indisputably as Augustinian but in the same time the one who gives the less extent to this notion of imago Dei. Through these examples, and with the additional consideration of Fénelon’s philosophy, we intend to precise what being an Augustinian means during the early modern Ages. (shrink)

This research file’s object is Fénelon’s correspondence, the complete edition of which, achieved in 2007, has considerably enriched our knowledge of both the life and works of the archbishop of Cambrai, by shedding new lights on its multiple facets. Mirror and memory of the published body of work, when it is not in itself an essential and constitutive part of it, the correspondence enhances Fénelon’s published body of work’s understanding through the discovery of its process of elaboration, the obstacles it (...) met, or the circumstances which favored it. The correspondence also reveals that which is not shown by the work : aborted projects and renouncements, lastly and most importantly, the societal environment, surrounding Fénelon, which allows him to weave the fabric and network in which is set this exceptional life made of radical commitments, of battles, of glory but also of disappointments, disgraces and submissions. (shrink)

La philosophie cartésienne se décline en un refrain tranquille : « je pense, donc je suis », la méthode, le doute, le triomphe de la raison, Dieu lui-même soumis à la logique de l’entendement et toutes les passions domestiquées. Ce refrain semble même être devenu celui de la nation française toute entière : y a-t-il un autre philosophe auquel il soit fait aussi couramment référence? Mais ce « cartésianisme » que la tradition a retenu n’est justement pas cartésien. A rebours (...) de nos a priori sur Descartes, Laurence Devillairs souligne le caractère inclassable de sa philosophie : Descartes revendique le droit de la raison à s’exercer librement mais il se définit aussi comme « philosophe chrétien » ; il déclare l’homme capable de connaître l’essence même de Dieu mais en affirme l’irréductible incompréhensibilité ; il rétablit les droits de l’âme contre toute confusion avec le corporel mais fait de l’homme l’union intime d’un corps et d’un esprit. Ainsi se fait jour le portrait d’un maître à penser sans réel disciple, critique de la philosophie de l’École, désireux de voir le cartésianisme enseigné au titre de philosophie officielle, premier philosophe de la modernité et meilleur théologien de son siècle. Descartes n’a d’autre école que la sienne. (shrink)

Comment connaître Dieu? Est-il légitime de faire de son essence l’objet de la méthode, d’appliquer à sa nature et à ses attributs les modes de connaissance définis par cette méthode, à savoir l’induction, la déduction voire l’intuition? Comment défendre la possibilité d’une intellection claire et distincte de l’essence de Dieu, telle que la représente son idée, et faire droit à l’incompréhensibilité attachée à son infinité? Le paradoxe de la métaphysique cartésienne consiste à la fois à revendiquer la possibilité de connaître (...) Dieu à partir de son essence, selon la « vraie définition » qu’en donne son idée innée, et à poser l’incompréhensiblité de cette essence, irréductible à ce que la raison peut en déterminer. C’est sur ce paradoxe que s’élaborent une « science parfaite » de Dieu et un traité de ses attributs, que Descartes déclare avoir tous « expressément prouvés ».Le Dieu de la métaphysique n’est toutefois pas seulement objet de science; il suscite aussi la plus « violent des passions » : sa connaissance et la preuve de tous ses attributs n’ont en effet d’autre utilité que de nous conduire à son amour, lequel procure des « satisfactions » et « des contentements qui valent incomparablement davantage que nos petites joies passagères ». (shrink)

Descartes choisit de donner à sa première publication métaphysique, la forme et le titre de « méditations ». Cette dénomination est un sujet d'études traditionnel du commentaire cartésien qui l'associe généralement à un exercice religieux, issu de la spiritualité jésuite. Nous souhaiterions renouveler cette interprétation et montrer que la forme méditative de la métaphysique n'est ni une rhétorique ni une pratique religieuse mais qu'elle représente une méthode proprement philosophique. De plus, ce n'est pas aux exercices d'Ignace de Loyola que semble (...) se référer la méditation cartésienne mais bien plutôt à la pensée d'Augustin.Descartes chose to give to his first metaphysical publication, the form and the title of meditations. This denomination is a traditional topic of Cartesian commentary, which generally relates it to a religious exercise, derived from Jesuitical spirituality. We wish for changing this interpretation by asserting that the meditative form of Metaphysics is not a question of rhetoric neither of religious practice but it represents a purely philosophical method. Moreover, it is not to Ignace de Loyola's exercises that Cartesian meditation seems to refer but rather to Augustine's thought. (shrink)

Le Dieu de la Première Méditation de Descartes reste une figure énigmatique de la Divinité ; le développement de la métaphysique cartésienne opposera à cette vetus opinio d’un Dieu tout-puissant et bon l’idée innée du « vrai Dieu ». Les commentateurs ont cherché à préciser l’origine d’une telle opinion : nous tenterons à notre tour de lever l’anonymat de ce Dieu en montrant que la Première Méditation s’élabore à partir d’une lecture des premières confessions d’Augustin, à savoir le De beata (...) vita. Cette source augustinienne est d’ailleurs confirmée par Régis qui rattache spontanément les attributs du Dieu de la vetus opinio à la théologie d’Augustin. (shrink)

Against the “universal consent of the people” and “the crowd of philosophers”, Pascal proves the existence of the void, thus re-establishing the truth where only the force and falsity of opinions had prevailed. Nature “has no repugnance for the void”, it “makes no effort to avoid it” but “admits it without difficulty or resistance”. Pascal defines the void as neither matter nor nothingness. Can this definition be found in Philosophy, in the Anthropology of the Pensées? We would like to show (...) the importance of the notion of the capacity of empty nature, which is decisive when it comes to describing the condition of man, troubled by a desire for truth and happiness that he cannot satisfy. Nature is thus, for him, what is “most contrary” to him, depriving him of what is rightfully his. The void has a cardinal function in Physics, but also in Philosophy. (shrink)

The wisdom of famous philosophers distilled into practical takeaways for modern readers For centuries, philosophers have considered the "big questions" of human life, mulling over everything from ethics to the definition of reality. Their ideas and insights are powerful and innovative, but often inaccessible and far too academic for most readers. In The Philosophy Cure: Lessons on Living from the Great Philosophers, scholar and expert on Cartesian philosophy, Laurence Devillairs has stripped away the convoluted language, translating the core ideas and (...) wisdom of some of the most prominent philosophers into simple concepts for modern readers. She skillfully reveals that far from being impractical or distantly academic, philosophy is, at its heart, a deeply useful discipline ultimately concerned with what it means to live a good and fulfilling life. Perfect for readers who are intrigued with philosophy, but who are uninterested in reading dense academic texts, The Philosophy Cure reveals the true wisdom of the best-known philosophers-from Socrates to Kant and Descartes. (shrink)

Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.

In Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, leading figures in the fields of virtue ethics and ethics come together to present the first ...

This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the (...) possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections. (shrink)

Two problems are considered here. One relates to who has moral status, and the other relates to who has moral responsibility. The criteria for mattering morally have long been disputed, and many humans and nonhuman animals have been considered “marginal cases,” on the contested edges of moral considerability and concern. The marginalization of humans and other species is frequently the pretext for denying their rights, including the rights to health care, to reproductive freedom, and to bodily autonomy. There is broad (...) agreement across cultural and philosophical traditions about the capacities and responsibilities of moral agents. I propose an inclusive and expansive way of thinking about moral status, situating it not in the characteristics or capacities of individuals, but in the responsibilities and obligations of moral agents. Moral agents, under this view, are not privileged or entitled to special treatment but rather have responsibilities. I approach this by considering some African communitarian conceptions of moral status and moral agency. I propose that moral agency can also be more expansive and include not just individual moral agents but collective entities that have some of the traits of moral agents: power, freedom, and the capacity to recognize and act on the demands of morality and acknowledge and respect the rights of others. Expanding who and what is a moral agent correspondingly extends moral responsibility for respecting rights and fostering the conditions for the health and well-being of humans and animals onto the collective entities who uniquely have the capacity to attend to global-scale health threats such as pandemics and human-caused climate change. (shrink)

Our interpretive resources enable us to make sense of, navigate, and communicate about our shared world. These resources not only carve the world up into categories, but also guide how we, individually and collectively, are oriented towards it. In this thesis, I examine how these resources, and the dispositions they guide, may be harmful. A vital kind of interpretive resources are frames, which equip us with unified perspectives on the world. Perspectives are suites of open-ended interpretive (inquisitive, attentional, inferential, evaluative, (...) and affective) dispositions. Frames thereby guide how we interpret, respond to, and navigate the world. I show that these perspectives are epistemically powerful and indispensable. I argue that flawed perspectives, and the distorting frames that produce them, are deeply pernicious and I examine their relationship to oppression. (shrink)

This chapter presents an opinionated account of how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. I develop a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. My argument is not that cognitive science should replace (...) the metaphysician’s use of a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality. Rather, we should enrich our perspective on a priori theorizing and ordinary experience as a guide to metaphysical reality by drawing on any relevant work in cognitive science. (shrink)

It was proposed that the data from Monte Carlo statistical investigations be subjected to analysis of variance methods rather than the conventional techniques of tabling, graphing, and inspecting the data. Two examples in which analysis of variance methods were applied to published Monte Carlo studies were presented. It was suggested that balanced factorial designs should be used whenever possible in Monte Carlo studies so that analysis of variance methods would be directly applicable. Finally, three advantages of analysis of variance methods (...) over conventional techniques were described and analysis of variance methods were contrasted with a possible alternative analytical method, multiple regression analysis. (shrink)

Purpose. Romanticism as a movement developed in Germany, where, becoming the philosophy of time in the 18th-19th centuries, spread to all European countries. The "mobility" of the Romantic doctrine, its diversity, sometimes contradictory views, attitude to man as a free, harmonious, creative person led to the susceptibility of this movement by ethnic groups, different in nature and mentality. Its ideas found a wide response in Ukraine with its "cordocentric" type of culture in the early nineteenth century. Since the peculiarity of (...) "Ukrainian Romanticism" was its "literary-centric" nature, the purpose of this study is to analyse and comprehend the place of man in the national philosophy and literature of this period. Accordingly, the main tasks of the work are as follows: to determine the main features, the nature of Ukrainian Romanticism; to trace the main vectors of comprehension and image of man in the literature of this time. Theoretical basis. The ideas of European Romanticism were creatively rethought and assimilated during the emergence of new Ukrainian literature. It provided samples of highly artistic works, unique names of talented writers – creators and thinkers, who in their works reflected the philosophy of time. Based on the works of F. Schlegel, partly E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers, Romanticism in the Ukrainian humanities, in terms of philosophy, culturology, as well as at the intersection with literature, was studied by T. Bovsunivska, Y. Hrybkova, S. Efremov, N. Kalenichenko, S. Kozak, T. Komarynets, D. Nalyvayko, Y. Nakhlik, I. Ogorodnyk, V. Ogorodnyk, A. Sinitsyna, D. Chyzhevsky, M. Yatsenko, E. Kyryliuk, M. Biletsky, D. Dontsov, S. Efremov, G. Kostyuk, S. Krymsky, Y. Sherekh and others. Originality. The authors of the article prove that Romanticism in Ukraine, being "literary-centric" inherently, having absorbed the main ideas and features of European Romanticism, has its own features and vectors of formation and development. Man in this kind of movement, thanks to the means of art, appears very clearly as a spiritually rich, sensitive, vulnerable and strong person. For him or her, the highest value is freedom, the ability to make freely independent fateful decisions. Conclusions. Ukrainian writers, reflecting the philosophical ideas of Romanticism, saw in man a harmonious combination of "natural" and "social", through which he indirectly carries out his own national existence. In addition to the objective realities of the external world, in their works, Romantic writers appeal to the subjective, internal, spiritual, "ideal" world of the hero, who interacts with reality through his own system of values. At each level of development of the humanities and methodology of cognition, this allows a new reading of these works. (shrink)

Purpose. The dynamics and pace of social and economic transformations that are characteristic of modern society, lead to an increase in tension and the destruction of habitual stereotypes – ideals, values, norms, patterns of behaviour that unite people. These moments encourage us to rethink the understanding of "security" essence, in particular, psychological, which emphasizes the urgency of its study in the philosophical and sociocultural coordinates. Theoretical basis of the research is based on the philosophical methodology of K. Jaspers, E. Fromm (...) and the A. Maslow’s psychological approach to understanding of a person. Originality. Psychological security is considered at different levels: first and foremost, society is a characteristic of social security, that is an analysis of how today’s social technologies, social changes affect the quality of life of the country’s population; secondly, the social environment – the family, the immediate environment, reference groups, training teams; thirdly, a person is an experience of his own security-insecurity, when it is possible to talk about the manifestations of psychological violence, when certain behavioral acts contribute to the violation of the security of the other or to self-destruction. It is found out that the knowledge of psychological security is closely connected with the socio-historical conditions of being, with the level of development of material and spiritual culture, with the interests and values prevailing in society, which determines its ontological, epistemological and axiological features. The presented issue is considered in the correlation of psychological security with types of scientific rationality – classical, nonclassical and post-nonclassical approaches, within the framework of which various perspectives, aspects, forms and types of psychological security are studied. Conclusions. The concept of security requires a systematic description of its manifestations, types, levels, concepts: security as the absence of dangers ; security as a certain activity to ensure or to prevent any threats or dangers ; security as a conscious necessity, the value of the individual. The study systematizes various ideas about psychological security in accordance with the logic of scientific knowledge: in the mainstream of classical, non-classical and post-nonclassical approaches. (shrink)