Obwohl Leibniz' Lehre von der Trägheit im Lichte der klassischen Mechanik verworren erscheinen mag, gewinnt sie Plausibilität, wenn man sie im Kontext seiner „neuen Wissenschaft der Dynamik“ betrachtet. Die vorliegende Arbeit vertritt die These, daß die Leibnizsche Trägheitskraft zwar nicht in das Newtonsche Schema paßt, sich aber trotzdem sinnvoll aus Leibniz' Ablehnung der herkömmlichen Trägheitslehre in der Physik ergibt und eine wichtige Ableitung seines metaphysischen Passivitätsbegriffes darstellt.

Marxist historiography has always claimed to be "conceptually" rooted in the natural sciences and has therefore been concerned with the function of laws, the structure of theories, and the logical relations between hypotheses and empirical data. Minimal criteria for the identification of a scientific research program as developed by Lakatos and Laudan include: a negative heuristic; explanatory or predictable scientific theories; a central model or paradigm; identification and solution of internal problems; self-conscious awareness by researchers of a common tradition; and (...) the internal dynamics of conflict and convergence. Less than a generation ago, Marxist scholarship seemed to offer the most innovative methodologies in history. More recently, however, Marxist scholarship seems to be reliving old glories while other approaches have advanced more innovative research programs. (shrink)

Critical Reflections on Teacher Education argues that educational philosophy can improve the quality of teacher education programs in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The book documents the ways in which the market model of education propagated by governments and outside agencies hastens the decline of philosophy of education and turns teachers into technicians in hierarchical school systems. A grounding in educational philosophy, however, enables future teachers to make informed and qualified judgements defining their professional lives. In a (...) clear and accessible style, Howard Woodhouse uses a combination of reasoned argument and narrative to show that educational philosophy, together with Indigenous knowledge systems, forms the basis of a climate change education capable of educating students about the central issue of our time. (shrink)

Males traditionally predominate at upper achievement levels. One general view holds that this is due only to various social factors such as the and lack of female role models. Another view holds that it occurs partly because of innate ability differences, with more males being at upper ability levels. In the last few decades, women have become more achievement focused and competitive and have gained many more opportunities to achieve. The present study examined one intellectual domain, international chess, to quantify (...) its gender differences in achievement and to see if these have been diminishing with the societal changes. Chess is a good test domain because it is a meritocracy, it has objective performance measures, and longitudinal data of a whole population are available. Performance ratings overall and in the top 10, 50 and 100 players of each sex show large gender differences and little convergence over the past three decades, although a few females have become high achievers. The distribution of performance ratings on the January 2004 list shows a higher male mean and evidence for more male variation, just as with traits such as height. Career patterns of players first on the list between 1985 and 1989 show that top males and females entered the list at about the same age but females tend to play fewer games and have shorter careers. In this domain at least, the male predominance is large and has remained roughly constant despite societal changes. (shrink)

The concept of a reason is now central to many areas of contemporary philosophy. Key theses in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of the emotions, among others, have come to be framed in terms of reasons. And yet, despite their centrality, theorists seem to take inconsistent things for granted about how reasons work, what kinds of things can be reasons, what reasons favor, and more. Somehow reasons have come to be both indispensable and impenetrable. -/- (...) The Fundamentals of Reasons offers a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of reasons. Focusing on the twin roles of reasons in explanation and deliberation, the book not only emphasizes what has made reasons central across philosophy but it also explores why philosophers have such incompatible pictures about what reasons are and how they work. Working from the inside out, Howard and Schroeder identify contentious assumptions about not only the internal structure of reasons but also their relationship to other important concepts, and then show how these contentious assumptions shape the many downstream applications of reasons in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and beyond. -/- This mildly opinionated exploration of key questions about the significance and nature of reasons helps the reader to navigate this important part of the philosophical landscape and to get clearer about why reasons seem important and what their import, ultimately, is. (shrink)

Examines the processes of scientific creativity and discovery, and proposes a model of scientific development.

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...) normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)

"The best book available for non-mathematicians." — Contemporary Psychology. Superb nontechnical introduction to game theory and related disciplines, primarily as applied to the social sciences. Clear, comprehensive coverage of utility theory, 2-person zero-sum games, 2-person non-zero-sum games, n-person games, individual and group decision-making, much more. Appendixes. Bibliography. Graphs and figures.

What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding of method is something they just pick up in the course of being trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit about (...) what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might be legitimated. This book begins with the question of what methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of this book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism. Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4 considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have proposed naturalised theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and Rescher. This book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have grappled with the question over the last fifty years. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno's Aesthetic Theory offers one of the most powerful and comprehensive critiques of art and of the discipline of aesthetics ever written. The work offers a deeply critical engagement with the history and philosophy of aesthetics and with the traditions of European art through the middle of the 20th century. It is coupled with ambitious claims about what aesthetic theory ought to be. But the cultural horizon of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory was the world of high modernism, and much has (...) happened since then both in theory and in practice. Adorno's powerful vision of aesthetics calls for reconsideration in this light. Must his work be defended, updated, resisted, or simply left behind? This volume gathers new essays by leading philosophers, critics, and theorists writing in the wake of Adorno in order to address these questions. They hold in common a deep respect for the power of Adorno's aesthetic critique and a concern for the future of aesthetic theory in response to recent developments in aesthetics and its contexts. (shrink)

Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The (...) book will be of interest to philosophers and scientists alike in the reassessment it provides of earlier debates about method and current directions of research. (shrink)

Two conundrums puzzle COVID‐19 investigators: 1) morbidity and mortality is rare among infants and young children and 2) rates of morbidity and mortality exhibit large variances across nations, locales, and even within cities. It is found that the higher the rate of pneumococcal vaccination in a nation (or city) the lower the COVID‐19 morbidity and mortality. Vaccination rates with Bacillus Calmette–Guerin, poliovirus, and other vaccines do not correlate with COVID‐19 risks, nor do COVID‐19 case or death rates correlate with number (...) of people in the population with diabetes, obesity, or adults over 65. Infant protection may be due to maternal antibodies and antiviral proteins in milk such as lactoferrin that are known to protect against coronavirus infections. Subsequent protection might then be conferred (and correlate with) rates of Haemophilus influenzae type B (Hib) (universal in infants) and pneumococcal vaccination, the latter varying widely by geography among infants, at‐risk adults, and the elderly. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/GODBYRbPL00. (shrink)

I propose a T‐cell receptor (TcR)‐based mechanism by which immunity mediates both “genetic self” and “microbial self” thereby, connecting microbiome disease with autoimmunity. The hypothesis is based on simple principles. First, TcR are selected to avoid strong cross‐reactivity with “self,” resulting in selection for a TcR repertoire mimicking “genetic self.” Second, evolution has selected for a “microbial self” that mimics “genetic self” so as to share tolerance. In consequence, our TcR repertoire also mimics microbiome antigenicity, providing a novel mechanism for (...) modulating tolerance to it. Also, the microbiome mimics the TcR repertoire, acting as a secondary immune system. I call this TcR‐microbiome mimicry “holoimmunity” to denote immune tolerance to the “holobiont self.” Logically, microbiome‐host mimicry means that autoimmunity directed at host antigens will also attack components of the microbiome, and conversely, an immunological attack on the microbiome may cross‐react with host antigens producing “holoautoimmunity.”. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to integrate two outstanding problems within the philosophy of science. The first concerns what role aesthetics plays in scientific thinking. The second is the problem of how logically testable ideas are generated (the so-called "psychology of research" versus "logic of (dis)proof" problem). I argue that aesthetic sensibility is the basis for what scientists often call intuition, and that intuition in turn embodies (in a literal physiological sense) ways of thinking that have their own meta-logic. (...) Thus, aesthetics is a form of cognition. Scientists think not in equations or words or other logical abstractions, but emotionally and sensually, using visual and aural images, kinesthetic and other proprioceptive feelings, sensations, patterns, and analogies. These aesthetic forms of thinking have their own logics that I call "synosia", from the root words synaesthesia (a combining of senses) and gnosis, "to know". Synosia denotes understanding that integrates feeling that one knows with feeling what one knows. Eminent scientists universally describe an explicitly secondary process in which such personal knowledge must be "translated" into a formal language, such as words or equations, in order to be communicated to other people. Many of the unsolved problems that philosophers of science (as well as psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers) have had in making sense of scientific thinking have arisen from confusing the form and content of the final translations with the hidden means by which scientific insights are actually achieved. (shrink)

While it is tempting to suppose that an act has moral worth just when and because it is motivated by sufficient moral reasons, philosophers have, largely, come to doubt this analysis. Doubt is rooted in two claims. The first is that some facts can motivate a given act in multiple ways, not all of which are consistent with moral worth. The second is the orthodox view that normative reasons are facts. I defend the tempting analysis by proposing and defending a (...) heterodox account of both normative and motivating reasons that is inspired by Donald Davidson’s primary reasons. We should adopt the heterodox view, I argue, because it addresses an overlooked but fatal defect in the orthodox conception of reasons, of which challenges to the tempting analysis are a special case. (shrink)

Several issues are raised concerning the notion that a single strategy explains Fitts' law and the linear speed/accuracy trade-off. Two additional concerns are discussed: (1) distance is programmed, (2) the fact that movements produced without the aid of vision obey Fitts' law does not mean that sighted movements must be explained without regard to vision.

Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. (...) We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the typical package of semantic commitments that reductivists have embraced since the Kripkean revolution. (shrink)

I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...) argument employs. Consequently, the argument provides no reason to doubt the popular view that a desire for rightness as such is no part of virtue. I conclude by suggesting that a family of worries about merely accidentally right action presuppose one side of the recent debate about objectivism and perspectivism about moral rightness. (shrink)

This is a survey of theories of scientific method which opens the book "After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method".

Inflicting harm is generally preferable to inflicting death. If you must choose between the two, you should generally choose to harm. But prenatal harm seems different. If a mother must choose between harming her fetus or aborting it, she may choose either, at least in many cases. So it seems that prenatal harm is particularly objectionable, sometimes on a par with death. This paper offers an explanation of why prenatal harm seems particularly objectionable by drawing an analogy to the all-or-nothing (...) problem. It then argues that this analogy offers independent support for the ‘voluntarist’ view that at least some parental role obligations are grounded in the choice to be a parent. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: The Healer's Power. By Howard Brody.

Some have attempted to explain why it appears that action based on deferential moral belief lacks moral worth by appealing to claims about an attitude that is difficult to acquire through testimony, which theorists have called “moral understanding”. I argue that this state is at least partly non-cognitive. I begin by employing case-driven judgments to undermine the assumption that I argue is responsible for the strangeness of deferential moral belief: the assumption that if an agent knows that some fact gives (...) them a moral reason to act in some way, then they’re in a position to act that way for the moral reason given by that fact. I then argue that cases from non-moral epistemology concerning properly-based belief give us independent reason to reject this assumption and conclude by sketching a Davidson-inspired account of normative reasons that explains why acting for moral reasons requires the right non-cognitive state, which is worth calling a kind of moral understanding. (shrink)

Historically, scientific and engineering expertise has been key in shaping research and innovation policies, with benefits presumed to accrue to society more broadly over time. But there is persistent and growing concern about whether and how ethical and societal values are integrated into R&I policies and governance, as we confront public disbelief in science and political suspicion toward evidence-based policy-making. Erosion of such a social contract with science limits the ability of democratic societies to deal with challenges presented by new, (...) disruptive technologies, such as synthetic biology, nanotechnology, genetic engineering, automation and robotics, and artificial intelligence. Many policy efforts have emerged in response to such concerns, one prominent example being Europe's Eighth Framework Programme, Horizon 2020, whose focus on “Responsible Research and Innovation” provides a case study for the translation of such normative perspectives into concrete policy action and implementation. Our analysis of this H2020 RRI approach suggests a lack of consistent integration of elements such as ethics, open access, open innovation, and public engagement. On the basis of our evaluation, we suggest possible pathways for strengthening efforts to deliver R&I policies that deepen mutually beneficial science and society relationships. (shrink)

The origin of homochirality in molecules characterizing living systems has remained a mystery since Pasteur's recognition of the problem some 150 years ago.2-5 Most theories also assume that homochirality emerged in one class of molecules (e.g. ribose) from which it was enriched in other molecules (e.g. amino acids) as well.2-5 I propose a novel, experimentally testable hypothesis describing a process by which selective chirality in amino acids and ribonucleotides emerged simultaneously and hand-in-hand with the origin and directionality of the genetic (...) code within a system of interactions involving amino acids, peptides, nucleotide bases, their sugars and polynucleotides. BioEssays 29:689–698, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)