Muselmannwas a term used in German concentration camps to describe prisoners near death due to exhaustion, starvation, and helplessness. This paper suggests that the inhuman conditions in the concentration camps resulted in the development of a defensive sense of disownership toward the entire body. The body, in such cases, is reduced to a pure object. However, in the case of theMuselmannthis body-as-object is felt to belong to the captors, and as such is therefore identified as a tool to inflict suffering (...) and pain on theMuselmannhimself. In this situation, lacking cognitive resources, theMuselmannmay have no other alternative than to treat his body as an enemy, and then to retreat or disinvest from the body. This response is a form of somatic apathy, an indifference that is tied to a loss of the self/non-self distinction. This may, in turn, lead to suicidal inclinations, even after liberation from the camp. (shrink)

This essay turns to ancient sources in order to rethink the relationship between political apathy and democracy. If modern democratic theorists place political apathy entirely outside of democracy – either as a destructive limit upon the full realization of a democratic polity, or, more sanguinely, as a pragmatic necessity which tempers democracy so that it may function in a workable yet watered-down form – the ancients conceived of political apathy as a peculiarly democratic phenomenon that was likely (...) to flourish in tandem with the expansion of egalitarian institutional structures and moral ideas. Evidence for the ancient recognition of political apathy as a uniquely democratic kind of affliction centers on, but is not limited to, three main sources. In literature, the Homeric epic, and specifically the story of Achilles, present apathy for politics and commitment to human equality as synonymous forces. In philosophy, one of the main reasons Plato opposes the democratic regime is precisely that it engenders apathy among the citizenry. And in history, Herodotus’ account of the first debate on constitutions as well as the ancient democratic practice of election by lot reveal an ancient egalitarian interest in using democracy to quell, rather than encourage, political behavior. (shrink)

“Throw away anything that sounds too complicated. Only keep what is simple to grasp...If the information appears fuzzy and causes the brain to implode after two sentences, toss it away and stop listening. Doing so will make the news as orderly and simple to understand as the truth.” - In “GHG emissions,” The Kingfisher Story Collection, (Vuong 2022a).

This paper explores the themes of apathy and activism by contrasting the conventionally negative concept of motivational desire-lack with Deleuze and Guattari's positive concept of ‘desiring-production’. I suggest that apathy and activism are both problematically tied to the same motivational force: the conventional negativity of desire, which results in a ‘split subject’ always already ‘undone’ by difference. The philosophy of positive desiring-production provides alternative concepts of motivation and selfhood, not characterised by generative lack or alienation. On the contrary, (...) this alternative ontology describes an identity that is not primarily ‘undone’ by difference, but ‘done’ or ‘made’ through the complex and piecemeal relations it forges with various aspects of the bodies it encounters. Understood as a complex multiplicity, the self or community accordingly has a primary, immediate and active interest in the quality of its multifaceted relations with others. Finally, I argue that some contemporary forms of activism can be read as practices aimed at creating and safeguarding the social conditions that foster the complex relational composition of selves and communities. (shrink)

Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction (...) makes it possible to separate negative self-control (aimed at overcoming temptation) from positive self-control (aimed at overcoming lack of motivation). The paper argues that temptation should not play a central role in our conception of self-control, since overcoming temptation is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful self-control. (shrink)

This essay turns to ancient sources in order to rethink the relationship between political apathy and democracy. If modern democratic theorists place political apathy entirely outside of democracy – either as a destructive limit upon the full realization of a democratic polity, or, more sanguinely, as a pragmatic necessity which tempers democracy so that it may function in a workable yet watered-down form – the ancients conceived of political apathy as a peculiarly democratic phenomenon that was likely (...) to flourish in tandem with the expansion of egalitarian institutional structures and moral ideas. Evidence for the ancient recognition of political apathy as a uniquely democratic kind of affliction centers on, but is not limited to, three main sources. In literature, the Homeric epic, and specifically the story of Achilles, present apathy for politics and commitment to human equality as synonymous forces. In philosophy, one of the main reasons Plato opposes the democratic regime is precisely that it engenders apathy among the citizenry. And in history, Herodotus’ account of the first debate on constitutions as well as the ancient democratic practice of election by lot reveal an ancient egalitarian interest in using democracy to quell, rather than encourage, political behavior. (shrink)

The study of social change has neglected the dynamics motivating individuals to join mass movements. Particularly obscure is how apathetic people are transformed into social activists. Considering this problem the author suggests three stages of development through which the individual progresses in attaining a higher level of personal and social maturity. The first stage - dreaming -emerges when the individual aspires to change while wishing to avoid the risks involved. The second - the illusion of power - occurs when the (...) hunger for power and the fear of it are mediated. The third - real power - is promoted by the yearning for self-respect and social acceptance and is manifested by competence in gaining supremacy and actual experience in struggle. As a consequence of this process the individual advances from a subjective self-image to perceiving himself as a social being; society is humanized by the greater participation of individuals. (shrink)

Resumen: La novela epistolar Caro Michele [1973], de Natalia Ginzburg, aborda, como varias de las obras tardías de la autora, la decadencia de la pequeña burguesía y de la estructura tradicional de familia. Desarrollaremos la presencia de la melancolía en la novela ligada a su componente crítico. También nos proponemos analizar una reflexión acerca del lugar que ocupa la militancia del protagonista y la política como un objeto de deseo perdido en la obra.: Natalia Ginzburg’s epistolary novel Caro Michele [1973] (...) addresses, like several of the late works of the author, the decadence of the petty bourgeoisie and the crisis of the traditional institution of the family. We will develop the presence of melancholy in the novel linked to its critical component. We also propose to analyze the place that occupies the protagonist's militancy and politics as an object of lost desire in the novel. (shrink)

In his criticisms of the German youth movement and the emergence of fascism across Europe during the early 1920s, Max Scheler draws a distinction between the different senses of political apathy that give rise to mass political movements. Recent studies of mass apathy have tended to treat all forms of apathy as the same and as a consequence reduced the diverse expressions of mass violence to the same, stripping mass movements of any critical function. I show in (...) this paper that Scheler’s distinction provides the means by which to locate the various origins of mass violence and the practical means by which to address this violence that preserves the liberating potential of collective political movements. (shrink)

Apathy and depression are frequently observed as behavioral and psychological symptoms of dementia, respectively, and are important for ensuring adequate care. This study aims to explore effective non-pharmacological interventions for apathy and depression with mild cognitive impairment and dementia. Five search engines including PubMed, Scopus, CINAHL, PsycInfo, and Web of Science were used to extract relevant studies. Inclusion criteria were studies that involved participants who were diagnosed with MCI or dementia, included quantitative assessments of each symptom, and employed (...) randomized controlled trials. Twenty studies were extracted, with interventions have been conducted in care facilities, the community, and hospitals. Participants in many studies had MCI or mild-to-moderate dementia but were not diagnosed with the subtypes of dementia. Few studies had set apathy and depression as the primary outcomes of non-pharmacological interventions. The findings suggested that emotional and stimulation-oriented approaches to apathy and depression would be useful for people with MCI or mild-to-moderate dementia. It would be helpful for therapists to assess the clinical features of the target symptoms for selecting suitable interventions. Additionally, increasing the number of randomized controlled trials focusing on apathy or depression as primary outcomes would offer a more definite conclusion for future systematic reviews. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Apathy may be a Bad Thing, but it is not always bad in the cases and ways it is alleged to be. The charge that the apathetic are irrational often stems from an oversimplification of political decision‐making techniques. The apathetic need not, for example, simply deny the possibility of getting one's goals, or simply ignore the benefits of action. They may, instead, have learned from experience that an avidly desired and pursued goal is always more valued before than (...) after its attainment, and that setting a low initial value on a goal may actually increase its final value. If the values of various alternatives are adjusted in the light of such knowledge, apathy looks much more rational. But that is not the end of the story. The adjustments may be either (i) a conventional and involuntary discounting and surcharging of existing alternatives in the light of known preference patterns, or (ii) a ‘voluntary decision’to value or devalue a goal in order to obtain a certain result. The latter sort of adjustment requires the introduction of new alternatives into the decision problem, and revisions to our notion of when inaction is irrational. (shrink)

Some Kantian ethicists, myself included, have been trying to show how, contrary to popular belief, Kant makes an important place in his moral theory for emotions–especially love and sympathy. This paper confronts claims of Kant that seem to endorse an absence of sympathetic emotions. I analyze Kant’s accounts of different sorts of emotions (“affects,” “passions,” and “feelings”), and different sorts of emotional coolness (“apathy,” “self-mastery,” and “cold-bloodedness”). I focus on the particular way that Kant praises apathy, as “sublime,” (...) in order to argue that his praise of extreme emotional self-control is not incompatible with, but rather complementary to, his praise of sympathy. (shrink)

An apathetic life is not the sort of life that most of us would want for ourselves or believe that we have a duty to strive for. And yet Kant argues that we have a duty of apathy, a duty to strive to be without affects (Affecten) and passions (Leidenschaften). But is Kant’s claim that there is a duty of apathy really as problematic as it sounds? In arguing that it is not, this paper investigates in detail in (...) Kant’s accounts of affects and passions and defends Kant’s argument that we have a duty of apathy. This investigation reveals Kant’s nuanced view on the role that sensible motivating states play in moral agency and the development of a virtuous character. (shrink)

This essay is the journal editor's introduction to part 3 of an ongoing symposium on quietism. With reference to writings of James Joyce, Francis Picabia, J. M. Coetzee, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Elaine Pagels, and Karen King—and with extended reference to Jonathan Lear's study of “cultural devastation,” Radical Hope—Jeffrey Perl explores the possibility that the fear of anomie is misplaced. He argues that, in comparison with the violence and narrowness of any given social order, anomie may well be preferable, and, (...) in any case, may be no more than another name for quietism. (shrink)

This essay is the journal editor's introduction to part 3 of an ongoing symposium on quietism. With reference to writings of James Joyce, Francis Picabia, J. M. Coetzee, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, Elaine Pagels, and Karen King—and with extended reference to Jonathan Lear's study of “cultural devastation,” Radical Hope—Jeffrey Perl explores the possibility that the fear of anomie (“anomiphobia”) is misplaced. He argues that, in comparison with the violence and narrowness of any given social order, anomie may well be preferable, (...) and, in any case, may be no more than another name for quietism. (shrink)

The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was one of the most destructive in recent history. Scientists attributed the hurricanes’ increased intensity, frequency, duration, and reach to climate change (Sn...

Importance: Given the importance of apathy for stroke, we felt it was time to scrutinize the psychometric properties of the commonly used Starkstein Apathy Scale for this purpose.Objectives: The objectives were to: estimate the extent to which the SAS items fit a hierarchical continuum of the Rasch Model; and estimate the strength of the relationships between the Rasch analyzed SAS and converging constructs related to stroke outcomes.Methods: Data was from a clinical trial of a community-based intervention targeting participation. (...) A total of 857 SAS questionnaires were completed by 238 people with stroke from up to 5 time points. SAS has 14 items, rated on a 4-point scale with higher values indicating more apathy. Psychometric properties were tested using Rasch partial-credit model, correlation, and regression. Items were rescored so higher scores are interpreted as lower apathy levels.Results: Rasch analysis indicated that the response options were disordered for 8/14 items, pointing to unreliability in the interpretation of the response options; they were consequently reduced from 4 to 3. Only 9/14 items fit the Rasch model and therefore suitable for creating a total score. The new rSAS was deemed unidimensional. Apathy was correlated weakly with anxiety/depression and uncorrelated with physical capacity. Regression showed that the effect of apathy on participation and health perception was similar for rSAS/SAS versions: R2 participation measures ranged from 0.11 to 0.29; R2 for health perception was ∼0.25. When placed on the same scale, rSAS value was 6.5 units lower than SAS value with minimal floor/ceiling effects. Estimated change over time was identical which was not substantial but greater than expected assuming no change.Conclusion: The retained items of the rSAS targeted domains of behaviors more than beliefs and results support the rSAS as a robust measure of apathy in people with chronic stroke. (shrink)

Psychological questions within philosophical ethics, although very often deeply distrusted, are justified if we presume the ultimate unity of the ethical and psychosocial subject. Such questions are especially well-grounded when we deal with a philosophy that is as practical as Stoicism. Because of both their contents and origins, the theories of values and emotions proposed by this ancient school may attract the suspicious attention of psychologists. For there are good reasons to suggest that the ideas in question were neurotic – (...) that they arose from and caused neurosis. This hypothesis can be verified within the framework of Paul Tillich’s multidisciplinary conception of neurosis. After a somewhat more detailed analysis, it turns out that the Stoic conception is in principle neither the result nor the cause of neurotic disturbances. Furthermore, it seems that it is quite the contrary – it causes people to flourish psychologically and existentially. It must nevertheless be emphasized that Stoic philosophy, if misunderstood or led astray, still might become neurotic in character. (shrink)

Ghosn, Margaret Whether we acknowledge a God who sees all, or reject a God of history, there is meaning to be sought in the calamities of life. The fundamental question begins not with denying God, but with challenging the image of God. I argue for a God of all, despite evidence to the contrary, including prolific atheist arguments, the sweeping invasion of Islamic extremism, and apathetic attitudes of Christians today, and I do this firstly through a rebuttal of atheist arguments, (...) particularly in regard to morality and the role of science. Secondly, I use the book of Job as a reference point to discuss the God challenge, with a focus on human responsibility and the place of humans in the world. I propose that humans see the world evolving with purpose and that, in today's society, there is a God calling us to respond with conscious awareness. (shrink)

As we all know, people often do not do what would be the rational thing to do. Both psychologists and philosophers have long been interested in explaining this aspect of the human condition. Also, the relation between everyday irrationality and pathological breakdowns of rationality is a familiar topic of discussion in psychiatry. It is not merely the failures themselves that present interesting questions; there is also the hope that, by understanding when and why we violate rational norms, we might get (...) a firmer grasp on what it means to meet such norms, and thus gain a deeper understanding of the rational capacities of human beings. The capacity we focus on herein is our capacity for practical rationality... (shrink)

This paper studies the attempts (and failure) of Russian revolutionaries to mobilize the peasantry in the decade leading to the Soviet revolution of 1917. Peasants, who had been emancipated from serfdom only four decades earlier, in 1861, were still largely propertyless and poor. This would, at first glance, make them a ripe target for revolutionary activity. But peasants were largely refractory. We explain this lack of revolutionary spirit through two models. First, despite their lack of education and political awareness, the (...) peasants were rational in their refusal to participate in revolutionary activity; they engaged in a cost–benefit calculus which pushed them away from revolt and political organization. Second, based on the Wildavsky–Thompson cultural types, Russian peasants were largely fatalist: they believed they had no influence on the world, so it was not worth attempting to change it. This paper sheds light on some aspects of the Russian revolution, but also encourages further research in history and economic sociology on the interaction between culture and incentives. (shrink)

The Marquis de Sade’s work can be considered as one of the inaugural instances of a technique that, within both the philosophical and literary realm, is typical of the nineteenth century: emotional restraint. His disapproval of the rhetoric of empathy and moral sentimentalism assumes particular relevance in that it is an “internal” critique. Availing himself of certain characteristic premises of the sentimentalist philosophy—which are primarily attributable to the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau—Sade completely changes their conclusions, to the point of reaching (...) a conscious form of immoralism. This immoralism can be interpreted as a systematic overturning of the morale larmoyante, exalted in late eighteenth-century... (shrink)

The general argument of this book is easily stated: utopian thinking plays an essential role in all types of transformative politics. For a variety of reasons, however, utopian thinking has become virtually impossible in contemporary Western societies. Therefore, in these societies, transformative politics have almost completely disappeared and been replaced by a narrow form of interest group politics. Jacoby assumes that the disappearance of transformative politics represents a grave failure of modern society, but it is not clear why he believes (...) this is so. Moreover, throughout the book Jacoby assumes that the left has a monopoly on transformative politics, but this too is never argued. (shrink)

When a term is used in science, we tend to integrate its origins, functions, and history to see if the term is a scientific one or comes from other fields. The term «empathy» is an example to such a case. This article challenges the widespread view that empathy is the capability of a person to understand emotions and thoughts of others. We will deconstruct the concept of empathy as an academic one by focusing on its limits. We will discuss the (...) possibility of empathy for humans in critically reconstructing the meaning of the word and its meanings from its ancient origins to contemporary research. Our question is centered on cognitive actions that enable empathy as an emotional way of understanding others. Based on our findings, we argue that the concept of empathy is a recently established academic term. As a concept, it matches with some alternative concepts such as apathy and sympathy. In rhetoric, it is the pathos of the speech that affects the speaker by emotions since no specific receptive ability of the speaker is needed. Similarly, when we use the term empathy, we should use it as a category of the sender, not that of the receiver. This concept of logical empathy opposes to the classical view of empathy studies emphasizing that empathy is a receptive category of the receiver. So, empathy is nothing else but the ability to send emotional or intellectual content suitable to a capable receiver. Also, the comparative study in the concept of empathy in Buddhism gives us evidence that empathy is a spiritual or mental concept whose applications are in the area of pre-linguistic states and esoteric contexts. In rhetorical terms we could define it as a persuasive mood of pathos-driven speech. (shrink)

Sometimes, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems like a demand to have that attitude. But in other cases, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems more like a permission to have the attitude. I defend a proposal that can accommodate both of these appearances. I argue that there is a kind of emotionlessness, which I call apathy, that can be fitting or unfitting in just the same way that emotion can. I further argue that, in some (...) cases, it can be fitting to respond a single object either with emotion or with apathy. When both apathy and emotion are fitting options, the fittingness of the emotion is a permission-like status; failures to have the fitting emotion are not failures of fit. But when an emotion is fitting and apathy is unfitting, the fittingness of the emotion is a demand-like status; failures to have the emotion are failures of fit. (shrink)

This paper begins by drawing attention to inadequacies in common characterizations of the vice of complacency. An alternative account is presented that avoids these flaws. The distinctive nature of complacency is then clarified by contrasting it with related vices, including apathy, resignation, akrasia, excessive pride, and hypocrisy.

I examine the significance of the Stoic theory of pathē for Kant’s moral psychology, arguing against the received view that systematic differences block the possibility of Kant’s drawing anything more than rhetoric from his Stoic sources. More particularly, I take on the chronically underexamined assumption that Kant is committed to a psychological dualism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, positing distinct rational and nonrational elements of human mentality. By contrast, Stoics take the mentality of an adult human being to (...) be rational through and through, while recognising that this rationality is not normally in a state of health or excellence. I show how Kant’s account of affections—chiefly the “affects” and “passions” that he identifies as targets of a duty of apathy—draws substantive lessons from his Stoic sources, and how he accepts on his own terms the monistic principles of Stoic moral psychology. (shrink)