This is, of course, a philosophical question, but it is one that I hope to undercut in this paper, by directing attention away from it to what I think is the more basic question, what are the conditions of order, whether the latter be something that arises in a mind by reason of its habits of analysis and synthesis, or whether it be something inherent in nature and discovered directly? It is, however, necessary to assume that order can (...) be recognized, whatever its origin, and while there is much evidence to suggest that men can be made more sensitive to order through training, I think it must be admitted that even the untrained can recognize order in many situations. I shall therefore make use of the phrases "intuitive order," and "the intuitive recognition of order," to apply to those cases in which order is recognized without the presence in consciousness of explicit principles of order. In other words, I assume that order reveals itself. If it did not, it would be difficult to understand how principles of order ever came to be recognized, for it is only on analysis of a given order that they come to consciousness. (shrink)

Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the (...) Problem of Differential Application. I also examine four main existing strategies to solve it. In Section 3, I develop my argument. The first step consists in arguing that—among those strategies—relationism can only accept directionalism. The second step consists in arguing that directionalism is affected by a serious problem: the Problem of Converses. I also show that relationists who embrace directionalism cannot solve this problem. In Section 4, I introduce and rebut several strategies on behalf of relationists to cope with my argument. In Section 5, I briefly draw some conclusions. (shrink)

This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with (...) regards to P, then one is not justified in having any attitude towards P. Otherwise put: No attitude towards the doubted proposition respects one’s higher-order doubt. I argue that the most promising response to this problem is to hold that when one has a higher-order doubt about P, the best one can do to respect such a doubt is to simply have no attitude towards P. Higher-order doubt is thus much more rationally corrosive than non-higher-order doubt, as it undermines the possibility of justifiably having any attitude towards the doubted proposition. (shrink)

Jens Beckert’s 2009 article on the constitution and dynamics of markets is a bold attempt to define a novel research agenda. Deeming uncertainty and coordination essential for the constitution of social action in markets, Beckert proposes a framework centered on the resolution of three coordination problems: valuation, cooperation, and competition. The empirical study of these three coordination problems has the potential to contribute considerably to the sociological analysis of markets. However, the assertion that such a theoretical vantage point can explain (...) the constitution and dynamics of markets is not compelling because it (1) conflates social interaction with social structures, (2) fails to address power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures, and (3) neglects the historically contingent and socially contested nature of markets themselves. The present article shows that these three pitfalls are the result of starting from the problem of order and building upon uncertainty as the basis of action in markets, lending the suggested framework a methodologically individualist bent. Therefore, Beckert’s suggested framework is in danger of mystifying the very power relations, institutions, and macro-level structures that are at the heart of the constitution and dynamics of markets. (shrink)

In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego Freud addresses the problem of how groups are formed or of how society is possible. The question of the possibility of society presupposes that in some sense human beings are not thoroughly social beings, that they must agree to or be made to participate in a common life in which they submit to general principles regulating their conduct towards one another. The notion that the grounds for social order cannot (...) be taken for granted originates in the beginnings of modern thought, particularly in Hobbes’ Leviathan, in which the classical idea that human beings are essentially social and political animals is rejected in favor of the view that the individual is in a basic sense independent of society and opposed to it, and that society is merely a conventional unity. For Hobbes, society is primarily a defensive alliance guaranteed by fear of a sovereign who constitutes a legal order. Social order, then, is imposed externally on the individual, who submits to regulation only on the basis of prudence. The history of thought about the problem of order after Hobbes’ initial attempt to resolve it is a development of more refined motives for obedience, which culminates in Kant's notion of a self-legislated moral law. The importance of Kant's solution is that it provides a positive ground for society. Human beings do not merely submit to standards because they are inclined to, either out of fear or out of desire, but because they acknowledge a rational principle to which they give their voluntary assent. For Hobbes, society is at least an imposition and at most an expedient. For Kant, society may, indeed, be both an imposition and an expedient, but it is also an order of life that might be perfected. In Kant's view, human beings are imperfectly rational beings, not organisms entirely ruled by pleasure and pain, as they were for Hobbes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For once, (...) Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)

The problem of higher-order misrepresentation poses a dilemma for the higher-order theory of consciousness. The two ways of conceiving of the theory each run into a different difficulty raised by the problem of misrepresentation. If the theory is conceived relationally, i.e., conceived so as the higher-order state causes or makes a first-order state conscious, then the theory faces a problem raised by Block concerning the implausibility of non-existent conscious states. If conceived non-relationally, i.e., (...) conceived in such a way as it is the higher-order state itself which is the conscious state, then consideration of Neander’s original misrepresentation problem, that this seems to make the first-order state a spinning wheel in the explanation of consciousness, raises the conceptual problem that this version of the higher-order theory seems not to offer a philosophical theory of consciousness that is distinct from the first-order theory. (shrink)

The social sciences playa variety of multifaceted roles in the policymaking process. So varied are these roles, indeed, that it is futile to talk in the singular about the use of social science in policymaking, as if there were one constant relationship between two fixed and stable entities. Instead, to address this issue sensibly one must talk in the plural about uses of dif ferent modes of social scientific inquiry for different kinds of policies under various circumstances. In some cases, (...) the influence of social scientific research is direct and tangible, and the connection between the find ings and the policy is easy to see. In other cases, perhaps most, its influence is indirect-one small piece in a larger mosaic of politics, bargaining, and compromise. Occasionally the findings of social scientific studies are explicitly drawn upon by policymakers in the formation, implementation, or evaluation of particular policies. More often, the categories and theoretical models of social science provide a general background orientation within which policymakers concep tualize problems and frame policy options. At times, the in fluence of social scientific work is cognitive and informational in nature; in other instances, policymakers use social science primarily for symbolic and political purposes in order to le gitimate preestablished goals and strategies. Nonetheless, amid this diversity and variety, troubling general questions persistently arise. (shrink)

The paper discusses one of the central problems of contemporary formal semantics — counterexamples to the predictions of the theory of binding (due to N. Chomsky). In particular, the author addresses cases of the so-called coreferential readings of reflexive pronouns which are standardly predicted to receive only the bound reading. The author examines theories of T. Reinhart and I. Heim and suggests an extension ofthe latter theory in order to enable it to account for the aforementioned readings of reflexive (...) pronouns. (shrink)

One of the distinctive features of the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU was the extreme attention devoted to the theoretical and practical problems of perfecting socialism. Guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, the Congress underscored particularly that fidelity to this theory consists not in repeating the classical postulates and conclusions of Marxism, but in its creative development on the basis of accumulated experience. The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Twenty-seventh Congress contained the following statement by Lenin: "'Our theory (...) is not a dogma but a guide to action.' This is what Marx and Engels always said in justly ridiculing the rote memorization and simple repetition of ‘formulas’ capable in the best of cases of only marking out general tasks, which must undergo modifications in accordance with the concrete economic and political circumstances of every particular phase of the historical process.". (shrink)

Abstract -/- The indistinction between repose and uniform movement exposed in the principle of inertia marks one of the most famous dissertations: the discussion between Newton and Leibniz. Through their respective conceptions of space, both seek to solve the problem of indistinction. The relational space of Leibniz, supported by the principle of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles leads to the kinematic solution of the problem of inertia. The objective of this paper is to show the contribution (...) of Leibniz, in terms of relations of order, by distinguishing between equality by identity and equality by equivalence. Under a philosophical approach we link identity, equivalence and equality as relations of order with the indiscernibility between different states of movement. We expose first the principle of sufficient reason and the identity of indiscernibles. Under Bernoulli's principle of indifference, we argue that we distinguish between equality in abstract and equality in concrete. As a third part, we present the relationship between the identity of the indiscernibles and the predicate of equality under logical analysis. Finally we present the conclusions. -/- . (shrink)

In the 1950s and 1960s Freudian theory was deemed to be a vital part of the sociological tradition, but since then it has fallen from favor, largely because of the simplifications and misinterpretations both by Freud's sociological critics and by his supporters. Chief among such misunderstandings is the tendency to view Freud's social theory as a variant of that of Hobbes, in which a selfish and asocial human nature is made social through the imposition of external constraints; these constraints, as (...) Durkheim stated, eventually are "internalized" into the personalities of social beings. Against such a claim this paper argues that Freud's views differ profoundly from those of Hobbes and that the myth of the Hobbesian Freud has so distorted Freud's most fundamental concepts that their social theoretical significance has been largely obscured. (shrink)

Although eighteenth-century Federalists, including James Madison, have been associated with the very contemporary idea of a transnational political order, the argument that the modern state with its centralised authority and supreme power poses a threat to liberty was already a subject of discussions during the period. The American Constitution was intended to establish a new political order, rather than a loose federation or an enlarged state. The Framers were not alone in their preoccupation with a transnational order; (...) the German philosopher Immanuel Kant struggled with the same issues of liberty and security in his political essays. This chapter examines how Madison and Kant grapppled with the problem of transnational order in the context of democracy and republicanism. It looks at the issues addressed by Kant and Madison that are closely related to those discussed today, including diversity, popular sovereignty and political violence. The chapter suggests that Kant and Madison, along with many other republicans of the time, explored the idea of government without resorting to the models of small-scale, ancient republics. (shrink)

To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency (...) among adherents of different faith traditions to invoke asymmetric explanations of the religious value or salvific status of the home religion vis-à-vis all others. Attributions of good/bad religious luck and exclusivist dismissal of the significance of religious disagreement are the central phenomena that the book studies. Part I lays out a taxonomy of kinds of religious luck, a taxonomy that draws upon but extends work on moral and epistemic luck. It asks: What is going on when persons, theologies, or purported revelations ascribe various kinds of religiously-relevant traits to insiders and outsiders of a faith tradition in sharply asymmetric fashion? “I am saved but you are lost”; “My religion is holy but yours is idolatrous”; “My faith tradition is true, and valued by God, but yours is false and valueless.” Part II further develops the theory introduced in Part I, pushing forward both the descriptive/explanatory and normative sides of what the author terms his inductive risk account. Firstly, the concept of inductive risk is shown to contribute to the needed field of comparative fundamentalism by suggesting new psychological markers of fundamentalist orientation. The second side of what is termed an inductive risk account is concerned with the epistemology of religious belief, but more especially with an account of the limits of reasonable religious disagreement. Problems of inductively risky modes of belief-formation problematize claims to religion-specific knowledge. But the inductive risk account does not aim to set religion apart, or to challenge the reasonableness of religious belief tout court. Rather the burden of the argument is to challenge the reasonableness of attitudes of religious exclusivism, and to demotivate the “polemical apologetics” that exclusivists practice and hope to normalize. Lexington Books Pages: 290 978-1-4985-5017-8 • Hardback • December 2018 • $95.00 • (£65.00) 978-1-4985-5018-5 • eBook • December 2018 • $90.00 • (£60.00) ISBN 978-1-4985-5018-5 (pbk: alk. paper) (coming 2020) [Download the 30% personal use Discount Order Form I uploaded for hardcover or e-book, and please ask your library to purchase a copy for their collection.]. (shrink)

The problem of social order is the question of what holds complex and diverse societies together. Today, this question has become increasingly urgent in the world. Yet our ability to ask and answer the question in a helpful way is constrained by the intellectual legacy through which the question has been handed down to us. In this impressive, erudite study, Henrik Enroth describes and analyzes how the problem of social order has shaped concept formation, theory, and (...) normative arguments in political science. The book covers a broad range of influential thinkers and theories throughout the history of political science, from the early twentieth century onwards. Social order has long been a presupposition for inquiry in political science; now we face the challenge of turning it into an object of inquiry. (shrink)

PARTI The Problem of Method 1.1 Any discussion of order in past centuries was based on the conviction that the various real phenomena studied could be ...

The “Problem of the Rock” (PoR) is a famous objection to Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness. According to PoR, the HO theorists’ claim that a mental state is conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it implies that a rock is also conscious iff there is a higher-order mental state about it. In this paper I show that this argument confuses two grammatically distinct attributions of consciousness, and that if the consequent equivocation fallacy is (...) avoided, PoR is either a straw man argument or has an unproblematic conclusion. (shrink)

Although some critics of Eric Voegelin’s later work have faulted his failure to deal with the historical Jesus and to address the implications of Christianity for social and political life, the recent publication of Voegelin’s _History of Political Ideas_ has allowed a more complete assessment of his position regarding the Christian political order. This book addresses that criticism through an analysis of Voegelin’s early work. In _Eric Voegelin and the Problem of Christian Political Order_, Jeffrey C. Herndon analyzes (...) the development of Voegelin’s thought regarding the origins of Christianity in the person of Jesus, the development of the church in the works of Paul, and the relationship between an immanent institutional order symbolizing the divine presence and the struggle for social and political order. Focusing on the tension between a spiritual phenomenon based on Pauline faith and the institutionalization of that experience in the church, Herndon offers one of the first examinations of the relationship of the _History of Political Ideas_ to Voegelin’s larger body of work. In his wide-ranging study, Herndon explores Voegelin’s examination of the problem of Christian political order from the inception of Christianity through the Great Reformation. He also presents a clarification of Voegelin’s theory of civilizational foundation and of Voegelin’s philosophy of history with regard to Christianity and Western political order. Herndon addresses not only the nagging problem in Voegelin scholarship regarding his relationship with the historical Jesus but also the “Pauline compromises with the world” that enabled Christianity to become the instrument by which the West was civilized. He also shows that Voegelin’s interpretation of the historical pressures released by the Great Reformation is important to an understanding of his later work regarding the negative effect of Christian symbols in the creation of ideological disorder. _Eric Voegelin and the Problem of Christian Political Order_ clarifies issues in Voegelin studies regarding the intersection between political theory and Christian concerns, addressing the relation of religious experience to the public sphere of political life in the West and helping to explain Voegelin’s contention that the death of the spirit is the price of progress. It offers scholars a perspective heretofore lacking in Voegelin scholarship and a clearer view of Voegelin’s understanding of the Christian dispensation and its influence on the course of Western development, history, and philosophy. (shrink)

The target article proposes that people perceive social robots as depictions rather than as genuine social agents. We suggest that people might instead view social robots as social agents, albeit agents with more restricted capacities and moral rights than humans. We discuss why social robots, unlike other kinds of depictions, present a special challenge for testing the depiction hypothesis.

Robb & Heil describe a higher-order version of the popular Causal Exclusion Problem. In particular, they ask whether the argument that led to a change in focus from event causation to causal relevance of properties can be iterated, leading us to focus on the causal relevance of properties of those properties, or properties of properties of those properties, and so on. In this paper, I investigate this curious higher-order problem and argue that the appeal of both (...) the original argument and its iterations reflects a lack of understanding of causal relata and a problem with the notion of causal relevance. (shrink)

This article discusses the issue of arrangement /ordering of compulsory-comprehensive maqāsid. In this respect, the main purpose is to help clarify the ordering problem. To accomplish this task, the classical and contemporary studies on this subject were reviewed. Within the scope of this research, it has been determined that the universal principles are generally listed in the order of religion, nafs, mind, generation and property. However, alternative orderings can be found where the nafs is placed at the forefront. (...) The focal point of the ordering problem is emerges from the question of whether Allah's rights/otherworldly maqāsid should be priorities or servants' rights/worldly maqāsid. The conflict between religion, which is an otherworldly value, and other principles played an active role in this classification of maqāsid. Many legal scholars who placed religion in the first place in the classical period did not clearly explained the justification of their arrangement. Also, many of today's researchers also stated that religion should come first. The scholars who put both the religion and the nafs in the center have listed many evidence for their preference. The legal scholars who put religion at the center have pointed the verse " I have not created the jinn and men but they may worship Me" as the basis for their views. Accordingly, the main purpose of the creation of human being is to serve Allah. Because the most important right to be fulfilled is the right of Allah religion should take precedence over other virtues in maqasid. Religion is also the only essential way that leads to eternal happiness. According to the legal scholars who put religion into the center, other maqasid principles are secondary. Correlatively, other principles serve religion. The hadith "The debt to Allah is more worthy of being paid." has been made the basis. Since religion constitutes the essence of the maqāsid, it is also a requirement of reason to make religion essential. According to another reason they stated, the obligation of jihad also ensures that religion is at the center. The obligation of jihad causes lives to be sacrificed to protect the religion. This means that religion is superior to the nafs and other principles. Because jihad, which is the order of religion, is fard. The scholars who maintain that the rights of the servants should take precedence over the right of Allah have cited also a lot of evidence. We come across with their views presented as a weak view in the sources or as an answer to a possible question. There is no clear information about to whom these views belong. Therefore, it is stated that no one introduces the nafs to religion. As a matter of fact, it is stated that it is not correct to qualify these views as an independent view defended by scholars. In other words, the view putting the nafs at the center and the evidence to this preference at this point should be regarded as hypothetical. We are of the view that these claims of contemporary writers need to be proven. The basic reason of the views that puts the nafs in the center is based on the pre-acceptance that maslahahs like the nafs are the right of servants while religion is the right of Allah. The given reasons can be addressed under three main headings: punishments, mitigation of prayers, and concern with non-Muslims. In case where the rights of the servant and Allah unite, the rights of the servant should be preferred. Because, the rights of servants are on hardship, and the rights of Allah are on breadth and mercy. On the contrary to the rights of the servants, postponing or neglecting the right of Allah will not harm Allah. It is clear that if the rights of the servants face postponement, they will suffer serious damage. The fact that killing a man who both abandoned his religion and killed someone unfairly, not for his departure from religion, but for retaliation, that is, the right of a servant, is a concrete example of this. The shortening of the prayer during the journey, the patient’s abandoning standing in prayer and the fasting, and other examples also require the human to be in the center. Today, there are researchers who take the nafs to the center. The existence of religion for humans and society reflects the view of these researchers. Because it is clear that religion will remain dysfunctional where there is no human and society. When these evidences are examined carefully, it can be concluded that the opinion that defends the nafs to be at the center of comprehensive maqāsid is preferable. (shrink)

In this book the author analyzes the work of physicists, mathematicians, biologists, historians, and philosophers in order to discover the principles that underlie their various ways of knowing and in terms of which they describe the ...

Systems exhibiting relationships between mental states and material states, briefly mind-matter systems, offer epistemological and methodological problems exceeding those of systems with mental states or material states alone. Some of these problems can be addressed by proceeding from standard firstorder approaches to more sophisticated second-order approaches. These can illuminate questions of reference and validity, and their ramifications for the topic of reproducibility. For various situations in complex systems it is shown that second-order approaches need to be employed. Considering (...) mind-matter systems as generalized complex systems provides some guidelines for analyzing the problem of reproducibility in such systems from a novel perspective. (shrink)

This paper uses the resources of higher-order logic to articulate a Fregean conception of predicate reference, and of word-world relations more generally, that is immune to the concept horse problem. The paper then addresses a prominent style of expressibility problem for views of broadly this kind, versions of which are due to Linnebo, Hale, and Wright.

As the foundation of our rationality, logic has traditionally been considered fixed, stable and constant. This conception of the discipline has been challenged recently by the plurality of logics and in this book, Pavel Arazim extends the debate to offer a new view of logic as dynamic and without a definite, specific shape. The Problem of Plurality of Logics examines the origins of our standard view of logic alongside Kant's theories, the holistic view, the issue of logic's pragmatic significance (...) and Robert Brandom's logical expressivism. Arazim then draws on proof-theoretical approaches to present a convincing argument for a dynamic version of logical inferentialism, which opens space for a new freedom to modify our own logic. He explores the scope, possibilities and limits of this freedom in order to highlight the future paths logic could take, as a motivation for further research. Marking a departure from logical monism and also from the recent doctrine of logical pluralism in its various forms, this book addresses current debates concerning the expressive role of logic and contributes to a lively area of discussion in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

'China, by her resources and her population, is capable of being the greatest power in the world after the United States.' Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China In 1920 the philosopher Bertrand Russell spent a year in China as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Beijing, where his lectures on mathematical logic enthralled students and listeners, including Mao Tse Tung, who attended some of Russell's talks. Written at a time when China was largely regarded by the West as (...) backward and weak, The Problem of China sees Russell rise above the prejudices of his era and presciently assess China's past, present and future. Russell brings his analytical and insightful eye to bear on some fundamental aspects of China's history and politics, cautioning China against adopting a purely Western model of social and economic development, which he regarded as characterized by a combination of greed and militarism. Beginning with an overview of nineteenth-century Chinese history and considering China's relations with Japan and Russia, Russell then contrasts Chinese civilization with Western. He devotes a fascinating chapter to the character of the Chinese, which he argues is complex but ultimately defined by a 'pacific temper'. With uncanny foresight, Russell predicts China's resurgence, but only if it is able to establish an orderly government, promote industrial development under Chinese control and foster the spread of education. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new introduction by Bernard Linsky. (shrink)

One merit claimed for john rawls's coherence method, Wide reflective equilibrium, Is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. The two tiered conception of philosophical method is not limited to ethics. The most detailed exposition of the conception can be found in r m chisholm's various discussions of the problem of the criterion. While chisholm's work has played (...) a major role in structuring the way epistemologists think about method, It has not similarly influenced the deliberations of moral theorists. But moral philosophers are not the only ones with myopia, For neither rawls's coherentist method nor classical moral intuitionism figure in chisholm's taxonomy. One aim is to correct the vision of both parties by expanding chisholm's taxonomy in order to make clear how intuitionism and rawls's coherentist method are related to the methods identified by chisholm. My other aim is to argue for coherentism of the sort defended by rawls against the other non-Skeptical methods I consider. (shrink)