ABSTRACT An ontological analysis of time and of serial order is offered within the framework of a comprehensive ontology wherein the category of facts plays a crucial role. It is applied to distinguish them while various ways and contexts in which both have been mixed up in past and in present philosophy are discussed. The good reasons for that mix-up and the astonishing difficulty of keeping them apart are considered. The focus is more on the ontology of order than on (...) the ontology of time. The latter is too wide a subject. It turns out that order has not really been grounded even in set theory. The ontology of serial order expounded is new. It is also needed for the adequate ontological analysis of relational facts. (shrink)

The relation between universal and particular is considered to be the Achilles’ heel of universal realism. However, modern universal realism with facts does not have the difficulties which traditional Platonic universal realism had. Its exemplification relation connecting particulars and universals in atomic facts is very different from Platonic participation. Bradley’s regress argument against the exemplification relation can be refuted in two different ways. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to avoid the assumption of an exemplification relation and thus to go without (...) the Achilles’ heel altogether. (shrink)

Parmenides advances four arguments against becoming. Two of these are sound. Plato's and Aristotle's attempt to refute them fail. They react to Parmenides' challenge by differentiating and grading being and existence. Thus they deviate from Parmenides' strict concept of existence which is the only reasonable one. What's wrong with Parmenides' train of thought is a decisive premise: that becoming is a transition from non-existence to existence. The reality of becoming can be maintained if this premise is given up. One has (...) to see that becoming is a purely temporal affair not involving existence and that existence is timeless. Time and existence are independent of each other. (shrink)

The distinctions between A-series and B-series, between synchronic and diachronic identity and between perdurance and endurance are basic in the philosophy of time; yet they are flawed. McTaggart’s claim that the B-series is static and that a series has to be changing to be really temporal arises from a misunderstanding of temporal relations and of the task of ontological analysis. The dynamic appearance of the A-series results from the incompleteness of the analysis. “Synchronic identity” is synonymous with “strict identity”, which (...) has nothing to do with simultaneity. “Diachronic Identity” is another designation for persistence of an ordinary thing through time and change. Now, strict self-identity holds independently of whether a thing has a short or a long duration. Hence, diachronic identity is synchronic identity. Lewis’ distinguishes two kinds of ontological analyses of persistence, the perdurance and the endurance analysis. This dichotomy is in several respects not exhaustive. Above all, his definition of “persist” is inadequate being based on the notion of multiple temporal localisation which is apt with interrupted but misplaced with persistent, i.e., temporally continuous objects. (shrink)

Diversity, more often called numerical difference, is all-embracing and ubiquitous. Any entity (existent) of whatever category is diverse from any entity else. Diversity is also ontologically primary. All determinations depend upon it. Therefore, it is mistaken to define diversity as qualitative difference. Such a defintion is circular since qualitative difference is nothing but diversity of properties. This may be called into question by someone who conceives of qualitative difference in terms of negation.

El artículo discute el papel tanto de las categorías supremas como el de las subcategorías a partir de la tradicional distinción aristotélica entre una división mínima y una división máxima del ente. Señala que para determinar las categorías son necesarias las propiedades categoriales. Se argumenta que un existente no puede poseer dos propiedades esenciales de tipo categorial, mientras que solo las subcategorías más bajas en la escala poseen propiedades categoriales simples. Se señala, además, que las categorías y las subcategorías se (...) organizan en un árbol según una cierta unidad y que, por el contrario, los conceptos no se jerarquizan necesariamente formando un árbol. También se analizan las dificultades que Porfirio y Simplicio encontraron en la división mínima y máxima de Aristóteles. Finalmente, el artículo critica el modo en que Aristóteles evita, a través de la abstracción, la referencia a las propiedades categoriales. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAristotle submits to Parmenides’ criterion of simplicity and he tries to cope with the phenomena of complexity by grading ontological status. He lowers the ontological status of accidents because of their dependence using another of Parmenides’ criteria, namely that of independence. Later Aristotle introduced potentiality to keep a simple substance by allowing for implicit complexity. He also prevented first matter from disturbing the simplicity of substance by denying it any ontological status. In the fourteenth century a really simple substance was (...) achieved by Occam by transferring all accidents and even the essence as concepts into the mind. That was a specious solution of the problem of complexity. Epistemology cannot solve ontological problems. The more satisfactory alternative is to admit explicit complexes. Parmenides’ argument against complexity is not sound. One can credit Meinong for being the first to make that move. My own ontology has explicit complexes, namely facts. (shrink)

Bergmann advocated a universal realism different from that of Plato. His universals are different, and the fundamental tie connecting universals to particulars is also in many respects different from Plato's participation. Since Bergmann takes universals to be perceptible, it makes sense to argue empirically for the existence of the fundamental tie of exemplification. He holds that exemplification ties universals and particulars together into facts. However, finally he drops fundamental ties and attributes to diads of diversity the togetherness of universals and (...) particulars, though he is very reluctant to give up the principle that complexes need ties to give them unity. Analyzing the ontological tradition, Bergmann claims that it mostly mistook a function for a fundamental tie. (shrink)

Gustav Bergmann was, arguably, the greatest ontologist of the twentieth century in pursuing the fundamental questions of first philosophy as deeply as any philosopher of any time. In 2006 and 2007, international conferences devoted solely to Bergmann's work were held at the University of Iowa in the USA, Université de Provence in France, and Università degli Studi Roma Tre in Italy. The papers in this volume were presented at the first of these conferences, in Iowa City, where Bergmann taught for (...) nearly four decades after escaping from Europe, following the dissolution of the Vienna Circle of which he had been the youngest member. There are nine philosophical papers, reminiscences of three of his students, and a complete bibliography of his published writings. (shrink)

Meinong's realist theory of measurement is brought up against the presently dominating positivist and operationalist view. His criticism of 19th century positivist analysis of measurement (J. v. Kries) turns out to be pertinent to modern model-theoretic analysis (Suppes and Zinnes). Meinong's ontology of quantities as well as his view of associative and derived measurement is confronted with the operational analysis. The positivist cannot make sense of measurement error and tries to push it aside. In Meinong's view it is pivotal. This (...) view harmonises with the practice of measurement where error is used as a means of gaining knowledge. Starting from Meinong and his pupil Mally a more adequate theory of measurement could be developed. (shrink)

In his book Realism, dedicated to the “The Glorious Memory of Alexius Meinong” and devoted to complexity, Gustav Bergmann claims that in Meinong’s ontology there are no complexes. Bergmann judges Meinong’s solution of the ontological problem of complexity, a problem he considers pivotal, to have failed. How can he, nevertheless, praise Meinong, which he does not only in the dedication? This is because Bergmann thinks that Meinong comes very close to the right ontological analysis of complexes which was a rare (...) achievement in his time. (shrink)

Meinertsen’s unifier is discussed on the background of Aristotle’s distinction between four kinds of unity. It argued that Meinertsen combines two different kinds of unity that exclude each other. Only Aristotle’s first meaning of unity seems to be relevant for Meinertsen’s unifier. But this meaning applies literally only to spatial complexes. Its application to states of affairs is problematic because they are mostly not spatial. It is also problematic because unity in the first sense requires an agent. Meinertsen’s unifiers are (...) connectors between particulars and universals in states of affairs. It is objected that connectors in a state of affairs lead to a vicious infinite regress of further states of affairs. Meinertsen argues for his unifiers that states of affairs without them are non-mereological, that is, their existence is not entailed by the existence of their constituents. That does not seem a good argument if it is realised that a complex is not an additional entity and thus not existent if the existence of its parts is sufficient for its existence. It is also pointed out that the meaning of “mereological” involved is not related to the classical mereological calculus. (shrink)

Meinong's realist theory of measurement is brought up against the presently dominating positivist and operationalist view. His criticism of 19th century positivist analysis of measurement turns out to be pertinent to modern model-theoretic analysis. Meinong's ontology of quantities as well as his view of associative and derived measurement is confronted with the operational analysis. The positivist cannot make sense of measurement error and tries to push it aside. In Meinong's view it is pivotal. This view harmonises with the practice of (...) measurement where error is used as a means of gaining knowledge. Starting from Meinong and his pupil Mally a more adequate theory of measurement could be developed. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird versucht, die ethische Dimension des Existenzbegriffs, wie sie mit dem Ausdruck ‚authentisch sein‘ angesprochen wird, näher zu bestimmen. Während in Bezug auf Artefakte Authentizität gemeinhin als Echtheit hinsichtlich einer feststellbaren Autorschaft konzipiert wird, erweist sich die Authentizität von Personen und ihren Handlungsweisen als Ergebnis eines zusätzlichen eigenständigen Aktes der Aneignung. Personale Authentizität zeigt sich damit als Ausdrucksform real existierender Autonomie.

Ich bin ein Überläufer gewesen, von Habermas zu Albert. Damals gab es doch die Front im sogenannten Positivismusstreit: Adorno gegen Popper und Habermas gegen Albert. Die Angreifer saßen tatsächlich in Frankfurt.

In his book Realism, dedicated to the “The Glorious Memory of Alexius Meinong” and devoted to complexity, Gustav Bergmann claims that in Meinong’s ontology there are no complexes. Bergmann judges Meinong’s solution of the ontological problem of complexity, a problem he considers pivotal, to have failed. How can he, nevertheless, praise Meinong, which he does not only in the dedication? This is because Bergmann thinks that Meinong comes very close to the right ontological analysis of complexes which was a rare (...) achievement in his time. (shrink)