8 found
Order:
See also
  1.  20
    Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem.Graham Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about the hard problem of consciousness arise non-inferentially as a result of introspection. I raise two problems for such a non-inferentialist view of the metaproblem. It does not seem to match the psychological facts about how we come to the realization of the hard problem, and it is unclear how the view can bridge the (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2.  48
    Reflexive Theories of Consciousness and Unconscious Perception.Graham Peebles - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):25-43.
    A core commitment of the reflexive theory of consciousness is that conscious states are themselves necessarily the contents of mental states. The strongest argument for this claim—the necessity of inner-content for consciousness—is the argument from unconscious perception. According to this argument, we find evidence for the necessity claim from cases of alleged unconscious perception, the most well-known and widely discussed of these being blindsight. However, the reflexive theory cannot partake in this argument and therefore, must rely on at least one (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  8
    The Problem of Higher-Order Misrepresentation.Graham Peebles - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    The problem of higher-order misrepresentation poses a dilemma for the higher-order theory of consciousness. The two ways of conceiving of the theory each run into a different difficulty raised by the problem of misrepresentation. If the theory is conceived relationally, i.e., conceived so as the higher-order state causes or makes a first-order state conscious, then the theory faces a problem raised by Block concerning the implausibility of non-existent conscious states. If conceived non-relationally, i.e., conceived in such a way as it (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  23
    Phenomenology and the Unity of Consciousness.Graham Peebles - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5455-5477.
    The phenomenology of the unity of consciousness can be analyzed in terms of perceptual spatial and object unity. Subject unity—what we commonly understand by “the unity of consciousness”—has no attendant phenomenology. The further, non-phenomenological, effects of unity can be analyzed in terms of the functional notion of access unity. The unity of consciousness in general can therefore be analyzed in terms of access unity. As a consequence, we can avoid the theoretical introduction of problematic notions such as subsumptive or phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  73
    Looks Indexing.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):138-152.
    Charles Travis influentially argued in “The Silence of the Senses” that the representational theory of perceptual experience is false. According to Travis, the way that things look cannot index the content of experience as the subject of the experience cannot read the content off from the way things look. This looks indexing is a central commitment of representationalism. The main thrust of Travis’ argument is that the way things look is fundamentally comparative, and this prevents the subject from reading a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  53
    Temporal Experience and Metaphysics.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):145-182.
    The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  48
    Representationalism and Blindsight.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):541-556.
    According to representationalism, phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. According to first-person reports, blindsighters have no phenomenal character in the scotoma, even though their abilities suggest that they have conscious visual representations in the scotoma. The traditional representationalist response is that the representations in the scotoma are either non-conscious or non-visual. Drawing on empirical work, I consider the interpretation that blindsighters are unable to represent—and thus lack the phenomenal character of—luminance in the scotoma. However, they maintain the capacity to represent (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  33
    Perception and Judgement.Graham Peebles - unknown
    In this thesis, I am arguing for a single claim, namely that perceptual experiences are judgements, and I am arguing for it in a very specific way. This has not been a popular theory, although some have defended similar theories. One main reason that this has been a historically unpopular theory is to do with the problems of conflicting beliefs. I can see the Müller-Lyer lines as being of different lengths, they look different lengths, and yet I know that they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark