Problems of Order.The Problem of the Organic FormThe Idea of OrderCommunication: A Logical Model

Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):84 - 108 (1964)
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Abstract

This is, of course, a philosophical question, but it is one that I hope to undercut in this paper, by directing attention away from it to what I think is the more basic question, what are the conditions of order, whether the latter be something that arises in a mind by reason of its habits of analysis and synthesis, or whether it be something inherent in nature and discovered directly? It is, however, necessary to assume that order can be recognized, whatever its origin, and while there is much evidence to suggest that men can be made more sensitive to order through training, I think it must be admitted that even the untrained can recognize order in many situations. I shall therefore make use of the phrases "intuitive order," and "the intuitive recognition of order," to apply to those cases in which order is recognized without the presence in consciousness of explicit principles of order. In other words, I assume that order reveals itself. If it did not, it would be difficult to understand how principles of order ever came to be recognized, for it is only on analysis of a given order that they come to consciousness.

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