The architectonic principle, as stated in Aristotle's Politics, is related to the arrangement of the arts, the technai, whereby it is argued that the leading art is the politike techne. Plato, in the Gorgias, has argued for an architectonic of crafts. Four technai provide the best, aei pros to beltiston therapeuousai, and they differ from the pseudo-crafts that offer pleasure while indifferent to the beltiston. The principle for arranging the architectonic is the pursuit of the best, whereby each practitioner (...) of a craft is expected to give logos concerning the "how" as well as the end of the craft. Extending the Platonic principle, Aristotle brings together under a unified theory the intelligibility of nature and human nature in line with the ends of episteme and techne, especially the politike techne. (shrink)

The architectonic principle, as stated in Aristotle's Politics, is related to the arrangement of the arts, the technai, whereby it is argued that the leading art is the politike techne. Plato, in the Gorgias, has argued for an architectonic of crafts. Four technai provide the best, aei pros to beltiston therapeuousai, and they differ from the pseudo-crafts that offer pleasure while indifferent to the beltiston. The principle for arranging the architectonic is the pursuit of the best, whereby each practitioner (...) of a craft is expected to give logos concerning the "how" as well as the end of the craft. Extending the Platonic principle, Aristotle brings together under a unified theory the intelligibility of nature and human nature in line with the ends of episteme and techne, especially the politike techne. (shrink)

El presente estudio se propone rehabilitar la fundamentación onto-teológica del Justo natural platónico y poner en evidencia su proyección en orden a, en primer lugar, la constitución de la - politike episteme - Ciencia Política, en segundo lugar, la constitución de la polis, y, en tercer lugar, la constitución del - psykhe - alma humana, desde donde nace la polis justa. La misión del verdadero filósofo-político es la de ascender hacia la contemplación del Bien Supremo y posteriormente, una (...) vez lograda la purificación de su alma - katharsis -, iniciar el descenso hacia la polis, a fin de intentar la resolución del conflico existente entre el Poder Político y la Filosofía. Finalmente el propósito será subrayar la originalísima reducción del mundo sensible a la clave suprasensible que ofrece el mundo de las ideas y del Bien Supremo en particular, no sin dejar de poner en evidencia la debilidad de la dialéctica platónica al mantener dicho Bien Supremo en el plano meramente intuitivo. (shrink)

This paper assesses the historical meaning and contemporary significance of Aristotle’s educational ideas. It begins with a broad characterization of the project of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, which he calls “political science” (hê politikê epistêmê), and the central place of education in his vision of statesmanship. It proceeds through a series of topics fundamental to his educational ideas, culminating in the account of education in Politics VIII. A concluding section appraises the uses to which Aristotelian ideas are currently put (...) in philosophy of education, identifying some confusions in the influential literature of “practices.”. (shrink)

Aristotle presents his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics as an ordered pair comprising political science (hê politikê epistêmê), suggesting an axiomatic structure of theorems that are demonstratively deduced from first principles. He holds that this systematic knowledge of ethical and legislative matters provides the ‘universals’ essential to phronesis or practical wisdom, and that its acquisition begins in sound habituation. Aristotle thereby assigns habituation an epistemic role that must be understood in light of his account of the nature of a science. This (...) paper argues that what would be inductively established by, or on the basis of, sound habituation is the supposition that the natural kind of activity constitutive of living well exists; it establishes the supposition on which Aristotle’s definition of a eudaimon life rests. Having addressed this central interpretive issue, the paper sketches a psychologically grounded position on the substantive philosophical questions at stake. Are there natural signs of flourishing and failure to flourish present to us in our experience of attempts to live well? If such signs exist but are not sufficient to qualify ethical beliefs as knowledge in their own right, might they play a role in a science of what is good and bad for human beings? (shrink)

In this paper I consider Aristotle’s solutions to two questions about justice and the laws: why think that obeying the law is just? And why think that doing what is just will promote one’s happiness? I analyze Aristotle’s solutions to these two problems in terms of four claims concerning the laws that come from Plato and underwrite Aristotle’s optimism about the potential for politikê epistêmê to issue in laws which are objectively correct.

Epistemic Responsibility means that scientists are responsible for their research being suitable to contribute to our understanding of the world, or at least some part of the world. As will be shown with the example of computer simulations in social sciences, this is unfortunately far from being understood as a matter of course. Rather, there exist whole research traditions in which the bulk of the contributions is quite free from any tangible purpose of enhancing our knowledge about anything. This essay (...) is concerned with the causes of this phenomenon and pleads for taking epistemic responsibility as a scientific virtue serious. Science should be organized in such a way that it is possible and likely that scientists will assume epistemic responsibility for their research tasks. (shrink)

Epistemic Encounters, Emerging Challenges. Three Thoughts about the History of Science and Medicine. With good reason, the future of the history of science and medicine can be characterized as a continuous move towards diversity. Epistemic encounters between disciplines, approaches and subject areas are continuously emerging. At the same time, new and disturbing challenges have arisen in the relationship between science, politics and society. Based on this observation, the following miniature offers three reflective thoughts. These aim (1) to raise more awareness (...) of the socio‐political responsibility of historiographical positioning; (2) to address questions of (historical) relationality and (theoretical) systematicity more explicitly; and (3), and by focusing on German academic medicine, to highlight some desiderata at the intersection of the history of science and contemporary history. (shrink)

"Plato's Statesman reconsiders many questions familiar to readers of the Republic: questions in political theory - such as the qualifications for the leadership of a state and the best from of constitution (politeia) - as well as questions of philosophical methodology and epistemology. Instead of the theory of Forms that is the centrepiece of the epistemology of the Republic, the emphasis here is on the dialectical practice of collection and division (diairesis), in whose service the interlocutors also deploy the ancillary (...) methods of myth and of models (paradeigmata). Plato here introduces the doctrine of due measure (to metrion) and a conception of statecraft (politikē) as an architectonic expertise that governs subordinate disciplines such as rhetoric and the military - doctrines later developed by Aristotle. Readers will find a sustained defence of the importance of expertise (technē or epistēmē) in the conduct of affairs of state, a robust (although not unqualified) defence of the rule of law, and an unsparing but nuanced critique of democratic government. The chapters in this volume provide a comprehensive and detailed philosophical engagement with the entirety of Plato's wide-ranging dialogue, with successive chapters devoted to the sections of the dialogue as it unfolds, and an introduction that places the dialogue in the context of Plato's philosophy as a whole. While not a commentary in the traditional sense, the volume engages with Plato's Statesman in its entirety" -- Publisher's description. (shrink)

"Plato's Statesman reconsiders many questions familiar to readers of the Republic: questions in political theory - such as the qualifications for the leadership of a state and the best from of constitution (politeia) - as well as questions of philosophical methodology and epistemology. Instead of the theory of Forms that is the centrepiece of the epistemology of the Republic, the emphasis here is on the dialectical practice of collection and division (diairesis), in whose service the interlocutors also deploy the ancillary (...) methods of myth and of models (paradeigmata). Plato here introduces the doctrine of due measure (to metrion) and a conception of statecraft (politikē) as an architectonic expertise that governs subordinate disciplines such as rhetoric and the military - doctrines later developed by Aristotle. Readers will find a sustained defence of the importance of expertise (technē or epistēmē) in the conduct of affairs of state, a robust (although not unqualified) defence of the rule of law, and an unsparing but nuanced critique of democratic government. The chapters in this volume provide a comprehensive and detailed philosophical engagement with the entirety of Plato's wide-ranging dialogue, with successive chapters devoted to the sections of the dialogue as it unfolds, and an introduction that places the dialogue in the context of Plato's philosophy as a whole. While not a commentary in the traditional sense, the volume engages with Plato's Statesman in its entirety" -- Publisher's description. (shrink)

Abstrak: Prediksi tentang hilangnya agama seiring dengan proses modernisasi ternyata tidak benar. Agama-agama tetap hadir dan memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat. Kenyataan ini memberikan tantangan tersendiri bagi teologi, setidak-tidaknya karena tiga hal. Pertama, kehadiran agama seringkali disertai dengan kecenderungan kuat untuk melihat relevansi agama hanya pada lingkup kehidupan privat seseorang dan mengabaikan implikasi sosial politis hidup beriman. Kedua, kehadiran agama terkait pula dengan sejumlah tindak kekerasan yang mengancam ketenteraman hidup bersama. Ketiga, agama-agama —khususnya di Indonesia— dituntut menyesuaikan diri (...) berhadapan dengan kenyataan plural dan corak demokratis masyarakat. Teologi ditantang untuk menyumbangkan refleksi yang berguna bagi terbentuknya agama yang tidak lupa akan implikasi sosial-politiknya, yang bebas dari kekerasan dan mampu menempatkan diri dengan tepat di tengah masyarakat demokratis dan plural. Kata-Kata Kunci: Post-sekular, privatisasi agama, kekerasan, multikultural, posisi epistemis, demokrasi, teologi politik. Abstract: The prediction that religion would vanish during and because of the modernization is not really true. Religions are still present and play a significant role in social life. This fact gives a special and interesting challenge to theology, at least for three reasons. First, the presence of religion is often accompanied by the strong tendency among its adherents to find the relevance of religion only to the one’s private life, denying the social and political implication of religion. Second, the presence of religion is connected with the acts of violence, which threaten the peace of the social life. Third, the religions —especially in Indonesia— have to adapt themselves to the pluralistic reality and the democratic system of the society. Theology is challenged to offer meaningful reflection on the formation of religion, which does not forfeit its social and political implications, free from violence and mindful of how to place itself properly in the democratic and pluralistic society. Keywords: Post-secular, privatization of religion, violence, multi-cultural, epistemic position, democracy, political theology. (shrink)

Na primjeru Utopije morala Karla Alberta i Elenor Jain, autor pokazuje razliku između ontološke etike kao metafizičke etike i svih drugih prošlih i suvremenih etika kao nemetafizičkih. Središnja pretenzija ontološke etike kao aktualne etike primjerene vremenu ležiu tome da ona može nadmašiti specifičnosti pojedinačnih kultura i pokazati fundament etičkog mišljenja i djelovanja, koji prevladava razdvajajuće elemente tradiranih moralnih predodžaba ili religioznih normi te obraća pažnju na ono zajedničko što ljudi i narodi doživljavaju kao iskustvo bitka, u smislu ontološke misli, od (...) Parmenida i Platona do Heideggera i Lavellea. Nasuprot tom prenaglašavanju Platonove idealističke linije u europskoj praktičnoj filozofiji, autor ovoga rada ukazuje na druge smjerove europske filozofije, te posebno ističe Aristotelovu philosophia anthropina kao nemetafizičku praktičnu filozofiju u smislu jedinstva etike i politike, neovisno o metafizici. Dok Albert i Jain zagovaraju bliskost etike i estetike, te u smislu modernog globalizma povezuju europsku filozofiju s izvaneuropskom mitološkom i metafizičkom mudrošću, autor ovoga rada ukazuje na Gadamerovu interpretaciju odnosa phronesisa i sophiae u VI. knjizi Aristotelove Nikomahove etike i naHeideggerovu fundamentalnu ontologiju, ne kao metafiziku, nego kao hermeneutičku praktičnu filozofiju, da bi na tragu Finkove interpretacije VII. knjige Platonove Države pokazao mogućnost drukčijeg tumačenja odnosa dokse i episteme od onoga što ga pružaju Albert i Jain, kako kod samoga Platona tako i u transcendentalnoj fenomenologiji životnog svijeta kod kasnoga Husserla. Jer suvremenom globalnom svijetu više je potrebna nemetafizička praktična filozofija – kao povijesnom svijetu života primjereno mišljenje – negoli metafizička etika i mitologija.Am Beispiel von Die Utopie der Moral von Karl Albert und Elenor Jain zeigt der Verfasserden Unterschied zwischen einer ontologischen Ethik als einer metaphysischen Ethik und allenanderen vergangenen und gegenwärtigen Ethiken als nicht-metaphysischen Ethiken. Der Hauptanspruchder ontologischen Ethik als einer aktualen und der Zeit angemessenen Ethik liegtdarin,dass sie die Eigenartigkeiten der einzelnen Kulturenübergreifenund das Fundamentumdesethischen Denkens und Handelns aufweisen kann, das die trennendenElemente der tradiertenMoralvorstellungen oder religiösenNormen aufhebt und die Aufmerksamkeitauf dasGemeinsamelenkt, welches die Menschen und die Völker als Seinserfahrung erleben – im Sinnedesontologischen Gedankens von Parmenides und Platon bis Heidegger und Lavelle. Im Gegensatzzu dieser überbetonten idealistischen Linie Platons in der europäischenpraktischenPhilosophieweist der Verfasserdieser Arbeitauf die anderenStrömungen der europäischenPhilosophiehin und hebt insbesonderedie aristotelische philosophia anthropinaals nicht-metaphysischepraktische Philosophie im Sinne der Einheit von Ethik und Politik hervor,die vonderMetaphysik unabhängig ist. WährendAlbertund Jain die Nähe von Ethik und Ästhetik befürwortenund im Sinne des modernen Globalismus die europäischePhilosophie mit der außereuropäischenmythologischen und metaphysischen Weisheitverbinden, verweist der VerfasserdieserArbeitauf Gadamers Interpretationdes Verhältnissesvon phronesisund sophia im VI.Buchder NikomachischenEthik vonAristotelesund auf die Fundamentalontologie Heideggers–aufgefasst nicht als eine Metaphysik, sondern als hermeneutische praktische Philosophie. AufdenSpurender Fink’schenInterpretationdes VII. Buches von Platons Staat zeigt der Verfassersodannauf, dass eine andereMöglichkeit zur Deutung des Verhältnissesvon Doxe und Epistemebestehtals jene, die von Albertund Jain befürwortet wird,sowohl bei Platon selbst als auch inderTranszendentalphänomenologieder Lebenswelt beim späten Husserl. Denn die globale WeltderGegenwart braucht mehr eine nicht-metaphysische praktische Philosophie und ein der geschichtlichenLebenswelt angemessenes Denken als eine metaphysische Ethik und Mythologie. (shrink)

Issu de la thèse de l'auteur soutenue en 1987, cet ouvrage a pour visée de redéfinir l'anthropologie, en dissipant le malentendu instauré par le modèle galiléen de scientificité appliqué aux sciences sociales afin d'opérer un retour à la fondation historique de la discipline dans l'epistêmê politikê des anciens Grecs. Trois voies d'accès sont parcourues : G. Dumézil, M. Heidegger et G. Guillaume. ©Electre 2018.

Slijedeći Fichteovu misao da »svatko izabire onakvu filozofiju kakav je tko čovjek«, u članku se ocrtavaju misaoni sklopovi stvaralačkoga opusa Ante Pažanina, u nastojanju da se na taj način osvijetle stožerne sastavnice njegove životne filozofije. Pažaninova istraživanja o filozofiji kao strogoj znanosti, fenomenologiji, praktičnoj filozofiji, etici i politici imaju znatan odjek i utjecaj ne samo u Hrvatskoj nego su zapažena i u svijetu. Na međunarodnoj pozornici privukla je zanimanje njegova osebujna koncepcija normativne političke filozofije u kojoj kritički rasvjetljuje i ukazuje (...) na posljetke suvremene znanstveno-tehničke civilizacije. Nasuprot novovjekovnom odvajanju etike od prava i politike, Pažanin se oslonio na aristotelovsku tradiciju praktične filozofije koja polazi od jedinstva etike i politike. Praktičnu filozofiju promatra kao samostalno i neovisno područje o poietičnoj techne i teoretskoj episteme. Takav pristup praktičnoj filozofiji nadilazi poteškoće aprirornoga univerzalizma teoretskoga utemeljenja etičkih normi te bolje odgovara suvremenoj raznovrsnosti svijeta života i njegovoj složenosti. Pažaninovu životnu filozofsku misiju može se prispodobiti Gadamerovu opisu »nasljedovanja« Aristotela u nastojanju filozofa da se pomoću filozofske teorije stavi u službu ljudske prakse. Njegova je praktična životna filozofija svojevrsno misaono nastojanje oko razumijevanja i posuvremenjenja odnosa između refleksivnih oblika teorije i praktične umnosti povijesnoga svijeta života. Filozofska refleksija za njega ima zadaću ne samo primjereno razumjeti praktični svijet nego ga time i odgovorno mijenjati u nastojanju za ozbiljenjem najvišega ljudskog dobra kao bitne svrhe čovjekova življenja. (shrink)

Résumé Placée sous le signe d’une restauration de la science politique pour l’époque moderne, la pensée de Voegelin tourne autour du concept de représentation, dont elle renouvelle complètement le sens en le reconduisant aux conditions d’existence d’une société politique. On peut estimer que la confrontation avec la théorie hobbesienne de la personne civile en est l’épicentre. Cet essai s’efforce de restituer cette confrontation, en faisant ressortir l’ambivalence sur laquelle elle repose : le double visage de Hobbes, jugé d’un côté responsable (...) de la théorie abstraite de la représentation qui triomphe depuis le xvii e siècle, de l’autre résistant héroïque au déclin spirituel de la modernité, s’efforçant de forger un nouveau corpus mysticum dans un contexte où l’institution ecclésiale ne joue plus le rôle de garant. Plus radicalement, à travers la lecture voegelinienne de Hobbes, c’est le sens de ce que le christianisme fait subir à l’ épistémé politiké classique qui est soumis à l’examen. En reconstituant cette lecture, on fait apparaître pour finir les difficultés sur lesquelles Voegelin vient buter, dans la tâche restauratrice qu’il assigne à la pensée moderne tout entière. (shrink)

Do epistemic requirements vary along with facts about what promotes agents' well-being? Epistemic instrumentalists say 'yes', and thereby earn a lot of contempt. This contempt is a mistake on two counts. First, it is incorrectly based: the reasons typically given for it are misguided. Second, it fails to distinguish between first- and second-order epistemic instrumentalism; and, it happens, only the former is contemptible. -/- In this book, Nathaniel P. Sharadin argues for rejecting epistemic instrumentalism as a first-order view not because (...) it suffers extensional failures, but because it suffers explanatory ones. By contrast, he argues that epistemic instrumentalism offers a natural, straightforward explanation of why being epistemically correct matters. What emerges is a second-order instrumentalist explanation for epistemic authority that is neutral between competing first-order epistemic theories. -/- Epistemic Instrumentalism Explained will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

I will explore the paradoxical nature of epistemic access. By critiquing the traditional conception of mental states that are labelled as ’knowledge’, I demonstrate the susceptibility of these states to an infinite regress, thus, challenging their existence and validity. I scrutinise the assumption that an epistemic agent can have complete epistemic access to all facts about a given object while simultaneously being ignorant of certain truths that impact the very knowledge claims about the object. I further analyse the implications of (...) this paradox when attempting to fine-grain the parameters of epistemic access, which happens to reveal the vacuity of such definitions and the inevitability of the regress. (shrink)

Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in (...) the debate on peer disagreement, the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give the opinions of our peers the same weight we give our own. Adopting a likelihood definition, however, does not end the debate on peer disagreement, because the alleged theoretical alternatives to the Equal Weight View, reinterpreted in the light of a likelihood definition, can in fact be shown to be compatible with this view—though the reinterpreted versions may appear less plausible than the original ones. (shrink)

In this article, I argue in favor of an intersectional account of religious identity to better make sense of how religious subjects can be treated with epistemic injustice. To do this, I posit two perspectives through which to view religious identity: as a social identity and as a worldview. I argue that these perspectives shed light on the unique ways in which religious subjects can be epistemically harmed. From the first perspective, religious subjects can be harmed when their religion is (...) racialized or when their gender and dress are mistakenly thought to be predictive of their beliefs and practices. As an instance of this, I focus on the epistemic harms facing Muslim women who practice veiling. From the worldview perspective, religious subjects can be harmed when we, by contrast, underestimate the force of the connections between religion, race, and gender. Such connections can give rise to intersectionally rich theologies that can in turn be marginalized and denied credibility. To illuminate the worldview perspective, I focus on Christian abolitionist and feminist Sojourner Truth. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.

This paper argues that the current discourse on epistemic injustice in social epistemology itself perpetuates epistemic injustice, namely hermeneutic injustice with regards to class and classism. The main reason is that debates on epistemic injustice have foremost focussed on issues related to gender, race, and disability while mostly ignoring class issues. I suggest that this is due to (largely unwarranted) fears about looming class reductionism. More importantly, this is omission is not innocuous, but problematic insofar as it has an unlikely (...) ally in neoliberal propaganda which features as one main goal stifling class consciousness. While this “allyship” is unwitting, this presents grounds for the discourse of epistemic injustice to consider re-centring class issues and classism. (shrink)

This paper argues that the current discourse on epistemic injustice in social epistemology itself perpetuates epistemic injustice, namely hermeneutic injustice with regards to class and classism. The main reason is that debates on epistemic injustice have foremost focussed on issues related to gender, race, and disability while mostly ignoring class issues. I suggest that this is due to (largely unwarranted) fears about looming class reductionism. More importantly, this is omission is not innocuous, but problematic insofar as it has an unlikely (...) ally in neoliberal propaganda which features as one main goal stifling class consciousness. While this “allyship” is unwitting, this presents grounds for the discourse of epistemic injustice to consider re-centring class issues and classism. (shrink)

In disagreements about trivial matters, it often seems appropriate for disputing parties to adopt a ‘middle ground’ view about the disputed matter. But in disputes about more substantial controversies (e.g. in ethics, religion, or politics) this sort of doxastic conduct can seem viciously acquiescent. How should we distinguish between the two kinds of cases, and thereby account for our divergent intuitions about how we ought to respond to them? One possibility is to say that ceding ground in a trivial dispute (...) is appropriate because the disputing parties are usually epistemic peers within the relevant domain, whereas in a more substantial disagreement the disputing parties rarely, if ever, qualify as epistemic peers, and so ‘sticking to one’s guns’ is usually the appropriate doxastic response. My aim in this paper is to explain why this way of drawing the desired distinction is ultimately problematic, even if it seems promising at first blush. (shrink)

What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti-normativism). I argue against (...) both accounts and defend the traditional view. An agent can be blameworthy in doxastic dilemmas for complying with their practical but not their epistemic reasons. This reveals how epistemic reasons are normative: the concept of epistemic blame helps us track epistemic normativity. (shrink)

In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.

In this paper we distinguish between epistemic dilemmas, epistemic quasi-dilemmas, and quasi epistemic dilemmas. Our starting point is the commonsense position that S faces a genuine dilemma only when S must take one of two paths and both are bad. It’s the “must” that we think is key. Moral dilemmas arise because there are cases where S must perform A and S must perform B—where ‘must’ implies a moral duty—but S cannot do both. In such a situation, S is doomed (...) to violate a moral obligation. Analogously, S face’s a genuine epistemic dilemma only if she has an epistemic duty to believe that p and at the same time an epistemic duty to not believe that p (either because she has a duty to believe ~p or a duty to suspend judgment). We argue that such cases never arise because there is no epistemic duty to adopt a particular doxastic attitude towards any particular proposition (ever). Hence, there are no epistemic dilemmas. Nevertheless, one might suppose there are situations in which one’s evidence pulls in different directions without determining a uniquely justified doxastic attitude. Such epistemic quasi-dilemmas aren’t full-fledged dilemmas, but they are arguably close enough to pose a genuine problem for the believer. But we argue that there are no genuine epistemic quasi-dilemmas either: They are all resolvable in principle. Fans of dissonance will not be totally disappointed, however, since we argue that there may well be quasi-epistemic dilemmas. These are genuinely unwinnable situations in which one’s moral or pragmatic obligations to do epistemically-relevant things make incompatible demands. (shrink)

The notion of epistemic responsibility applied to memory has been in general examined in the framework of the responsibilities that a collective holds for past injustices, but it has never been the object of an analysis of its own. In this article, I propose to isolate and explore it in detail. For this purpose, I start by conceptualizing the epistemic responsibility applied to individual memories. I conclude that an epistemic responsible individual rememberer is a vigilant agent who knows when to (...) engage in different kinds of mental and non-mental actions in order to monitor and update her memories, and who develops and nurture different kinds of virtuous attitudes that guide those actions. These (epistemic) virtuous attitudes are oriented not only towards herself but also towards others. Whereas this conception of epistemic responsibility does not pose a problem to understand shared memories of family members and friends, it may seem suspicious when applied to large-scale collective memories. These memories, which I name historical memories, are memories of events that have a traumatic impact for the community, are permeated by unequal relations of power, keep a complex relationship with historical science, and present other characteristics that distinguish them from individual memories. But despite these differences, the analysis undertaken in this work shows that the general principles that govern the epistemic responsibility of individual and (large-scale) collective rememberers are similar, and are based on similar grounds: pragmatic considerations about the consequences of misremembering or forgetting and a feeling of care. The similarities at the individual and collective scale of the epistemic vigilant attitude that is and should be taken toward our significant past may partially justify the use of the same epithet—“memory”—to refer to these different kinds of representations. (shrink)