Can ordinary citizens in a democracy evaluate the claims of scientific experts? While a definitive answer must be case by case, some scholars have offered sharply opposed general answers: a skeptical versus an optimistic. The article addresses this basic conflict, arguing that a satisfactory answer requires a first-order engagement in judging the claims of experts which both skeptics and optimists rule out in taking the issue to be one of second-order assessments only. Having argued that such first-order judgments are necessary, (...) it then considers how they are possible, outlining a range of practices and virtues that can inform their success and likelihood, and drawing throughout on ancient Greek insights as well as contemporary social psychology and sociology of knowledge. In conclusion the ethics of democratic judgment so developed is applied to the dramatic conviction of the members of an Italian scientific risk commission in L'Aquila. (shrink)
Communication by scientists with policy makers and attentive publics raises ethical issues. Scientists need to decide how to communicate knowledge effectively in a way that nonscientists can understand and use, while remaining honest scientists and presenting estimates of the uncertainty of their inferences. They need to understand their own ethical choices in using scientific information to communicate to audiences. These issues were salient in the Fourth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change with respect to possible sea level rise (...) from disintegration of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets. Due to uncertainty, the reported values of projected sea level rise were incomplete, potentially leading some relevant audiences to underestimate future risk. Such judgments should be made in a principled rather than an ad hoc manner. Five principles for scientific communication under such conditions are important: honesty, precision, audience relevance, process transparency, and specification of uncertainty about conclusions. Some of these principles are of intrinsic importance while others are merely instrumental and subject to trade-offs among them. Scientists engaged in assessments under uncertainty should understand these principles and which trade-offs are acceptable. (shrink)
ABSTRACTThis paper explores and reevaluates the place of Plato in the history of liberty. In the first half, reevaluating the view that he invents a concept of ‘positive liberty’ in the Republic, I argue for two claims: that he does not do so, insofar as this is not the way that virtuous psychological self-mastery in the Republic is understood, and that the Republic works primarily with the inverse concept of slavery, relying on entrenched Greek ideas about the badness of the (...) status of being a slave and the actions and dispositions associated with it. Turning in the second half to seek Platonic innovation not in the domain of ‘positive liberty’ but in reflection on liberty as a political value, understood as the liberty of action of citizens within the laws, I argue for two further claims: that as such a political value, liberty is limited and reshaped in both the Republic and the Laws to be compatible with obedience to rule / willingness to be ruled, ideally willing obedience; and that for this limited and reshaped value to be secured, such obedience must be manifested not only in regard to a constitution’s laws, but also to the magistrates who hold office within it. (shrink)
This paper transposes for evaluation in relation to the concerns of Plato’s Politicus a claim developed by Verity Harte in the context of his Philebus, that ‘external imposition of a practical aim would in some way corrupt paideutic [philosophical] knowledge’. I argue that the Politicus provides a case for which the Philebus distinction may not allow: ruling, or statecraft, as embodying a form of knowledge that can be answerable to practical norms in a way that does not necessarily subordinate or (...) corrupt its epistemic norms. I argue further that while Harte shows that the Philebus develops a view of the ethical value for a knower in being a knower, the Politicus for its part does not develop any view of the ethical value for a knower in being a ruler. (shrink)
A lively and accessible introduction to the Greek and Roman origins of our political ideas In The Birth of Politics, Melissa Lane introduces the reader to the foundations of Western political thought, from the Greeks, who invented democracy, to the Romans, who created a republic and then transformed it into an empire. Tracing the origins of our political concepts from Socrates to Plutarch to Cicero, Lane reminds us that the birth of politics was a story as much of individuals as (...) ideas. Scouring the speeches of lawyers alongside the speculations of philosophers, and the reflections of ex-slaves next to the popular comedies and tragedies of the Greek and Roman stages, this book brings ancient ideas to life in unexpected ways. Lane shows how the Greeks and Romans defined politics with distinctive concepts, vocabulary, and practices—all of which continue to influence politics and political aspirations around the world today. She focuses on eight political ideas from the Greco-Roman world that are especially influential today: justice, virtue, constitution, democracy, citizenship, cosmopolitanism, republic, and sovereignty. Lane also describes how the ancient formulations of these ideas often challenge widely held modern assumptions—for example, that it is possible to have political equality despite great economic inequality, or that political regimes can be indifferent to the moral character of their citizens. A stimulating introduction to the origins of our political ideas and ideals, The Birth of Politics demonstrates how much we still have to learn from the political genius of the Greeks and Romans. (shrink)
The paper asks what is living in political state-of-nature approaches, and answers by way of considering recent epistemic uses of state-of-nature arguments. Using Edward Craig's idea that a concept of knowledge can be explicated from the need for good informants, I argue that a concept of authority can be explicated from a parallel need for good practical informants. But this need not justify rule of a Platonic elite. Practically relevant epistemic advantages are more likely to be secured by the political (...) creation of institutions. In conclusion it is suggested that this approach can explain a problem of justification which arises for Joseph Raz's account of authority. (shrink)
It is argued that the Crito hinges on the relation between words and deeds. Socrates sets out a standard of agreement reached through persuasive argument or words. In this case the argument is deliberative: a general shared principle (do not do wrong) is juxtaposed to a particular minor premise (this act of escape is wrong) to reach a conclusion (do not escape). Crito baulks at the perception of the minor premise. At this juncture the Laws of Athens are introduced, who (...) set out a standard of agreement established instead by deeds. Both standards apply to Socrates, constituting the drama of the dialogue. (shrink)
Prima facie, the sceptical procedure described in Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism I is committed to a gap between appearance and reality, that is, to the possibility that reality is other than it appears. But the Pyrrhonist is keen to avoid having commitments. In this paper, we consider whether the Pyrrhonist is indeed so committed; what, more precisely, the commitment might be; and whether it is the kind of commitment which can be dislodged in the way the Pyrrhonist advertises as (...) the way to get rid of commitments, be they his own or others'. The Protagorean is our foil. It is the Protagorean's alternative approach to conflicting appearances which reveals, by contrast, the implications of the sceptical procedure, implications which prove difficult to dislodge by Pyrrhonist means. (shrink)
ABSTRACTIlya Somin argues that in light of the public's rational political ignorance we should make government smaller. But his account of the phenomenon of rational ignorance does not justify his policy prescription of smaller government; on the contrary, it implies that we should revamp the current framework of democratic institutions. This is because, since Somin fails to set out a principled basis on which to value democracy even in the face of rational ignorance, he cannot explain why we should want (...) any democratic government, however small it may be. If rational ignorance is as grave a challenge to democracy as he takes it to be, it would seem to demand either radical institutional innovation or, alternatively, an abandonment of certain democratic principles. By not explaining why we should value citizens’ involvement in politics at all, and why we might therefore draw different policy conclusions than he does himself, Somin's book ultimately fails to do full justice to the important questions that it raises. (shrink)
This is the first exploration of how ideas of politeia structure both political and extra-political relations throughout the entirety of Greek and Roman philosophy, ranging from Presocratic to classical, Hellenistic, and Neoplatonic thought. A highly distinguished international team of scholars investigate topics such as the Athenian, Spartan and Platonic visions of politeia, the reshaping of Greek and Latin vocabularies of politics, the practice of politics in Plato and Proclus, the politics of value in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and the (...) extension of constitutional order to discussions of animals, gods and the cosmos. The volume is dedicated to Professor Malcolm Schofield, one of the world's leading scholars of ancient philosophy. (shrink)
This article reports on a conversation convened by Quentin Skinner at the invitation of the Editors of The Journal of Political Philosophy and held in Cambridge on 13 February 2001.
Socrates wrote nothing; Plato's accounts of Socrates helped to establish western politics, ethics, and metaphysics. Both have played crucial and dramatically changing roles in western culture. In the last two centuries, the triumph of democracy has led many to side with the Athenians against a Socrates whom they were right to kill. Meanwhile the Cold War gave us polar images of Plato as both a dangerous totalitarian and an escapist intellectual. And visions of Plato have proliferated at the heart of (...) postmodern critiques of the very idea of metaphysics and politics. Plato's Progeny begins with an account of modern responses to the trial of Socrates and the controversial question of Socrates' relation to Plato. At its centre are two chapters exploring the idea of Platonic origins in and for philosophy, and of Platonic foundations for philosophical politics. Exploring unfamiliar as well as familiar invocations of Plato, Melissa Lane argues that twentieth-century ideological battles have obscured the importance of Socratic individualism, the nature of Platonic ethics, and the value of Platonic politics. Succinct and clearly written, this is an ideal guide for everyone interested in the way philosophers are still writing footnotes to Plato. (shrink)
In this excellent book, drawing on previously published articles, George Duke gathers the scattered threads of Aristotle's discussions of law while defending clear stances in the various philosophical debates they have engendered. The book works within Aristotelian methodology and metaphysics, developing the view that a politeia should be understood as a formal cause that is worked out in terms of the successive definitions offered in book III of Politics. Building on studies of the evolution of the meaning of nomos and (...) making occasional reference to Greek legal history and practice, primarily in Athens, it treats what I see as three themes, spread across seven chapters.In chapters 1 and 2, Duke addresses the... (shrink)
This article rejects the claim made by other scholars that Plato in the Statesman, by employing the so-called ‘architect’ in one of the early divisions leading to the definition of political expertise, prefigured and anticipated the architectonic conception of political expertise advanced by Aristotle. It argues for an alternative reading in which Plato in the Statesman, and in the only other of his works in which the word appears, closely tracks the existing social role of the architektōn, who was designated (...) as such only in virtue of appointment by a city to a role that was crucially defined as epitactic, involving overseeing the workers on site engaged in constructing some civic building works. It is this epitactic dimension of the role on which Plato relies in the Statesman, as opposed to the kind of claim to overarching integrative expertise that Aristotle would use the figure of architectonic political knowledge to make. (shrink)
Cet article examine les relations entre deux dialogues tardifs de Platon à partir de la notion de juste mesure. Dans le Politique, cette notion intervient dans le cadre d’une distinction entre deux types de métrétiques, dont l’Étranger renvoie toutefois la discussion détaillée à une autre occasion. La thèse ici défendue est que cette autre occasion est le Philèbe, dont l’argumentation complexe peut être lue comme une clarification de la notion de mesure. Ce rapprochement permet d’éclairer deux aspects importants du Politique (...) : d’une part, le rôle qu’y joue l’Idée du Bien ; d’autre part, le lien entre la juste mesure et le problème de la participation.This paper examines the relations between two late Platonic dialogues by focusing on the notion of due measure. In the Statesman, this notion occurs in the context of a distinction between two types of metretics, although the Stranger defers its detailed discussion to another occasion. The thesis here argued is that this other occasion is the Philebus, the complex argument of which can be read as a clarification of the notion of measure. This parallel makes it possible to shed light on two important aspects of the Statesman : on the one hand, the role played in that dialogue by the Idea of the Good, and on the other hand, the relation between due measure and participation. (shrink)
