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  1. A Defense of Endorsement.Will Fleisher - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    It is often irrational to believe philosophical claims because they are subject to systematic disagreement, under-determination, and pessimistic induction. Along with some other authors in this volume, I argue that many philosophers should (and do) have a different attitude to their own philosophical commitments. On my account, this attitude is a form of epistemic acceptance called endorsement. However, several objections have been raised to this view and others like it. One worry is that endorsement is spineless: that people who merely (...)
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  2. Skeptical Theistic Steadfastness.Jamie B. Turner - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    The problem of religious disagreement between epistemic peers is a potential threat to the epistemic justification of one’s theistic belief. In this paper, I develop a response to this problem which draws on the central epistemological thesis of skeptical theism concerning our inability to make proper judgements about God’s reasons for permitting evil. I suggest that this thesis may extend over to our judgements about God’s reasons for self-revealing, and that when it does so, it can enable theists to remain (...)
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  3. Gaslighting and Peer Disagreement.Scott Hill - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 26 (3).
    I present a counterexample to Kirk-Giannini’s Dilemmatic Theory of gaslighting.
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  4. Beweis der Gleichgewichtungsthese aus der Wahrscheinlichkeitskonzeption epistemischer Ebenbürtigkeit.Moritz Cordes - 2023 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (1):5-16.
    In his book Meinungsverschiedenheiten (engl.: Disagreement) Marc Andree Weber defends a probability based conception of epistemic peerhood. Starting from this conception he proves the equal weight thesis, which prescribes that one should allocate the same weight to the beliefs of epistemic peers as to one's own beliefs. – In the present article I provide a much shorter proof. For that purpose I first formalize Weber's definition and thesis and I close the argumentative gap between the two of them by making (...)
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  5. A Polarization-Containing Ethics of Campaign Advertising.Attila Mráz - 2023 - Analyse & Kritik 45 (1):111-135.
    (OPEN ACCESS) This paper establishes moral duties for intermediaries of political advertising in election campaigns. First, I argue for a collective duty to maintain the democratic quality of elections which entails a duty to contain some forms of political polarization. Second, I show that the focus of campaign ethics on candidates, parties and voters—ignoring the mediators of campaigns—yields mistaken conclusions about how the burdens of the latter collective duty should be distributed. Third, I show why it is fair to require (...)
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  6. David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds. , The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays . Reviewed by.Dustin Olson - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (1):4-6.
  7. Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  8. Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):87-97.
    In this paper I present a criticism of Sarah Moss‘ recent proposal to use scoring rules as a means of reaching epistemic compromise in disagreements between epistemic peers that have encountered conflict. The problem I have with Moss‘ proposal is twofold. Firstly, it appears to involve a double counting of epistemic value. Secondly, it isn‘t clear whether the notion of epistemic value that Moss appeals to actually involves the type of value that would be acceptable and unproblematic to regard as (...)
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  9. New Essays on Disagreement.Jennifer Lackey (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  10. Moral Virtue and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Christopher W. Gowans - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):39-57.
    The paper is a defense of the thesis that there are situations in which morally virtuous persons who are epistemic peers may disagree about what to do without either person being rationally required to change his or her judgment (a version of the Steadfast position in the epistemology of disagreement debate). The argument is based in part on similarities between decisions of virtuous agents and other practical decisions such as a baseball manager’s decision to change pitchers during a game. In (...)
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  11. Dealing with Disagreement: Uniqueness and Conciliation.Jonathan D. Matheson - 2010 - Dissertation, Proquest
  12. Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the power of Disruptive Technologies.I. Alon - 2001 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 13 (4):138-139.
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