The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience

Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.

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