Research on values is extensive. Values and value systems are concepts that have interested researchers across domains such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. However, antecedents of values have not received sufficient attention. In this study, we develop and assess a personal value system from the ancient texts of India. The texts describe a system of existential beliefs and values or prescriptive beliefs. Existential beliefs are concerned with the nature of reality. Prescriptive beliefs or values (...) follow from these existential beliefs, and behavior is influenced by values. The content of existential beliefs and the implied values or prescriptive beliefs are extracted from the texts and a conceptual model of the belief system is developed. Scales are constructed and administered to a sample of subjects. Responses from the survey are analyzed using a structural equation modeling framework. Confirmatory factor analysis is used to assess the scales and establish their adequacy. The nomological net of existential beliefs and values is empirically assessed, and construct validity is examined. Results support the belief system described in the texts. (shrink)

An exposition and defense of an existential argument for believing in God.

The whats and whys of religious belief -- A history of thanatocentric theories of religion -- Measuring faith and fear -- Are people afraid of death? -- The religious correlates of death anxiety -- Death anxiety and religion: causes and consequences -- The future of immortality, literal, and symbolic.

What leads people to believe in conspiracy theories? In this paper, we explore the possibility that people might be drawn towards conspiracy theories because believing in them might satisfy certain existential needs and help people find meaning in their life. Through two studies (N = 289 and 287 after exclusion), we found that par­ ticipants higher in the need and search for meaning were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. This relationship was not moderated by participants' feelings of (...) control. We also found that believing in conspiracy theories was associated with more presence of meaning (Study 1), and more precisely with a heightened feeling of mattering in the grand scheme of things (Study 2). Additionally, we found that participants were more likely to endorse conspiracy theories that left them more agency and allowed them the possibility to make a difference. Overall, we argue that our results suggest that people might sometimes be drawn towards conspiracy theories because they allow them to feel as if they can make a difference and have a positive impact on the world, and thus that conspiracy theories can be used as tools to satisfy existential needs. (shrink)

The Matrix raises several familiar philosophical problems in such new ways that students all over the country are assigning it to their philosophy professors. In so doing, they have offered us a great opportunity to illustrate some of the basic insights of existential phenomenology. The Matrix might seem to renew Descartes’s worry that, since all we ever experience are our own inner mental states, we might, for all we could tell, be living in an illusion created by a malicious (...) demon. In that case, most of our beliefs about reality would be false. But there is a way of understanding The Matrix that denies the mediation of mental states and shows those living in the Matrix to be in direct touch with Matrix reality. The Matrix world is public and objective, not a private subjective dream. Still, there is clearly a sense in which the Matrix world, while not merely mental, is not real either. There is after all a demon—the AI intelligences and their computer—that has in some sense fooled all those who accept the reality of the Matrix world. Thus, the film’s account of our situation is even more disturbing than Descartes’s claim that we are each confined to our own mind. The Matrix world is a vivid illustration of Descartes’s additional prescient claim that we could never be in direct touch with the real world because we are all what we would now call brains in vats. (shrink)

As humans, we want to live meaningfully, yet we are often driven by impulse. In Religion and the Meaning of Life, Williams investigates this paradox – one with profound implications. Delving into felt realities pertinent to meaning, such as boredom, trauma, suicide, denial of death, and indifference, Williams describes ways to acquire meaning and potential obstacles to its acquisition. This book is unique in its willingness to transcend a more secular stance and explore how one's belief in God may be (...) relevant to life's meaning. Religion and the Meaning of Life's interdisciplinary approach makes it useful to philosophers, religious studies scholars, psychologists, students, and general readers alike. The insights from this book have profound real-world applications – they can transform how readers search for meaning and, consequently, how readers see and exist in the world. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to contribute to the discussion about the relevance of existential issues in contemporary education. Analysis presented in the paper is related to the problems of self-awareness, becoming oneself and self-development. First, the author begins by depicting the meaning of human existence in the light of philosophy. The following aspects have been analyzed: being true to one’s own beliefs and values, recognizing personal truth, making existential choices and finding one’s own voice. A (...) special attention is paid to the language as an essential, constitutive element of being. Second, the article attempts to consider some educational implications resulting from the existential approach to education. Some of the issues discussed are learning to philosophize and to discover meaning, the concept of encounter in education and the role of language in self-development. While describing them the author indicates that the ignoring of crucial existential questions in education contributes to spiritual vacuity in life of young people and reduces educational thinking merely to instrumental, pragmatic problems concerning qualification and transfer of communicative skills. (shrink)

To ascertain the rational credences for the epistemic agents in the famous cases of self-locating belief, one should model the processes by which those agents acquire their evidence. This approach, taken by Darren Bradley (Phil. Review 121, 149–177) and Joseph Halpern (Ergo 2, 195–206), is immensely reasonable. Nevertheless, the work of those authors makes it seem as if this approach must lead to such conclusions as the Doomsday argument being correct, and that Sleeping Beauty should be a halfer. I argue (...) that this is due to an implicit existential bias: it is assumed that the first step in those processes is the determination that the agent in question must necessarily exist. It is much more reasonable to model that determination as contingent and a result of other, earlier, steps in the process. This paper offers such alternative models. They imply an endorsement of what has mockingly been called “presumptuous” reasoning, and a massive shift of credences in favor of (1) the existence of a multiverse and (2) the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Dark Brew: Traditional Existentialism and Community Coffee and Otherness: Community and Coffee Coffee, Community, and Hope.

Hume's account of belief has been much reviled, especially considered as an account of what it is to assent to or judge a proposition to be true. In fact, given that he thinks that thoughts about existence can be composed of a single idea, and that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judgment at all. Nonetheless, Hume was extremely proud of his account of belief, discussing it at length in the Abstract, (...) and developing it in the Appendix. Furthermore, he claimed several times that his account was new. It was not just a new answer to an old question, but an answer to a new question as well. Why did Hume think he was raising, and answering, a new question? Is his answer really so appalling? Why did he define belief in terms of a relationship with a present impression? In this paper, I propose answers to these questions. The answers emerge by contrasting Hume with Locke. Locke thought that belief was a pale imitation of knowledge, and that the assent we give to propositions is constituted in the very same act as forming those propositions. Hume saw the problems such a theory faced concerning existential beliefs. By ceasing to treat existence as a predicate, Hume was confronted with the issue of what it was to judge something to be true, or to assent to something. This issue had to be solved independently of the question of what it was to conceive something, or understand the content of a proposition. Hume thought this problem was new. He should be looked at, not as giving a bad answer to an important question, but rather as being the first in the early modern period to recognize that there was an important question here to be answered. (shrink)

An assertion is existentially known if and only if: (i) the speaker knows that the sentence she uses to make the assertion expresses a true proposition; (ii) she makes the assertion based on that knowledge; and (iii) she does not believe, have justification for, or know the proposition asserted. Accordingly, if existentially known assertions could be made correctly—as argued by Charlie Pelling in his ‘Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge’—this would show that the norm of assertion cannot be the speaker's (...) belief in, justification for or knowledge of the proposition. In this paper, I try to show that Pelling's argument is inconclusive, as it rests on two assumptions which can be resisted. In turn, I offer a pair of alternative strategies to explain how we can deal with existentially known assertions under the assumption that the speaker's knowledge is the norm of assertion. (shrink)

Analysis of the psychological processes involved in generating the sense of supernatural agency, as well as social scientific research into the factors most directly associated with the prevalence of religious belief and practice, both support a common finding: the direct correlation between levels of existential anxiety and the prevalence and intensity of religiosity. All functional elements of religion involve efforts to invoke, activate, and deploy supernatural causal agency of one sort or another. But religiosity varies throughout the world. This (...) paper reviews psychological evidence that existential anxiety is the core factor activating the intra-psychic mechanisms that give rise to and constitute the nature of religiosity, and that variations in physical and socio-cultural pressures impinging on the individual give rise to variations in anxiety. This combination of intrinsic psychological mechanisms driven though existential anxiety by extrinsic physical, economic, and social pressures indicates that religiosity is best understood as a social–psychological process: socio-cultural factors activating anxiety which in turn drives the intra-psychic mechanisms generating the sense of supernatural agency expressed in belief and practice. By the same token, for analytical purposes, religions are most effectively viewed as social–psychological organisms: social organisms driven by intra-psychic mechanisms that constitute religious convictions and practices in the way that we find them—dedicated to and engaged with supernatural agency in its various forms. (shrink)

Recent advances in natural language processing have given rise to a new kind of AI architecture: the language agent. By repeatedly calling an LLM to perform a variety of cognitive tasks, language agents are able to function autonomously to pursue goals specified in natural language and stored in a human-readable format. Because of their architecture, language agents exhibit behavior that is predictable according to the laws of folk psychology: they function as though they have desires and beliefs, and then (...) make and update plans to pursue their desires given their beliefs. We argue that the rise of language agents significantly reduces the probability of an existential catastrophe due to loss of control over an AGI. This is because the probability of such an existential catastrophe is proportional to the difficulty of aligning AGI systems, and language agents significantly reduce that difficulty. In particular, language agents help to resolve three important issues related to aligning AIs: reward misspecification, goal misgeneralization, and uninterpretability. (shrink)

It is first argued that there are two types of beliefs-in; beliefs in X which are identical with the belief that X exists and beliefs-in which entail no existential belief but which do entail a commendatory attitude. It is then shown that belief in God is not identical with, but rather entails, the belief that God exists. Pace Norman Malcolm, the converse holds neither as a logical nor psychological claims.

[1] In _What Computers Can't Do_ (1972), Hubert Dreyfus identified several basic assumptions about the nature of human knowledge which grounded contemporary research in cognitive science. Contemporary artificial intelligence, he argued, relied on an unjustified belief that the mind functions like a digital computer using symbolic manipulations ("the psychological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 163ff), or at least that computer programs could be understood as formalizing human thought ("the epistemological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 189). In addition, the project depended upon an assumption about (...) the data about the human world which we employ in thought - namely, that it consists of discrete, determinate, and explicit pieces which can be processed heuristically ("the ontological assumption") (Dreyfus 1992: 206). (shrink)

On a wide range of measures and across cultures and societies, women tend to be more religious than men. Religious beliefs are associated with evolved social-cognitive mechanisms such as agency detection and theory-of-mind. Women perform better on most of these components of social cognition, suggesting an underlying psychological explanation for these sex differences. The Existential Orientation Scale was developed to extend the measurement of religion to include non-religious beliefs. Factor analysis extracted two dimensions: religious orientation and science (...) acceptance. This new scale was used to investigate the hypothesis that the dimensions of empathizing, a measure of social cognition, and systemizing can explain the sex differences in religious orientation. The sex differences in both religious orientation and science acceptance disappeared when empathizing and systemizing were entered. This indicates that underlying dimensions of individual differences can explain existential orientation better than being male or female. (shrink)

The authors review the profound and diverse ways in which mysticism is embedded in and influences belief, lifestyle, identity and politics in Jewish life in Israel and North America. They outline some existential and cultural dimensions of the conditions in which this phenomena flourish, specifically relating to the condition of post-modernity. The seeming dominance of mysticism over more rational forms of religious belief and behavior is explored. The opposite ideational and historic trends within Jewish mysticism as they relate to (...) national lifestyle, being alternatively closed and parochial or open and universal are reviewed. The authors suggest that, in light of the current situation within and outside of the Jewish people, the latter approach needs to be strengthened. (shrink)

The “pre-intentional” is a proposed category of mental states that conditions a subject’s experience of what is possible for them by, for example, modifying the motivational efficacy or experienced quality of intentional states, like beliefs or desires, without necessarily modifying their propositional content. Matthew Ratcliffe, who has coined the term, identifies the pre-intentional with existential feelings, senses of possibility like “feeling alive” or “feeling deadened,” and argues that these feelings are conditions of the possibility of the scope and (...) valence of intentional states. Jussi Saarinen questions if existential feelings should be understood as consciously occurring episodes or background affective styles, which has implications for the problem of “bi-directionality”: how or if intentional states might affect the pre-intentional. I first argue that answering Saarinen requires, contra Ratcliffe, the introduction of a feeling-disposition distinction: existential feelings are not pre-intentional structures but ways of becoming aware of the “existential dispositions” that are pre-intentional structures. I then propose a new definition of the pre-intentional: existential dispositions are a category of states that are introspectively opaque and so ambiguous between being an intentional state, like a “quasi-belief,” or non-intentional state, like a reflex. This allows for a novel account of what I, following Saarinen’s terminology, call indirect bi-directionality, and thus of indirectly induced existential change, which Ratcliffe only understands as spontaneous. To clarify how intentional states may influence the pre-intentional also clarifies how change in, say, beliefs about what one’s experiences of depression signify may induce existential change that alleviates the suffering of these experiences. (shrink)

Take the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did (...) not believe in belief. According to Van Fraassen, the empiricist, one may yet have a rational existential belief concerning unobservables, given a liberal notion of rationality of belief. In this paper I will investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Popper’s rejection of the rationality of belief and Van Fraassen’s reformulation of the rationality of belief, points towards a new and pragmatist dissolution of the ‘problem of scientific realism’. (shrink)

An existential reading of ‘is’ in the argument at Republic 476–480 is widely thought to be objectionable because it commits Plato to belief in degrees of existence. In this paper, I argue that neither proposed alternative—the veridical reading or the predicative reading—can be reconciled with the text, thus forcing the existential reading upon us. Further, I show that when Plato's doctrine of existence is properly understood, his commitment to degrees of existence is not at all absurd.

An existential reading of ‘is’ in the argument at Republic 476–480 is widely thought to be objectionable because it commits Plato to belief in degrees of existence. In this paper, I argue that neither proposed alternative—the veridical reading or the predicative reading—can be reconciled with the text, thus forcing the existential reading upon us. Further, I show that when Plato's doctrine of existence is properly understood, his commitment to degrees of existence is not at all absurd.

Richard Mullen and Grant Gillett (2014) decry the oversimplifications that accompany ‘doxastic’ analyses of delusion analogizing them to belief states; particularly, they object to the recent elevation to the status of paradigmatic the ordinary beliefs often understood, in Bayesian terms, as probabilistic estimates of empirical facts. Such an approach ignores the significance of the delusion for the individual, they emphasize, neglecting the delusional person’s conceptions of self and identity in relation to the world. In support of their plea for (...) a broader, more nuanced, and more clinically and existentially sensitive understanding of delusion, Mullen and Gillett enumerate drawbacks to the doxastic view not .. (shrink)

SummaryTake the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did (...) not believe in belief. According to Van Fraassen, the empiricist, one may yet have a rational existential belief concerning unobservables, given a liberal notion of rationality of belief. In this paper I will investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Popper’s rejection of the rationality of belief and Van Fraassen’s reformulation of the rationality of belief, points towards a new and pragmatist dissolution of the ‘problem of scientific realism’. (shrink)

The philosophy of mind envisions belief as a mental act, the individual mindtaking specific propositions to be true. But we, and scientists, do not really“believe” observation-statements about the perceived, and scientificallyobserved world. Michel de Certeau envisions belief as a social act, a sort ofcontract, that has practical effects. De Certeau’s conception of thecontractual and practical nature of belief may illuminate religious belief.Anthropologist Clifford Geertz argues that it is in ritual that the convictionthat religious conceptions are veridical and that religious directives (...) are soundis somehow generated. De Certeau and Geertz show since the 18th centuryreligious belief came to be understood as the intellectual adherence to certainempirically or logically unverified or unverifiable propositions. They showhow this mode of religious belief has lost its credibility.I find some difficulties in de Certeau’s and Geertz’s conceptions.There are also forms of belief that isolate one from others, eventually allothers, and there is a distinctive and fundamental kind of belief that is beliefin oneself.But the harrowing perplexities that confound common sense understandingand threaten the ability of people to orient themselves and act effectively inthe world, and which have led humans to believe in a fundamental reality, ina different sense and a different way from the way the common sense worldis real, have not disappeared. They recur, in new forms. I identify threepractices pursued today outside of common sense, impractical, practices thatare haunted by the intellectual, existential and ethical dilemmas that recur innew forms in our secular, scientific society, our globalized postindustrialsociety. (shrink)

The most important and common solution to the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s regress problem is foundationalism. Reason-giving must stop somewhere, argues the foundationalist, and the fact that it does stop does not threaten knowledge or justification. The foundationalist has a problem, though; while foundationalism might adequately answer skepticism, it does not allow for a satisfying reply to the skeptic. The feature that makes a belief foundationally justified is not the sort of thing that can be given to another as a reason. Thus, (...) if foundationalism is true, we can only fall silent in the face of a challenge to our epistemically basic beliefs. Call this the practical or existential problem of foundationalism. Thomas Reid offers a rather stunning solution to this problem. Humor, he thinks, can be used to defend basic beliefs which cannot be defended by argument. We develop and defend an account on which Reid is correct and emotions such as rueful amusement can be invoked to rationally persuade the skeptic to accept foundationally justified beliefs. Then, inspired by Kierkegaard, we extend the account to foundational moral and religious beliefs. (shrink)

Despite their growing popularity, little is known about the psychological effects of participating in past-life meditation groups in contemporary western contexts. We conducted a study to re-create some of the conditions observed in the field by facilitating a group of adults interested in exploring past life meditation. Before the session, participants completed a survey about their afterlife beliefs and associated experiences. Participants also completed questionnaires measuring meaningfulness in life and fear of death before and after the session. In the (...) sample (n = 125), just over half of the participants (52%) reported having a past life memory or vision during the session. Higher paranormal beliefs predicted reporting a past life memory or vision. We also found that having prior memories or visions of having lived before, but not the general belief in having a past life, predicted reporting having past life experiences during the session. Consistent with our predictions, participants who reported having a past life memory or vision also reported reduced existential death distress and increased meaningfulness in life following the session, compared to those who did not report these experiences. (shrink)

Peter Winch's philosophy of religion is controversial, accused of mere “perspectivism” and fideism, and for avoiding discussion of any existential reference for the object of belief. This essay examines what Winch meant by a “perspective.” It first deals with problems of first person propositions of belief. For Wittgenstein and Winch belief and the fact it believes are inextricably bound together. Thus Winch argues that what is said cannot be divorced from the situation of the sayer; understanding requires making shifts (...) in perspective. Finally I compare Winch's use of religious language to Augustine's doctrine of the “inner word,” arguing that there are important parallels in Winch to pre‐Lockean theological understandings of faith. (shrink)

The Belief Game is a two-person, nonzero-sum game in which both players can do well [e.g., at (3, 4)] or badly [e.g., at (1,1)] simultaneously. The problem that occurs in the play of this game is that its rational outcome of (2, 3) is not only unappealing to both players, especially God, but also, paradoxically, there is an outcome, (3, 4), preferred by both players that is unattainable. Moreover, because God has a dominant strategy, His omniscience does not remedy the (...) situation, though - less plausibly - if man possessed this quality, and God were aware of it, (3, 4) would be attainable.How reasonable is it to use the device of a simple game to argue that nonrevelation by God, and nonbelief by man, are rational strategies? Like any model of a complex reality, the Belief Game abstracts a great deal from the problem that confronts the thoughtful agnostic asking the most profound of existential questions. Yet, to the degree that belief in God is seen as a personal question, conceptualized in terms of a possible relationship one might have with one's Creator, it seems appropriate to try to model this relationship as a game. The most difficult question to answer, I suppose, is, if God exists, what are His preferences in such a game?I have argued that He would first like to be believed, but at the same time not reveal Himself. These goals, in my opinion, are consistent with the role He assumes in many biblical stories, although this is not to say that the Bible offers the final word on philosophical and theological matters in the modern world. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a logical place from which to start, and the clues it offers on God's preferences seem not contradicted by contemporary events.Of course, the Belief Game supposes that God not only has preferences but makes choices as well. To many people today - myself included - these choices are not apparent. But if He does make them, and in particular chooses not to reveal Himself, I think the Belief Game helps us to understand why nonrevelation is rational. Furthermore, it gives us insight into why, given this choice by God, our own reasons for believing in Him - in a game-theoretic context - may be rendered tenuous. (shrink)

Peter Winch's philosophy of religion is controversial, accused of mere “perspectivism” and fideism, and for avoiding discussion of any existential reference for the object of belief. This essay examines what Winch meant by a “perspective.” It first deals with problems of first person propositions of belief. For Wittgenstein and Winch belief and the fact it believes are inextricably bound together. Thus Winch argues that what is said cannot be divorced from the situation of the sayer; understanding requires making shifts (...) in perspective. Finally I compare Winch's use of religious language to Augustine's doctrine of the “inner word,” arguing that there are important parallels in Winch to pre‐Lockean theological understandings of faith. (shrink)

In this paper I evaluate Zamulinski’s recent attempt to rebut an argument to the conclusion that having any kind of religious faith violates a moral duty. I agree with Zamulinski that the argument is unsound, but I disagree on where it goes wrong. I criticize Zamulinski’s alternative construal of Christian faith as existential commitment to fundamental assumptions. It does not follow that we should accept the moral argument against religious faith, for at least two reasons. First, Zamulinski’s Cliffordian ethics (...) of belief is defective in several regards. Second, the truth of doxastic involuntarism and the possibility of doxastic excuse conditions can be used to demonstrate that the argument is unconvincing. (shrink)

In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Gettier cases and the ones closely modelled on them fail, and the reason for the failure is that the subject in these cases does not actually have the belief that would serve as a counterexample to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. They claim that if our evidence pertains to a particular individual (as in the first case) or to the truth of one of the (...) disjuncts (as in the second case), we do not genuinely believe the existential generalization or the disjunction which logically follows. I will challenge their arguments and suggest that our unwillingness to assert the existential generalization or the disjunction under these conditions does not stem from lack of belief but from pragmatic principles. (shrink)

Some recent work by philosophers of mathematics has been aimed at showing that our knowledge of the existence of at least some mathematical objects and/or sets can be epistemically grounded by appealing to perceptual experience. The sensory capacity that they refer to in doing so is the ability to perceive numbers, mathematical properties and/or sets. The chief defense of this view as it applies to the perception of sets is found in Penelope Maddy’s Realism in Mathematics, but a number of (...) other philosophers have made similar, if more simple, appeals of this sort. For example, Jaegwon Kim (1981, 1982), John Bigelow (1988, 1990), and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1990) have all defended such views. The main critical issue that will be raised here concerns the coherence of the notions of set perception and mathematical perception, and whether appeals to such perceptual faculties can really provide any justification for or explanation of belief in the existence of sets, mathematical properties and/or numbers. (shrink)

SummaryTake the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did (...) not believe in belief. According to Van Fraassen, the empiricist, one may yet have a rational existential belief concerning unobservables, given a liberal notion of rationality of belief. In this paper I will investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Popper’s rejection of the rationality of belief and Van Fraassen’s reformulation of the rationality of belief, points towards a new and pragmatist dissolution of the ‘problem of scientific realism’. (shrink)

The next contrast, like that between grammatical beliefs and non-grammatical beliefs, has to do with what is believed. My labels for the contrast may be misleading, but I have not found better ones. Some beliefs are ‘ existential ’, others are ‘ non-existential ’. You will be misled if the labels suggest my earlier contrasts between intentional and non-intentional or attitudinal and non-attitudinal, or the contrast often made between what exists and what is non-existent. The (...) existential/non-existential contrast is a contrast made in terms of conditions of understanding . By an ‘existential’ belief I mean a belief where what is believed can only be understood to the extent that one has fulfilled certain existential conditions—that is, conditions which existentialist philosophers emphasise, conditions having to do with the personal depth and authenticity of one's commitments, attitudes and general life-experience. A non-existential belief is one which has no such conditions for understanding. (shrink)

The God of the Biblical and patristic tradition, though perhaps incomplete, possesses properties including those that involve genidentity or C-connections with us. Thus God's existence is at least possible. Using a modified version of Parson's elaboration of Meinong's theory of objects, we find that God exists if we do. But we also find that much else exists if we do; rather too much for confident belief.

The God of the Biblical and patristic tradition, though perhaps incomplete, possesses properties including those that involve genidentity or C-connections with us. Thus God's existence is at least possible. Using a modified version of Parson's elaboration of Meinong's theory of objects, we find that God exists if we do. But we also find that much else exists if we do; rather too much for confident belief.

The God of the Biblical and patristic tradition, though perhaps incomplete, possesses properties including those that involve genidentity or C-connections with us. Thus God's existence is at least possible. Using a modified version of Parson's elaboration of Meinong's theory of objects, we find that God exists if we do. But we also find that much else exists if we do; rather too much for confident belief.

This paper discusses a set of observations, many of which are novel, concerning differences between the adjectival modals _certain_ and _possible_ and their adverbial counterparts _certainly_ and _possibly_. It argues that the observations can be derived from a standard interpretation of _certain_/_certainly_ as universal and _possible_/_possibly_ as existential quantifiers over possible worlds, in conjunction with the hypothesis that the adjectives quantify over knowledge and the adverbs quantify over belief. The claims on which the argument relies include the following: (i) (...) knowledge implies belief, (ii) agents have epistemic access to their belief, (iii) relevance is closed under speakers’ belief, and (iv) commitment is pragmatically inconsistent with explicit denial of belief. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the possibility of reading Wittgenstein’s understanding of religious belief with Tillich’s concept of existential/religious doubt, especially as developed in his Dynamics of Faith. I argue, first, that Wittgenstein’s understanding of religious belief as a deep certainty of a grammatical remark is not the same as his understanding of hinge-certainty of “hinge propositions”, and that the relevant difference is that Wittgenstein leaves room for the possibility of doubt in the former but not in the latter. (...) Second, I argue that Tillich’s concept of dynamic faith by which Tillich explicates the role of doubt internal to religious believing can enrich the Wittgensteinian conception of religious belief. Despite the notable differences between Wittgenstein’s thoughts and Tillich’s overall system of theology, Tillich’s treatment of the concept of “faith” signals a possibility of a more positive way of relating Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation and Tillich’s mature understanding of philosophical theology. At the end of the essay, responding to D. Z. Phillips’ negative assessment of Tillich’s theology in the name of Wittgenstein, I suggest what such positive way of relating the two might look like. (shrink)

In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoyevsky illustrates that encounters with evil do not solely impact agents’ beliefs about God (or God’s existence). Evil impacts people on an emotional level as well. Authors like Hasker and van Inwagen sometimes identify the emotional impact of evil with the “existential” problem of evil. For better or worse, the existential version of the problem is often set aside in contemporary philosophical discussions. In this essay, I rely on Robert Roberts’ account of emotions (...) as “concern-based construals” to show that theistic philosophers can effectively address the existential problem (and so, the problem should not be set aside). In fact, addressing the emotional impact of evil is crucial, I argue, given that resolving just the impact of evil on agents’ beliefs about God constitutes an incomplete response to the problem of evil. (shrink)

The Eucharist, as a pillar of Christian life and faith, stands at the center of the Mass. It bears multi-dimensional meanings and functions, each of which addresses a different aspect of Christian life and mindset. The study resonates dialectically between the Eucharist as a unique religious affirmation of faith and philosophical strategies that are developed to meet its challenges, particularly the rational frameworks by which the believer affirms that the consecrated bread and wine are Christ’s body and blood. On the (...) one hand, the philosophical examination offers new perspectives to understand the Eucharist and its influence on the faithful; on the other hand, the Eucharist and the unique challenges it poses allow us to examine man’s relation to reality within the colors of faith. It will be argued that Edward Schillebeeckx’s discussion of the Eucharist, particularly his attempt to bridge between reality and the symbolic sphere, accords with Heidegger’s reevaluation of the question of Being. The present reading limits itself to the encounter between the mind and the phenomenon and does not proceed to the meaning of the Eucharist as part of the Mass and the crucifixion of Christ. However, the focus of the article is not on the phenomenon but rather on the existential position of the subject and his orientation toward reality. (shrink)

Young Hegelianism has often been identified as a crucial element in the reorientation of Western philosophy during the mid-nineteenth century. Due to its substantial contribution to the ‘revolutionary rupture’ between Hegel and Nietzsche, it is even said to have had a direct and lasting influence on the identity of philosophy today. This article attempts to shed a new light on the Young Hegelians’ radical critique of traditional philosophy by focusing on their existential condition as youngphilosophers. More particularly, it attempts (...) to see their revolutionary philosophical project from the perspective of a generation conflict. In order to underline the validity of this perspective, three specific arguments are elaborated and brought together. The first draws attention to the fact that the emergence of an independent youth generation was a totally new phenomenon in European civilization at that time. By demonstrating its intrinsic relationship with rebellious youth movements such as Young Italy, Young Europe and Young Germany, Young Hegelianism is situated in the social and political context of a wide-ranginggeneration conflict in European culture. The second argument establishes that the name ‘Jung-Hegelianer’ was anything but an external or superficial indication since, by the end of the 1830ies, it became the consciously preferred self-identification of the radical fraction within the Hegelian school. Hence, the use of the prefix ‘young’ should be associated with the then prevailing subversive meaning of the term, expressing the belief in a whole-sale cultural renewal by the young generation. The third and final argument reveals how the philosophical revolution of the Young Hegelians is fundamentally linked with Hegel’s dialectical understanding of the different stages of life. In that respect, their name also expresses a well-considered philosophical choice for the stage of youth and accordingly determines a specific way of philosophizing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Christian Identity and Genuine Openness to the Religious Beliefs of OthersSchubert M. OgdenNot the least important thing I have learned from my participation in the International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter is that genuine interreligious dialogue is possible only under certain conditions. Specifically, I am now confirmed in the assumption I made in beginning my participation that one can enter into such dialogue only if one can somehow claim truth (...) for one's own religious beliefs without thereby denying, explicitly or implicitly, that others' religious beliefs also may possibly be true. But how is it possible to claim that one's own beliefs as a Christian are true while allowing for at least the possible truth of others' beliefs as well?This is how I, as a Christian, formulate the question—or, at any rate, one of the questions—that I took to be raised by the topic discussed at the most recent meeting of our group: "Religious Identity and Openness in a Pluralistic World." One implication of this formulation, obviously, is that, in my view, a necessary aspect of Christian identity, as of religious identity generally, is the confession, or profession, of certain religious beliefs, together with the claim that these beliefs are true. Moreover, by "true" in this context I understand not merely "substantially true," in the sense of agreeing in substance with any other true religious or existential beliefs, but also "formally true," in the sense of providing the norm with which any other religious or existential beliefs must agree in order to be true beliefs. With this understanding, then, the question I propose to pursue really asks, "How is it possible to be a Christian and to claim formal truth for one's own religious beliefs while allowing that others' beliefs also can be formally true?"This explains, in turn, why the other operative term in the title of my paper is not simply "openness," but "genuine openness." One might possibly think—or be thought—to be open to the religious beliefs of others simply because one allowed that their beliefs could indeed be true provided only that they substantially agreed with Christian beliefs taken as the norm for judging their truth. But on my analysis of the claim that others themselves make for the truth of their beliefs, one would [End Page 21] not be genuinely open to their beliefs at all. For their claim is that their beliefs are formally true and therefore themselves the norm with which all other religious or existential beliefs, including Christian beliefs, must agree if their own claim to be true is a valid claim. My test of "genuine openness," then, is openness to at least the possibility that the religious beliefs of others are formally true in the same sense in which I as a Christian claim my own religious beliefs to be so.The other thing to note about my formulation of the question is what it does and does not ask. It does not ask whether it is possible to claim formal truth for my beliefs as a Christian while allowing that others' religious beliefs also can be formally true; rather, simply assuming that it is possible, somehow, to do this, it asks how it is possible. In other words, what are the necessary conditions of the possibility of claiming formal truth for one's own religious beliefs as a Christian while allowing that others' religious beliefs also can be formally true?With this clarification of our question, I now want to indicate how I, as a Christian and a theologian, answer it. This I propose to do by briefly developing my answer against another that is currently being given to it by what appears to be a growing number of other Christians and theologians.I refer to those who are commonly called—and call themselves—"religious (or Christian) pluralists," or simply "pluralists." According to these Christians and theologians, the monistic claim traditionally made for the truth of Christian beliefs, to the effect that they alone among religious or existential beliefs are formally true, can no longer be defended and should be given up. Far from being the only true religion, Christianity is in fact... (shrink)

In uttering negative existential sentences, we do not mention but use an empty singular term. A pretense account explains the use in terms of pretense. I argue that our understanding of negative existential statements can be successfully explained by Crimmins’ theory of shallow pretense if it is supplemented and reconstructed properly. First, I explain the notion of shallow pretense and supplement Crimmin’s theory with an Evansian account that we immediately grasp the phenomenology of what is pretended without a (...) conscious effort to imagine the condition under which what is pretended can be true. Thus, shallow pretense does not consist in the counterintuitive meta-representation of the fact of pretense. Second, against the objection to Crimmins’ distinction between utterance truth-condition and modal content that it is ad hoc, I argue that there is good reason to hold the distinction for the semantics of belief reports. Finally, I argue that the distinction has a merit of explaining our intuition about the epistemic possibility associated with our use of an empty singular term. (shrink)

This paper deals with atheism, Sartre's notion of absolute freedom and Jean-Paul Sartre's claim of the irreconcilability of human freedom with God’s existence. For Sartre, man to be truly human must continuously create his own essence and continuously assert himself. Man can achieve this because he is absolutely free; the affirmation of God would undermine the exigencies of man's freedom and creativity. The question on the impossibility of the coexistence between the affirmation of God's existence and the recognition of human (...) freedom raises certain points against Sartre's notion of God and human freedom. The paper urges the believer to fully understand his beliefs and be also critical of his faith. (shrink)