Michel Foucault defines the modern psychiatric hospital as an institution of power that excludes and disciplines those who are deemed immoral, perverse, or abnormal in society. Rather than a facility for healing, as Foucault has taught us, the psychiatric hospital operates more as a punitive method of the body. But what is not considered in Foucault’s historical account of the psychiatric institution are the epistemological preconditions that allowed for its original formation. Drawing on the Kyoto School philosophers’ critique of modernity, (...) this article will discuss how the biomedical model underlying modern psychiatric care is rooted in a prior epistemological duality that was developed even earlier within Western intellectual history—a duality we will call the “epistemology of nihilism.” Foucault’s political technology of the body is therefore a symptom of the epistemology of nihilism, that which leads to consequences beyond mere panoptical surveillance. This article will discuss such consequences, in particular the mechanization of human life derived from the excesses of scientific technology, in the service of introducing a new way of thinking about the limits of psychiatric treatment in today’s world. (shrink)

Within the last decade, burgeoning interest in the intersection of epistemology and social issues has generated a new set of research questions. These questions range from the relevance of social identity, to peer disagreement, to debates on the significance of moral considerations to epistemic evaluations, to discussions of our epistemic practices and how those practices exclude certain agents and certain bodies of knowledge. Central in this new and emerging body of work is the realization that epistemology has more to do (...) than simply answer questions about what knowledge consists in; it must also acknowledge that our answers to these questions might be influenced by features we have previously failed to make space for. It is in this respect that we are witnessing a renewed interest in a theoretical approach long consigned to the margins of epistemology – that of standpoint epistemology. (shrink)

Each of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of our own, and each of us can recognize that the same is true of others. We can then remove ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and think simply of all those people, without singling out as I the one we happen to be. From this abstracted impersonal standpoint, the content and character of different individual standpoints remain unchanged. The impersonal standpoint plays (...) an essential role in the evaluation of political institutions. Any political theory that aspires to moral decency must try to devise and justify a form of institutional life, which answers to the real strength of impersonal values while recognizing that they are not all we have to reckon with. (shrink)

Long neglected as a focus of linguistic research, evaluation in its various guises is now being recognized as a crucial aspect of any study of discourse. In this book, writers coming from different standpoints are brought together, providing a unique profile of the topic from several perspectives. These perspectives include: Systemic Linguistics, Narrative, Corpus Linguistics, and Discourse Analysis.

In this collection of essays Béatrice Longuenesse considers the three aspects of Kant's philosophy, his epistemology and metaphysics of nature, his moral philosophy and his aesthetic theory, under one unifying standpoint: Kant's conception of our capacity to form judgements. She argues that the elements which make up our cognitive access to the world - what Kant calls the 'human point of view' - have an equally important role to play in our moral evaluations and our aesthetic judgements. Her discussion (...) ranges over Kant's account of our representations of space and time, his conception of the logical forms of judgements, sufficient reason, causality, community, God, freedom, morality, and beauty in nature and art. Her book will appeal to all who are interested in Kant and his thought. (shrink)

In this dissertation I argue that naturalist epistemology would benefit if it were recognized to include feminist standpoint theory, a theory of knowledge that is based on the feminist critiques of science. Naturalists such as W. O. Quine argue that normative epistemology can be developed on the basis of science. However, they have mostly rested content with descriptions of how knowledge seems to work. Naturalists need to evaluate our epistemic practices against competing alternatives if they are to justify our (...) knowledge claims. For this reason, they can benefit from taking up the feminist challenges to science. The feminist critiques of science challenge the warrant of many scientific claims but also are based on science. Even feminist standpoint theory, which is usually associated with Marxism, can be viewed as a form of naturalist epistemology because of its reliance on these scientific studies, especially those by Dorothy Smith and Patricia Hill Collins. So naturalists would benefit from addressing the claims of feminist standpoint theorists. ;Characterizing feminist standpoint theory as a naturalist epistemology reveals how an apparent weakness of both feminist standpoint theory and naturalist epistemology is really a strength: it shows that attending to the way beliefs are developed can be epistemically advantageous. The normative claim of feminist standpoint theorists that people ought to involve feminists and feminist values in their inquiries builds on descriptions of how gender politics affects knowledge. Feminist standpoint theory builds on the observations that feminism encourages the generation of competing alternative points of view about knowledge that can challenge scientific knowledge claims. The generation of alternative perspectives facilitates testing. In this way feminist standpoint theory actually demonstrates how naturalism can be normative epistemology. Other feminists who advocate naturalism have described the operation of gender in cognition but they have not recognized the importance of feminism as a source of critique within science. In this way, feminist standpoint theory is a better exemplar of naturalism than any accounts of knowledge that have previously been identified as naturalist. (shrink)

In a famous debate between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, Popper accused Kuhn and Quine of propagating the “Myth of the Framework”: that some broad set of specific background commitments are required for interlocutors to be able to have a fruitful conversation. The Myth of the Framework could be used to argue for a beneficial version of the canon: that training in these shared background commitments allows for the growth of a robust community of inquiry. Popper argues, however, that the (...) position that truth or inquiry can be framework-dependent is a pernicious form of relativism, and undermines the possibility of rational inquiry. I subject Popper’s view to criticism, showing that it can be used to undermine “orthodoxy” and the canon in some ways, but that it props up the canon in others. In closing, the paper examines the connections between Popper’s position on the community of inquiry and standpoint epistemology, and argues for the claim that Popper’s view, to be persuasive, requires a more robust account of how critical inquiry relies on the evaluative capacities of rational agents within a community. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Evaluation of Implicit AnthropologiesJochen Fahrenberg (bio) and Marcus Cheetham (bio)Keywordsmind-body, philosophical assumptions, human natureThe three commentaries and the reviewer’s notes contain valuable reflections and expand on number of important points. There is general agreement that surprisingly little is known about psychologists’, psychotherapists’, clinicians’, and other professionals’ philosophical assumptions about human nature. It is conceivable that these implicit anthropologies represent a potential source of bias in research and practice (...) and that further research is therefore justified.Doctor Walach emphasizes the pluralism of world views, which is evident in the questionnaire response patterns. The findings contradict the assumption that monism, immanence, and a scientific worldview are predominant preconceptions. Instead, psychology students mostly favor ontological or methodological dualism, and con-firm that they have spiritual beliefs or indeed some belief in paranormal phenomena. From this, Dr. Walach extends his thought-provoking perspective to folk psychology, as opposed to mainstream psychology, and reflects on the influence of individual beliefs on scientific culture. It is especially from this perspective that the investigation of certain key concepts and belief systems should be given every encouragement.Doctors Wells and Rackley were particularly interested in the implicit anthropologies of clinicians. They are inclined to attribute individual differences in understanding and interaction with patients to “psychological” traits or to momentary experience rather than to philosophical beliefs. The latter view was supported by the majority of students in our investigation. With respect to psychotherapists and clinicians, our article contained only a short reference to the interviews conducted by Wider. The majority of the forty-two professionals taking part in this pilot study assumed that there may be such differential biases in their fields, but they conceded that the momentary clinical condition and pragmatic necessities would often override such biases. An empirical investigation to differentiate psychological, pragmatic–clinical, and philosophical factors and the associated bias would be an ambitious project; very careful interviews and perhaps participant observation would be necessary. But before undertaking such a study, further descriptive studies and the development of testable hypotheses are required.Doctor Brendel referred to the intricacies of the mind–body problem. We agree that many of the recent philosophical writings show nonreductive physicalism to be among the highly favored conceptions. (We do not know whether this discourse represents the majority opinion of philosophers, psychologists, clinicians, or even neuroscientists.) [End Page 213] The inclusion of this specific conception in the multiple-choice item list would require the inclusion of a specific vocabulary and some definitions that are controversial, even among the proponents of nonreductive physicalism. We decided to restrict the wide spectrum of concepts to five categories. Doctor Brendel goes on to voice explicit support for the conceptualization proposed by Horgan, who recommended a pragmatic approach and the use of double vocabularies. He suggests that context-related features in a given instance would suffice for selecting the most appropriate explanation. It is, however, conceivable that close examination of the decision process would reveal criteria containing or stemming from philosophical assumptions.Doctor Walach makes reference to the complementarity principle, which has a certain intellectual appeal when cross-category relationships are considered, and is not restricted to the domain of physics. Compared with a double-language dualism, the complementarity principle postulates that both frames of reference are fundamentally different in categories, exhaustive within their specific explanation scheme, but are essentially incomplete if, for example, brain and consciousness are viewed as a whole.Pertinent methodological aspects were already addressed in the article and endnote. However, the appropriateness of a questionnaire with which to assess philosophical standpoints will continue to be met with concern and require careful consideration. It is clear that there is no other practical method for gathering in a population like first-year students of psychology representative data about ontological beliefs, religious attitudes, or assumptions on human nature.Doctors Wells and Rackley noted discrepancies in the response to two items relating to spiritual existence after death and the cessation of consciousness with biological death. The two statements seem to be contradictory and the observed inconsistencies point to possible misunderstandings, response tendencies, context-dependent effects, or other shortcomings well-known in research using personality questionnaires. However, the assumed postmortal existence... (shrink)

In the recent debate on the nature of Kantian ‘content of cognition’, some scholars argue that Kantian judgments of taste bear a nonconceptual mental content because these judgments lack any conceptual determining functions of some kind. In this article, I challenge the latter standpoint for the very simple reason that judgments of taste are no propositions, but rather formative evaluations. This implies as well the fact that we are initially in possession of no aesthetic representation. Hence, neither propositionally nor (...) non-propositionally is an aesthetic representation eligible to be counted as mental content. Instead, as the representation of the beautiful just contents oneself with itself, it refers to its objects relationally, yet not representationally in the full-fledged sense. Regarding the properties of objects, it remains consequently always ineffectively monotonous. On the occasion of agreement of the relevant cognitive faculties, we may, however, count the representation of the beautiful as phenomenal content. -/- . (shrink)

In the second edition Preface of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant responds to an anonymous review of the first edition. We present the first English translation of this obscure book review. Following our translation, we summarize the reviewer's main points and evaluate the adequacy of Kant's replies to five criticisms, including two replies that Kant provides in footnotes added in the second edition. A key issue is the reviewer's claim that Religion adopts an implied standpoint, described (...) using transcendental terminology. Kant could have avoided much confusion surrounding Religion, had he taken this review more seriously. We therefore respond to three objections that Kant failed to address: how the Wille–Willkür distinction enables the propensity to evil to be viewed as coexisting with freedom of choice; how moral improvement is possible, even though the propensity to evil is necessary and universal; and how a ‘deed’ can be regarded as ‘noumenal’.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare ReasonVolume 18, Issue 1Stephen R. Palmquist and Steven Otterman DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000295Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare ReasonVolume 18, Issue 1Stephen R. Palmquist and Steven Otterman DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000295Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare ReasonVolume 18, Issue 1Stephen R. Palmquist and Steven Otterman DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000295Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

If we peruse the Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi) and the Nietzschean corpus, we will find numerous examples of evaluative statements. And yet, both Chuang Tzu and Nietzsche are well known for their critique of conventional value distinctions. Time and again they argue that our conventional value distinctions are invalid and sometimes even harmful. Are these two philosophers justified in making what appear to be self-negating claims? This essay offers a line of argument to justify their employment of evaluative language (...) while at the same time disclaiming its validity. My essential argument is that there are two levels of consciousness in both of these philosophers and that evaluative language is transcended at one of these levels but still possesses limited validity at the other. I assume, I believe correctly, that the purpose of philosophy for both philosophers is self-transformation. Given this functional direction of philosophizing, I divide the types of statements I will analyze into three standpoints: (1) “evaluative standpoint,” or statements which I take to be primarily evaluative in nature. “Class i” refers to the evaluative standpoint which is the standpoint not yet transcended and to be transcended; (2) “transevaluative standpoint”, or statements which I take to be primarily transevaluative in nature. “Class ii” refers to the transevaluative standpoint which is the standpoint to be achieved; (3) “transevaluative resultant values,” or statements which are primarily statements of the resultant value which are the product of a value free standpoint. “Class iii” refers to the resultant concrete values which are the product of following the transevaluative standpoint. My analyses lead to the conclusion that evaluative language is employed in its appropriate level of consciousness and transcended in the other level. In short, I propose that Chuang Tzu and Nietzsche can have their cake, and eat it, too. (shrink)

Revolution and industrialization meant for the patrician Burckhardt the end of Western civilization and the dehumanization of men and women. He upholds the idea of the historical unity of European culture as the core of historical consciousness while characterizing his own time as the breakdown of historical continuity in Western civilization by "anth ropo logi zing,"" structuralizing, "and "aestheticizing "history. He surpasses the age of revolution by having recourse to the suprahistorical nature of the human mind, using his historical topics (...) as paradigms of transhistoric potentialities of human life. The historian sits in untimelv contemplation of the creative forces of the human mind in history, recalling the importance of culture in a time of increasing loss of culture. In evaluating Burckhardt's postmodernist, apolitical attitude, we should not forget the historical experience which Europe and especially Germany have had with antimodern thought. (shrink)

With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of evidence controversy. The (...) worry, raised by Stathis Psillos, is that as constructivist accounts of science demoted the previously secure status of evidence for drawing justified conclusions in science, we were left with no rational delineation between the right and wrong values for science. The implication for the death of evidence controversy is that we may have no rational grounds for claiming that the Canadian Government is wrong to interfere with scientific enterprise. But he does offer another avenue for reaching the conclusion that the wrong social values are directing the current stifling of some sectors of Canadian science. Psillos draws from standpoint epistemologies to devise a salient defence of ‘valuing evidence’ as a universalizable social value. That is, government bodies ought to enable scientific research via adequate funding as well as political non-interference. In this paper, I counter that non-epistemic values can be rationally evaluated and that standpoint epistemology’s universalizable standpoint provides an inadequate framework for negotiating social values in science. Regarding, I draw from the evidence-based medicine debate in philosophy of medicine and from feminist empiricist investigations into the science–values relationship in order to make the argument for empirically driven value arbitration. If social values can be rationally chosen in the context of justification, then we can have grounds for charging the Canadian leadership with being ‘at war with science’. I further argue that my recommended empiricist methodology is preferable to Psillos’s search for universalizable perspectives for negotiating social values in science because the latter method permits little more than the trivial conclusion that evidence is valuable to science. (shrink)

Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention (...) in part because of your anticipation of regret in the further future if you were to give in to the temptation. It does this by appeal to the significance of anticipated future regret to the agent ’s present standpoint, and to the role of the agent ’s standpoint in her self-governance. (shrink)

The landscape of sport shows conspicuous discursive and material disparities between the responses to openly violent on-field transgressors and the responses to other kinds of transgressor, most notably drug users. The former gets off significantly lighter in terms of ideological framing and formal punishment. The latter—and drug users in particular—are typically demonised and heavily punished, whilst the former are regularly lionised, dramatised, celebrated and punished less severely. The preceding disparities cannot be upheld from the standpoint of morality in general (...) or from that of a Broad Internalist sport ethic. Consideration of the consequences, actions, motives and vices involved in the respective categories fails to support them. Nor is support provided by the notion that sports are tests of the physical skills and virtues that the obstacles presented are designed to foster and promote, and behaviour that threatens the opportunity to exercise those excellences or have competitions determined by them should be the subject of critical moral scrutiny. Openly violent on-field transgression does not fare at all well by the yardstick of Broad Internalism. Robust investigation of and ultimate change in the values underpinning the disparities is warranted. (shrink)

Havstad and Smith (2019) argue that Lakatos’ “methodology of scientific research programs” (MSRP) is a promising philosophical framework for explaining the perceived empirical success of the hypothesis that birds are maniraptoran theropod dinosaurs, and the perceived empirical failures or stagnation of alternatives to that hypothesis. These conclusions are rejected: Havstad and Smith’s account of the alternative “research programs” inadequately characterizes criticism of the hypothesis that birds are maniraptoran theropods and they neither offer sufficient modifications to MSRP to correct its known (...) difficulties in deriving logically or empirically satisfactory criteria for the assessment and preferential selection of “research programs” from historiographical data, nor proposals to mitigate its tendency to promote confirmation bias and dogmatism. Independent flight loss, an important problem in systematic ornithology with implications for the origin of birds, provides a supplementary demonstration of how the application of MSRP in the present context would tend systematically to mislead investigations of the evolutionary history of birds by promoting an uncritical perspective. Given these difficulties, MSRP is an unacceptable philosophical framework for evaluating alternative hypotheses for the origin of birds. (shrink)

Although political values guide people who take advice from standpoint epistemolo-gies in deciding whether to reveal secrets used to resist oppression, these decisions can also be understood and evaluated in purely cognitive or epistemological terms. When political considerations direct us to preserve a secret, the cognitive value progressively diminishes because the view of the world projected by the secret is increasingly vulnerable.

Japanese philosopher and literary critic, Kōjin Karatani, introduces a ‘third position’ that seeks to correct the limitations of post-modern thought and the problems of global capitalism. By restoring Kant’s ‘transcendental’ as the methodological basis for capturing the structural interstice between different theoretical positions, Karatani’s ‘third position’ allows for a re-introduction of Marxism in addressing the circulation of the capital-nation-state trifecta and its relationship to ideological superstructures operating within a closed discursive space. Many years earlier, Nishida Kitarō, the father of the (...) Kyoto School, had also developed a ‘third position,’ except that this standpoint seeks to overcome the cultural-philosophical logics of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ thought. As Nishida claims, Western epistemologies cannot be converted into universal standpoints because they fail to make visible the conditions that both precede and structure contradictory categories. In this paper, I will discuss and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Nishida’s and Karatani’s standpoint of the ‘third.’. (shrink)

The category-theoretic representation of quantum event structures provides a canonical setting for confronting the fundamental problem of truth valua- tion in quantum mechanics as exemplified, in particular, by Kochen-Specker’s theorem. In the present study, this is realized on the basis of the existence of a categorical adjunction between the category of sheaves of variable local Boolean frames, constituting a topos, and the category of quantum event al- gebras. We show explicitly that the latter category is equipped with an object of (...) truth values, or classifying object, which constitutes the appropriate tool for assigning truth values to propositions describing the behavior of quantum systems. Effectively, this category-theoretic representation scheme circumvents consistently the semantic ambiguity with respect to truth valuation that is in- herent in conventional quantum mechanics by inducing an objective contextual account of truth in the quantum domain of discourse. The philosophical im- plications of the resulting account are analyzed. We argue that it subscribes neither to a pragmatic instrumental nor to a relative notion of truth. Such an account essentially denies that there can be a universal context of reference or an Archimedean standpoint from which to evaluate logically the totality of facts of nature. In this light, the transcendence condition of the usual concep- tion of correspondence truth is superseded by a reflective-like transcendental reasoning of the proposed account of truth that is suitable to the quantum domain of discourse. (shrink)

The book is divided into four sections, and contains two central arguments. The goal of the first argument is to show that generally accepted concepts in moral theory have an irreducibly second-personal character and that it is impossible to fully understand many central moral ideas without it. Here, by evaluating a broad range of literature in moral theory and articulating the second-personal aspect of each, Darwall elaborates on the interpersonal nature of moral obligation. The detailed discussion presents some well-known moral (...) theories, and while emphasizing the Deontological perspective, highlights the second-personal character of all moral theories; a perspective that has, in the past, gone unnoticed. However, as Darwall himself acknowledges, the first argument cannot vindicate the very ideas it analyzes. He thus dedicates the second part of the book to a reverse-strategy: instead of arguing for the existence of a second-person foundation in moral theory, Darwall sets out to show that the presuppositions of the second-person standpoint include the moral law in them. In this second argument, Darwall explains that the second-personal standing can only be justified within a circle of four interrelated ideas (claim, accountability, second-personal reason, and second-personal authority), and that this circle necessarily excludes instances of coercion. (shrink)

Although political values guide people who take advice from standpoint epistemolo-gies in deciding whether to reveal secrets used to resist oppression, these decisions can also be understood and evaluated in purely cognitive or epistemological terms. When political considerations direct us to preserve a secret, the cognitive value progressively diminishes because the view of the world projected by the secret is increasingly vulnerable.

Rutherford and Lindell (2011) review an extensive literature on lateralization of emotion. As they note, an important issue surrounding this question is the nature of emotion, which bears on what, precisely, is lateralized. The present comments are intended to broaden the context of the review, by considering lateralization from the standpoint of a bivariate model of evaluative processes and a neuroevolutionary perspective.

In this article, the theory of argumentation set out by the Dutch scholars Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst is brought to bear in subjecting the general form of the argument from coherence to a critical analysis. First, a distinction is brought out between two basic kinds of argument from coherence: in one use this argumentative structure occurs as a sequence of two arguments establishing that a standpoint constitutes a particular instantiation or a inherent quality of the system it (...) will become part of (symptomatic argument); in the other use we have a main symptomatic argument supported by a subordinate argument appealing to instrumental considerations (pragmatic argument). It is then claimed that arguments from coherence are complex types of argumentation, structured at various argumentative levels, where the premises must be taken together to yield an adequate defence of the conclusion (coordinative argumentation). Finally, an evaluative assessment is made as to whether arguments from coherence can serve acceptably as tools for settling disputes: it will be maintained that we can generally welcome these argumentative structures as sound and fully acceptable provided we are aware of the interpretive discretion their use entails. (shrink)

: Although political values guide people who take advice from standpoint epistemologies in deciding whether to reveal secrets used to resist oppression, these decisions can also be understood and evaluated in purely cognitive or epistemological terms. When political considerations direct us to preserve a secret, the cognitive value progressively diminishes because the view of the world projected by the secret is increasingly vulnerable.

Environmental Philosophy: A Revaluation of Cosmopolitan Ethics from an Ecocentric Standpoint calls for a new approach to ethics. Starting from the necessity for all life of air, water, and food, the book revalues the relation of ethics and environmentalism. Using insights of the environmental ethicists, environmental ethics becomes the model for ethics as a whole. Humans are part of a larger environment. Cosmopolitanism should be revised in accord with environmental ethics. The book applies a new theory of values to (...) the relation of value and obligation, and of duty, rights and virtue, to accord with ecocentrism. The book also critically evaluates Utilitarianism and the self interest theory. Other chapters address population, species preservation and a practical program for environmental policy. (shrink)

Theories of identification explain which elements in our mental economy determine our authoritative standpoint and which elements are external. My evaluative theory explains this special authority by considering the holistic pattern of emotional evaluations and evaluative judgments without excluding Jaworska's so-called "marginal cases".

Normative pragmatics can bridge the differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories in a way that saves the central insights of both. Normative pragmatics calls attention to how the manifest strategic design of a message produces interpretive effects and interactional consequences. Argumentative analysis of messages should begin with the manifest persuasive rationale they communicate. But not all persuasive inducements should be treated as arguments. Arguments express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one (...) another. Normative pragmatics provides a framework within which varieties of propositional inference and pragmatic force may be kept straight. Normative pragmatics conceptualizes argumentative effectiveness in a way that integrates notions of rhetorical strategy and rhetorical situation with dialectical norms and procedures for reasonable deliberation. Strategic effectiveness should be seen in terms of maximizing the chances that claims and arguments will be reasonably evaluated, whether or not they are accepted. Procedural rationality should be seen in terms of adjustment to the demands of concrete circumstances. Two types of adjustment are illustrated: rhetorical strategies for framing the conditions for dialectical deliberation and rhetorical strategies for making do with limitations to dialectical deliberation. (shrink)

Company–cause fit has been one of the major issues in the domain of corporate social responsibility. This study tries to expand the perspective from company–cause to company–non-profit organization (NPO) fit, and it gives implications to firms looking for long-term collaboration with an NPO. Specifically, it suggests three types of fit, i.e., familiarity, business, and activity fit and investigates the potential effects of these fits in social alliances between companies and the partnering NPOs on consumer attributions of the firms’ motives for (...) the alliances. An experiment that used scenarios revealed that consumers perceive high-fitted alliances on the dimensions of the familiarity and activity fit as being more public-serving than low-matched ones. However, the consumers’ attribution of the motive is not different between the high and low business fit. The implications of the research results are discussed from an academic and practical standpoint. (shrink)

This article is a methodological discussion of formal approaches to the question of identity of proofs from a philosophical standpoint. First, an introduction to the question of identity of proofs itself is given, followed by a brief reconstruction of the so-called normalisation thesis, proposed by Dag Prawitz in 1971, in which some of its core mathematical and conceptual traits are presented. After that, a comparison between the normalisation thesis and the more well-known Church-Turing thesis on computability is carried out (...) in three main parts: the first dedicated to highlighting some of the analogies between them; the second, their most remarkable differences; and the third, to the possible relations of dependence between the two. Based on these considerations, some concluding remarks concerning the potential of the normalisation thesis and similar approaches to the question of identity of proofs are made in the last section. (shrink)

Prior literature on ethical concerns in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has often concluded that many stakeholders, such as workers and communities, have unjustly suffered as a result of takeovers and associated defences and that their rights as stakeholders have been violated. However, very few papers provide any guidance on how to evaluate a merger or acquisition from an ethical standpoint. This study looks at how ethical frameworks could be used to assess the ethical impact of a merger or acquisition (...) and gives practical guidance. It is proposed that decision makers should consider the impact on four stakeholder groups: shareholders, employees, customers and directors. We call the proposed method for doing this Partial Utilitarian analysis. We suggest two possible ways of applying the Partial Utilitarian analysis. One approach could rely on the evidence from a sample of recent deals. For this, empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of large M&As in the United Kingdom in the period 1993–2003. Alternatively, a better approach, requiring considerable management time, requires forecasting of the economic impact on the four groups of stakeholders. The paper shows how to do this. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Fairtrade certification system represents an illuminating example of the challenge of systematically determining consumer and entrepreneurial responsibilities in our global age. In taking up the central question of what, if anything, may be called ‘just’ or ‘fair’ in Fairtrade, I more precisely argue for a two-fold thesis: that a meaningful evaluation of Fairtrade must consider both an interactional and an institutional understanding of global responsibilities to promote justice and that Fairtrade can be better defended against (...) several popular objections from the perspective of a theory that adequately differentiates between interactional responsibilities and institutional responsibilities of promoting justice under unjust circumstances. (shrink)

Prior literature on ethical concerns in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has often concluded that many stakeholders, such as workers and communities, have unjustly suffered as a result of takeovers and associated defences and that their rights as stakeholders have been violated. However, very few papers provide any guidance on how to evaluate a merger or acquisition from an ethical standpoint. This study looks at how ethical frameworks could be used to assess the ethical impact of a merger or acquisition (...) and gives practical guidance. It is proposed that decision makers should consider the impact on four stakeholder groups: shareholders, employees, customers and directors. We call the proposed method for doing this Partial Utilitarian analysis. We suggest two possible ways of applying the Partial Utilitarian analysis. One approach could rely on the evidence from a sample of recent deals. For this, empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of large M&As in the United Kingdom in the period 1993–2003. Alternatively, a better approach, requiring considerable management time, requires forecasting of the economic impact on the four groups of stakeholders. The paper shows how to do this. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Fairtrade certification system represents an illuminating example of the challenge of systematically determining consumer and entrepreneurial responsibilities in our global age. In taking up the central question of what, if anything, may be called ‘just’ or ‘fair’ in Fairtrade, I more precisely argue for a two-fold thesis: that a meaningful evaluation of Fairtrade must consider both an interactional and an institutional understanding of global responsibilities to promote justice and that Fairtrade can be better defended against (...) several popular objections from the perspective of a theory that adequately differentiates between interactional responsibilities and institutional responsibilities of promoting justice under unjust circumstances. (shrink)

This article is an ethical evaluation of the SENS bio-engineering program of Aubrey de Grey. After a general introduction, section 2 is a refutation of the claim that not to cure aging is immoral. It analyses the conceptual identification made by de Grey between “aging” and “disease.” This identification has important moral implications. It is argued that from a physiological standpoint the identification makes sense but from an evolutionary point of view it is highly questionable. Section 3 is a (...) refutation of the answer given by transhumanists to objections concerning the desirability of physical immortality. It is argued that the objections have not been adequately answered. (shrink)

In Germany the question whether to uphold or repeal the judicial prohibition on Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis is being debated from quite different standpoints. This paper differentiates the major arguments according to their reasons as a) moral, b) evaluative , and c) legal. The arguments for and against PGD can be divided by content into three groups: arguments relating to the status of the embryo, focusing on individual actions in the implementation of PGD, and relating to the foreseeable or probable (...) consequences of PGD.In Germany, from a legal perspective, the status of the embryo does not permit the intervention of PGD; from a purely moral perspective, a prohibition on PGD does not appear defensible. It remains an open question, however, whether the moral argument permitting PGD should be restricted for evaluative reasons. The paper discusses the species-ethical reasons, for which Jürgen Habermas sees worrisome consequences in the wake of PGD to the extent that we comprehend it as the forerunner of a ‘positive eugenics’. It would so disrupt the natural preconditions of our universal morality. The question of whether to prohibit or allow PGD is not merely a question of simple moral and/or legal arguments, but demands a choice between evaluative, moral and species-ethical arguments, and the question remains open. (shrink)

For philosophers who would think “with” religion, rather than simply to theorize “about” it, the question of the relationship between religious imagination and philosophical rationality is a matter of constitutive importance. The way we answer this question would have far reaching implications for how we understand the work we do as philosophers who take religion seriously, and how we situate ourselves within broader academic contexts. Indeed, the answer to such a question –insofar as we can give any sort of definitive (...) answer to it –would convey us to the core of what it means for us to “philosophically” appropriate religious and theological materials. We could do worse, I think, than to phrase the question in these terms: do religious imaginaries –representations, narratives, gestures, sacraments, etc. –anticipate a pure, conceptual reflexivity, or do they represent the impossibility of such a standpoint? This question is not only constitutive for philosophical reflection on religion. It is of a more general, formal relevance as well; it effectively raises the additional question as to whether the limits of conceptuality can themselves be conceptually articulated or whether they must be representationally displayed in such a way as to lead thought, obliquely, to an encounter or an experience of its limits. We can distill the question further: does philosophy comprehend religion, or does religion serve to mark the limits of what can be conceptually expressed by philosophy? Is religion the scene of the concept’s satisfaction? Its infinite longing? Or its transcendental frustration? (shrink)

The central question of this thesis is how one can learn about particular targets by using models of those targets. A widespread assumption is that models have to be representative models in order to foster knowledge about targets. Thus the thesis begins by examining the concept of representation from an epistemic point of view and supports an account of representation that does not distinguish between representation simpliciter and adequate representation. Representation, understood in the sense of a representative model, is regarded (...) as a success term. That is, a representative model is one relatum in a relation of adequate representation (Chapter 2). When a representative model represents a target, it allows users of this model to learn something about the target. It is argued that a representative model has this epistemic function because it shares relevant features with the target. This presupposes a similarity view of representation. Similarity views of representation face serious objections, which will be rebutted (Chapter 3). One way of spelling out a similarity view of representation is to defend an indirect view of representation. In this thesis, which does not argue for an indirect view, it is assumed that the indirect view is a good option, if not the best, for articulating the similarity view. It is demonstrated how such an indirect view can be expanded to account for cases of technological modeling. A case study in bioengineering is used to show that the indirect view of representation must acknowledge a distinction between two directions of fit in relations between vehicles and targets. In this context the notion of design is interpreted as a relation between a vehicle and a target, thereby connecting ideas from philosophy of science with ideas from philosophy of technology (Chapter 4). Fictionalist accounts of models are intended to tackle the issue of the ontology of models. In this thesis, however, two prominent fictionalist accounts are discussed from an epistemological point of view in light of the central question regarding how one can learn about targets by using models. This question is addressed from the standpoint of Waltonian fictionalism. The result of the discussion is that the two discussed Waltonian fictionalist accounts cannot sufficiently answer the question. These accounts are criticized for their inability to deliver a satisfactory epistemology of representation (Chapter 5). Although Waltonian fictionalism is criticized, the present thesis also shows that the foundational theory of Waltonian fictionalism, the theory of make-believe can nevertheless be used to account for the distinction between projections and predictions that is made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Chapter 6). (shrink)

The writings of the later Mohists are generally taken to contain several updates to the consequentialist ethical view held by the Mohist school. In this paper, I defend one interpretation of those updates and how they may have served, within the Mohists’ argumentative context, to make their views more defensible. I argue that we should reject A.C. Graham’s prominent interpretation, on which the later Mohists’ argumentative strategy is to develop a conception of the a priori and to ground their ethical (...) view in a form of a priori rationalism. I contend, instead, that the strength of the later Mohists’ ethical view comes largely from their adoption of a subjective criterion for identifying what counts as a benefit within their consequentialist view. I show how the adoption of this subjective criterion fits within a larger trend in later Mohist thought of coming to terms with the diversity of people’s evaluative standpoints, and further show how it equips the later Mohists with worthwhile responses to their philosophical rivals. (shrink)

In this paper we distinguish two competing conceptions of dignity, one recognizably Hobbesian and one recognizably Kantian. We provide a formal model of how decision-makers committed to these conceptions of dignity might reason when engaged in an economic transaction that is not inherently insulting, but in which it is possible for the dignity of the agent to be called into question. This is a modified version of the ultimatum game. We then use this model to illustrate ways in which the (...) Kantian evaluative standpoint enjoys a kind of internal stability that the Hobbesian framework lacks. Our interpersonal argument shows that, under certain conditions, Hobbesians prefer to cultivate Kantian commitments in others and promote the presence of Kantians in the population. Our intrapersonal argument shows that agents who are conflicted between Kantian and Hobbesian commitments have powerful reasons not to resolve this commitment in favour of Hobbesian values. Our emulation argument illustrates that in repeated versions of the ultimatum game, the Hobbesian chooses to behave like a Kantian, including publicly repudiating her Hobbesian commitments. Here again, however, the Hobbesian is able to achieve a desired benefit only on the condition that there are genuine Kantians in the population. Finally, our social planning argument explores the reasons why a community of Hobbesians would opt to enshrine a Kantian conception of dignity into law. The paper concludes with some remarks about the policy implications of this work. The value or worth of a man is, as for all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another... The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. Hobbes, _Leviathan X_, 16. (shrink)

I examine Bernard Williams’s forceful challenge that evolutionary science has done away with the sort of teleological worldview that is needed in order to make sense of an Aristotelian virtue ethic perspective. I also consider Rosalind Hursthouse’s response to Williams and argue that it is not sufficient. My main task is to show what is needed in order to meet Williams’s challenge. First, I argue that we need a deeper exploration of the first-personal evaluative standpoint from within our (...) human form of life than we find in Hursthouse’s ethical naturalist perspective. In particular, we need to recognize the important role of “strong evaluation” for identifying what is noblest and best about us as human beings, for this will enable us to address the “mixed bag” problem of human nature. Second, I argue—contra John McDowell’s quietism—that in order to make sense of such a normative account of human nature we must overcome Williams’s tragic cosmic outlook according to which human life is seen as ultimately without meaning and purpose. (shrink)

Using Ian McEwan's 2007 novel On Chesil Beach as a case study, this paper seeks to enhance opportunities for dialogue between researchers in the cognitive sciences and scholars of story. More specifically, now that narrative alternatives to theories of mind have begun to shape debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, it is time to flesh out those alternatives by highlighting the action-modelling capacity built into the structure of stories. Narrative practices like McEwan's demonstrate how stories can be (...) used to configure and reconfigure characters'behaviour from different temporal, spatial, and evaluative standpoints, in the way that a complex molecule or architectural structure can be displayed and manipulated in virtual space with the help of an advanced computer graphics program. In turn, interpreting narrative as a system for building models of action underscores the relevance of narratology for the philosophy of mind -- and vice versa. (shrink)

In this article I seek to show the importance of spirituality for a neo-Aristotelian account of ‘the good life’. First, I lay out my account of spirituality. Second, I discuss why the issue of the place of spirituality in the good life has often either been ignored or explicitly excluded from consideration by neo-Aristotelians. I suggest that a lot turns on how one understands the ‘ethical naturalism’ to which neo-Aristotelians are committed. Finally, I argue that through a deeper exploration of (...) the evaluative standpoint from within our human form of life as ‘meaning-seeking animals’ we can come to better appreciate the importance of spirituality for human beings throughout recorded history up to the present and why we can be described as homo religiosus. (shrink)

One of Bratman’s aims in Planning, Time, and Self-Governance is to develop his insights regarding planning to shed light on temptation. I focus on the main case of temptation Bratman appeals to in supporting his conclusion that it can be rational for an agent facing temptation to stick to her prior plan even if she finds herself with an evaluative judgment that favors deviating. Bratman’s reasoning is meant to be consistent with the priority of present evaluation, and to be (...) sensitive to Smart’s insight that, as Bratman puts it, ‘inference from the advantages of the general habit [of non-reconsideration] directly to a specific conclusion about what to do on the present occasion, once the question of what to do on the present occasion is raised, is fraught.’ My reasoning suggests that, interpreted in one way, the case Bratman uses to make his argument is not clearly a case of giving in to temptation (or else not a case that requires the sort of novel contribution Bratman thinks is needed); and interpreted otherwise, the case does not raise exactly the challenges Bratman suggests it does, and the challenges it does raise are not directly addressed by the solution Bratman provides. (shrink)

Coherence is a term of art in both epistemology and literary criticism, and in both contexts judgments of coherence carry evaluative significance. However, whereas the epistemic use of the term picks out a property of belief sets, the literary use can pick out properties of various elements of a literary work, including its plot, characters, and style. For this reason, some have claimed that literary critics are not concerned with the same concept of coherence as epistemologists. In this article (...) I argue against this claim. Although various nonepistemic notions of coherence figure in literary criticism, the epistemic concept has a mirror image in the literary–critical concept of thematic coherence. Moreover, evidence from literary criticism suggests that thematic coherence can be valuable from a literary-evaluative standpoint because it can be valuable from an epistemic standpoint, in particular by enhancing the credibility of a work's themes or author. My analysis of the notion of thematic coherence thus provides novel support for literary cognitivism, the view that a work's literary-aesthetic merits can depend on its epistemic merits. (shrink)

The moral value of Religion could be doubtful from an utilitarian evaluative standpoint. J. S. Mill analysis about that question in Utility of Religion is well-known.However Hume's similar study in his Enquiry Concerning the Principies of Morals is not known in the same degree. There Hume writes that we consider something a virtue when (1) it is useful to others; (2) it is useful to the subject himself; (3) it is immediately agreeable to others; or ( 4) it (...) is immediately agreeable to the person himself. But, if everything which is useful or agreeable must be considered a virtue, onthe contrary everything useless or disagreeable must be a vice. That is the case with Cristian, monkish, or religious virtues, or «vices»?, in general terms. (shrink)

Garssen and van Laar in effect concede our main criticism of the pragma-dialectical approach. The criticism is that the conclusions of arguments can be ‘P-D reasonable’ yet patently unreasonable, epistemically speaking. The concession consists in the claim that the theory “remains restricted to the investigation of standpoints in the light of particular sets of starting points” which are “up to individual disputants to create” and the admission that all the relevant terms of normative appraisal have been redefined. We also discuss (...) their criticisms of the epistemic account of argumentation and argument evaluation and raise some new questions about the approach they defend. (shrink)

An adequate evaluation of argumentation requires identification of the object to which the argumentation pertains: the point of view. What are the distinguishing features of this object? In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the object of argumentation is referred to by means of the notion ‘standpoint’. In other theories concerned with argumentation, reasoning, convincing or persuading, notions are used such as ‘thesis’, ‘conclusion’, ‘opinion’ and ‘attitude’. This paper is a survey of the characterisations of the object of argumentation given in (...) the various theories. It discusses the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, socio-psychological research on persuasion, cognitive research on reasoning, argumentative discourse analysis, two variants of informal logic, advocacy and debate, and the theory of communicative action. Next, it explores some relations between the notions used in these theories. Finally, it outlines some starting points for further research into the problems of identification. (shrink)

The paper introduces what is deemed as the general epistemological problem of measurement: what characterizes measurement with respect to generic evaluation? It also analyzes the fundamental positions that have been maintained about this issue, thus presenting some sketches for a conceptual history of measurement. This characterization, in which three distinct standpoints are recognized, corresponding to a metaphysical, an anti-metaphysical, and relativistic period, allows us to introduce and briefly discuss some general issues on the current epistemological status of measurement science.

This paper explores the role of deliberation in the context of the capability approach to human well-being from the standpoint of the individual doing the reflecting. The concept of a ‘strong evaluator’ is used develop a concept of the agent of capability. The role of values is discussed in the process of deliberating, particularly the nature of and difference between prudential values and intrinsic values. Some consideration is given to the limits and constraints on deliberation and finally a brief (...) example of deliberation is considered—that of occupational choice. (shrink)