Hate speech is one of the most important conceptual categories in anti‐oppression politics today; a great deal of energy and political will is devoted to identifying, characterizing, contesting, and penalizing hate speech. However, despite the increasing inclusion of gender identity as a socially salient trait, antipatriarchal politics has largely been absent within this body of scholarship. Figuring out how to properly situate patriarchy‐enforcing speech within the category of hate speech is therefore an important politico‐philosophical project. My aim in this (...) article is twofold: first, I argue that sexist speech, though oppressive, is not hate speech. Second, I argue that misogynistic speech is hate speech, even when it is intradivisional. This is important because recognizing that the concepthate speechapplies to certain forms of patriarchy‐enforcing speech is another step in clarifying what is wrong with the practice, and how bad it is in relation to other abuses. Consequently, this article provides a more nuanced account of the kinds of expressions that can and should count as instances of hate speech. (shrink)

In the past three decades a number of narrative self-concepts have appeared in the philosophical literature. A central question posed in recent literature concerns the embodiment of the narrative self. Though one of the best-known narrative self-concepts is a non-embodied one, namely Dennett’s self as ‘a center of narrative gravity’, others argue that the narrative self should include a role for embodiment. Several arguments have been made in support of the latter claim, but these can (...) be summarized in two main points. Firstly, a logical one: without taking the body into account Dennett’s theory becomes self-refuting. Secondly, a more practical/phenomenological point: a disembodied self-concept overlooks how personal the body is, and as such should be considered part of the self. In this paper I endorse these criticisms of non-embodied narrative self-concepts, but I argue that the relationship between the narrative self and the body is far from sufficiently fleshed out. I claim that the narrative self and the body are much more interwoven than the above criticisms suggest. What I aim to show in this paper is that the relationship between the body and the narrative self is interactive rather than unidirectional: not only does our body shape our narrative self, but our narrative self also shapes our body. The upshot of this is a better conception of the self is as a dynamic interaction between its various aspects. (shrink)

Socialism grew up in opposition to capitalism, just as liberalism developed in reaction to feudalism. Both liberalism and socialism combined potent critiques of the existing socio‐economic order with blueprints for a desirable future society. However, liberalism provides a rather more coherent body of thought than does socialism, and its theories are linked with the emergence of a dominant system combining capitalism and liberal democracy. By contrast, no widespread socio‐economic order has as yet emerged which can be confidently or closely (...) associated with the ideas of socialism. In both cases the relationship between theories and actual systems is a contestable one, but it has been particularly problematic in the history of socialism. (shrink)

근대 이후 다양한 철학적 흐름에서 자아에 대한 객관주의적 입장은 비판을 계속 받아왔다. 최근에는 객관주의적 자아 대신 새로운 대안으로 떠오르는 개념이 ‘변화적 자아’ 또는 ‘과정적 자아(self-in-process)’이다. 우리의 자아는 고정된 본질을 가진 실체가 아니라 역사적 우연성들 의 영향을 받으며 진화하는 자아이다. 스스로의 행위에 의해 변형되며, 따라서 경험을 통해 드러 나고 경험에 의해 변형되는 자아이다. 변화적 자아에서는 의식 대신에 ‘몸’이 중심축이다. 몸이 라는 것은 단순히 뇌와 신체를 가리키는 것은 아니며, 그것은 생리학적 심리학적 현상일 뿐만 아니라, 사유, 느낌, 욕구의 역동적 복합성이다. 이 글은 (...) 몸적 자아에 근거하여 중국 고대 철학자인 순자의 수신(修身) 개념을 분석하고자 한다. 본 논문에서는 구체적으로 세 가지 질문에 초점을 맞추고자 한다. 첫째, 순자가 왜 의례의 장 (場)으로서 몸에 집중했는가? 둘째, 인간은 몸을 통해서 어떻게 자아를 형성하고 표현하는가? 셋째, 자아는 어떻게 성장하는가? 순자가 의례의 장으로서 몸짓에 주목한 이유는 인간의 몸이 언표화되지 않는 그 이상의 것, 즉 인간의 내면의 상태를 전달할 수 있다고 믿었기 때문이다. 인간의 몸짓은 다른 의사소통 수 단보다 훨씬 더 근원적이고 직접적인 기호이다. 그리고 우리는 의례 습득을 통해 단순히 어떤 사회에서 올바르다고 승인되는 몸짓을 습득하는 데에서 그치는 것이 아니라 우리의 자아를 형 성한다. 의례 과정에서 존대와 처신의 기제를 통해 나의 자아를 표현하고 상대방의 자아를 대우 한다. 개인의 자아는 상호작용 의례를 행하는 과정에서 형성되고 실현된다. 또한 순자는 『순자』 ｢권학(勸學)｣에서 수신의 단계로 법(法)-> 류(類)-> 예(禮) 또는 통류(統類)의 과정을 제시한다. 이것은 개인이 수신을 통해 차이성-> 유사성-> 통일성의 세계로 나아가는 과정을 묘사한 것이다. 다시 말하면 수신이라는 것은 자신만의 고유한 방식을 통해 자아 정체성을 형성하는 것이기도 하지만, 동시에 개별 존재 간의 유사성, 더 나아가 통일성을 깨닫는 길이기도 하다. 그리고 이 것은 인간됨의 길이기도 하다. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates Jonathan Lowe's arguments for his non-Cartesian substance dualism. Sections 1 and 2 set out the principal claims of NCSD. The unity argument proposed in Lowe is discussed in Section 3. Throughout his career Lowe offered spirited attacks on reductionism about the self. Section 4 evaluates the anti-reductionist argument that Lowe offers in Subjects of Experience, an argument based on the individuation of mental events. Lowe offers an inventive proposal that the semantic distinction between direct and (...) indirect reference delineates the metaphysical boundary between self and world, and uses this as a further argument against reductionism about the self. This proposal is discussed in Sections 5 and 6. (shrink)

In keeping with recent views of consciousness of self as represented in the body in action, empirical studies are reviewed that demonstrate a bottlenose dolphin’s conscious awareness of its own body and body parts, implying a representational “body image” system. Additional work reviewed demonstrates an advanced capability of dolphins for motor imitation of self-produced behaviors and of behaviors of others, including imitation of human actions, supporting hypotheses that dolphins have a sense of agency and (...) ownership of their actions and may implicitly attribute those levels of self-awareness to others. Possibly, a mirror-neuron system, or its functional equivalent to that described in monkeys and humans, may mediate both self-awareness and awareness of others. (shrink)

Table of Contents Acknowledgments 1 Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction by Naomi Eiland, Anthony Marcel and José Luis Bermúdez 2 The Body Image and Self-Consciousness by John Campbell 3 Infants’ Understanding of People and Things: From Body Imitation to Folk Psychology by Andrew N. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore 4 Persons, Animals, and Bodies by Paul F. Snowdon 5 An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Self by George Butterworth 6 Objectivity, Causality, (...) and Agency by Thomas Baldwin 7 At Two with Nature: Agency and the Development of Self-World Dualism by James Russell 8 Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View by José Luis Bermúdez 9 Proprioception and the Body Image by Brian O’Shaughnessy 10 Awareness of One’s Own Body: An Attentional Theory of Its Nature, Development, and Brain Basis by Marcel Kinsbourne 11 Body Schema and Intentionality by Shaun Gallagher 12 Living without Touch and Peripheral Information about Body Position and Movement: Studies with Deafferented Subjects by Jonathan Cole and Jacques Paillard 13 Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership by M. G. F. Martin 14 Bodily Awareness and the Self by Bill Brewer 15 Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription by Quassim Cassam 16 Consciousness and the Self by Naomi Eilan Contributors Index. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the media's framing of non-mainstream body modification as a social problem. I demonstrate, through an analysis of a sample of 35 newspaper articles on body modification, that a mutilation discourse is one of the dominant frames of meaning used to make sense of body modifiers in the mainstream media. This framing, which effects the pathologization of body modifiers, utilizes the claims making of mental-health experts and relies on a gendered account (...) of body modification as a social problem. While news accounts are a medium for presenting body modification to a large `community of speakers', I find that they have precluded the legitimacy of the claims of subcultural actors. I argue from a poststructuralist perspective that body modifiers' `claims from the underside' are subjugated by accounts that problematize body modification through the dominant discourse of the mental-health model. I suggest that this frame is problematic for its silencing of `underside' or marginal embodied knowledges, which include, for example, alternative accounts of female embodiment. (shrink)

In this incisive study of the biological and cultural origins of the human self, the author challenges readers to re-think ideas about the self and consciousness as being exclusive to humans. In their place, he expounds a metatheoretical approach to the self as a purposeful system of extended cognition common to animal life: the invisible medium maintaining mind, body and environment as an integrated 'field of being'. Supported by recent research in evolutionary and developmental studies together (...) with related discoveries in animal behavior and the neurosciences, the author examines the factors that have shaped the evolution of the animal self across widely different species and times, through to the modern, technologically enmeshed human self; the differences between which are presented as relations of degree rather than absolute differences. Much like our primitive ancestors, he contends, routine human behaviour is governed more by unconscious instinct than self-conscious rationality, and is generally resistant to any major changes in customary habits of life, until compelled in time to do so. However, in extreme and rapidly evolving circumstances, as with climate change, tardy responses may become so detached from reality as to constitute an actual threat to survival. (shrink)

in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez, The Body and the Self, 29-42.

A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by (...) these predicates, with the result that the physical properties that determine the person's mental states will belong to the person and not to the human animal. (shrink)

Common practices such as donating blood or selling hair assume rights of disposal over oneself that are similar to, if not indistinguishable from, property rights. However, a simple view of self‐ownership fails to capture relevant moral differences between parts of a person and other objects. In light of this, we require some account of the continuity in the form of ownership rights a person has over herself and other objects, which also acknowledges the normative differences between constitutive parts of (...) a person, on the one hand, and external objects, on the other. This paper provides such an account by arguing that there are reasons internal to a general justification of property rights to limit the extent of powers included in ownership of different kinds of object, depending on how the person is situated in relation to them. Rejecting a typical Hohfeldian view of property as a univocal, gradable concept allows us to make space for a new approach to property and self‐ownership: one which can make sense of various uses of the body as property without entailing that our relation to those parts is exhaustively characterised by an ordinary property right. (shrink)

The inheritance of dualism from Plato to Descartes, and since, has impoverished the human relation with nature, the world, other humans, and other species. The division of soul and body, and its counterpart of mind and body, gave us a world from which we believe ourselves to be separate from and superior to other species. This self-othering standpoint has had devastating consequences socially, politically, economically, and ecologically. This essay seeks to identify some resources in the Western tradition (...) in phenomenology and pragmatism that avoid this standpoint and bring them into conversation with some primary insights of Buddhist philosophy: interdependent arising, the not-self, and interbeing. By doing so, it is not only suggested that comparative conversations are not only useful in their own right, but they add dimensions to our experience in the world. Moreover, they offer avenues for living enriched lives in concert with the world without engaging in self-deceptive mental and comforting psychological activities of who and what we really are. (shrink)

[Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by these predicates, (...) with the result that the physical properties that determine the person's mental states will belong to the person and not to the human animal. /// [Galen Strawson] What are the grounds of self-consciousness? I consider 29 proposals and reject 22, including a number of proposals that experience of body is necessary for self-consciousness. A popular strategy in debates of this sort is to argue that one cannot be said to have some concept C unless one has a need or a use for C given the character of one's experience considered independently of the character that it has given that one possesses C. I suggest that such arguments are invalid. (shrink)

We will argue that Sartre’s failure and Beauvoir’s success in formulating a successful existential ethics lie in their distinct understandings of transcendence. Sartre’s struggle between transcendent consciousness and immanent body undermines being-in-the-world and being-with-others (what is, in Sartre’s language, only a being-for-others) as a way to enrich the self. Contra Sartre, Beauvoir’s notion of transcendence is an upsurge of being which originates in and necessitates bodily immanence. For Beauvoir, transcendence is to be gained only by revelling in immanence, (...) a gesture that puts oneself at risk toward the Other. This putting oneself at risk is, however, the only way to generate an authentic and no longer conflictual encounter with the Other. (shrink)

Se ofrece una posible lectura de la trascendencia levinasiana desde el fenómeno de la responsabilidad, lectura que no es posible desde la lógica de la libertad, sino en cuanto que trascendencia del retorno sin partir de ninguna parte. Esto exige aceptar que la sensibilidad es el punto cero de la situación, con lo que se pone de manifiesto que el hombre, antes de trascender y responder, está encarnado. Por lo tanto, la corporalidad del cuerpo es el hecho desde el cual (...) un sujeto responsable es posible. The article offers a possible reading of transcendence in Levinas from the perspective of the phenomenon of responsibility, a reading that is only possible from the logic of freedom as the transcendence of returning without having ever left. This entails accepting that sensibility is the ground zero of the situation, which makes evident that human beings are embodied before transcending and responding. Therefore, the body's corporality is the fact that makes possible a responsible subject. Neste artigo, oferece-se uma possível leitura da transcendência levinasiana a partir do fenómeno da responsabilidade, leitura que não é possível sob a lógica da liberdade, mas sim enquanto transcendência do retorno sem partir de nenhum lugar. Isso exige aceitar que a sensibilidade é o ponto de partida da situação, com o que se manifesta que o homem, antes de transcender e responder, está encarnado. Portanto, a corporalidade do corpo é o fato do qual um sujeito responsável é possível. (shrink)

Chinese philosophy has long recognized the importance of the body and emotions in extensive and diverse self-cultivation traditions. Philosophical debates about the relationship between mind and body are often described in terms of mind-body dualism and its opposite, monism or some kind of "holism." Monist or holist views agree on the unity of mind and body, but with much debate about what kind, whereas mind-body dualists take body and mind to be metaphysically distinct (...) entities. The question is important for several reasons. Several humanistic and scientific disciplines recognize embodiment as an important dimension of the human condition. One version, the problem of mind-body dualism, is central to the history of both philosophy and religion. Some account of relations between body and mind, spirit or soul is also central to any understanding of the self. Recent work in cognitive and neuroscience underscores the importance of our somatic experience for how we think and feel. (shrink)

In this article, I re-examine political subjectivity by way of looking at the canonical text of Chinese Daoist philosophy – Zhuangzi. I trace the course of how the body is conceived in Zhuangzi and discuss its relation with the unmaking of personhood. I then look into ways in which the body–self nexus in Zhuangzi gives rise to new conceptualization of political relations. I argue that, in Zhuangzi, the body is conceived as spontaneous and dispossessed. The (...) class='Hi'>body as such foregrounds the condition for unsettling subjectivity. In staging ambivalent subjectivities, Zhuangzi describes a mode of politics where political relations thrive on indeterminacy and uncertainty. I submit that the authors of Zhuangzi propose a depoliticizing approach to politics whereby ‘effortless action’ replaces established processes in reinventing new relations and subjects. (shrink)

Recent cases involving biosamples taken from indigenous tribes and newborn babies reveal the emptiness of informed consent. This venerable doctrine often functions as a charade, a collective fiction which thinly masks the uncomfortable fact that the subjects of human research are not actually afforded full information regarding the types of research that may be contemplated, nor do they provide meaningful consent. But if informed consent fails to provide adequate protection to the donors of biological materials, why not turn to principles (...) of property law? Property is power, yet current law permits everyone except for those who donate biological materials to possess property rights. The reluctance to invoke property probably stems from fears of resurrecting slavery and the commodification of human beings. But ironically, avoidance of property transforms the subjects of human research into objects that can be owned only by others, resulting in new forms of oppression and exploitation. Human research subjects are autonomous individuals who should not only possess the power to contribute their biological materials, but also the right to help control the course of research, and to share in the resulting benefits or profits. Conferring body property might enable research subjects to regain power and a measure of self-sovereignty. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reason as an Organ of the Body The Body as the Instrument of Reason The Paradox of Aesthetic Concepts Hatred of the Body The Meaning of the Body The Living Body and its Ego An “Unknown Wise Man” between Body and Ego.

Proceedings of 2 international conferences held at the University of Mainz and at Fudan University/Shanghai.

This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. (...) In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds. (shrink)

몸의 기억은 일종의 암묵적 기억으로서 삶의 과정동안 형성된 지각습관과 운동 감각, 상황과 공간 경험 그리고 다른 사람과의 신체적 상호 작용을 통해 형성된 행위구조 속에 침전되어 평생 개인의 삶에 영향을 미친다. 그래서 몸의 기억은 언제나 삶의 세계에 뿌리를 두고 있으며, 개인이 살아온 삶의 역사가 담긴 자기 정체성의 근원이 되는 것이다. 따라서 개인의 인격의 지속성은 주체가 스스로 기술한 자기 서사에서 확인되는 것이 아니라, 암묵적으로 침전된 개인의 역사가 현재화되는 몸의 기억에서 근본적으로 확인되는 것이다. 그래서 몸의 기억은 우리가 항상 되돌아가는 전반성적인 자기 신뢰의 지점이며 (...) 자기정체성의 기반이 되는 것이다. 이러한 몸의 기억에 대한 현상학적 이해는 특히 치매를 앓고 있는 환자에게 세상에 대한 신뢰와 자기 자신에 대한 안정감을 되찾을 수 있는 돌봄의 방향을 제시해 줄 수 있다. 또한 뇌졸중 환자의 회복 체험에 대한 해석학적 현상학적 연구들은 몸의 회복이란 삶의 환경과 엮여 있는 생활습관, 가치관, 관심 등이 통합적으로 육화된 몸의 기억을 회복하는 데 있음을 보여준다. 따라서 몸의 기억에 대한 현상학적 이해는 뇌졸중환자, 치매환자에서 뿐만이 아니라 몸의 회복을 목표로 하는 다양한 의료 실천현장에서 신체적 자기 정체성의 회복을 위한 돌봄의 실천 방향을 제시해준다고 여겨진다. (shrink)